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Foreword by Prof. Reimar Lüst
Chairman of the ESA History Project Advisory Committee
There is no doubt that Europe’s history of excellence in space is one of the most visible achievements
of European co-operation in science and technology which started some thirty five years ago. Today
the European Space Agency, which brings together the resources and expertise of 14 nations, has
achieved a high profile in many sectors of space activity, in particular in space science and launchers
and is a strong partner in global space co-operation.
Not only should ESA staff and those working in industry and national institutions feel proud of what
has been accomplished, but also future scientists and engineers of Europe should know about and be
inspired by Europe’s current achievements in space.
As someone who accompanied Europe’s journey into space from the beginning until a few years ago, I
know that progress in an institution such as ESA is never easy and success is impossible without co-
operation. It is a lengthy and complicated process of persuasion to assemble the right package of
programmes which has a reasonable chance of acceptance by the Member States. As with most major
European technological ventures, the space programme requires a delicate equilibrium between the
political, technical, and industrial interests of the various partners.
For anyone approaching the history of European space activities, the present volume will not only
provide valuable insights into this turbulent but exciting period of the first ten years of European co-
operation in space, but also be important for those who create the future of ESA.
I am convinced that Europe possesses all the resources and talents necessary to move forward in the
exciting adventure of space and that ESA should be supported and strengthened as the centre of
European space policy.
Finally, I would like to take this opportunity of offering my personal thanks to my friends and
colleagues on the Advisory Committee who have contributed their expertise and dedication to the
activities of the panel in guiding the ESA History Project.
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Foreword by Mr Antonio Rodotà
ESA Director General
Among the institutions in the family of science organisations in Europe, the European Space Agency
stands out as a shining example that international co-operation in science and technology can work.
Building on the lessons learned from ESRO and ELDO, ESA has become an outstandingly successful
model of European scientific and technical collaboration. Its contribution to the development of a
collective European space capability has been fundamental. The Agency has played an important role
not only in space but also in uniting Europe.
This success has resulted first of all from a sustained political will on the part of our respective
governments and a long, productive partnership between the governments, ESA, industry and the user
communities.
This study traces the history of the European collaborative space programme from the beginnings in
the late 1950s to the creation of a single space agency in the early 1970s up to the recent developments
in the light of its main actors and policies. It provides valuable insights into the complex decision
making processes in a unique multinational organisation which often involves a delicate balancing act
between the various interests of its Member States.
After some thirty five years of remarkable achievement in the advancement of cooperation in space,
ESA now integrates a wide range of activities, from basic scientific research to advanced technology
and applications, to launchers and Europe’s contribution to the International Space Station.
European co-operation in space provides a living history of science and engineering, of patient steps
forward, of some setbacks and remarkable achievements. The story of the laborious but ultimately
successful effort is thus not only of interest and importance to the Agency itself, but also to all those
concerned with the managing of large co-operative scientific programmes in science and technology in
general.
The philosopher George Santayana exhorts us to remember that “those who do not learn the lessons of
history will be forced to repeat them”. I am convinced that the history of the development of a joint
and distinct European capability conveyed in this book, can teach us some lessons about the leadership
and vision that were needed to plan and implement a co-ordinated European space effort, in order to
cope better with the challenges that lie ahead.
I warmly recommend this book to anyone with an interest in the birth and development of the
European space programme and look forward to the second volume.
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Foreword by K.-E. Reuter
Head of the Director General’s Cabinet, ESA
The space age is relatively young and has not as yet, therefore, been the subject of extensive historical
research. This is true above all for Europe, the old continent, as it did not participate in the space race
of the 1960s. The European Space Agency, which has co-ordinated and implemented the exploration
of space in Europe for more than 30 years, thus responded with great interest to an initiative by three
professional historians of science to write an independent, academic history of ESA and its
predecessor organisations ESRO and ELDO. Following a first contact in 1989, a feasibility study was
conducted in the first half of 1990, the encouraging results of which were decisive for ESA giving full
support to the history project.
The success of the project was supported by the fact that following the suggestions made in the
feasibility study, the ESA History Project has been based on three cornerstones:
• Firstly, the research efforts of three professional, independent historians of science. Dr John Krige,
who had already for some years headed the History of CERN Project, agreed to direct the project.
Professors Arturo Russo and Michelangelo de Maria from the Universities of Palermo and Rome,
respectively, were appointed project scientists and contributed substantially to the project. The
latter left the project for personal reasons in 1993. His tasks were taken over by Dr Lorenza
Sebesta of the University of Bologna.
• Secondly, the hosting of the project at an independent academic institution. Since the historical
archives of ESA were set up in 1989 at the European University Institute in Florence, this
institution appeared to be the best place for hosting the ESA History Project and to install Dr
Krige as a scientist at the EUI. The Principal of the Institute agreed to this proposal and to jointly
supervise the project with ESA. After five years the contractual co-operation with the EUI was
terminated and the Project leader, Dr John Krige, moved to Paris where he became Director of the
“Centre de Recherche en Histoire des Sciences et des Techniques” at the Cité des Sciences et de
l’Industrie.
• Finally, the establishment of an Advisory Committee to monitor the progress of the research work
and to advise ESA on administrative and academic aspects of the project. This Committee consists
of a number of ESA pioneers (Michel Bignier, Peter Creola, George Van Reeth) and outstanding
European professional historians (Prof. Paolo Galluzzi, Florence, Prof. Guido Gambetta, Bologna,
Prof. Svante Lindqvist, Stockholm, Dominique Pestre, Paris, Dr Walter Rathjen, Munich). The
chairmanship of the Advisory Committee was entrusted to Prof. Reimar Lüst, the Agency’s former
Director General, who has been actively involved in the European space activities since their very
beginning and helped to inspire the History Project.
The ESA History Project which I have been overseeing as the ESA project manager since the initiation
of the feasibility study in 1990, has produced an impressive output, including more than twenty self-
standing reports in the ESA-HSR series, many presentations, seminars, and publications in the
specialised literature, and now as the final product two large volumes summarising the history of
European co-operation in space between 1960 and 1987.
But besides this rich production the thorough and scientific approach of the team of historians has also
led to the rediscovery of many hidden facets of the European space effort that may otherwise have
been forgotten forever.
xiv
It is therefore that I would like to pay a particular tribute to the historians John Krige, Arturo Russo
and Lorenza Sebesta for their unceasing efforts that made this project such a fascinating experience.
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Authors’ Preface
This is the first of two volumes dealing with the history of the European Space Agency (ESA) and its
predecessors, the European Space Research Organisation (ESRO), and the European Launcher
Development Organisation (ELDO). It covers the period from the birth of ESRO and ELDO, in the
early 1960s, up to 1973. In that year the decision was taken to bring ESRO and ELDO together in a
new organisation (ESA) and the programmatic basis for the new agency was laid with the adoption of
the so-called Second Package Deal. This arrangement, and the First Package Deal of 1971, allowed for
a mandatory scientific programme to be supplemented by optional applications programmes in various
fields, as well as two major undertakings, the Ariane launcher and Spacelab, a scientific laboratory to
be carried on board NASA’s Space Shuttle.
The detailed evolution of these programmes is not discussed here. They are taken up in Volume II,
which concludes the history of ESA up to 1987. An epilogue schematically describes the re-
orientation in the Agency’s priorities in the decade thereafter.
These two books derive from the work of a team of professional historians, much of which has already
been circulated in the ESA HSR (History Study Report) series. These volumes are not simply a collage
of published texts however; unnecessary repetition and overlap have been avoided. New material not
published before has been added. Together they thus constitute a major description and analysis of the
broad lines of over 30 years of the space activities collectively undertaken by European governments
through ESRO, ELDO and ESA.
The results presented here are essentially based on the excellent ESRO, ELDO and ESA archives
housed at the Historical Archives of the European Community at the European University Institute in
Florence (Italy). By concentrating on this vast collection of documents, freely available for scholarly
research, we have been able to develop in detail the decision- making processes at the
intergovernmental level which underpinned the formulation and evolution of the programmes in
ESRO, ELDO and ESA. For more recent documents (from 1983 onwards), the authors have been
granted access to the archives at the Agency’s Headquarters in Paris.
Useful papers related to the history of Europe in space have also been consulted at the Public Record
Office in Kew (London), at the US National Archives (Washington DC) and at the NASA History
Office (at NASA Headquarters in Washington DC). Other important sources were the papers of Italian
physicist Edoardo Amaldi at the University of Rome “La Sapienza”, and of former NASA
Administrator Thomas Paine (also in Washington, DC).
The main source we have used has provided documentary material which is fundamental to an
understanding of the dynamics of European space policy. But it does not tell the whole story. The
results of the scientific programmes, the evolution of the application programmes and of the user
communities and their institutions (PTTs, meteorological services, as well as bodies like Eumetsat,
Inmarsat, etc.), the internal decision making processes within different national bureaucracies, all of
these remain to be studied in depth.
Much work is still to be done then. These volumes are presented primarily as an essential resource and
reference work, the foundation stones for additional studies of the collaborative European space effort.
The authors owe an immense debt of gratitude to the European Space Agency, which promoted and
supported this history for almost a decade, to those responsible for its archive at the European
University Institute in Florence, to participants in the story itself, many of whom we interviewed in the
course of this study, and to countless members of the European space community and colleagues who
read our texts in draft and made valuable comments on them. Even if this will inevitably be seen as an
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official history of ESA it has to be stressed that at no time has the access of the historians to archival
material been impeded, nor have they been asked to suppress any material in their reports. Their
academic freedom has been fully respected and the authors are entirely responsible for their findings
and the interpretations they put on them.
The support, encouragement and help of some people deserve special mention. First and foremost,
Professor Reimar Lüst, who promoted this project when he was ESA’s Director General, and who has
watched over it with fatherly care for almost ten years in his capacity as Chairman of the ESA History
Advisory Committee. Then the ESA Director-General’s Head of Cabinet, Mr Karl Reuter who, in
consultation and collaboration with the ESA History Advisory Committee, has ensured the continued
good functioning of the venture and helped to bring it to fruition.
Sound historical scholarship requires rich and accessible archives. The material possibility of this
project has rested on the determined efforts of Gabriel Lafferranderie, ESA Legal Adviser, and of Eva
Vermeer who put the archival programme on a solid basis. They could count on the support and
collaboration of the head of the archive in Florence, Jean Marie Palayret, and of Gherardo Bonini, the
archivist who was made directly responsible for the collection. We are also pleased to acknowledge
the help of Dr Roger Launius of the NASA History Office in Washington D.C. Our debt to them, and
that of the scholars who will follow us in this exciting field of research, is immense.
*   *   *
A few words need to be said about the organisation of the book. After a brief introduction, which
sketches quickly the background to the collaborative European space effort, the volume is divided into
five main parts. The first two deal respectively with the launch of ESRO and ELDO, which were both
officially established in 1964. Part III deals with ESRO’s scientific programme and part IV deals with
the rise of a telecommunications satellite programme, also undertaken under the auspices of ESRO.
The fifth and last part describes the tortuous process to establish a European space programme, a
process which was bedevilled by deep disagreements over launcher policy, and which terminated with
the so-called First and Second Package Deals adopted in 1971 and 1973. Included in part V are also
two chapters dealing with the politics of US-European relations in space, which culminated in a major
collaborative venture, the post-Apollo programme.
The way we have cut our material imposes an artificial logic on it, and separates out different threads
which were, in practice, intimately interwoven with one another. Experience has taught us that it is
simply impossible to build a chronologically linear narrative of this period. If we had divided our
documents predominantly by date rather than by theme the tale we have to tell would have been
unintelligible. The reader will hopefully thus forgive us for repeating in different sections some
elements of debates which took place in key meetings. We have chosen to leave each part of the book
as a unified whole in the interests of internal coherence, rather than making a fetish of avoiding minor
repetition between sections.
The secondary literature on space history is vast, notably as regards the United States. We barely
scratch its surface in these volumes. This is mostly because so little has, in fact, been written on the
European space effort. These volumes not only fill that gap in the literature. They are precursors to
more reflective and comparative studies in which we plan to contextualise our results and to relate
them to other research in the field.
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Abbreviations and Acronyms
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ARPA Advanced Research Projects Agency (USA)
ATT American Telephone and Telegraph
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ESA European Space Agency
ESC European Space Conference
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ESLAB European Space Research Laboratory
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ESRIN European Space Research Institute
ESRO European Space Research Organisation
ESTEC European Space Research and Technology Centre
ESTRACK European Space Tracking and Telemetry Network
EUI European University Institute
EXOSAT European X ray Observatory Satellite
FIAT Fabbrica Italiana Automobili Torino
FPP Fundamental Physics Panel (ESRO)
xviii
GEERS Groupe d'Etudes Européen pour la Recherche Spatiale
GEOS Geostationary (Scentific) Satellite
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1Introduction:
The Beginning of the Space Age
J. Krige & A. Russo
I.1 Prophets, pioneers and generals: from science-fiction to the V-2 missile
For centuries people have fantasised about exploring space. Such fantasies were doomed to remain
unfulfilled, however, until rockets had been developed with sufficient thrust to escape the pull of the
Earth's gravitational field. This was the problem that was tackled, theoretically at first, by pioneers like
Konstantin Tsiolkovsky (1857-1935) in Russia, Hermann Oberth (1894-1989) in Germany and by
Robert Goddard (1882-1945) in the United States. Many of these early rocketeers were inspired by the
science fiction they had read when young: books like Jules Verne's De la Terre à la Lune (1865) and
Autour de la Lune (1870), H.G. Wells' War of the Worlds (1898) and The First Men in the Moon
(1901), and Edgar Rice Burroughs' series of novels in Martian settings published on the eve of World
War I.
A mathematics teacher in the provincial town of Kaluga, about 150 km from the capital, Tsiolkovsky
started thinking of spaceflight at the turn of the century, out of his early work on aerodynamics. He
recognised that rocket propulsion could be used for driving a craft in the empty space beyond the
Earth's atmosphere and envisaged using fuels similar to kerosene or, for better performance, liquid
oxygen and liquid hydrogen. Tsiolkovsky published his ideas in a few articles before World War I, but
his work remained almost unknown until the mid-1920s.
Oberth was also a mathematics teacher. He had studied in Munich and Heidelberg but then had
returned to his hometown in Romania, where he taught in the local Gymnasium. After World War I,
Oberth developed a strong fascination with rockets and, like Tsiolkovsky, he recognised that by
burning modern liquid fuels, such as gasoline and liquid oxygen, a rocket could achieve performance
far surpassing that of any solid fuel based on gunpowder and its derivatives which had been in vogue
until then. Drawing from science-fiction writers, Oberth argued that with a liquid fuel it was possible
to make a very large manned spaceship capable of reaching the moon or other planets. In 1923 he
published the results of his theoretical research on rocketry in a book, titled Die Rakete zu den
Planetenräumen (The Rocket into Planetary Space), in which he identified the necessary equipment
for sustaining people in an orbiting station used for astronomical observations and tele-
communications. Oberth's Rakete obtained great success among the public and inspired the famous
German filmmaker Fritz Lang, the author of the classic Metropolis (1926), to produce the science-
fiction movie Frau im Mond (The girl in the Moon), released in 1929.
The third prophet of spaceflight, the American physicist R. Goddard, gave a solid experimental reality
to the dreams of Tsiolkovsky and Oberth. Goddard published his early ideas in 1920, in a pamphlet
titled A Method for Reaching Extreme Altitudes, which reported on the first results of his experimental
programme supported by the Smithsonian Institution. Six years later, in March 1926, he launched the
world's first liquid-fuelled rocket from a test area located in a strawberry farm near Auburn,
Massachusetts. It flew a distance of only about 50 m, but it was followed by other successful tests that
helped to secure further support from the Smithsonian Institution and, more important, from the
Guggenheim Foundation. This support allowed Goddard to establish a serious programme in rocket
research in New Mexico and, in December 1930, an important success was achieved when a rocket
flew at a speed of 800 km/hr up to an altitude of about 650 m. In his next rounds of experiments,
Goddard introduced important new improvements such as cooling and gyroscopic guidance.
The work of these pioneers inspired the formation of a number of rocket societies in the 1920s and
1930s, small clubs of amateur enthusiasts dedicated to the cause of rocketry.1 These societies
1 Winter (1983). On the early history of rocketry see also Von Braun & Ordway (1969).
2performed a number of important functions. They publicised and legitimated spaceflight, giving
scientific credibility to an enterprise which had previously been seen as the domain of fiction writers
and cranks. Their members conducted a considerable amount of systematic research into rocketry,
often at great personal risk. And they served as training grounds for some of the most important rocket
engineers of this century, notably Wernher von Braun (1912-1977), a dominant figure in the post-war
American space programme, and Sergei Korolev (1906-1966), his Soviet 'counterpart'. The former
was an active member of the German Verein für Raumschiffahrt (Society for Space Travel), a group of
rocket enthusiasts created by Oberth which operated a test area near Berlin, called the Raketeflugplatz
(Rocket Airport). Korolev had joined in 1930 a new society of young rocketeers created in Moscow by
the Latvian engineer Friedrikh Tsander (1887-1933), the Group for Studying Reaction Propulsion
(GIRD).
The rocket societies did not have the resources or the institutional base to sustain a viable programme
of rocket research and development, let alone production. The military did, and did so, notably in the
Soviet Union and in Nazi Germany. In the former, important contributions were made to rocket
technology in the 1930s under military auspices both at Moscow GIRD and at the Gas Dynamics
Laboratory (GDL) in Leningrad. The latter had been created by Nikolai Tikhomirov (1859-1930) on
the grounds of the Sts Peter and Paul Fortress and it served as training ground for another important
Russian rocket engineer, Valentin Glushko (1908-1989). It was at the GDL that the famous Katyusha
rockets were developed in this period. This brilliant work suffered a serious setback in the Stalinist
purges of 1937-8. By this time there were probably well over 2000 rocketeers at work in the Soviet
Union. Many of them were killed, humiliated, or discouraged. Some of the key figures in the post-war
Soviet programme survived these purges, notably Korolev who spent the war years improving military
aircraft in a prison camp for technical experts. Soviet rocketry thus made few important advances
during World War II.2
The great interest of the military in rocket development in pre-war Germany sprung from a general
concern to rebuild the country's war fighting ability, coupled with the more specific fact that rockets
were not subject to the restrictions placed on German rearmament in the Treaty of Versailles. The first
military initiatives were taken in the late 1920s, stimulated by intense public interest and the active
publicity of the newly-formed Verein für Raumschiffahrt (VfR). In 1932 three senior members of the
German army visited the VfR's test facilities at the Raketenflugplatz. They were not impressed by the
progress made by the amateur society, but they discovered Wernher von Braun, who was barely 20
years old at the time. That same year von Braun became the first VfR member employed in the
German army's rocket programme, which was being conducted secretly at Kummersdorf, south of
Berlin. Five years later, with war clouds gathering over Europe, von Braun was appointed the
technical director of the rocket programme at the army's new, expanded premises established at
Peenemünde on the Baltic sea.3
One of von Braun's first tasks was to develop an operational version of his experimental rocket
Aggregat-2 or A-2, which had successfully flown in 1934. In 1942 he had what was wanted: in
October that year, his so-called A-4 rocket rose 80 km into the air, and fell to the ground 190 km
downrange. By this time there were almost 2000 scientists and engineers and 4000 other employees
working at Peenemünde on missiles for the German army. The A-4 was re-baptised the V-2
(Vergeltungswaffe 2, or Vengeance Weapon 2, apparently so named because it was thought to be the
weapon that would restore German pride after the humiliations imposed by the Treaty of Versailles).4
Mass production of the missile soon got under way. The factories were dispersed over Germany after
August 1943, when the Royal Air Force bombed Peenemünde, causing considerable loss of life but
little material damage. On 6 September 1944, the first V-2 fired from the Netherlands fell on the
outskirts of Paris. Two days later a V-2 missile hit Staveley Road, Chiswick, on the western fringes of
London, killing three people and injuring another 18. London and Antwerp where the main target of
2 Harford (1997).
3 Neufeld (1995). See also Ordway & Sharpe (1979).
4 Kennedy (1983).
3the major V-2 offensive launched by the Germans in the last few months of the war. Indeed about
6000 V-2's were constructed in Germany in 1944 and 1945. One factory alone, the Mittelwerk factory
in Nordhausen was allegedly producing almost 900 V-2s a month by 1945, using slave labour.
With the Red Army advancing on the eastern front, von Braun decided to evacuate Peenemünde early
in 1945. At the end of February he, along with over 500 of his best people and the Peenemünde
archives, began to move south in the hope of restarting activities at a new centre. This was not to be.
They found southern Germany in chaos. The archives were buried in a disused mineshaft. In April the
Americans captured the V-2 factory in Nordhausen, and immediately began shipping missiles back to
the United States. On 2 May 1945, von Braun, his brother, his close friend and confidant General
Walter Dornberger, and several other German rocket engineers surrendered to the Americans. A
special mission was hastily sent north to recover the Peenemünde files. The last convoy of V-2's left
Nordhausen for Antwerp and New Orleans under the nose of the Soviet troops on 31 May 1945.
Within a few months von Braun and about 120 of his best engineers had signed contracts with the US
Army Ordnance Corps. By the autumn of 1945 they were installed at Fort Bliss, near El Paso in Texas,
and at the White Sands Proving Grounds, about 80 miles north in New Mexico. About 60 of their
captured rockets were at their disposal. In 1950 the team was moved to the Army's new missile centre
at Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, Alabama.5
The Americans were not the only ones to benefit from Nazi rocketry, but they captured the richest
prizes. The Soviets certainly let the leading experts slip from their grasp, but they did round up about
200 of the rank and file engineers and technicians of the German V-2 programme, notably those with
experience in mass producing the missile, and one high-level manager, Helmut Grottrup. These were
taken, along with the entire V-2 factory at Nordhausen, back to the Soviet Union in 1946 and 1947.
With the knowledge and the technology that they already had, and with the injection of new ideas,
new people, and new resources from a defeated and depleted Germany, both of the Superpowers were
now poised to take major initiatives in the field of rocketry. A new era in missile development was
beginning, and with it the promise of ultimately exploring and exploiting space.
I.2 The legacy of war: ICBMs and IRBMs
Important progress in rocket technology had been realised in the US during the war years, which
received new impulse after von Braun's arrival. Goddard had joined a Navy rocket project in
Annapolis, where he made important technical improvements to his original liquid-fuel rocket
programme, as documented by more that 150 patents. Meanwhile, Theodore von Kármán, a professor
of aeronautics at the California Institute of Technology (Caltech), who had studied in Germany with
Ludwig Prandtl, had established an important school in applied aerodynamics which raised the interest
of the Air Corps. In 1940 he and his student Frank Malina developed mathematical techniques that
allowed significant progress in solid-fuel rocket technology. Out of this work, and thanks to military
support, two important institutions were set up in California before the war's end: the Jet Propulsion
Laboratory (JPL), a rocket research centre managed by Caltech, and Aerojet General, a company
devoted to battlefield missile production.6
Within days of surrendering in Germany, von Braun and his team had explained the possibilities
opened up by the development of rocketry to an admiring US technical mission. They spoke of
launching artificial Earth satellites, of manned space stations, and of interplanetary voyages. However,
any hopes that they might have had of actually developing the heavy launchers required for such
ventures were to be frustrated for almost a decade. In fact it was only in 1954 that top policy makers in
the United States seriously committed resources to the development of rockets which were powerful
enough to carry atomic warheads long distances and eventually to launch payloads into Earth-orbit.
This required the prior development of relatively lightweight "dry" nuclear weapons and the
5 Lasby (1971).
6 Koppes (1982).
4recognition that the bomber was not the only appropriate long-range weapons delivery system. It also
required the stimulus of "the Soviet threat".7
In August 1953, only a few months after the first American H-bomb test (November 1952), the Soviet
Union successfully tested a lightweight hydrogen bomb. The US responded by wiping the Bikini atoll
off the map with a more powerful device in March 1954 (Bravo test). On May Day that year, at the
usual military parade in Moscow, a brand new long-range jet bomber was showed, dubbed Bison by
NATO. The US long-standing superiority in strategic air forces was directly challenged. All this
suggested that intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles (IRBMs and ICBMs) should
be developed soon as delivery systems of nuclear weapons. In February 1954 a committee chaired by
the brilliant mathematician John von Neumann expressed "grave concern" about the United States'
comparative disadvantage in rocket technologies. By May 1954 that "grave concern" had become an
instruction to reorient and to accelerate the US Air Force's Atlas ICBM programme "to the maximum
extent that technological development will permit".8 The next year the USAF was authorised to build a
second generation ICBM, the Titan.
At the same time, several programmes to develop intermediate-range ballistic missiles were initiated.
The Army set von Braun and his team to work on developing a missile, later called Jupiter, which was
capable of delivering a one-ton payload over about 1600 miles (2600 km). The Air Force, not to be
outdone, won permission to develop the Thor, which was technically almost identical to its Army
rival. Both Jupiter and Thor flew successfully for the first time in 1957. Finally, the Navy, after briefly
collaborating on the Jupiter project with the Army, decided that it needed a solid-fuelled IRBM for its
submarines, rather than a liquid-fuelled missile like the Jupiter and Thor, and in 1956 it was
authorised to develop the Polaris. That same year, the Pentagon approved Air Force plans for
developing a solid-fuelled intercontinental rocket, lighter and cheaper than Atlas or Titan, that could
be launched within sixty seconds of an alert. Hence its name: the Minuteman. While becoming
obsolete as weapons, Atlas, Titan, Jupiter and Thor were an efficient and diversified family of
boosters for launching military and civil satellites. The foundations had thus been laid for American
military power in the decades ahead and for its entry into space.
What of developments behind the Iron Curtain in this period? Soviet Union policy makers believed it
was necessary for the country to develop intercontinental delivery systems almost immediately after
the war, before they even possessed the atomic bomb. An important installation for research and
development on missile technology, called NII-88, was established in the Moscow suburb of
Kaliningrad, with Korolev in charge of long-range missile designs. A major engine development
centre was established nearby in Khimki, under the direction of Valentin Glushko, who had headed a
wartime rocket programme. The German contingent was divided into two groups: one of them,
including Grottrup, went to NII-88, the other was installed on the island of Gorodomliya in a lake
some 250 km away. A test range was realised at Kapustin Yar, 130 km east of Stalingrad, where the
first V-2 was launched in October 1947.
Korolev, for his part, began upgrading V-2s. By 1949 he was supplying the Red Army with the R-2, a
modified version of the V-2 having a range of some 600 km, twice its German predecessor. In the
early 1950s, along with his colleague Valentin Glushko, he was developing ever more powerful, solid-
fuelled rocket engines, which were particularly requested by the military because of their better
capability for use on the battlefield. The first such missile, labelled R-11 in the USSR, was called Scud
by NATO military planners and it became sadly familiar during the Gulf War of 1991, when Iraq's
dictator Saddam Hussein authorised its firing against Israel.
7 Among the numerous works on the arms race between the two superpowers are Stares (1985), Zaloga
(1993), Holloway (1994), Rhodes (1995). Specifically devoted to the space race are McDougall (1985a)
and Heppenheimer (1997). For an outline of the Russian space effort see Harford (1997).
8 McDougall (1985a), p. 107.
5By 1952 Korolev and Glushko started designing the R-5, a IRBM with a range of 1200 km which flew
for the first time in march 1953. At the same time they succeeded in convincing the Soviet government
to support a major effort in ICBM development. The programme was approved in 1954 and the
envisaged missile was designated R-7 or, more familiarly, Semyorka (No. 7). It was designed to carry
a 5-ton warhead for 8,600 km and a new launch site was realised for it in the desert east of the Aral
sea, near the town of Tyuratan in Kazakhstan, later known as Baikonur. By mid-1957 the huge rocket
with its characteristic cluster of four strap-on boosters, was ready for flight. After two unsuccessful
attempts which ended in explosion soon after take-off, another R-7 rocket flew successfully on
21 August to a range of 6000 km, thus becoming the first ICBM to fly. A second successful flight
occurred a few weeks later, and Korolev was now authorised to modify the rocket in order to make it
capable of putting a satellite into orbit as soon as possible. This would be Sputnik 1.
In short, by following a very different policy on the development of ICBMs immediately after the war,
planning in the Soviet Union on the deployment of giant rockets was considerably ahead of that in the
USA in 1954. This 'lag' was one important reason why the Soviets were in space before the Americans
and maintained a lead in the space race for almost a decade.
I.3 The International Geophysical Year
In addition to developing rockets for delivering nuclear weapons, the idea of launching unmanned
spacecraft into orbits around the Earth was also suggested in the USA in the immediate post-war
period. As early as May 1946, a report by the Rand Corporation analysed the technical aspects of such
an undertaking and underlined the great value that such artificial satellites could have for scientific
research and national defence. The political and military implications of Earth satellites were again
discussed at length in another Rand report in 1950 which set the stage for the future American satellite
programme.
Strategic reconnaissance was the main objective of satellites from the military point of view. In March
1955, a few months before the first test flight of the Central Intelligence Agency's U-2 spy plane, the
Air Force requested industry to submit proposals for strategic reconnaissance satellite designated WS-
117L. This, however, posed a severe political problem, for a spacecraft overflying foreign territory and
gathering photographic data well beyond the range of retaliation risked being taken as an act of
aggression. A vigorous Soviet protest, in particular, was to be expected, with an appeal to international
law or even threats against neighbouring states housing American tracking stations. The idea of the
"freedom of space" had to be established world-wide before space activities could be undertaken
without becoming snarled up in the complexities of Cold War politics. The International Geophysical
Year (IGY), offered a solution to such a problem.
The IGY was originally proposed in 1950 as the Third International Polar Year, a follow up of two
Polar Years which had taken place in 1882 and 1932. The initiative was taken by a small group of
British and American scientists, notably Lloyd Berkner, head of the Brookhaven National Laboratory
and a 1932 Polar Year veteran; Sydney Chapman, a leading expert in atmospheric physics from
Oxford University; and James Van Allen, a physicist of the Applied Physics Laboratory at John
Hopkins University involved since 1947 in an high altitude research programme based on Aerojet's
Aerobee sounding rocket. The project was endorsed by the International Council of Scientific Unions
(ICSU) and, following a wider definition of its scientific objectives, it received the name of
International Geophysical Year. It would run for eighteen months, i.e. from 1 July 1957 to 31
December 1958, and one of its main scientific objectives was to gain basic information about upper
atmosphere phenomena during a period of maximum solar activity in 1957-58. In the event, it was an
important cooperative scientific venture supported by 66 nations. 9
9 Sullivan (1961).
6To organise the scientific activities of the IGY, the ICSU set up an international IGY committee
(CSAGI), with Chapman as president and Berkner as vice president. It is of relevance to our story
because it was at a meeting of this committee, held in Rome in October 1954, that the idea that
governments should try to launch artificial Earth satellites for scientific purposes during the
International Geophysical Year was suggested by the American delegates, and eventually endorsed by
the other participants. On 29 July 1955, the White House Press Secretary announced that the President
had agreed to the launch of "small, Earth-circling satellites" as part of the USA's contribution to the
IGY. Within a day or two the Kremlin announced that the USSR planned to do likewise.
The two Superpowers took very different policy decisions on satellite development. The Soviet Union
unhesitatingly decided to use a military launcher for the scientific mission envisaged in the IGY
framework, and started planning the use of the future R-7 ICBM to launch a heavy satellite. The
Americans reasoned differently. The Eisenhower administration wanted to stress the scientific image
of the venture, partly because they wanted to use their participation in the IGY to establish the
principle of freedom of space for civilian purposes before probing the Soviet's reaction to military
reconnaissance satellites. Their most advanced rocket under development was von Braun's Redstone, a
military IRBM evolved from the V-2 rocket and built by an army arsenal. By the addition of upper
stages, von Braun explained, the rocket (renamed Jupiter-C) would be able to put a small satellite into
orbit by mid-1957. The Administration chose instead the Naval Research Laboratory's Viking, a rocket
designed to probe the upper atmosphere for scientific purposes, plus an Aerojet-built upper stage
derived from the Aerobee rocket (Aerobee-Hi). This became Project Vanguard, and it was intended to
put the US's first satellite into space all while preserving its civilian image. It was a tactical choice for
which the Eisenhower administration was to pay heavily.
I.4 Sputnik, 'Kaputnik' and Explorer
On 4 October 1957 Moscow radio announced that the Soviet Union had successfully launched
Sputnik 1, "the first-in-the-world artificial satellite of the Earth". It was an aluminium sphere of 58 cm
diameter and weighing about 84 kg that circled the Earth once every 96.3 minutes on an elliptical orbit
with a perigee of 228 km an apogee of 947 km. Its two radio emitters sent its familiar "beep-beep"
sound into homes all over the world for 21 days. The scientific instruments on board the satellite
carried out the first measurements of atmospheric density and the first investigations into the
transmission of electromagnetic waves through the ionosphere.
The reaction, at least in certain American circles, bordered on the hysterical.10 A wave of
recriminations and self-criticism swept through the country, stimulated by the media. A myriad of
explanations were put forward for what Life magazine called "defeat for the United States": inter-
service rivalry between the various sections of the military leading to parallel rocket programmes,
under-funding of basic research and development, a philistine attitude towards 'egghead' scientists, an
educational system that was not turning out enough scientists and engineers, and a President who was
more interested in golf than in guiding the nation. Indeed the whole American way of life, with its
laisser-faire approach and its consumerism, was called into question. Perhaps "totalitarianism", with
its ability to mobilise resources and to direct them to a single objective, had some advantages after all.
Not all shared this view, of course. The head of the Strategic Air Command, General Curtis LeMay,
for one, was disparaging. Sputnik, he opined, was "just a hunk of iron". The President also played
down its importance, at least in public. Sputnik "does not raise my apprehensions, not one iota [...]
They have put one small ball into the air", he claimed in the aftermath of the Soviet announcement.11
The United States' satellite programme, Eisenhower argued, was intended to reap maximum scientific
benefits within the framework of the IGY. A small test satellite was to be launched in December, and a
fully-instrumented  satellite  was  planned  for  launching in March 1958  (hopefully on board an Atlas
10 McDougall (1985a), pp. 141-156. See also Bulkeley (1991). For the reaction in the UK see Krige (1997).
11 McDougall (1985a), pp. 145, 146.
7rocket). The United States, he told scientists a week later, was not intent on "competing with any other
nation for first place in a Sputnik race. [...] The serving of science, not a high score in an outer space
basket ball game has been and still is our country's goal".12
He was soon forced to revise his public stance. Early on the morning of 3 November Sputnik 2 was
successfully launched. This satellite, dedicated to the fortieth anniversary of the October revolution,
was more than six times heavier than Sputnik 1 (it weighed about 500 kg), and was placed in an orbit
almost twice as high as that of the first. What is more, it carried the first living being into space, the
dog Laika, who was wired up for medical and biological studies. Against this striking achievement,
the US Vanguard project, well known to the public, was due to launch a ten-kilogram satellite and was
not ready to fly yet. The metaphor of the country having suffered something like a new "Pearl
Harbour" became commonplace and "Catching up with the Russians" became something of a US
national slogan. Space had become a key domestic issue fuelled by the tensions of the Cold War.
The launch of Sputnik 2 led Eisenhower to increase the pressure on the Vanguard team, who were
instructed to bill the first scheduled test flight of their rocket as a full-blown attempt to orbit a satellite.
It also forced him to change his ideas about using von Braun's Redstone missile as a backup to
Vanguard. Indeed the President used the recovered nose cone of a Jupiter missile as a prop at a
televised press conference a few days after Sputnik 2 first orbited the Earth. 13 "This object here in my
office is an experimental missile. It has been hundreds of miles to outer space and back. Here it is,
completely intact". On the same day the Department of Defense gave the Army, who had the rocket,
and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, California, which was responsible for the associated
satellite, authority to prepare for launch as soon as possible.
The competition proved too strong for Vanguard. Early in December reporters from around the world
gathered at Cape Canaveral to witness America's reply to the Soviets. The launch had been prepared in
haste. The first stage had only been tested once a few weeks earlier and the second stage had never
flown at all. The satellite was nothing more than a small sphere weighing 1.5 kg with a diameter of
15 cm, barely larger than a grapefruit. After two days of suspense, the countdown finally reached zero
just before noon on 6 December 1957. Vanguard rose four feet off its pad, and slumped back to Earth
in a ball of thunder and flame. The press was unrelenting. Vanguard was Kaputnik and Flopnik in
London newspapers. "It seems there is a worm in the grapefruit", wrote the Paris-Journal, while the
Ottawa journal compared the rocket's "loss of thrust" to the loss of thrust that "the Western
democracies have been suffering from". Soviet delegates at the United Nations reputedly asked the
American counterparts if the US was interested in receiving foreign aid under Moscow's programme
of technical assistance to underdeveloped countries.14 The Navy desperately prepared for a second
launch, but too late. At the end of January the Army's "Missile 29" carrying the JPL's satellite was
prepared for launch under conditions of great secrecy at Cape Canaveral. The Jupiter-C rocket blasted
off successfully on 31 January 1958, and placed its Explorer 1 satellite into orbit. Explorer 1 was
essentially the last stage of a Jupiter-C rocket. It was cylindrical in shape, a little over 2 m high and 15
cm in diameter. It weighed just under 14 kg - one sixth the weight of Sputnik I - and was placed in an
elliptical orbit with a perigee of 356 km and an apogee of 2,548 km. The satellite carried two detectors
of micrometeorites and a Geiger counter for studying charged particles designed by Van Allen. This
experiment led to the discovery of the radiation belts around the Earth which were subsequently
named after him. On 17 March the Navy evened the score when the diminutive (1.5 kg) Vanguard 1
reached orbit. Later that month, it was followed by Von Braun's second satellite, Explorer 3. In May,
the Soviet Union launched the 1.3-ton Sputnik 3, a spacecraft full of scientific instruments. And
finally, in December, the Atlas rocket put into orbit the 100-kg SCORE satellite, carrying a
telecommunication equipment and a tape recorder with a Christmas message from Eisenhower which
was relayed to Earth: "Through the marvels of scientific advance, my voice is coming to you from a
satellite circling in outer space. My message is a simple one. Through this unique means, I convey to
12 On the metaphor, see McDougall (1985a), p 148
13 Ibid p 150.
14 Heppenheimer (1997), pp. 127-128.
8you and to all mankind America's wish for peace on Earth and good will towards men everywhere".15
The space race between the two Superpowers had definitely started.
I.5 The creation of NASA
In parallel with these developments, the Eisenhower administration began to think about the
appropriate institutional framework for America's space programme. The debate over how to do this
was intense and vociferous, and dominated by the question of the relationship between the civilian and
military aspects of space.16 As all existing satellite programmes were run by the military, the
Administration decided in January 1958 to create the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA)
within the Department of Defense. Its aim was to run US space programmes on an interim basis under
the authority of the Secretary of Defense. Subsequently, however, a growing consensus emerged that,
apart from reconnaissance satellites, the major goals of spaceflight in the near term were scientific and
political, and that a civilian space agency would best serve American interests by building the image
of an open, peaceful programme in contrast to Soviet secrecy. This opinion was supported in particular
by the newly-established President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC). The PSAC also
recommended that an existing agency, the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics (NACA) be
expanded and upgraded to take over all aspects of the American space programme except those having
direct military application (like reconnaissance satellites).
The NACA had been set up by the Federal Government during the first World War to supervise and
direct the study of the scientific and technical problems of aeronautics. It had a modest budget until
1940, which by 1945 had increased tenfold to about $ 40 million. One of the strengths of the
'Committee' was that it had some of the best in-house research facilities in the world. And while much
of its attention was directed to solving aeronautical problems, by the mid-1950s it also did a great deal
of advanced research and development in support of missile projects, much of it for aircraft
manufacturers and the Department of Defense. NACA also maintained close links with a segment of
the scientific community through a university research programme.17
On 5 March 1958 Eisenhower approved the recommendation that the leadership of the civil space
effort be lodged in a strengthened NACA, and one month late the National Aeronautics and Space Act
was submitted to the Congress. This was quickly signed into law and, on 1 October 1958, almost a
year to the day after Sputnik 1 was launched, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) came officially into being. It inherited NACA's vast organisation and facilities and a
workforce of some 8000 people. And it expanded rapidly, taking over all space activities currently
under way except those of strict military interest, mainly concentrated in the USAF programmes. In
December 1958, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena came under NASA's control. In May 1959
the key personnel in the Navy's Project Vanguard were transferred to a new facility at Greenbelt,
Maryland, later named the Goddard Space Flight Center in honour of the American rocket pioneer.
And in October 1959 the NASA space programme acquired the Army team at Huntsville, Alabama
under Wernher von Braun. The centre at Hunstville was renamed the George C. Marshall Space Flight
Center and von Braun was appointed its first Director. His specific task was to develop the heavy
launchers for the man-in-space programme, which was also under NASA's control. In fact, by the end
of 1960 NASA's staff had doubled to 16,000 and its annual expenditure was over $500 million, three
times that of NACA in 1958. On 25 May 1961, one month and half after the Russian cosmonaut Yuri
Gagarin had become the first human to orbit the Earth (12 April), the newly elected US president John
Kennedy announced in an extraordinary State of the Union message its plan for "landing a man on the
Moon and returning him safely to Earth" before the end of the decade.18
15 Heppenheimer (1997), p. 131.
16 McDougall (1985a), 157-176. See also Rosholt (1966).
17 Roland (1985); Anderson (1981).
18 Logsdon (1970).
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For both the United States and the Soviet Union, space was an important field of political and military
confrontation. By demonstrating the superiority of their respective space programmes, the White
House and the Kremlin wanted to show Third World countries the superiority of their ideology, the
efficiency of their political institutions, the capacity of their high technology industry, and the strength
of their armed forces. Nothing comparable to the American and Soviet efforts was of course possible
in Europe. However, some of the major European countries had considerable potential for entering the
space age in the late 1950s and did develop limited national space programmes. To conclude this
chapter we will quickly survey the situations prevailing in the United Kingdom, France, Italy and
(West) Germany in the 1960s. This will provide the national backdrop against which we begin to look,
in the next chapter, at the initiatives to have a collaborative European space effort.
The United Kingdom was the leading country in the space effort in Europe. The British worked on the
development of solid-fuel guided rockets during the war, and as early as October 1945 launched three
captured V-2s with the help of German specialists.19 In 1946 a Controlled Weapons Department was
established at the Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE) near Farnborough, and an agreement was
signed between the governments of the UK and Australia to establish a joint launching range at
Woomera in South Australia. In the decade that followed there were two important developments at
the RAE which are of relevance to our story. Firstly, a series of small rockets were developed which
were capable of carrying payloads of about 200 kg to heights of about 150 km. One of this series was
offered to scientists for research purposes in 1953. It was renamed the Skylark, and was an ideal
sounding rocket for upper atmosphere research. The Skylark was first tested at Woomera on
17 February 1957.
Secondly, in 1955, the UK, in collaboration with the USA, undertook the development of its own
IRBM, called Blue Streak, with a range of about 2500 km. This was intended both to maintain an
independent British deterrent and to complement American ICBMs with medium range missiles in the
European theatre. For several reasons, to be discussed later, the UK government decided to cancel the
military programme in 1960 and to recycle the rocket as the first stage of a civilian satellite launcher,
in collaboration with partners across the Channel if possible. Thus were the foundations laid of a
European organisation for launcher development which we will look at in more detail in chapter 3.
Another notable feature of the UK in this early period was the strength and organisation of its space
science community.20 In addition to a distinguished history in astronomy, which was continued with
the installation of giant radio-telescopes at Jodrell Bank in the 1950s, there was a long tradition of
ionospheric research initiated by E.V. Appleton in the 1920s. British space science was given a boost
by the availability of the Skylark, by an active participation in the International Geophysical Year, and
by close contacts with American colleagues. In December 1958, a British National Committee for
Space Research (BNCSR) was established. Its chairman was Harrie Massey and it had representatives
from a wide variety of government departments and scientific societies.
Within a few years, the first scientific payloads were in orbit. In March 1959 NASA had offered to
launch scientific equipment for scientists from other countries. Massey and his colleagues reacted
immediately and by 1960 a cooperative programme was agreed. It foresaw the launch of three
satellites with UK instruments on board at roughly yearly intervals. The first in the series, the 60 kg
Ariel 1, blasted off from Cape Canaveral atop a Thor-Delta rocket on 26 April 1962 and placed in an
orbit with a perigee of 389 km and an apogee of 1214 km. It carried out seven experiments built by
scientists from UK universities to investigate the Van Allen particle belt, the solar radiation and the
cosmic rays. A second Ariel satellite, weighing 68 kg and carrying three British experiments, was
launched on 27 March 1964 from Wallops Island, on the east coast of the USA, by a Scout rocket. The
19 Sharpe (1989), Becklake (1998).
20 Massey and Robins (1986).
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third of the series was built in the UK. It weighed about 90 kg and carried five experiments. It was
launched on 5 May 1967 from the Vandenberg base, in California, by a Scout rocket.
Second to Britain came France. Not all of the German rocketeers fled the war-ravaged continent. A
small group of about 40 settled in France in 1946-47 where they formed the nucleus of the first French
rocket teams.21 In 1949 the French government set up the Laboratoire de Recherches Ballistiques et
Aérodynamiques in Vernon, on the Seine north west of Paris, with the aim of developing ballistic
missiles for military use. Though its budget was initially rather small, it did develop one important
sounding rocket, Véronique, modelled on the German V-2. The first operational flight of Véronique
occurred in 1954 from the French military base at Hammaguir, in the Algerian desert. In 1957, the
French military Comité d'Action Scientifique de la Défense Nationale (CASDN) decided to fund the
construction of 15 improved Véronique rockets to carry out high-altitude atmospheric research in the
framework of the IGY.
Despite these achievements, the French effort tended to limp along until 1958, when it benefited from
the happy conjuncture of the launch of Sputniks and the arrival of General Charles de Gaulle in power.
De Gaulle's determination to develop an independent nuclear capability gave an enormous boost to
rocket/missile development in the framework of the government's strong support for scientific and
technological research. His initial wide-ranging programme included IRBMs, submarine launched
missiles and reconnaissance satellites. In 1959 the French government set up the SEREB (Société pour
l'Etudes et la Réalisation d'Engins Ballistiques) whose aim it was to develop the in-house knowledge
and technology required for this military programme. In the same year, it established a Comité de
Recherches Spatiales, chaired by the physicist Pierre Auger, to coordinate scientific research in space.
Finally, by a law voted on 19 December 1961, the CNES (Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales) came
into being. Its prime task was to develop a satellite launcher, called Diamant, based on the military
ballistic missiles that France was developing for its strategic deterrent.22 The fruits of these
investments were soon to be seen. On 26 November 1965 the rocket Diamant rose from the
Hammaguir launch pad and placed the first French satellite, Astérix, in orbit. France thus became the
third space power and confirmed its claim for an independent role in this important strategic field.
Astérix was a 42 kg test satellite whose role was to confirm the rocket's ability to place it in orbit. Ten
days later, on 6 December 1965, a Scout rocket launched France's first scientific satellite, FR-1. This
satellite, weighing 60 kg, had been developed by the CNES and carried instruments for studying
ionisation irregularities in the ionosphere and the magnetosphere. It was launched from Vandenberg,
and placed in a near-circular orbit about 750 km high. In 1966 and 1967 France launched three small
scientific satellites developed by the CNES. All of them were launched by Diamant rockets from
Hammaguir, and their scientific mission was to make geodetic experiments based on the study of the
Doppler effect. The first satellite, called D-1A (Diapason), was launched on 17 February 1966; the two
others, called D-1C and D-1D (Diadème), were both launched in February 1967. We should also
mention here the Franco-German scientific satellite Dial/Wika, launched on 10 March 1970 by a
Diamant-B rocket from the new base of Kourou, in French Guyana. It weighed 63 kg and carried four
experiments for studying the belt of particles around the Earth.
Italy also had an important national space programme, initially stimulated by the military. The Italian
navy invited the German expert Hermann Oberth to their arsenal at La Spezia for several years to
advise on rocket development. The Air Force, in collaboration with various firms, developed both
solid and liquid-fuelled sounding rockets. And in 1959 the Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (CNR),
responsible for funding scientific research, together with the Air Force, launched a programme for
upper atmosphere research under the direction of Colonel Luigi Broglio. A launching range was




Broglio was quick to react to NASA's offer of collaboration in space research. In 1962 Italy and the
USA signed an agreement for the so-called "San Marco" project and two years later, on 15 December
1964, the first Italian satellite, San Marco-1, was launched by an American Scout rocket from Wallops
Island and placed in an orbit with a perigee of 198 km and an apogee of 856 km. It was a sphere with a
diameter of 66 cm and weighed no less than 115 kg. Built by the University of Rome's Centro di
Ricerche Aerospaziali under the direction of Luigi Broglio, this was the very first all-European
satellite to circle the Earth. On board was a dynamometric balance (known as "Bilancia Broglio")
which measured variations in the density of the atmosphere and, indirectly, the average temperature
and molecular weight of the air. A second San Marco satellite was launched by Broglio's group in
1967 from a platform anchored in the Indian Ocean off the coast of Kenya, and the programme
continued in the following decade.
Finally, a last word must be said on the situation in the Federal Republic of Germany. Throughout the
1950s there was increasing pressure for the development of a national space effort. A number of space
societies were revived and a space research institute was established. Scientists and technicians from
the Peenemünde project were prominent in both. Contacts were made with major industries. However,
it took some time for their efforts to bear fruit. The V-2 weapon had damaged the public image of
space in the country, and restrictions imposed by the Allied powers did the rest. For a decade after the
war, all activity in rocket technology was forbidden. And even though the Paris Treaties of May 1955
relaxed the constraints a little, the construction of guided missiles with a range greater than 70 km was
still not allowed.
Blocked by the legacy of the past, many interest groups in Germany were thus particularly receptive to
the initiatives taken at the end of 1959 to launch a collaborative European space programme. They
were seen as legitimating Germany's re-entry into a field of research from which she had been
effectively excluded for many years. They served as a platform from which to launch an independent
national programme. And they dovetailed neatly with Minister of Defence Franz Josef Strauss'
conviction that the strength of the western alliance, and of Germany's place in it, rested on the
development of modern technologies, including missiles. Germany at the end of the 1950s was thus at
once "lagging" the other three major European countries in the space field, and endowed with a group
of scientists, engineers, businessmen and politicians who were determined that she should rapidly play
a leading role in this sector.23
These national efforts in Europe could not compete in any way with the aggressive space programmes
developed in the United States and the Soviet Union. Both the super powers were motivated by strong
political, ideological and military interests, and they were prepared to spend money, intellectual
resources and industrial capability for the pursuit of their goals. Cold war confrontation, however, was
not the only aspect of space. Launching instruments high in the atmosphere and beyond also meant
opening new interesting fields of scientific research.24 Moreover, important applications in civilian
fields such as telecommunications and meteorology seemed possible in the future. Finally, space
appeared to many European industrialists to be a key sector for technological development and
economic success. In September 1961, the European industry created a supranational body called
Eurospace, which included all the leading companies in aircraft and missile manufacture. Its aim,
according to its statutes, was "to promote the development of aerospace activities in Western Europe".
It is against this background that in the late 1950s and early 1960s a few initiatives were undertaken
for pooling European resources in a collaborative effort in space. Eventually, these initiatives led to
the creation of ESRO and ELDO.
23 Fisher (1994).
24 Important reviews on the promises of space research were published in those years: see, for example,
Van Allen (ed.) (1956) and Berkner & Odishaw (eds.) (1961).
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Chapter 1: 
The Pioneers: From Amaldi's 'Euroluna' Vision
to the Creation of COPERS
J. Krige & M. de Maria
The origins of a joint European space effort are generally traced back to a number of initiatives taken
in 1959 and 1960 by a small group of scientists and science administrators, catalysed by two friends,
physicists and scientific statesmen, the Italian Edoardo Amaldi and the Frenchman Pierre Auger.
Neither Amaldi nor Auger was stranger to the cause of scientific collaboration on a European scale.
Indeed it was they who, in the early 1950s, were key actors in the process which led to the setting up
of CERN, the European Organisation for Nuclear Research. Now, as the decade drew to a close, they
turned their attention to space. Success was rapid. Within a year of the first formal discussions being
held amongst scientists, European governments had set up a preparatory commission to explore the
possibilities for a joint space research effort.
The most striking feature of the story we are about to tell in this chapter is the transformation of the
scientists' original project into one which was more modest in scope – and over which they could hope
to retain a large measure of control. In the first meetings held in the early 1960s, they were thinking of
setting up a European body dedicated solely to scientific research, but with sufficient funds to finance
all that that required, including the construction of satellites and the development of the required
launch vehicles. In parallel with these discussions, however, governments and industry were
formulating their own ideas about the nature and purposes of a European collaborative venture in
space. At the heart of their deliberations was the question of the launcher. For the scientists, a launcher
was essentially a means to put a scientific experiments into orbit. For politicians and industrialists, it
was a device whose development was intertwined with national European political, military and
commercial strategy. Starting from very different perspectives, and seeking control over very different
aspects of the space programme, by the end of 1960 it was understood by both parties that Europe
would have not one, but two space organisations, one dedicated to scientific research and the other to
launcher development. It was an arrangement that at the time pleased scientists and politicians in at
least the prime movers, Britain and France. But it was an arrangement which was to cause endless
difficulty for Europe throughout the 1960s.
1.1 Amaldi's dream of "a Euroluna before 1965"
According to Pierre Auger, the first ideas for a European organisation for space research were
discussed by himself and Edoardo Amaldi during a peripatetic conversation in the Luxembourg
gardens in Paris in April 1959.25 This conversation, in fact, had been prepared by a number of
initiatives of Amaldi during the preceding nine months, which aimed at setting up a scientific
constituency for a joint European effort in space research, similar to that realised for CERN, the large
laboratory for high energy physics established near Geneva in the early 1950s.26 Amaldi's project
sprang from political as well as scientific considerations. Like most of his European colleagues, he had
been impressed by the important scientific results obtained by the first USSR and American satellites.
The space race among the Superpowers was mainly motivated by political, ideological and military
considerations, but Cold War confrontation was not the only rationale for space programmes. It also
meant opening new interesting fields for scientific research, while important applications in civilian
sectors such as meteorology or telecommunications seemed possible in the future. As a scientific
statesman, Amaldi thought that Europe should not be left out of space: he considered it an urgent
25 Auger (1984). There is a reference made to this event in a document entitled "Sur la création d'ESRO", in
the Auger papers, HAEC. This document is undated, but it was probably written in the late 1960s or early
1970s.
26 Hermann et al. (1987).
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necessity for Western European countries to enter space. The launching of a Euroluna (Euromoon)
from a European space organisation would have, in his words, "a first order importance, both moral
and practical, for all countries of the continent".27
Amaldi conceived such an organisation as one solely dedicated to scientific research and essentially
controlled by the scientific community. In particular, it was clear to him that the military were to be
left out of any future European space organisation, notwithstanding the obvious military interest in
rocket technology. The conquest of space had to be a peaceful enterprise on behalf of the whole of
mankind, he claimed, and the presence of the military would prevent a space organisation from
pursuing this "moral" goal. Moreover, from a "practical" point view, the military environment would
certainly be an obstacle to the best development of science, which is characterised by open co-
operation and free exchange of ideas. As one of the founding fathers of CERN, Amaldi considered this
Organisation as the ideal model to be followed in the new cooperative venture: CERN represented a
very successful example of an organisation conceived and funded only "on the basis of scientific and
technical principles and not on the basis of political and commercial arguments".28 Accordingly, the
new space organisation was to be free from any political, industrial and military interference, like
CERN. Amaldi began thinking about the possibility of developing in Europe a collaborative effort in
space towards the end of July 1958, after a conversation he had with his old friend Luigi Crocco in the
home of the Rome physicist Giorgio Salvini. Crocco was at that time a professor of Aerospace
Propulsion at Princeton University's Department of Aeronautical Engineering and a former scientific
consultant of the Italian FIAT Company and of NATO's Advisory Group for Aeronautical Research
and Development (AGARD). "If European experts in the field of satellites and launchers start moving
immediately, by 1965 they will be able to give quite a substantial contribution to the study of space
problems, in addition to American and Russian groups", Amaldi wrote Crocco later on. The
development of advanced space technologies was not within the reach of individual European
countries, for both technical and financial reasons, but could be realised on a continental scale, "like
what has been done for big particle accelerators with the creation of CERN".29
After his conversation with Crocco, Amaldi talked to his colleague Luigi Broglio, one of the few
Italian experts in rocket technology, who was at that time the director of the University of Rome's
Institute of Aeronautical Engineering and a colonel in the Italian Air Force. Broglio expressed "a
substantial agreement on the theoretical formulation of the problem but also a noteworthy scepticism
regarding the real feasibility of a concrete project", Amaldi reported to Crocco. In fact, Broglio
acknowledged that the development of launchers and satellites was an objective whose realisation was
so complex that it could only be reached by a collaborative effort of several nations and considered
Amaldi's initiative worthy of attention, "both for its important scientific aspects and for its high moral
effects". However, he expressed many doubts for the difficulties that could arise in reaching an
international agreement in a field where "military interest is highly pre-eminent".30
Following Broglio's rather cold reaction, Amaldi decided to discuss his idea with friends and
colleagues in the international physics community, in particular with some of the CERN pioneers. In
early September 1958, during a staying in Geneva, he spoke to Isidor I. Rabi. Rabi was one of the
most important American physicists of the Los Alamos generation, who had contributed to shape US
scientific and security policy during the late 1940s and early 1950s, serving in key scientific advisory
committees of both the Defense Department and the Atomic Energy Commission. What was more
important to Amaldi, in his capacity as a US delegate to UNESCO, Rabi had played a crucial role in
the creation of CERN.31 Rabi considered very favourably Amaldi's project and declared that should his
27 Amaldi to L. Crocco, 16 December 1958, Amaldi archive, Rome, box 212, folder 6.
28 Amaldi to J.B. Adams, 15 December 1961, Amaldi archive, Rome, box 210, folder 1.
29 Amaldi to Crocco, 16 December 1958, cit.
30 Broglio to Amaldi, 28 August 1958, Amaldi archive, Rome, box 248, folder "Corrispondenza con
Broglio,
1958-1961".
31 Kevles (1978), pp. 368 and 376-377; Pestre in Hermann et al. (1987), pp. 82-89.
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initiative be developed, he would do everything possible to assure US support. Moreover, given his
capacity as a US delegate in NATO's Scientific Committee, Rabi suggested that this body could
initiate the project. Amaldi, however, opposed this last point, for reasons that we shall discuss later.
In the following months Amaldi continued searching for support among his confrères. In November,
again at CERN, he discussed the issue with Harrie Massey, an important space scientist and scientific
statesman in the UK, who was about to become the chairman of the British National Committee for
Space Research (BNCSR), set up by the Royal Society in December 1958.32 Massey was "rather
sceptical, but this is the normal British attitude in front of any continental initiative", Amaldi reported
to Crocco. A more positive reaction came from Francis Perrin, one of the most influential leaders of
the French physics community, whom he met at CERN in December. Perrin enthusiastically supported
Amaldi's project and promised that he would find "some authority in the field of launchers in France to
advocate [the project] and to establish the basis of a preliminary organisation".33
Following these first discussions, Amaldi wrote to Crocco in Princeton asking for advice and help.34
On this occasion, he worded for the first time a fully-fledged idea of what he thought should be the
main features of a future European organisation for space research, an idea which brought together his
strong belief in the European ideal and his vision of scientific research as a free and peaceful
international enterprise. Firstly, as regards its membership, Amaldi thought that, in addition to the six
European Economic Community (EEC) Member States (Belgium, France, (the Federal Republic of)
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands), at least the United Kingdom and the Scandinavian
countries had to be involved. Recalling however Massey's sceptical reaction, which echoed the early
cold reactions to the CERN concept from across the Channel, Amaldi remarked that "in the first phase,
England will only send some observers and will probably make some opposition, but I am sure that
she will eventually give an important contribution when the project begins to assume a concrete
aspect".
Secondly, as regards the promoters, Amaldi suggested that a small group of experts from the main
countries of continental Europe - at least from France, Germany and Italy - should prepare in a few
months' time a plan for the setting up of the organisation, including: a) a well defined objective,
"sufficiently ambitious as to be comparable to those established by the USA and the USSR in this field
and to justify the European dimension of the undertaking"; b) an evaluation of the required technical
staff; c) a realistic time schedule. This programme should then be submitted for approval to Western
European governments. Amaldi underlined, however, a difficulty on this path: while, in the case of
CERN, UNESCO had played the role of "mother and wet-nurse", he wondered which international
agency could now play the same role for the envisaged space organisation. Certainly this could not be
NATO's Science Committee, as suggested by Rabi. It is "absolutely essential", Amaldi underlined,
that the future organisation "has no military connotation and no connection with whatsoever military
agency". It had to be "purely scientific [and] open, like CERN, to all kinds of cooperation, both inside
and outside the member nations". Amaldi's ideas were not naively pacifist. He believed that an
organisation free from any military influence would foster in all its Member States the strengthening
of their scientific and technical capability, and this "would obviously produce great benefit also in the
military sector, [...] but would not make the realisation of its programme more difficult and
complicated, as it would happen if the military, directly or indirectly, were its masters".
Thirdly, as to the programme of the future organisation, Amaldi thought that it should include both the
construction of common European laboratories and a number of cooperative projects to be developed
in the participating countries. This organisation, he concluded, "would attract the brightest part of the
young generation and make possible the recovery of scholars who work outside Europe".
32 Massey and Robins (1986), p. 62.
33 Amaldi to Crocco, 16 December 1958, cit. Writing to Auger two months later (6 February 1959), Amaldi
commented: "Massey en bon anglais s'est s'est montré plutôt sceptique".
34 Amaldi to Crocco, 16 December 1958, cit.
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Amaldi asked Crocco to become an active supporter of this project and to indicate "the most
competent and open-minded people in the [space] field in Italy, France, Germany, England and the
Scandinavian countries". He also asked for the address of Theodore von Kármán, an important
American physicist and a promoter of AGARD: "A man of his authority, if favourable, could exert a
noteworthy influence", Amaldi noted. In early 1958, in fact, von Kármán had proposed to launch a
peaceful NATO satellite as a reply to the Sputnik, but his idea was eventually dropped because the US
State Department objected that NATO was a military organisation and "peace satellites were not its
business".35 In his wishes for a Merry Christmas to Crocco, Amaldi included a hope for "a Euroluna
before 1965".
Crocco received Amaldi's ideas "with much interest and enthusiasm". He shared Amaldi's view that a
non-military organisation would represent the best solution, "from both a diplomatic and a scientific
point of view". However, he warned Amaldi about the risks and difficulties that the realisation of his
project would meet, arguing that a straightforward application of the "CERN model" to space could
hardly be realised, given the political and institutional differences among the two cases. Firstly, one
had to cope with the military presence in the field, as demonstrated in the case of the setting up of
NASA. The creation of the American space agency in the aftermath of the "Sputnik psychosis",
Crocco explained, occurred after "considerable intestine fights, because everything done so far in the
field of rocket and spacecraft development [...] had been realised by the military or under their
patronage", and the corresponding technology was "private property of the military".36 The situation
was even more difficult in Europe, owing to the many borders which divided the various nations in the
Old Continent. The question here was "winning a fight against the military not in one single country,
but in each European country, and a failure in one country is sufficient to compromise the entire
initiative". Nothing similar existed for CERN, since research in high energy physics was "a pie where
the military had not yet put their finger".
A second problem regarded costs. Europe was poorer than the United States, Crocco wrote, and even
assuming that costs on this side of the Atlantic were lower than in the US, or that one could "substitute
at least in part the brute force of money with the less ostentatious but more penetrating force of the
brain", it was impossible to realise such an ambitious project as building rockets and satellites without
investing a "huge amount of money". Moreover, the organisation conceived by Amaldi was due to
pursue only scientific research that did not have any short-term "utilitarian fall-outs in the civil field";
therefore, it would not be easy "to convince a number of Parliaments of the necessity of spending huge
amounts of money only for science and prestige without a utilitarian perspective" [Crocco's
underlining].
Thirdly, Crocco warned Amaldi that not only the "Euromoon project" required much more complex
structures than CERN's, but while in the case of CERN, "the laboratories constitute 'an end in itself', in
the case of Euromoon they represent only the means, and a very expensive one, for the development
and testing of prototypes". Finally, a last problem regarded the technical staff. It was not easy at all,
according to Crocco, to find in Europe a good number of specialists in the space sector. A possible
shortcut, which might be necessary to resort to, "with some sacrifice of European pride", was to launch
and develop the European programme with the help of some US experts: this implied, however not
only the approval of the US Government, but also "its willingness to support Europe's undertaking by
transferring people and technology".
35 Von Kármán (1967), pp 323-339. Von Kármán had started thinking of NATO "as a 'pilot plant' to test out
the feasibility of international scientific cooperation" immediately after the birth of this organisation in
April 1949. After a long gestation, AGARD was set up in February 1952. Its scientific activities were
focused only on "unclassified items", which gave AGARD, according to von Kármán, "greater freedom
in the selection of scientific projects" and allowed AGARD scientists "to meet on an easier basis with
scientists of other nations". See von Kármán (1967), chapters 40-42.
36 Crocco to Amaldi, 2 January 1959, Amaldi archive, Rome, Rome, box 212, folder 6. On the
establishment of NASA, see McDougall (1985a).
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Concluding his letter, Crocco suggested that he himself could make contact with von Kármán, Hugh
Dryden, the scientific director of NASA and "very influential also in Europe", and James Killian, the
president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and President Eisenhower's scientific
adviser, to sound out US reactions to Amaldi's project. If von Kármán was convinced, Crocco argued,
"[this] would represent a great advantage not only for Europe but also in relation to the US". He also
suggested that Amaldi contact Maurice Roy, the director of the Office National d'Etudes et de
Recherches Aéronautiques (ONERA), who exercised "a sort of dictatorship on the developments of
[military] aeronautics research in France", and his brother-in-law Giuseppe Gabrielli, the director of
the FIAT Aviation Company, to sound out the reactions of industrial circles in Italy.
Amaldi considered Crocco's proposal to talk with von Kármán "very useful", but he also insisted in
defending the two main tenets of his initiative: firstly, that the future space organisation should keep "a
real European character" and should therefore not appear, at least in the beginning, as "a suggestion
coming from the US"; secondly, that it should absolutely have "a peaceful character". "The answer to
those who worry about European defence problems is that, once the technology of satellite launching
is mastered in Europe, the military structure of all countries would automatically be strengthened as a
result".37
At Amaldi's request, Crocco had a long conversation with von Kármán in New York on 27 January
1959, and immediately reported its contents to Amaldi. Firstly, von Kármán wanted to inform Amaldi
that AGARD was already trying to develop a similar project, "although on a smaller scale". A
provisional plan foresaw the launching of satellites entirely designed and developed in Europe, with
US launchers supplied by NASA while control systems would probably be European. Secondly, von
Kármán too perceived "the weakness of an initiative based on military or paramilitary organisations"
and agreed that, in principle, excluding the military and not depending on US launch systems were
"desirable" objectives. However, he believed that full European autonomy in space should follow a
first collaborative undertaking with the US that would not entail large expenses for Europe. "It seems
to me", Crocco commented, "that the AGARD solution, possibly supported by a civil committee,
would have the advantage of breaking the ice, creating an interest and paving the way for more
independent undertakings".38 Amaldi, however, was not convinced by von Kármán and Crocco's
arguments in favour of the AGARD solution and dropped their suggestion, as he had done with Rabi's,
since the European involvement with NATO or the US was incompatible with the "peaceful and real
European character" of the future space organisation.
In those days, Amaldi was defending the (Western) European character of his project on another front,
i.e. the British physicist Cecil Powell's proposal of extending cooperation in space to the Soviet Union.
Powell was a spokesman of the cosmic-ray physics community in the UK, a Nobel prize winner in
1950 for his discovery of the π meson and a member of CERN's Scientific Policy Committee. In his
letter to Amaldi, Powell too dealt with the military question, expressing his concern that "if you
attempt to make satellites in Western Europe without military support, you will be a long way behind",
and proposed "to establish on an international scale the kind of cooperation which you had visualised
for Western Europe. [...] What is required here is a genuine international cooperation involving world
resources". In particular, Powell argued that Russian scientists should be included from the very
beginning and he was ready, if Amaldi agreed with this idea, to speak with some of them during his
forthcoming visit to Moscow, "entirely unofficially, without committing anybody to anything".39
Against Powell's argument, Amaldi defended his conception of scientific internationalism limited to
Western European nations. Firstly, an international collaboration of the kind envisaged by Powell
"should take place at a different level from that which I consider as an urgent necessity for the
European countries". This was for Amaldi both "a matter of principle and of feasibility". He again
presented the CERN model: "CERN has been built in spite of the existence of the [MIT's] Radiation
37 Amaldi to Crocco, 9  January 1959, Amaldi archive, Rome, Rome, box 212, folder 6.
38 Crocco to Amaldi, 27 January 1959, ibidem.
39 Powell to Amaldi, 2 February 1959, ibidem.
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Lab. or the Brookhaven National Lab. [near New York]; and Dubna [the main high energy physics
laboratory in the USSR] has been built in spite of the existence of all the above mentioned
laboratories". In the same spirit, he believed that Europe should have its own organisation for space
research, "a purely scientific organisation which collaborates with any other similar organisation in the
world". Referring to the difficulties of collaborating with the USSR, Amaldi reminded Powell that
when they were making the first steps towards the establishment of CERN, the official Soviet
newspaper Pravda had written that "CERN was made by the USA in order to teach German scientists
- in particular Heisenberg – how to make atomic bombs against the USSR". Amaldi himself had been
put "in the list of warmongers" for this. In conclusion, such a large organisation, "including all the
world's nations", was not desirable, not only because Europe was not yet prepared for such a big
enterprise, but also because, in principle, one should avoid having"a single world Directorate for
[space] research which decides the general lines of attack on scientific problems". Moreover, a world-
wide organisation could not work from a practical point of view: CERN itself would be almost
impossible to manage if delegates from 30 or 50 nations sat in its Council instead of twelve. "Twelve
are quite enough, even too many", Amaldi concluded.40
Apparently, Amaldi's first round of consultations with his colleagues resulted in an almost unanimous
chorus of warnings against a straightforward application of the CERN model to space. Firstly, because
a certain amount of involvement with the military seemed to many unavoidable, if only because they
already controlled the field. Secondly, because the purely Western European option met with various
counter-arguments: the difficulty for Europe to fill the technological gap with the superpowers; the
"huge amounts of money" required; the ideal of a world-wide scientific internationalism. Amaldi,
however, stubbornly stuck to his original idea, and was soon rewarded when he met with the right man
with whom to push forward his project. This was Pierre Auger, a French cosmic-ray physicist and
Amaldi's old friend. Amaldi and Auger had been the leaders of the so called "Franco-Italian front"
during the early discussions on the establishment of CERN.41 Now this successful team was ready to
go back in action for space.
1.2 Amaldi and Auger's first steps
Early in February 1959, Perrin informed Amaldi that Auger "was interested in the same problems".
The Italian physicist wrote immediately to his French colleague, informing him of his previous
contacts and making explicit the "essential points" that should characterise the envisaged European
space organisation: firstly, that it "should be only civil and with a strictly scientific character, without
military links or secrecy problems in general"; secondly, that it should comprise "a sufficiently large
European basis, possibly like CERN".42 The first problem, he wrote, was to identify an international
organisation that could play the same institutional role as UNESCO in the establishment of CERN.
This organisation should appoint a group of experts with the task of making the necessary preparatory
work. One can start with two or three "trustworthy" experts in France, Germany and Italy, Amaldi
wrote, "and the others would eventually follow". As regards Italy, Amaldi informed Auger that
Broglio, finally convinced, was ready to serve as an expert on behalf of Italy, and that a number of
FIAT managers "would be very interested in collaborating in this project from the industrial point of
view".
Auger's reaction was very positive. He informed Amaldi that in January that year a Comité des
Recherches Spatiales (CRS) had been set up in France under his chairmanship, with the task of
establishing a national programme of research in the upper atmosphere and the outer space. Amaldi
immediately realised that the creation of similar national space committees in other European
countries, at least in Italy and Germany, would represent a more efficient institutional framework for
the start of a  European  joint effort in space.  Therefore, in early  March 1959 he asked  Auger to send
40 Amaldi to Powell, 6 February 1959; Powell to Amaldi, 20 February 1959, ibidem.
41 Pestre in Hermann et al. (1987), chapter 4.
42 Amaldi to Auger, 6 February 1959, cit.
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him, "as soon as possible", some information on the CRS, including its membership and first
programmes.43 Auger replied immediately, asking however for discretion since the press had not been
informed yet. He sent Amaldi the CRS member list and a copy of its founding decree, dated 7 January
1959.44
Amaldi thus learned that the CRS had outlined a two-phase programme: a "minimum programme",
with a budget of about 2 billion French Francs, for researches with instruments carried on board of
sounding rockets and devoted to atmospheric studies, solar investigation and cosmic ray physics; and a
"more ambitious and much more costly" programme, including the launch of Earth satellites and,
possibly, solar and lunar probes. According to Auger, this part of the programme, whose realisation
"required an effort exceeding that that could be made by one European country", could be
implemented by international collaboration. However, he did not think that the time was ripe for an
immediate start at a European level: "Up to now there is no question of any international action
besides the participation of France in COSPAR and in the United Nations' newly established Space
Committee".45 As regards rockets, Auger continued, the CRS had not yet considered the problem,
since there were already a few types of French military rockets that could be used immediately for
space research, while the realisation of satellite launchers "depended evidently in part on the military
programme and also on the attitude of the French government towards a satellite programme".
Evidently, Auger and the French space scientists did not have a direct interest in building launchers
and considered the presence of the military in space with much greater realism than Amaldi, if only
because they were already on the spot in France.
The two physicists, as we have anticipated, met in Paris in April and discussed their plans during a
walk in the Luxembourg gardens. Shortly after that discussions Amaldi took two important initiatives.
Firstly, he convinced the president of the Italian Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (CNR), Francesco
Giordani, to set up within the framework of the CNR a Commissione per le Ricerche Spaziali (CRS).
This was officially established in September 1959 with the twofold task of assessing the national
capabilities in this field and setting up a "collaboration among European nations in order to realise a
common programme of work". Broglio was its President and Amaldi was one of its seven members.46
Secondly, he wrote an important paper, entitled "Introduction to the discussion on space research in
Europe" and dated 30 April 1959, which he sent to a small group of senior science administrators,
asking that it be circulated within the European scientific community.47 The list included Auger, in his
capacity as the president of the French CRS, J.H. Bannier, the director of the Netherlands Organisation
for the Advancement of Pure Research (ZWO), F. Giordani, the president of the Italian CNR, A.
Hocker, at the German Bundesministerium für Atomfragen and, finally, J. Willems, the president of
the Belgian Institut Inter-Universitaire de Sciences Nucléaires. Moreover, the paper was also sent to
CERN's Director General, C.J. Bakker and to the president of the Euratom Commission, E. Hirsch, in
order to encourage other European institutions to take an interest in the initiative.48
43 Amaldi to Auger, 5 March 1959, Amaldi archive, Rome, box 12, folder 6.
44 Auger to Amaldi, 12 March 1959; Amaldi to Auger, 18 March 191959, ibidem.
45 The COSPAR (Committee on Space Research) had been set up by the International Council of Scientific
Unions during the International Geophysical Year. See COSPAR (1998).
46 Giordani to Amaldi, 5 September 1959; Amaldi to Giordani, 8 September 1959; Broglio to Amaldi,
17 September 1959, Amaldi archive, Rome, box 248, folder "Ricerche spaziali - Corrispondenza con
Broglio 1958-1961". The other members were Mario Boella, a professor of Electrical Communications at
the Politechnic of Turin; Nello Carrara, a professor of Electromagnetic Waves at the University of
Florence; Corrado Casci, a professor of Motors for Aeromobiles at the Politechnic of Milan; Giampiero
Puppi, professor of Physics at the University of Bologna; Guglielmo Righini, professor of Astronomy at
the University of Bologna.
47 A copy of this document can be found in Amaldi archive, Rome, box 212, folder 6, and in the Mussard
files, HAEC, folder "Origine de la COPERS I".
48 Copies of these letters are in the Amaldi archive, Rome, box 212, folder 6. The list is also in "First
mailing list – May 1959", Mussard files, HAEC, folder "Origine de la COPERS I". We shall say a little
more about the significance of some of these personalities in due course.
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In his paper, Amaldi began by describing the international initiatives which had been taken in the past
few years to encourage scientific research in space using rockets and satellites. This had really got
under way during the International Geophysical Year (IGY), which ran from 1 July 1957 to
31 December 1958. In anticipation of the ending of the IGY, Amaldi explained, the International
Council of Scientific Unions had set up a number of additional committees to ensure that the scientific
work which had been initiated during the preceding 18 months was continued on an international
basis. One of these was the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) which had the task of
coordinating and promoting the development of space research on behalf of the world scientific
community.49
Having sketched the international structures put in place in the second half of the 1950s, Amaldi went
on to identify some of the important results which had already been obtained. The most significant
was the so-called "Van Allen radiation" belts. These belts comprised charged electrons and protons
with an energy between a fraction and several dozen million electron-volts (MeV). The particles were
effectively trapped by the Earth's magnetic field, and seldom if ever penetrated into the atmosphere.
They were first detected by a Geiger-Müller detector built by the American physicist J. Van Allen and
mounted on Explorer-I, the first American satellite launched on 31 January 1958. This discovery,
wrote Amaldi, was one of several of "exceptional importance, in that they open up a whole new field
of hitherto unexplored and vast phenomena involving the properties of the Earth, the Sun, and cosmic
radiation". They were, he went on to say, "no more than a modest beginning in a field of research so
enormous and important that it far surpasses anything that can be imagined today".
The scientific importance of the field having been identified, Amaldi went on to stress how urgent it
was for Europe to enter it. To date, he pointed out, only the Soviet Union and the United States of
America were in a position to capitalise on the new possibilities being opened up by research into
space using rockets and satellites. This gap could only become wider, if not "all but unbridgeable", if
measures were not taken immediately to close it "both on the scientific and on the technological and
industrial plane". Elaborating on the latter point Amaldi stressed that the launching of satellites
required the development of a large number of fields of industrial significance, like propellants,
metallurgy and electronics, "and this development in turn has its effect on the countries' entire
industry".
What chance did Europe have of closing the gap, though? Countries having lesser financial, industrial
and organisational capacities than the two superpowers, he said, would find it very difficult to
establish themselves in this field. There was a danger then that this type of research was "destined to
remain a monopoly of the United States and the Soviet Union", with the countries of Europe being
"mere spectators of the grand endeavours to the East and West of our continent". There was a solution,
however: "An International Organisation pooling the resources of, say, ten European countries might
well be able to tackle the problem and to enable the scientists of Europe to make a valuable
contribution to the exploration and study of outer space.
This organisation, he went on to say, "could achieve impressive results within four or five years" if it
had a budget about twice as large as that of CERN, currently costing about 65 million Swiss francs per
year. "The proposed European Space Research Organisation should have no other purpose than
research and should, therefore, be independent of any kind of military organisation and free from any
Official Secrets Act". This was not only necessary to ensure what Amaldi called "its moral authority".
It was probably also crucial, he pointed out, to ensure the participation of a wide cross-section of
European states.
49 General information on these international organisations was provided by Amaldi in four extensive
appendices attached to his document. The President of COSPAR's first Executive Committee was
Professor H.C. van de Hulst, of Leiden in the Netherlands, and Professor H.S.W. Massey from London
was one of its members. We shall meet them again soon. For some personal recollections on the
COSPAR activities see COSPAR (1998).
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Amaldi then turned to discussing the possible programme of the new organisation. While stressing that
it would have to be "very closely defined", he was careful to avoid being too precise about its contents.
He limited himself to suggesting that it concern itself with two problems phased in time. One "might
be a standard problem of the kind already solved by the USSR and USA, so chosen that its solution
could be expected within a relatively short time of, say, three to four years". The second problem
would be much more ambitious and comparable to "the greatest enterprises" then being undertaken in
the United States and the Soviet Union. This might last for six to seven years. The first problem would
serve to give Europeans the time and the opportunity to develop the know-how and to train the
personnel required for space research. The second would put them on a level comparable to that
attained by the leading protagonists in the field.
Finally, addressing himself to procedural matters Amaldi proposed that a number of European
countries - and here he identified Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands - could set up
commissions to assess the resources available nationally, and to estimate the total effort required to
make a meaningful contribution to space research. Their findings could then be laid before an
international conference which would work out a detailed programme for submission to the
governments of interested countries. Amaldi concluded by saying that this preparatory stage should
not exceed one year. If a European organisation, "or at least a fairly well-founded provisional
precursor of it", could begin operating before the end of 1960, Europe could hope to close the gap
between "herself and the Soviet Union and the United States before 1970".50
The first reaction to Amaldi's paper came from Jean Willems, an influential member of the "CERN
lobby".51 Willems informed Amaldi of the situation in Belgium: a working group on space matters,
chaired by Willems himself, came to be set up within the framework of the Centre National d'Etudes
et de Recherches Aéronautiques, whose Secretary General, M. Freson, was a member of the Belgian
delegation to the CERN Council. Another organisation, the Centre National de Recherches Spatiales,
had also been established, but work was at the very beginning and the scientists involved in both these
bodies had a strong interest in Amaldi's project. "What should be next? I believe that we should turn to
you to know more", Willems concluded.
A second important answer came from another member of the "CERN lobby", Jan H. Bannier, a Dutch
delegate in the CERN Council and the chairman of its Finance Committee. Bannier met Amaldi in
Geneva and was immediately convinced of the actual feasibility of his Euroluna project. He started to
discuss the project with a number of important Dutch scientists, in particular with J.F. Koksma,
General Secretary of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Sciences, and with Hendrik C. van de Hulst,
the president of COSPAR's Executive Committee. Although no definite conclusions were reached
during these discussions, Bannier informed Amaldi that "the general impression was one of great
interest in your plans".52
Bannier also touched the problem of the institutional framework for officially discussing the future
organisation. He doubted that UNESCO could play the same role as it did with CERN since Auger's
successor as director of UNESCO's Department of Natural Sciences, the Russian J.F. Kovda, would
probably not be willing to undertake this task. "It may be difficult for him as a Russian to assist in the
creation of a Western European Organisation; [...] he would probably prefer a more universal task". As
an alternative, he suggested that the Western European delegates in the forthcoming General
Assembly of COSPAR, scheduled for January 1960 in Nice, extend their stay in Nice for one more
day in order to discuss Amaldi's plan.  According to Bannier,  the time was not ripe to bring the matter
50 The list of countries cited by Amaldi was anything but arbitrary. Indeed, his paper was circulated to
senior science administrators in each of the five countries that he had mentioned
51 Willems to E. Amaldi, 22 June 1959, Amaldi archive, Rome, box 212, folder 6. For the concept of the
"CERN lobby", see Pestre in Hermann et al. (1990), chapter 7.
52 Bannier to Amaldi, 24 July 1959, Amaldi archive, Rome, box 212, folder 6.
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up to government level in the Netherlands, since a national committee for space research had not yet
been established. However, if a formal meeting of European space scientists was convened in order to
discuss the creation a European organisation for space research, "it would be not so difficult to create
such a committee" in the Netherlands. As a final joke, he proposed Amaldi to use the acronym EROS
(European Research Organisation for Space), as "a nice abbreviation" for the future organisation.
In his answer to Bannier, Amaldi wrote that he had also reached the conclusion that UNESCO could
not be proposed as the promoter of the envisaged European organisation and agreed that the COSPAR
meeting in Nice was a good and timely framework. Regarding the approach to national governments,
Amaldi pragmatically envisaged a two-phase strategy: in the first, one should convince "many peoples
in each of our countries of the importance and feasibility of such an enterprise" and only after a few
months one could start an action at government level. He informed Bannier that he was still waiting
for an answer from Germany, which he expected would arrive soon, and was "trying to get
Switzerland in the play". EROS, he concluded, "sounds very nice".53
We have no direct information about the reactions from other recipients of Amaldi's report. These
must have been however encouraging if a French version of the text was published in December 1959
under the more explicit title "Créons une organisation européenne pour la recherche spatiale". This
version differed only slightly from that circulated in May. But it was supplemented by extremely
positive reactions from a number of high-level academics and administrators in Belgium, France,
Germany and the Netherlands, and an additional statement by Amaldi.54 In his statement, Amaldi
stressed again that the new organisation should be kept out of the hands of the military, and devoted to
strictly scientific and peaceful activities. It should have a central laboratory, its own launching range,
and it should develop a European launcher. "If the military maintained the monopoly on the
construction of rockets", he said, "each European country would build its own". "We must take CERN
as a model", Amaldi stressed, estimating that one could do a "good job" with three or four times
CERN's annual budget. Time though was of the essence. A small group of five or six people from
interested European countries should be set up "as soon as possible" to study together a more detailed
scheme. Within a matter of weeks Auger had taken the first steps in this direction.
These early initiatives call for two comments of a very different kind. Firstly, there is Amaldi's
determination that the entire European space effort, from the development of launchers to the
construction, launching and operation of satellites, be under civilian control and, more specifically, be
essentially in the hands of the scientific community. Secondly, there is the precise role played by
Amaldi and Auger in launching a European space effort, the sense in which they may be characterised
as its "founding fathers".
Amaldi's insistence that a collaborative European space effort be civilian in character was partly a
matter of temperament: he made a point throughout the post-war period of publicly distancing himself
from the direct military applications of science, even setting down his day-to-day movements in a
diary intended to "prove" that he had not been personally involved in such activities. His attitude was
also that of a generation of physicists who had seen, and disliked, the restrictions placed on scientific
research and on scientists by the military during wartime projects. Finally, it was indicative of the
pragmatically inspired belief that only if the new body were solely dedicated to peaceful purposes
could it be fully European in the sense that it could include all the Member States of CERN, notably
the "neutrals" like Sweden and Switzerland.55
53 Amaldi to Bannier, 30 July 1959, ibidem.
54 Amaldi (1959) and, for an English version of the text, Amaldi (1984).
55 It is important to recall here Amaldi's active involvement in the so calleed "Pugwash Movement", an
organisation of scientists from the Eastern and Western countries devoted to arms control issues and
peaceful coesistence of the two blocs.
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Two considerations lay behind these sentiments and gave an added significance to Amaldi's demand
for a civilian space programme. Firstly, there was the strategic nature of space itself, an activity in
which the boundaries between basic research and commercial applications, and between peaceful and
belligerent uses were quickly blurred. The technology developed for a scientific satellite could be
transferred to a telecommunications satellite commissioned by a Postmaster General or by a Brigadier
General. The rockets used to launch satellites could also be the intercontinental ballistic missiles used
to launch nuclear warheads. Secondly, and most fundamentally, there were important moves being
made inside the NATO at the time to shape European collaboration in space. In June 1957 NATO set
up a Task Force on Scientific and Technical Cooperation. Its report was rushed directly to a meeting
of the NATO heads of government in December that year. The launch of Sputnik a few months earlier
weighed heavily on everyone's minds. The meeting affirmed that "the full development of our science
and technology is essential to the culture, to the economy and to the political and military strength of
the Atlantic community", and established a Science Committee forthwith.56 Within months it had
suggested that NATO organise a space research programme. In the face of considerable opposition
from scientists, the Committee's second chairman and science adviser to the NATO Secretary General,
F. Seitz, who held office in 1959-60, suggested that NATO sponsor a "European NASA" to work with
the American NASA. It was against the backdrop of these developments that Amaldi contacted Auger
in February and again in April 1959. Indeed the moves being taken inside NATO at this time might
well have been the most important single consideration which spurred Amaldi to act when he did.
Certainly the NATO science committee was quick to learn that the eminent Italian scientist was
against any military involvement in a joint European space effort. Remember that his April 1959 paper
was sent inter alia to Prof. F. Giordani, who was the president of the Italian Consiglio Nazionale delle
Ricerche and also a founder member of the NATO Science Committee, on which he served from 1958
to 1961.
It was not only a civilian space organisation that Amaldi sought, however: it was also one in which
scientists had the power to shape the programme free not simply from military pressures but also from
bureaucratic and political "interference" by Member States' governments. Here lies the significance of
his claim that any new body be "modelled on CERN". At one level, this simply meant that CERN
provide practical guidelines for the new organisation, a precedent and a point of reference for its
membership (assumed to be the ten core Member States of CERN), its annual budget (always
specified in relation to CERN's), and its initial programme, defined as involving two phases, the first
conventional (corresponding to the construction of the CERN synchrocyclotron), the second state-of-
the-art (like the CERN proton synchrotron).57 More fundamentally though Amaldi wanted the new
institution modelled on the CERN in the sense that it was to be "depoliticised". On the one hand, this
meant that governments should pay for the programme without trying to define its direction and
content - whence Auger's remark, after considering the possibility of "modelling" the space research
organisation on EURATOM, "that this was not an example to follow, since it was too subject to
political contingencies".58  On the other, it  encapsulated the hope  that the  Member States delegates to
56 For this and other information on the NATO Science Committee, see NATO (1973). The quotation is
from p. 15. See also Massey and Robins (1986), 108-109.
57 For the launching of CERN, see Hermann et al. (1987). The first twelve Member States of CERN were
Belgium, Denmark, (Federal Republic of) Germany, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and Yugoslavia. In reducing these numbers to ten Amaldi
undoubtedly eliminated Greece and Yugoslavia, the former presumably for predominantly financial
reasons, the latter because of the changed international climate in 1960 as opposed to 1950.
58 When Auger and Amaldi first discussed their ideas in the Luxembourg Gardens in April, it seems as
though they may have been torn between modelling a space research organisation on EURATOM or on
CERN. Indeed it is possible that on this occasion Amaldi proposed to Auger that the name EUROLUNE,
be used for "a daughter of the European Communities, like EURATOM": see paper by Auger entitled Sur
la creation d'ESRO, undated but clearly late 1960s, in Auger papers, HAEC, from which the quotations
are taken..
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the organisation would believe in its importance, would leave the scientists and engineers who ran it to
get on with the job with a minimum of external surveillance, and would be prepared vigorously to
defend its interests before their national authorities - whence the circulation of Amaldi's May report to
Bannier, Hocker and Willems, three of the staunchest members of the "CERN lobby", administrators
who shared Amaldi's goals, administrators who saw themselves not simply as representing their
national governments at CERN but also as representing CERN before their national governments.59
The second comment we want to make about this early initiative concerns the precise role of Amaldi
and of Auger. These two were not the first to propose some sort of European collaboration in the
general area of space. Indeed as early as November/December 1957 a plea was made for the "creation
of a European centre for rocket research, which would be managed by scientists, on the model of the
Centre Européen de Recherche Nucléaire (CERN)".60 NATO was also actively canvassing the idea in
1958/1959 as we have seen. That there should be other suggestions of the kind made by Amaldi and
Auger is hardly surprising. Granted the context in which the exploration of space was born in the late
1950s, it was inevitably at once a symbol of scientific and technological prowess, an index of political
power, and a component of military strategy. Other governments could not stand by idly and allow the
superpowers to monopolise the field. Indeed many countries (Australia, France, Italy, Japan,
Switzerland ...) took steps to establish national space committees in the late 1950s. Amaldi and Auger
brought two specific elements to this rapidly evolving situation.
Firstly, they were plugged into the appropriate national and international networks, appropriate in the
sense that they knew personally the high-level science administrators whom they could count on to
sympathise with their ideas and to do something about having them implemented. Throughout the
1950s Amaldi had enriched and extended his links into the CERN network through his ongoing
activities in the Geneva laboratory.61 By the end of the decade he was also a member of the newly-
established EURATOM's Scientific and Technical Committee. As for Auger, through his presence in
UNESCO he had played a key role both in the birth of CERN and in setting up an international
computing centre in Rome in the mid-1950s. Now he was the chairman of the French national space
committee established in January 1959, through which he had direct access to the French Minister of
Foreign Affairs, for example.
Alongside their network of personal relationships - and this was their second trump card - there was
Amaldi's and Auger's sense of timing. Indeed the Rome physicist's article calling for the creation of a
European space research organisation, with its supporting statements, was published the month after a
major achievement at CERN and the month before a major COSPAR meeting. In November 1959,
CERN's proton synchrotron reached its design energy of 25 GeV for the first time. European
physicists had the most powerful high-energy accelerator in the world at their disposal. European
governments, by pooling their resources, seemed, at a stroke, to have made up the gap that separated
them from the United States. By the end of 1959 then it was clear that European scientific and
technical cooperation could work, and it was almost natural to consider extending it to the new and
challenging field of space. And what better place to broaden support for such a project than the
General Assembly of COSPAR to be held in Nice in January 1960. "It is the first time that such a
conference has been held", wrote Auger, "and it will play for space a role analogous to that which the
1955 Geneva conference played for the atom".62 It was clearly an opportunity too good to miss.
Indeed, the ground had already been prepared. The journal in which the French version of Amaldi's
59 The last phrase in this paragraph is a paraphrase of a statement made by Bannier at a CERN meeting in
1957, in which he rapped the British delegate over the knuckles for what he felt was that country's lack of
commitment to CERN. See Pestre in Hermann et al. (1990), chapter 7.
60 This plea was made in an unsigned article - in fact the author was J. Blamont - entitled "Les nations et la
conquête de l'espace" which appeared in Les cahiers de la Republique, novembre/décembre 1957, No. 10,
pp. 8-9. The aim of Les cahiers..., as described in a note written by P. Mèndes France in the first number
issued in 1956, was to prepare the ground intellectually for action at the political level.
61 Between 1958 and 1960 he was the chairman of CERN's Scientific Policy Committee, and between 1961
and 1963 he was a vice-president, with Bannier, of the Council whose president was in fact Willems.
62 Document "Note sur la recherche spatiale en France", 11-15 January 1960, in Auger papers, HAEC.
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report had been published in December 1959 had asked van de Hulst, the president of COSPAR's
Executive Committee for his comments on the piece. They quoted him as saying that "we will offer
our services to a European organism".63 Sandwiched between CERN's achievement and COSPAR's
conference, the publication of the plea for a joint European space effort could not but make an impact.
1.3 Building up a scientific constituency
The first General Assembly of COSPAR was held at the Centre Universitaire Méditerranéen in Nice
from 9 to 16 January 1960. It was here that Auger discussed with a number of European scientists the
possibility of creating a European space organisation, having CERN as a model of success. Amaldi
could not attend the meeting because of other engagements with CERN and EURATOM, but he was
duly informed by Auger of the main events and decisions taken. 64 Two different meetings had been
convened by Auger. The first one was attended by representatives of "those countries which have
organised a national commission in this field", i.e. Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden
and the United Kingdom. In the second one, "Germany and Switzerland asked to join, hoping to have
very soon their own committees". But the real novelty in Nice was represented, contrary to Amaldi's
early expectations, by the enthusiasm with which the British, represented by H. Massey, supported the
idea of a European collaboration in space. Massey, in fact, played a major role in outlining the
possible programmes of the future organisation. He endorsed Amaldi's suggestion that the future
European space organisation should have a two-phase programme, like for CERN. The first-phase
programme, according to Massey, should include research on the properties of high atmosphere
(ionisation, turbulence, temperature), on space radiation (cosmic, van Allen and X-rays) and on
astrophysics. For the realisation of this programme he envisaged the use of medium range rockets
(200-500 km) and sounding balloons up to 30-40 km. As for the more ambitious, long-term
programme, to be based on the use of Earth satellite and space probes, Massey informed his confréres
that Great Britain was building military missiles with a range of some thousand kilometres and
capable of launching satellites. He therefore suggested, according to Auger's report to Amaldi, that the
future European organisation "should encourage Great Britain in her national [rocket] programme and
induce her to decide the construction of these launchers (this in a few months' time)". This was the
first hint to the eventual British initiative in the launcher field which will discuss in detail in chapter 3.
As to the next actions, Auger informed Amaldi that the participants in the Nice meeting had decided to
contact the various European national space committees in order to organise a more formal meeting,
i.e. "a meeting of delegates in charge of establishing programmes and administrative mechanisms
(funding included)", to be held in Paris on 29 February.
The meeting was duly organised by Auger at his home in Paris on 29 February 1960. It was attended
by eight scientists from eight different countries, most or all of whom had important roles as science
administrators. In addition to Amaldi and Auger were present:
• J. Bartels, from the Geophysikalisches Institut, Göttingen, Germany;
• E.Å. "Brunberg, E.", from the Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden, and secretary
of the newly established Swedish Committee on Space Research;
• F.G. Houtermans, from the University of Bern, Switzerland, then involved in the setting up
of a Swiss committee on space research;
63 Van de Hulst's offer was published along with the text of Amaldi (1959).
64 Auger to Amaldi, 26 January 1960, Amaldi archive, Rome, box 270, Folder "Spazio Europa -
Corrispondenza e Relazioni, 1960-1962". See also Auger (1984), and a detailed chronology headed
"Commission Préparatoire Européenne de Recherches Spatiales. Dates des reunions depuis l'origine",
which can be found in the Auger papers, HAEC.
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• H.S.W. Massey, from University College London, UK, who was the chairman of the
British National Committee for Space Research;
• M. Nicolet, director of the Centre National de Recherches de l'Espace, Bruxelles;
• J. Veldkamp, from the Royal Dutch Meteorological Institute in De Bilt, Netherlands, who was
the secretary of the Netherlands Committee of Geophysical and Space Research;
A ninth scientist, S. Rosseland, was invited but could not attend. Rosseland was the chairman of the
Norwegian Space Research Committee and also a member of the NATO Science Committee.65
The meeting in Auger's flat was important for two reasons. Firstly, it confirmed that at least all those
present were interested in a joint European space research effort. Secondly, it confirmed that the
British were most enthusiastic about the scheme. Indeed, Massey apparently went out of his way to
"make it clear that British scientists were favourably disposed towards European collaboration", and to
suggest that "United Kingdom laboratories participating in the [British] space science programme
could receive research workers from Western European nations". Reading the mood of the gathering,
he then proposed that, "as the next step towards formalisation of the discussions, he would ask the
British National Committee for Space Research to consider issuing an invitation to a meeting in
London, in late April, with aim [sic] of setting up a recognised Committee or working group".66
An informal meeting of about 20 European space research scientists from ten West European countries
(the founder members of CERN minus Greece and Yugoslavia) met in the rooms of the Royal Society
of London on 29 April 1960. Sir William Hodge, the Physical Secretary of the Royal Society was in
the chair, in the absence of Massey who was visiting Australia at the time.67 After scientists from
several countries had reported on their national activities, the discussion focussed on three main issues.
Firstly, the possibilities for cooperation based on existing or soon to be developed national facilities.
Secondly, the possibilities for a jointly funded European initiative in the field of space research.
Thirdly, the most desirable procedure to be followed for implementing such an initiative.
Three main areas were identified in which European countries could profitably make use of one
another's existing facilities. Visiting scientists could be exchanged between universities and some
government funded institutions in different countries. Satellites tracking could be coordinated at a
European level, and a joint plan agreed for the best distribution of stations and the most appropriate
instrumentation with which to equip them. Finally the importance of cooperating in sounding-rocket
experiments was stressed, particularly the advantages to be gained by scientists in one country using
65 The list of invited scientists is in Auger to Amaldi, 16 February 1960, Amaldi archive, Rome, box 270,
Folder "Spazio Europa - Corrispondenza e Relazioni, 1960-1962". See also the minutes of the meeting at
the Royal Society on 29 April 1960 (fn. 57 below) and Massey and Robins (1986), 110.
66 Massey and Robins (1986), 110. Massey's suggestion regarding European scientists to be received in
British laboratories is quoted from the letter, dated 30 March 1960, sent by the Physical Secretary of the
Royal Society, W. Hodge, to Amaldi, inviting him to participate in the London meeting: Amaldi archive,
Rome, box 248, Folder "Spazio Europa - Corrispondenza fino al 1962".
67 Those present were: L.M. Malet (B), K. Thernøe representing J.K. Bøggild (DK), P. Auger (F),
J. Blamont (F), A. Ehmert (D), R. Lüst (D), E. Amaldi (I), L. Broglio (I), H.C. van de Hulst (NL),
H.S. van der Maas (NL), J. Veldkamp (NL), R. Rosseland (N), E-Å. "Brunberg, E." (S), M. Golay (CH),
F.G. Houtermans (CH), W. Hodge (UK), R.L.F. Boyd (UK), H. Elliot (UK), A.W. Lines (UK),
D.C. Martin (UK), J.A. Ratcliffe (UK), M.O. Robins (UK), R.L. Smith-Rose (UK). The minutes of this
meeting are headed "Western European Space Research Meeting, 29 April 1960", Document NCSR/80a
(60), dated 30 April 1960. They can be found in the folder "Origines de la COPERS I", Mussard files,
HAEC. This folder also contains the agenda and other papers prepared for the meeting, notably national
reports from the Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom. The draft
minutes, Document NCSR/80 (60) are also in this folder. They differ from the final version in that they
include more information on the French national programme and statements by Auger as to the kind of
contribution that France would be likely to make towards a joint European satellite programme.
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launching facilities in another, geographically different region. The Swedes pointed out that there was
a site available near the Arctic circle and that the possibility of building a larger site was being
discussed. They welcomed proposals for launching "foreign apparatus" from both. Norway was
similarly considering a site in the northern coastal region, as well as launchings from ships. If these
plans matured, they said, "European cooperative work there would be welcomed". The Italian military
had developed a launching site at Sardinia, and the ministry of defence had agreed "that the facilities
of the range could be put at the disposal of university workers". Finally, the French could offer their
military base in the Sahara, which was particularly convenient as it was in a large uninhabited area.
After some deliberation, those present decided that "it was a little too early" to set up a working group
to investigate the possibilities offered by these proposals; the matter was better discussed again later.
Attention then focussed on cooperation in artificial satellite experiments. Auger pointed out that this
could take place in two ways. There could be simple bilateral cooperation in which countries like
Britain or France, which already had plans to launch their own satellites, could include experiments
from other countries in the spacecraft. Alternatively, as Auger put it, "all the nations might join
together in constructing and launching artificial satellites with each of them contributing to the cost".
Attention rapidly focussed on the kind of programme this CERN-like organisation could have, the
debate being dominated by the British whose plans were obviously well advanced.
The British scientists described the experiments that they might like to perform during the next five
years, i.e. galactic noise measurements, the determination of cloud cover, the geodetic uses of flashing
satellites, oceanographic studies from satellites, deeper space probes, etc. The project which they
described in most detail, however, was a large satellite carrying an astronomical telescope to be used
for obtaining ultraviolet and X-ray stellar spectra. This was to be a high resolution instrument (a figure
of 1 Ångström was mentioned) stabilised for astronomical studies. The design study on the satellite
had been in progress for six months and British scientists hoped to be able to place design contracts by
the end of 1961. In parallel with these developments, there was an important civilian launcher
programme being considered in Britain. The government, it was pointed out, was possibly going to
cease the development of its Blue Streak ballistic rocket for military purposes.68 If the UK decided to
recycle it for civilian purposes, Blue Streak could be used as the first stage of a satellite launcher, with
a modified version of the Black Knight rocket as the second stage. The British scientists explained that
three satellites of various sizes had been considered in relation to the design studies of this possible
British civilian launcher, of which the large astronomical satellite was the heaviest.
The details of the British five-year plan were spelled out before lunch. Immediately after lunch, if not
before, it was clear that the British were not simply interested in informing their colleagues. They were
also trying to gauge the level of interest in the European scientific community for a research
programme based on the use of Blue Streak as a launcher. According to the minutes, the chairman
opened the afternoon session by asking "whether any of those present were in a position to give details
of their own proposed participation in any joint European satellite programme which might be
formulated". He went on to ask for indications of the level of financial support which governments
might be willing to contribute towards such a joint programme. Then, becoming even more specific,
Hodge inquired "if any country represented would be prepared to indicate the possible order of their
contribution should the Blue Streak rocket be used to place a European satellite in orbit". The British
programme, it was said, would cost about £ 20 million a year for each of the first five years. This
would be used for Blue Streak and for other stages of the launcher as well as for the development of
the satellites, aiming at two launchings a year two or three years into the programme.
The British proposal was received very positively, and various delegates made suggestions as to the
kind and level of contribution which their countries could make to a joint European programme.
In the draft, but not in the final, version of the minutes,  Auger suggested that a French  contribution of
68 The decision to cancel the military rocket programme had in fact been taken by the Cabinet on 13 April,
just two weeks before the Royal Society meeting.
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£4-5 million per annum would probably be favourably considered in official circles. Several delegates
(Amaldi, Houtermans, Malet, van de Hulst) felt that their countries would probably be willing to make
contributions of at least the same magnitude as that which they made to CERN. All who spoke were
also keen to see Blue Streak used as a civilian launcher, though Amaldi and van de Hulst were quick to
stress that they were not interested in the rocket in itself. "The Italian government", said the former,
"would certainly look very favourably on the use of part of its contribution for the further development
of Blue Streak, provided that Blue Streak really became an important part of a common integrated
European project". Similarly van de Hulst was careful to specify that any Dutch contribution was to be
used "for the broader aim of placing a European satellite in orbit and not merely for the development
of Blue Streak as a launching vehicle". These concerns did not impede the committee agreeing
"unanimously that Blue Streak appeared to be the best possible solution to the problem of finding a
suitable launching vehicle for a European satellite". And Auger, spelling out a seven-year programme,
proposed that "its final climax [...] should be the placing in orbit of a heavy accurately stabilised
platform".
The only jarring note in what seems to have been an otherwise enthusiastic response to the British
proposals concerned the position of the Commonwealth in any joint programme. In particular there
was the question of Australia, which had important launching facilities at Woomera in the north of the
country. From the British point of view, the participation of this country was essential for both
scientific and political reasons. Many others, notably Amaldi, Auger and van de Hulst, were not keen
to include Commonwealth countries on an equal footing in a European programme, suggesting that an
informal arrangement similar to that which existed between CERN and its non-Member States (like
Israel) might be a suitable solution. It was decided to postpone consideration of this thorny issue to a
later date pending, one imagines, on clarity about the UK government's intentions for Blue Streak.
How was the group to proceed? Auger suggested that it should constitute itself there and then as a
provisional European Space Research Group. He hoped that this group could have considerable
powers, including powers to decide what other Member States should be part of a joint venture. This
proposal ran into difficulties immediately. A Swedish delegate pointed out that if this was done, the
constitution of the group should be officially communicated "to the Russians" to protect Sweden's
neutrality. The British participants in the meeting, for their part, said that they had no authority to
constitute itself in this way, adding later that if they did so "any recommendations [...] would have
little standing".69 After some debate, it was decided that within two months Auger should call another
meeting of delegates formally nominated by their national committees, and "empowered to create a
Preparatory Committee for the establishment of plans for an extended European collaboration in space
research". This body would nominate an Executive Secretary who would be expected to draft plans,
with the help of experts, for a permanent organisation whose convention would be prepared for
government signature "in the course of the next six months following the creation of the Preparatory
Committee".70
As for infrastructure support, it was proposed that the Organisation for European Economic
Cooperation (OEEC) might be a suitable base for the group's activities. Auger was clearly bothered by
this idea, pointing out, according to the minutes, "that this should not involve the exertion of any
influence by OEEC on the constitution or membership of the group". In fact what Auger feared was
the dilution of the "purely" West European nature of any future organisation: a number of non-
69 The first objection on constitutional grounds was raised by Hodge. The second objection was raised by
Ratcliffe, who took over the chairmanship towards the end of the meeting.
70 The quotations are from the resolutions attached to document NCSR/80a (60) and from a report written
by Auger in his capacity as the chairman of the French Comité des Recherches Spatiales. The report is
entitled "Rapport sur la reunion, à Londres, de savants europeens pour examiner les possibilités d'une
cooperation dans le domaine des recherches spatiales", and is dated 9 May 1960 (folder "Origines de la
COPERS I", Mussard files, HAEC.
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European Member States, notably Canada and the USA, were about to enter the OEEC.71 In response
to these anxieties, Golay telephoned the appropriate office in Bern, and was authorised by his Federal
authorities to offer all the necessary financial, administrative and diplomatic assistance for the
preparatory arrangements for any approved cooperative scheme. It was left to Auger to explore both of
these avenues as soon as possible.
The deliberations which we have described call for three comments. Firstly, there is the sense of
urgency felt by the scientists. Indeed, it seems as though they hoped to have government agreement on
a project within eight months of the April meeting. This feeling sprung partly perhaps from the fear
that if they did not define a civilian space programme, quickly political and military-related interests
would steal a march on them - space research was being discussed by the European Consultative
Assembly and the OEEC in addition to NATO - leaving them with few resources and little or no
control over the shape of a joint European space programme. In addition, at least for the British, there
was the burning question of how to proceed with Blue Streak now that the government had decided to
abandon it as a ballistic missile. Even as the scientists were deliberating at the Royal Society there
were intense interdepartmental discussions going on inside the UK government around the possible
options for the now obsolete rocket - including its use as a civilian launcher in a European space
research programme (see chapter 3).
A second point to note is that at this stage the scientists interested in a European space effort were
thinking of creating one single organisation dedicated to the development of satellites as well of the
launchers needed for placing them into orbit. The details were of course still to be defined, notably the
nature and the extent of the contribution to be made by continental countries towards the development
of the launcher. But the principle was clear. In the words of the resolution passed by the group on
29 April 1960, those present were "strongly in favour of a cooperative effort by European nations
towards further research in space science including the placing in orbit of artificial satellites by a
launching vehicle developed and financed cooperatively".
This brings us to our third point - and here the contrast with CERN is striking - the British scientists'
enthusiasm, already manifest in February, to become involved in a joint European venture. On the face
of it one would have expected them to be as reticent in this case as they had been in the early 1950s
about the setting up of a European nuclear physics laboratory. Now, as then, they were the undisputed
leaders in Europe in the field, with a national research programme far more important than that of any
of their potential partners. On the other hand, unlike then, they were now seeking partners in a field
which was far more intellectually diverse and expensive than high-energy physics - and there was the
problem of Blue Streak. One of those attending the meeting at the Royal Society was A.W. Lines,
from the Royal Aircraft Establishment at Farnborough. Lines, Auger wrote afterwards, "was very
explicit about his country wanting to see this programme [i.e. Blue Streak], now abandoned for
military purposes, turned to civilian use". £56 million had already been spent on the project. With
another £10 million per annum for three to five years, Lines said, the rocket could be used to put a
500 kg satellite into orbit. Reinforcing Lines' remarks, other British delegates present "stressed how
encouraged their authorities would be if neighbouring European nations indicated their desire to
cooperate civilly in space", referring to the list of CERN Member States several times.72 In the case of
CERN, British scientists had had to decide whether or not to participate in a programme whose outline
was being progressively shaped by a group around Auger in 1951/52.73 A decade later, in the case of
space,  British scientists had defined an  ambitious  satellite programme and British engineers had built
71 See the report cited in the previous note. In December 1960, the OEEC was enlarged to include Canada
and the USA, whereupon it became the OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development).
72 Auger, "Rapport sur la reunion, ...", cit.
73 For the changing British attitudes on participation in CERN, see Krige in Hermann et al. (1987), chapters
12 and 13.
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rockets, initially for military purposes, which could be used to place their experiments in orbit.
"Europeanisation" was a way of sharing costs on the former, and of saving the money and the
expertise already invested in the latter.
1.4 The formation of GEERS
Auger set about the task of establishing the preparatory commission, as instructed by the resolutions
passed at the Royal Society meeting, in the weeks that followed. In May he discussed with the OEEC
and with Swiss representatives the terms and conditions under which they would support and finance
the commission. He also obtained offers of support from his own national authorities.74 Keen not to
lose the momentum that the new venture seemed to have picked up, he called a meeting of interested
delegates in Paris on 23 and 24 June 1960 (Figure 1-1). The delegates had before them Auger's
proposed "Draft Agreement Creating a Preparatory Commission for European Collaboration in the
Field of Space Research".75
It rapidly emerged that it would be impossible to set up the preparatory commission at this meeting, as
those who had gathered in April had hoped. For one thing, the scientific programme of any envisaged
European joint venture was not clear. And the British delegation insisted strongly that the precise
domain in which European collaboration was to occur had to be clearly specified before any
intergovernmental agreement was put forward for signature. The greatest uncertainty, of course,
concerned the launcher. Should the development of Blue Streak, Massey asked, "be part of European
cooperation, or should this cooperation be more specifically dedicated to the development of
instruments to be flown on satellites or on the construction of the satellite itself?"76
Then there was the question of the membership of the preparatory commission, and of Australia in
particular. Massey, while stressing that his government was keen to be involved in the activities of the
commission, "stated that the position of Australia was a serious difficulty in connection with United
Kingdom participation in the work of the group". Several delegations (notably the Swiss) felt that the
European character of the group should not be diluted. As S. Campiche put it, "the reason for having
this meeting was exactly to set up collaboration at the European level in this key domain, just as for
the case of CERN".77 But Massey was emphatic: the CERN arrangements made for collaboration with
non-European Member States would not suffice in this case, he said. Nor was he asking that an
exception be made for the whole of the Commonwealth, as had been the concern of the British when
the CERN Convention was drafted.78 "The major United Kingdom launching site belonged to the
Australian government", explained Massey, "and nothing must be done which would lead to the group
being denied access to the launching facilities at Woomera". The form of words, Massey went on, was
less important than the interpretation that may be put on them. These should not be such that they
could "in any way lead to the withdrawal of Australian cooperation".79
74 For brief information on Auger's activities during May, see the document "Date des Reunions Depuis
l'Origine", cit.
75 There is a more or less verbatim French version of the minutes of this meeting, entitled "Groupe d'étude
européen pour la collaboration dans le domain des recherches spatiales, reunions tenues à Paris les 23 et
24 juin 1960", distinguished by morning and afternoon sessions, and a briefer English version of the
minutes, entitled "Western European Space Research Meeting, 23/24 June 1960", which was prepared,
we believe, by the nominated British rapporteur, A.F. Moore, and dated 4 July 1960. These documents,
along with other supporting material, including Auger's "Draft Agreement ...", dated 21 June 1960, are to
be found in the folder "Origines de la COPERS, II", Mussard files, HAEC.
76 From the French version of the minutes referred to in the previous note, our translation.
77 Ibidem.
78 See Krige in Hermann et al. (1987), chapter 8.
79 From the English version of the minutes cit.
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Figure 1-1: The attendance register of some of those present at the meeting
constituting the GEERS on the morning of Friday 24 June 1960. R. Lüst was also present.
(folder Origines de la COPERS II, Mussard files, HAEC
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Finally, it was clear that those present simply did not have the authority to take decisions which would
be binding on their governments. True some national authorities had sent senior members of the state
apparatus to the meeting. France, for example, was represented by Auger along with a delegate from
Foreign Affairs, from the Armées "Air", and from the Délégation Générale à la Recherche Scientifique
et Technique. Similarly, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden and Spain sent high level officials, some
of them well-known in CERN circles (Bannier, Funke and Campiche). On the other hand, important
delegations like those from Italy and Britain were essentially represented by scientists - Broglio in the
case of Italy (Amaldi did not attend), and Massey, Moore and Robins in the case of the UK - with
limited powers. To accelerate matters, the Swedes proposed that the agreement be signed by
representatives within the limits of the authority that each had, so that it would be a mixed or semi-
governmental agreement. But it was not to be. The Belgian delegate F. Darimont stressed that "the
group must not forget that in Europe governments themselves are directly concerned with problems of
space research. Contacts at the highest level have already taken place on this subject between
ministers". International organisations, Darimont went on, had discussed these questions, and the
OEEC had already drawn up a broad outline of a possible scheme for collaboration in the field of
space. That granted, the Belgians insisted, it would be fatal not to involve governments from the very
start in the initiatives favoured by the scientists.80
In the light of these considerations - and much to the distress of Auger, Bannier and Funke - it was
decided that it was first necessary to establish a study group whose main tasks would be to continue
with scientific and technical studies to define more precisely the areas in which European cooperation
would take place, to draft a new agreement establishing the preparatory commission, and to convene a
meeting of duly authorised representatives to sign the agreement. This intergovernmental meeting, it
was thought, could be held within the course of the year (i.e. 1960). The preparatory commission
would come into being shortly thereafter, its main task being to draft a Convention and the associated
protocols for a European space research organisation, which would be submitted to prospective
Member States' governments for signature and parliamentary ratification.
The meeting duly constituted itself as the GEERS (Groupe d'Etudes Européen pour la Collaboration
dans le Domaine des Recherches Spatiales or, in the English version, The European Space Research
Study Group) and nominated its bureau: H. Massey (UK), chairman, L. Broglio (I), M. Golay (CH)
and L. Hulthén (S), vice-chairmen, and P. Auger (F) executive secretary. The French government's
offer to host such a bureau was accepted on the grounds that it was more convenient since Auger
would be the executive secretary. The Swiss in turn agreed to convene the intergovernmental meeting.
A drafting committee was set up to modify the original paper prepared by Auger. It met under the
chairmanship of Campiche on 5 July 1960 and rapidly converged on a new three-page draft agreement
establishing the preparatory commission.81
With these procedural matters settled, the only remaining important point of discussion was the
composition of technical study groups. According to the British version of the minutes, it was not clear
whether these meetings should be attended by technical representatives from each of the countries
present at the meeting, or "whether only those most intimately involved would be invited to the
meeting regardless of nationality". Auger, in a brief set of remarks on the deliberations, was more
explicit. Everyone understood, he said, that these meetings primarily concerned discussions between
British and French experts (about the launcher).82 All the same, several other countries - he mentions
Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden in particular - insisted on being involved in technical discussions
from the very beginning. Their argument was that only in this way could they begin to gain the
80 From the French version of the minutes cit., our translation.
81 The draft, entitled "Draft of an Agreement Creating a Preparatory Commission to Study the Possibilities
of European Collaboration in the Field of Space Research" is document no. 1 rev. 3, Paris, 5 July 1960 in
folder "Origines de la COPERS II", Mussard files, HAEC. The members of the drafting committee were
S. Campiche (CH) (convenor), J.H. Ferrier (NL), L. Malet (B), A.F. Moore (UK) and P. Auger (F).
82 See the document entitled "Remarques", undated and unsigned, but clearly written by Auger just after the
Paris meeting (folder "Origines de la COPERS II", Mussard files, HAEC.
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necessary experience in space research which until then had been a monopoly of the larger European
countries.83 In the light of these requests, Auger thought that a possible composition of the technical
group would involve four experts each from Britain and from France and one each from the other
eight member countries.
One comment by way of conclusion. The importance of this meeting in June 1960 lay in the fact that it
was the first in which scientists dealt face to face with administrators from a variety of European
countries interested in space research and were confronted with the political implications of their
project. For a space scientist par excellence like van de Hulst, there really seemed to be no need to
complicate matters by holding a conference of government representatives to sign what was after all
only "a preliminary agreement which would lead to the creation of a small organisation with rather
limited powers".84 But this was not in fact possible. And it was not possible because, in parallel with
the initiatives being taken by the scientists, there were high-level negotiations taking place between
European governments, above all over the question of launchers. The main actors here were Britain
and France, with at least Belgium keeping a very close eye on developments. Indeed, according to an
internal French document, from the time Britain decided to cancel its strategic military rocket Blue
Streak in April 1960, it had "offered France the possibility of collaborating in the development of a
satellite [launcher] using Blue Streak for the first stage, the experimental rocket Black Night (sic) for
the second stage, and a third stage involving new ideas".85 These negotiations were certainly behind
Massey's insistence that, while it was most likely that Britain would join the work of the preparatory
commission, it could not do so until it knew exactly what areas of collaboration were envisaged.
Nothing concrete could now be done until the place of launchers in any future European scheme had
been clarified.
1.5 Preparing for the intergovernmental meeting
Auger's expectation that the technical working group would be limited to about 16 people was not to
be realised. Indeed, no less than 36 experts attended the gathering held in the rooms of the Royal
Society from 3 to 6 October 1960. About half of these were from Britain (nine delegates) and from
France (eight delegates). Most other countries sent two or three representatives. Among the several
new faces at the meeting, which seems to have comprised almost exclusively scientists and engineers,
was a representative from Australia. After the deliberations by the experts Auger combined their
various reports into a single document. This was to form a basis for the meeting of governmental
representatives to be called by the Swiss.86
Auger's synthesis comprised four main divisions. The first briefly described the scientific, technical,
and economic advantages, as well as the indirect benefits deriving from European cooperation in the
field of space research. This was followed by a section written by A.W. Lines and R.F. Boyd
describing a possible scientific programme. Then came an outline, written by Auger himself, of the
general principles and organisational structure of the envisaged European agency. Finally Auger's
report described the activities to be undertaken by the preparatory commission which was to plan for
the establishment of the permanent organisation. It was to have a secretariat and five working groups,
it was expected to last for about a year, and its budget for that period was estimated to be of the order
of 935,000 new French francs (FF), over half of which was intended for the working groups.
83 See the British version of the minutes cit.
84 From the French version of the minutes cit., our translation.
85 Unsigned document entitled "Propositions britanniques de collaboration dans le domaine spatial", from
the Délégation générale à la recherche scientifique et technique, Paris, 2/4/1960: in Archives Nationales,
Mission Recherche, Paris, Re 130/31 Liasse 620.
86 The paper, entitled "Report on the London meeting. 3-6 October 1960", is document GEERS/3,
28 November 1960. A copy is in folder "Origines de la COPERS III", Mussard files, HAEC. An
abbreviated version of the paper is published in Massey and Robins (1986), Annex 8.
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One of the five working groups envisaged was to draft the proposed administrative and technical
framework of the new agency. The other four would deal exclusively with scientific and technical
matters. One would be responsible for defining the scientific programme, to be based essentially on
sounding rockets and satellites. Another was to be a group of rocketry experts "whose task [would] be
to study the existing possibilities in obtaining vehicles and using launching sites". This group would
look into the possible use of European rockets like Blue Streak, as well study the conditions under
which American rockets like Thor and Atlas could be obtained. As for launching sites, the report
mentioned Colomb-Bechar - the French military base in the Sahara - Woomera in Australia and Cape
Canaveral in Florida. A third group would be needed "to make proposals for scientific and
technological research in such fields as propulsion, power sources, information storage and
transmission, solid state physics". This activity, the experts suggested, should take up a rather
important slice of the agency's budget since in addition to their intrinsic scientific interest, such studies
promoted "general technological progress", as well as stimulating industrial development in the
Member States. Finally, there would be a group of scientists responsible for exploring the possibilities
of setting up and using networks of telemetry and tracking stations both for satellites orbiting the Earth
and for deep space probes.
The underlying philosophy and a possible organisational scheme of the new European agency were
also defined by the experts in the autumn 1960 meeting. It was essential, they said, that the agency be
involved in all stages of space research, from securing vehicles and using launching sites to the
exploitation of the scientific results and the processing of the data. Its international character, they
went on, should be reflected in the geographical distribution of its establishments, in the composition
of its scientific and technical personnel, and in the allocation of contracts to industry. At the same
time, they insisted that it should not compete with national efforts in the Member States: it was to
"help [...] and enhance their efficiency but in no case supplant them".
From the organisational point of view, the London meeting proposed that the main facility of the
organisation should be an Engineering Centre responsible for the engineering of satellites and large
scientific payloads. It was also suggested that a main Data Analysis Centre should be established, in
addition to the tracking and data facilities which would be required.87 In the scheme of the
Organisation that Auger sketched on a blackboard chart at the meeting the most interesting feature is
the equal status of the two main bodies controlling it: the Scientific Committee and the Council, both
composed of national delegates.88 The former had the task to examine all proposals for research, either
from Universities and national scientific institutions or from within the organisation itself, and to
decide about the actual scientific programme of the Organisation. The Council would have "overall
control on policy and finance". Scientists would undoubtedly serve on both. It is evident that, by this
time, the plans for the new European space research organisation were strongly affected by the
determination of the scientists to control, as far as possible, the new Organisation: they were thinking
of an international agency, funded by governments, whose policy had to be defined by an independent
scientific body on the basis of pure scientific considerations. A striking aspect of this scheme was the
omission of an administrative and financial committee composed of national administrators which, as
in the case of CERN, would be responsible for recommending the organisation's budget and for
advising the Council on financial matters. By lopping off the main organ through which national
treasuries could make their presence felt, the scientists doubtless hoped to reduce bureaucratic and
political influence on the shape of the organisation to the minimum.
The broad outlines of a possible scientific programme were also sketched in London. This should
include both a sounding rocket programme and a satellite programme. The scientific aims of the
former were to be a synoptic study of the atmosphere from 30 to 200 km and the study of solar
activity. The Organisation would approve the scientific experiments, coordinate the buying and
distribution of the rockets, integrate, engineer and test the payloads, obtain access for scientists to
87 These two centres became the European Space Research and Technology Centre (ESTEC) and the
European Space Data Centre (ESDAC): see following chapter.
88 Massey and Robins (1986), 116.
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existing launching sites, organise the testing and firing of the rockets, and, finally, collect and
disseminate data on telemetry and tracking systems and equipment.
As for satellites, "the Agency should administer funds large enough to provide scientists with missiles
enabling them to put satellites in orbit, and develop the required instrumentation". A three phase
programme was described. The first, lasting about three years, would include putting into orbit
satellites of approximately 100 kg carrying experiments in the fields of atmospheric physics, geodetic
and time measurement problems, and cosmic rays. Although these experiments would not be
sophisticated, they would serve "to build up European scientific teams with enough experiments to
make a full contribution to space research". In the second phase, which would start after about five
years, satellites of 500-1000 kg would be launched into terrestrial orbit and lighter payloads into the
lunar field. Here more sophisticated experiments would be undertaken, such as the detailed study of
stellar ultraviolet and X-ray spectra, the interplanetary and interstellar absorption, and the cosmic rays
in interplanetary space. Finally, there was the third phase, to be developed in parallel with the first
two. In this phase, the aim would be to study projects "likely to end up, during the following years, in
the development of devices capable of landing scientific equipment on the moon, exploring other
planets and studying the Sun's neighbourhood". For this it was necessary for the agency, inter alia, to
undertake research from the start in the "advanced systems that this phase of the programme
demanded". Examples were propulsion systems, power sources, information storage, solid state
physics, high-vacuum technology and material science.
An important aspect of this meeting is that the delegates did not discuss, as they had in April, possible
collaboration in the development of Blue Streak as a European launcher. This was partly because
Anglo-French negotiations in this regard were still under way and, to quote Massey and Robins, "the
UK delegates to the technical discussion meeting were asked not to refer to the matter in any way
during the meeting".89 At the same time it is noteworthy that, in so far as Blue Streak and Australia
were mentioned at the meeting, they were seen as one option among others, which included using
American launchers and French and American launching bases. In other words, whatever the outcome
of the political negotiations over the launcher, the technical experts were already beginning to distance
themselves from the issue, to consider alternative ways of achieving their scientific objectives. And to
narrow the scope of "their" space organisation accordingly.
1.6 The Meyrin conference and the setting up of COPERS
The meeting of authorised governmental representatives was duly convoked by the Swiss government.
It took place at CERN in Meyrin (a suburb of Geneva) from 28 November to 1 December 1960.90 It
was attended by mixed delegations of scientists and government officials (notably from the
departments of foreign affairs) from the now usual ten countries plus Spain, which was initially
admitted as an observer and later as a full participant in the conference proceedings.
89 Massey and Robins (1986), 115. The authors remark that "this was somewhat embarassing because some
of the delegates from the Continent already knew quite a lot about it".
90 A report on the proceedings of this conference drafted by J.H. Bannier, its rapporteur, and labelled
document CIRS/4/rev is available in the ESA Collection, box 787, HAEC. Its annexes include the
introductory speeches to the conference (Annex 1), amendments to the draft agreement proposed by the
Dutch delegation (Annex 2), and the Resolution drafted by one of the working groups which was set up
by the conference (Annex 3). In the same box one finds the draft agreement setting up the Preparatory
Commission, document CIRS4/rev. 7, 1 December 1960. A copy of this report without the annexes can
also be found in the folder "Origines de la COPERS IV", Mussard files, HAEC. This folder also contains
a number of other documents and letters relevant to the conference, in particular a report of the
proceedings written by Auger in his capacity as the chairman of the French committee for space research.
It is entitled "Compte rendu sommaire de la conférence intergouvernementale sur la recherche spatiale
tenue à Genève, du 28 novembre au 1er décembre 1960". There are two versions of this report, a
preliminary version which is undated, and a final version dated 5 December 1960.
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After being welcomed by Max Petitpierre, the president of the Swiss Confederation, and François de
Rose, the president of the CERN Council and the head of the French delegation, those present elected
their bureau. Massey (UK) was elected chairman of the conference by acclamation, Broglio (I) and
Golay (CH) were appointed vice-chairmen, Auger (F) was appointed secretary, and Bannier (NL) was
elected rapporteur. After a preliminary exchange of views, three working groups were set up. The first,
chaired by Campiche (CH), was called on to study the legal aspects of the draft agreement. The
second, chaired by Funke (S), was to study the proposed budget and scale of contributions to the
envisaged Preparatory Commission. Finally and most importantly, there was the working group
chaired by Golay, whose task it was to study the scientific and technical objectives of the organisation
to be created. The working groups spent two full days in discussion, submitting their reports after
lunch on 30 November. On the last morning the final touches were put to the draft agreement,
arrangements were made for the interim period between the conference and the setting up of a
"Preparatory Commission to Study the Possibilities of European Collaboration in the Field of Space
Research" (COPERS, from its French initials), and a budget for the first year of the preparatory
commission (935,000 FF) and scale of contributions (those in force at CERN) were settled. The
agreement establishing the COPERS was opened for signature at 4 p.m. on the afternoon of
1 December 1960.
The proceedings at Geneva were overshadowed by new developments on the question of launchers. In
the weeks before the Meyrin conference there had been intense activity in both Britain and France.
According to a French source, in September 1960 there was mounting pressure on his government to
react positively to the UK's proposal to have France collaborate in the development of a rocket using
Blue Streak as a first stage, and possibly Black Knight as a second.91 Several technical and ministerial
exchanges took place between the two countries and a meeting presided by the Prime Minister was
held in November to establish the French position. Here it was decided that "France was willing to
associate itself with the British government in a proposal to other European states that a study be made
of the technical and financial possibilities of building in Europe a rocket system able to put heavy
satellites in orbit." In return, though, it was a necessary, but not sufficient condition for any such
collaboration that the second stage of the rocket be built in France, and not be Black Knight.92
By the end of November, then, it looked increasingly likely that Britain and France would jointly
propose a launcher programme to their European partners on terms and conditions still to be arranged.
Neither wanted the issue discussed at Meyrin. At the outset, the leader of the British delegation,
R.N. Quirk, made it clear that in his view, "the main purpose of the present Conference was to come to
an agreement about the legal document that would establish the Preparatory Commission and about
the budgetary arrangements which the creation of the Commission would entail". As for its scientific
and technical objectives, he said a little later, "it would be desirable to define them briefly and exclude
such questions as rockets and telecommunications from discussions at this stage". The leader of the
French delegation, F. de Rose, was quick to support him: "The problem of rocket vehicles should not
be considered by the Conference". It was possible, he went on, to separate the scientific aspects of
space research from that concerning the development and construction of space vehicles in Europe.
"The French government was prepared to consider the possibility of developing suitable rockets in
Europe", said de Rose, "but not within the terms of reference of the present Conference or of the
Preparatory Commission." An organisation, he went on, "could be set up in Europe to carry out space
research without developing its own rockets".93 The British and French governments, in other words,
were now absolutely determined to keep scientific research in space separate from applications on the
one hand, and, more fundamentally, from the construction and development of launchers on the other.
91 See the unsigned document "Proposition Britannique de Collaboration dans le Domaine Spatial",
21 November 1960, produced by the Délégation Générale à la Recherche Scientifique et Technique, in
Archives Nationales, Mission Recherche, Re 130/31, Liasse 620.
92 See the "Procès-Verbal de la 22ème Réunion du Comité des Recherches Spatiales tenue le 14 Décembre
1960", dated 20 December 1960, at which F. de Rose explained developments in the Anglo-French
negotiations over the launcher: in Archives Nationales, Mission Recherche, Re 130/31, Liasse 620. Our
translation of what appears to be a verbatim statement.
93 From Bannier's report on the meeting, cit.
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The main arguments given at the meeting against "creating an organisation that would not only carry
out space research but also develop large rockets" (Quirk) were of a financial nature. Firstly, it was
pointed out that since the latter part of such a programme would cost far more than the former, it was
likely that the scientific part "would become a very small fraction of the whole project" (de Rose), so
not only being swamped but also marginalised. Secondly, it was stressed that the added burden
imposed by including rocket construction along with scientific research might frighten off some
governments, notably those from the smaller Member States, from joining a space organisation. This
would not only dilute its European character but increase the already heavy burden borne by the
remaining Member States.
The weight of these considerations was reinforced by the fact that the scientific communities in some
countries were becoming increasingly dubious about including launcher development along with space
research in the same organisation. This was particularly so in Britain and France, where space
scientists hoped to have important national research programmes. Both communities feared that if
European research in space science was funded from the same source as the construction of launchers
it could only be at the expense of their national plans. Massey posed the problem in terms of the
danger to scientific research as a whole. "We do not want to set up a European NASA", he is alleged
to have said. "The funds given to a new research agency must not be excessive with respect to the
funds allocated to other scientific fields, and thus one cannot consider financing within this framework
the development of costly vehicles or of important fixed installations". The role of any new
organisation, Massey went on, should be directed exclusively towards scientific research.94 A French
committee for space research meeting about a fortnight before reached a similar conclusion. It
remarked that the British government's proposal for building a satellite launcher in common was not
without interest. If the scheme went ahead as hoped, it would rapidly enable French scientists to put
payloads in orbit which were heavier than those then being launched by the United States. At the same
time, the committee expressed its concern at the possibility of there being "an important
disequilibrium" between the expenditure required for building launchers and what would then be
available for the construction and exploitation of the scientific equipment. It was certainly useful for
France to explore the possibility opened up by the British proposal, the committee concluded, but only
on condition that "the national programme for space science research was not in any way reduced".
And there was an alternative, i.e. the possibility of having NASA launch French satellites on the same
terms as had recently been agreed with their British colleagues.95
At the Meyrin conference only the Swedish delegation, of those whose reactions are recorded in the
minutes, was unambiguously in favour of the Anglo-French wish to hive off launchers from satellites.
This was doubtless for reasons of cost and to protect its neutrality. "The development of launchers was
a problem for highly industrialised countries and should be kept separate from the problem of space
research", the Scandinavian delegate said. Apart from that, the Belgians, in particular, were strongly
opposed. "There should be only one international organisation in Europe responsible for the design
and development of rockets, space research and the exploitation of results", said their delegate
M. Depasse. The Dutch, the Swiss, and the Italians were similarly concerned though not prepared to
argue for a single organisation. The development of rockets, van de Hulst pointed out, required a
considerable amount of scientific research, and Europe had much to learn in this regard. One should
not exclude the development of rockets altogether, said Golay, since those available might not be
adapted to the needs which European scientists had. While it was certainly of little interest to devote
important sums to the construction of rockets in the short term, said Broglio, "as a long term project,
94 From Auger's "Compte rendu sommaire ...", cit.
95 See document "Examen de la Proposition Britannique par le Comité des Recherches Spatiales",
16 November 1960: in Archives Nationales, Mission Recherche, Paris, Re 130/31 Liasse 620. The
committee pointed out that its five year plan for the years 196l-1965 was estimated to cost 130 million
FF, and that a further 100 million FF would probably be required for a European collaborative effort in
space science. The cost to France of collaborating with the British on launchers was estimated to be
roughly the same as the sum of these together (250 million FF spread over five years).
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however, the development of rockets by the Space Research Organisation might prove cheaper than
purchasing launchers or having them developed under contract by other organisations".96
It was inevitably the view of the two most powerful countries (the German delegation having no
authority to speak on the matter) that prevailed in the resolution passed by the meeting. The task of the
preparatory commission would be to "consider arrangements for the design, development and
construction of space research satellites, and arrangements for the launching of such satellites". The
commission was then instructed to "take note of the negotiations separately in progress among certain
Member States of the Conference for the collaborative development of a satellite launcher". In the
event of an organisation being created for this purpose, it was to "consider the closest possible co-
operation between this organisation and the contemplated European Space Research Organisation".97
Countries like Belgium who feared that, if they did not participate in a rocket programme, they would
be deprived of "knowledge and experience which would be of more direct economic utility than that
which could be had from an organisation concerned principally with satellites", were compensated in
the preamble to the agreement setting up the preparatory commission.98 In line with a Dutch
amendment, the scope of the envisaged organisation was expanded beyond "collaboration in the field
of space research" to "collaboration in research in space science and space technology and in the
pooling of the knowledge thereof".99 The decision that the preparatory commission should not concern
itself with launchers solved, or rather dissolved, one major problem: the question of Australia. The
agreement establishing the COPERS, while insisting that new members be accepted unanimously,
stated clearly that these should be European states. "Other states," it added, could "associate
themselves" with the work of COPERS, again by unanimous agreement. There was no important
debate over these now uncontroversial restrictions.100
The "Meyrin Agreement" setting up the preparatory commission was signed on 1 December 1960
without reserve by representatives from five states (Belgium and the Netherlands, Norway and
Sweden, and the United Kingdom), and subject to reservation by representatives from five others
(Denmark, France, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland). The German delegate had no authority to sign the
document, but made it clear that this was for purely formal reasons and that he would do so in due
course. With the deposit of the instruments of ratification by France (27 January 1960) and
Switzerland (24 February 1960), and the subsequent signature without reserve by Germany, eight
countries totalling 83.46% of the budget had become parties to the agreement. With the conditions
satisfied (signature, with ratification if necessary, by six Member States contributing at least 70% of
the budget), it entered into force on 27 February 1961. The first session of the European Preparatory
Commission for Space Research (COPERS) was held a fortnight later in Paris from 13-14 March
1961.101
In parallel with these developments, the British and French governments continued their discussions
about the launcher. Early in December, a UK technical mission was sent across the Channel to explore
the implications of the French demand that they be responsible for the second stage of a jointly
developed rocket. The conclusions they drew were explained to the French government on
96 All these quotations are from Bannier's report on the conference proceedings, cit.
97 See Annex 3 to Bannier's report, cit.
98 The quotation is from a "Note aux chefs de la division des organisations internationales",
17 November 1960, written by Campiche and copied to Auger, in which he reported on a meeting he had
had with the Belgian Ambassador that day. According to this note, Campiche hoped that countries
supplying rockets to the new organisation would allow the technicians from its Member States to take
part in the elaboration of rocket projects. From the folder "Origines de la COPERS IV", Mussard files,
HAEC.
99 The first formulation is from a draft of the agreement proposed by the French delegation, document
GEERS/1/rev 4, 28 November 1960 in the folder "Origines de la COPERS IV", Mussard files, HAEC.
The second formulation is from the final Agreement, document CIRS/1/rev 7, 1 December 1960, in box
787, ESA Collection, HAEC.
100 See Article 2 of the Agreement, document CIRS/1/rev. 7, cit.
101 For information on this paragraph see the minutes of the first session of the COPERS, COPERS/Min/1.
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12 December by Peter Thorneycroft, the British Minister of Aviation. Britain, he said, was prepared to
see a French rocket atop Blue Streak instead of its own Black Knight, and British firms would even be
available to act as consultants to the French, who seemed to be technically somewhat behind their UK
counterparts - but on condition that France paid the same fraction as Britain of the costs of the
launcher. France made it clear that she could not accept a financial burden of this magnitude.102 An
agreement was hammered out at an intergovernmental meeting called by the two countries and held at
Strasbourg from 30 January to 2 February 1961. A programme was adopted for the development of a
three-stage launcher with the first built by the UK, the second by France and the third, as well as a
series of test satellites, by other Member States. It was accepted that France, Germany and Italy would
contribute to the costs of the programme, estimated at £ 70 million over five years for the vehicle, at
the rate of their contributions to the CERN budget, which was based on national income (i.e. about
21%, 20%, and 10%, respectively, in 1960). Britain, for her part, instead of paying the 25% that she
contributed to CERN would pay 33.33 % of the whole. The benefit of her additional investment was to
be handed on to smaller contributors, whose shares would be reduced accordingly. "This British
proposal was decisive for the future of the undertaking", we are told.103 By February 1961 it was clear
that Europe would enter space with not one organisation, as Amaldi and Auger had thought that spring
day in Paris almost two years before, but with two.
102 For details on the Anglo-French negotiations in this period as seen by the French, see the
"Procès-Verbal ..." cit. above. Further details on these matters will be given in chapter 3.
103 From the ELDO Report to the Council of Europe 1965, pp. 7-8.
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Chapter 2: 
The Early Activities of the COPERS and the Setting up of ESRO104
J. Krige & A. Russo
The COPERS held its first session in Paris on 13 and 14 March 1961.105 Its first task was to create the
organs needed to define the scientific programme and the necessary infrastructure of the envisaged
organisation, to draw up its budget, and to prepare a Convention for signature by those member state
governments who wished to join it. To this end the meeting first elected its "bureau": chairman Harrie
Massey, vice-chairmen, Luigi Broglio and Hendrik van de Hulst, and executive secretary Pierre
Auger, all men who had played an important role in the debates in 1960 and, Auger apart, still active
and eminent European space scientists. It then established two working groups. The first was the
Interim Scientific and Technical Working Group (STWG). Its task was to prepare the scientific
programme for the future space organisation, paying particular attention to the technical and financial
implications of its proposals. Lamek Hulthén, from the Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm,
was nominated chairman of this group; Reimar Lüst from the Max-Planck-Institut für Physik und
Astrophysik in Garching, near Munich was appointed its coordinating secretary. The second was the
Legal, Administrative and Financial Working Group (LAFWG). Its chairman was initially left open,
though it was recommended that he be someone from the German Federal Republic. In the event,
Alexander Hocker, a senior bureaucrat from Bad-Godesberg who was also the chairman of the CERN
Finance Committee at the time, took on this task. All Member States were to be represented on both
working groups, which were empowered to set up subgroups to facilitate their work.
Most of this chapter will be devoted to a description of the main activities of these two groups,
particularly in so far as they bore on the drafting of the Convention of the new European Space
Research Organisation (ESRO). This Convention was laid before an intergovernmental conference in
Paris on 14 and 15 June 1962. Three main aspects will be discussed in particular. The first is the
preparation of the scientific programme for ESRO's first eight-year period, including an outline of the
research fields to be pursued, the identification of the technical means to be used (sounding rockets,
satellites and space probes) and a tentative launching programme. The scientific programme was
worked out by the STWG and presented to the COPERS in October 1961 in a report eventually known
as the "Blue Book" from the colour of its cover.106 The second aspect is the definition of the facilities
and technical infrastructure of the new organisation and the controversial decision about sites of its
establishments. Finally, the third aspect we will discuss is the definition of ESRO's eight-year budget
and the mechanism worked out for keeping it under control. In the last section, we will discuss some
features of ESRO's institutional structure and its evolution in the first period of the Organisation's life.
By restricting our subject matter in this way, we do not, of course, deal with all matters handled by the
COPERS and its working groups in this period, and not by the LAFWG in particular (staff policy and
internal structure, privileges and immunities, etc.). We do however throw into relief the most
significant issues which were "settled" in the run up to the signature of the Convention, so exploring in
depth the history of some key clauses in that important legal document. Two striking features will be
pointed out, in particular. First is the determination of the Member States delegates to keep the
development of ESRO under tight control. This was so regarding the scope of its scientific
programme, the extent of its facilities, and above all its budget, which was fixed for no less than eight
years with difficult-to-dislodge ceilings on expenditure at regular intervals. Second, and more
surprisingly, is the willingness of scientists to accept these constraints. In fact we even find scientists
arguing against administrators who wanted to increase ESRO's budget during the first eight-year
period, and who thought it prudent to introduce a large margin of flexibility into its funding profile.
104 This chapter is essentially based on Russo (1992a) and Krige (1993a) and (1993b).
105 The minutes of the meeting are COPERS/Min/1, undated.
106 Report of the Scientific and Technical Working Group to the European Preparatory Commission for
Space Research, 2nd edition, December 1961, hereafter referred to as the Blue Book.
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The attitudes of both governments and scientists were, we believe, informed by their wish to develop
robust national programmes in parallel with their European commitments. This inevitably meant that
the scope of ESRO's activities and its cost had to be contained so as to stop the international initiative
swamping the national efforts. It was yet another difference between ESRO and the CERN on which it
was "modelled", a difference reflecting the very different perceptions which government's had of
space - seen as a strategic activity directly affecting the national interest - and high-energy physics in
the 1960s.
2.1 Working out ESRO's scientific programme:
2.1.1 The first discussions
The most pressing task facing the Preparatory Commission was the definition of the scientific
programme of the new organisation. This was not simply because this programme formed the
backbone, the raison d'être of the envisaged body. It was also for practical reasons: it determined the
necessary infrastructure and, of course, the budget of ESRO. To this end, Hulthén and Lüst rapidly
convened the first meeting of the STWG in Stockholm on 4 and 5 April 1961. It was attended by 23
delegates from the eleven Member States of the COPERS, the bulk of them scientists though there
were also a few engineers. The main purpose of this meeting was to make a preliminary survey of
suitable scientific and technical projects, and to set up working groups to elaborate them further. The
meeting was necessarily preparatory. Not only had it been called in great haste. There was also limited
overlap in participation with the GEERS working group which had met the previous October in
London (see chapter 1). Ten of the delegates to Stockholm had not attended the earlier meeting, and
many influential European space scientists were not present in Sweden.107
Following the deliberations of the GEERS, the participants in the Stockholm meeting agreed to
organise ESRO's scientific programme into three kinds of projects: short-term projects, based on the
use of sounding rockets; medium-term projects, requiring small satellites and space probes; and long-
term projects, involving the use of larger and more complex spacecraft. This decision was not
uncontroversial, however. Stimulated by some critical comments from the Italian engineer and space
scientist Luigi Broglio, a lively discussion arose about the role and scope of the sounding rocket and
small satellite programmes.108 According to Broglio, these two programmes had to be mainly
performed on a national basis (sounding rockets) and in close cooperation with the NASA (small
satellites), while ESRO should concentrate its efforts on more ambitious projects, well beyond
national resources. In order to get the small satellite programme started quickly, Broglio proposed that
contact be made with NASA to establish what kind of launches and what technical assistance the
American agency would be prepared to give to the Europeans. ESRO's small satellite programmes
would then be "subordinated to the vehicles which might be available". As regards a "real, original and
advanced long-term programme", Broglio insisted that Europe should pursue technology research on
future propulsion systems (e.g. nuclear propulsion).
Broglio won little support for his idea that the sounding rocket programme should be left at national
level. Apart the consideration that the geographical dependency of such projects and the joint
provision of launch facilities required a collaborative effort, three main arguments were given for
maintaining this programme within the framework of ESRO. First was the need to involve the smaller
countries more effectively in ESRO's cooperative activities; second was the possibility for the
European space science community to get significant results in a short time and independently from
the American programmes; third was the consideration that such a programme would provide the
107 We have two versions of the minutes of this meeting, one in French and one in English, respectively in
the Mussard files and in folder 1688 of the ESA Collection, HAEC. Both are unsigned. In addition there
are twelve Appendices to the minutes which include a list of those present and the details of the various
offers and scientific proposals made at the meeting. Mussard files (HAEC), folder "GTST intérimaire".
See also Massey and Robins (1986), 120-123.
108 Broglio's statement is Appendix 8 to the minutes.
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research groups and the new Organisation with useful experience in view of growing involvement in
the more demanding satellite projects.
Broglio's suggestion that American launchers be used systematically created considerable controversy.
Some delegates, obviously not wishing to have a European satellite programme defined simply by the
availability of American launchers, feared that his proposal "would lead to extensive dependency upon
American organisations". More generally, though, there was a "thorough discussion" of whether or not
American launchers should be used at all in the European programme. According to one version of the
meeting, there were "tense exchanges between representatives from the United Kingdom, Belgium,
Holland, Italy, Germany and France" on this question and, after "a show of hands, the Working Group
rejected the British request to take immediately a position for or against the possible use of American
satellite launchers".109
There was probably one main reason why delegates to the Stockholm meeting baulked at the idea of
systematically using American launchers to get started with a European satellite programme. As we
shall discuss in depth in the following chapter, in April 1961 negotiations in government circles over
ELDO membership were in a particularly delicate phase. Britain and France had proposed to their
European partners a joint launcher development programme based on the British rocket Blue Streak as
a first stage, but the initial reactions in Germany and Italy, in particular, were cool. It would be
politically foolish to draft an ESRO programme now in which the scientists seemed committed to
using American launchers. In the event, the Interim STWG decided that a decision on the question of
launchers "was not appropriate under the present circumstances and that a subgroup would be a more
suitable forum to discuss this question".
A coherent and well defined proposal on short-term projects was presented in Stockholm by the
Swedish physicist Bengt Hultqvist, the director of the Geophysical Observatory in Kiruna. This listed
13 experiments to measure upper atmosphere parameters in the auroral zone by means of rocket-borne
instrumentation, and included cost estimates for rockets (six for each experiment), personnel and
equipment.110 The proposal reflected the interest and experience of Scandinavian scientists, and
Hultqvist's in particular, in ionospheric studies in the auroral zone and over the polar cap. An interest
in this kind of investigation also existed in Great Britain, where a rocket programme for ionospheric
studies had started in 1953 with launchings going on since 1957. Hultqvist's proposal was thus
strongly supported at the meeting by the British physicist Robert Boyd, of University College London,
in spite of some disagreement among the delegates "as to whether such a sounding rocket program
was to be regarded as a true European cooperative project".111
Boyd himself, on behalf of the British delegation, presented a proposal for the long term
programme.112 This included two projects to be realised in 4-6 years, i.e. a series of astronomical
observatories based on a highly stabilised satellite platform and a series of lunar satellites. Several
scientific objectives were listed for the space observatories, with emphasis on astronomical studies in
the ultraviolet (UV) and X-ray region of the electromagnetic spectrum, where atmospheric absorption
hinders the use of ground based telescopes. Boyd mentioned in this respect that extensive preparatory
work had been made in Great Britain for a satellite devoted to UV stellar spectroscopy with 1 Å
resolution in the range 1250-3300 Å. The aims of the second project were the investigation of the
physical properties of the moon and the provision of a long-life observatory for the study of the solar
corpuscular radiation, of the interplanetary dust and of cosmic rays outside the terrestrial magnetic
field. Lunar satellites were also considered a first step towards the direct study of planets.
While Hultqvist's and Boyd's proposals were accepted in principle as a basis for further elaboration of
the short and long-term programmes respectively, no definite idea was discussed about the medium-
109 The first two quotes are from the English and the last from the French version of the minutes.
110 Hultqvist' proposal is Appendix 9 to the minutes.
111 The British programme in ionospheric research is extensively described in Massey and Robins (1986).
112 Appendix 3 to the minutes.
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term projects. The participants at the meeting received favourably a suggestion from the French
delegation (P. Blassel and J. Kovalevsky) for a radio-astronomical satellite and a proposal from Lüst
to use satellites and rockets to create artificial comets. Other projects were received coolly and
ultimately given a very low priority by the STWG, e.g. a proposal by the Swedish physicist B. Bolin
for a programme of sounding rocket research in meteorology and an offer from the Spanish delegation
to establish a launching range as soon as possible on the Iberian peninsula or in the Canaries.113 Bolin's
proposal was retained in a first draft of the programme but eventually dropped. Other proposals were
stifled at birth, notably a Dutch suggestion that ESRO conduct research into means of guidance and
control for sounding rockets such that they could be safely launched from small sites
(e.g. 5 km x 5 km) in built-up areas.114 The meeting felt that the safety questions raised by this
proposal should first be settled by international agreement before ESRO conducted such activities.
Another important proposal made in Stockholm was not simply marginalised but actually
subsequently excluded by the STWG. It was a suggestion from the Belgian delegation that the
Working Group "leave open" the possibility of having European telecommunication satellites for
telephone and television linkages. The STWG did just the opposite. In an early draft of the
Convention, the Group, after its meeting of 27 and 28 July 1961, specifically excluded work of a
potentially commercial nature from the activities of ESRO.115
Concluding its business, the meeting nominated the Norwegian delegate O. Dahl as Vice-Chairman of
the Interim STWG and set up four subgroups of experts devoted respectively to Scientific Programmes
(chairman B. Hultqvist), Technology (chairman A.W. Lines, from the Royal Aircraft Establishment at
Farnborough), Tracking and Data Handling (chairman J.C. Pecker, from the Observatoire de Meudon,
and subsequently C. de Jager, from the Utrecht Observatory) and Vehicles and Ranges (chairman
J. Vandenkerckhove, from the Institute of Aeronautics of the University of Brussels). Eventually, the
reports produced by these groups were included in the STWG's final report to the COPERS (the Blue
Book).
After the London and Stockholm meetings, and with Boyd's and Hultqvist's proposals to hand, it was
not a difficult task for the first subgroup to write down the outline of ESRO's future scientific
programme. The first meeting of this subgroup, held in Kiruna on 27-29 April 1961, was attended only
by Boyd and Hultqvist, by two other scientists from Sweden (E.A. "Brunberg, E." and J. Ortner) and
by one from Norway (B. Landmark). The French engineer P. Blassel was also present on behalf of the
COPERS Secretariat. Of the other Member States, only Belgium and Germany had nominated
representatives in the subgroup but they were unable to attend.116 The meeting confirmed the three-
phase programme and made it slightly richer. The short-term programme included (with just a few
additions) the rocket experiments in the auroral zone outlined by Hultqvist, with the addition of similar
experiments in the upper atmosphere at medium and low latitudes and of rocket-borne astronomical
experiments. A series of meteorological pilot studies was also included at this stage, to be performed
by launching many small rockets (350 per year). This part of the programme, however, was eventually
not included in the Blue Book. The long-term programme included Boyd's projects of astronomical
satellites and lunar orbiters, with the addition of a project for geostationary satellites and a twin-
satellite project for radio-interferometric studies of the upper atmosphere. Eventually, however, only
Boyd's proposals survived in the Blue Book. Finally, the list of research fields in the medium-term
programme remained quite generic. It included a wide range of topics such as ionospheric research;
solar physics; geodetic studies; cosmic-ray physics and Van Allen radiation; gravitational, electric and
magnetic fields in the Earth's space environment and in the interplanetary space; solar wind
investigations; cometary evolution and interplanetary plasma. The list also included "study of
113 Appendices 10 and 11 to the minutes.
114 Appendix 7 to the minutes.
115 The Belgian proposal is prominent in the French version of the minutes. The change in the Convention is
to be found in COPERS/AWG/18 (add. 1, rev. 3), 28 July 1961.
116 Hultqvist, Report to the interim Scientific and Technical Working Group of the Preparatory Commission
for European Space Research from the Subgroup for Scientific Projects, 4 May 1961: Mussard files,
HAEC, folder "GTST intérimaire". J. Ortner is actually Austrian but he worked at Kiruna at that time.
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fundamental problems in long distance communication by means of satellites" which eventually
disappeared from the Blue Book.
From the organisational point of view, the meeting proposed that the scientific projects to be supported
by ESRO should be divided into two groups:
a. pure ESRO projects, totally funded and engineered by the Organisation: these were to be primarily
large satellite projects in the long-term programme;
b. combined national and ESRO projects, in which the experiments were built by the scientific
institutes proposing them and funded by national funds, while ESRO would take care of their
integration in rocket or satellite payloads and would provide technical facilities for engineering,
testing and launching.
For both kinds of projects, however, it was foreseen that all the scientific work - planning the
experiments, design and construction of the scientific instruments, interpretation of the results, etc. -
had to be done by research groups in the Member States, while no in-house scientific laboratory was to
be established.
2.1.2 The question of in-house research in ESRO
The scheme worked out by the subgroup was discussed at the second meeting of the Interim STWG,
held in London on 8-9 May 1961. The meeting was attended by 37 people, including not only
scientists and engineers, but also some bureaucrats and representatives from industry. They accepted
in principle the plan, which underwent in fact only minor modifications before being presented to the
COPERS for final approval. On this basis, the STWG drafted an outline of the launching programme,
the facilities and the budget of ESRO over the first eight years of its existence.117 We shall discuss
these elements in the following sections. Here we want to focus on some controversial aspects
regarding the role and aims of the future Organisation which were lively discussed in this period.
Two major areas of conflict can be identified. The first regards the relative priority to be given to
projects involving small- and medium-size satellites, on the one hand, and to those requiring larger
and more complex spacecraft on the other. The first option met the interests of the physicists involved
in the various fields of space research: they advocated a programme mainly based on a large number
of multi-experiment satellites, capable of meeting the needs of numerous research groups. The second
option was supported by the astronomers, whose scientific interest was in the realisation of a few
space telescopes on highly stabilised, high-performance spacecraft.
The first option was more versatile and flexible but left ESRO mainly in the position of an agency
providing managerial and technical facilities for a rather dispersed and fragmented set of activities.
Moreover, this course of action left the Organisation's financially limited operational programme to
competition between the various sectors of the space science community. The second option was more
in line with the CERN model, establishing a principle of cooperation with the view of carrying out
projects of interest to a large, relatively homogeneous, multinational scientific community, whose
realisation required financial and technological means far beyond the capabilities of individual
Member States.118
In the event, the programme of ESRO, as it was worked out in that very early phase, did not establish
priorities: either between different kinds of projects or between scientific fields. It came to be
presented as an ambitious list of topics covering almost all fields of space science, with the only
exclusion of those involving manned flights. This was obviously the easiest course of action in a phase
117 COPERS/20, 11 May 1961. No minutes of this meeting are available. For a list of those present and a
draft of the report which emerged from it see folder "GTST intérimaire", Mussard files, HAEC.
118 For a discussion of this point see Golay (1984).
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when space science in Europe was at its very beginning and no research group or disciplinary
community had the experience and the prestige to advocate clear priority choices. As we shall see, a
great deal of optimism about the technical and financial realities eventually led to gross overestimation
in the number of spacecraft ESRO could actually realise, thus giving the illusion that this highly
ambitious and unfocussed programme could be implemented.
The second area of controversy regarded the question whether or not ESRO was to be endowed with
its own research laboratory and to make in-house research. Following the recommendation of its
subgroup for the scientific programme, the STWG's opinion was definitely on the negative. The
Working Group agreed in fact that ESRO should only be responsible for the engineering development
of satellites and that it "should [not] compete with Universities and other Research Institutes in
carrying out purely scientific research".119 The whole of the scientific work would be under the
responsibility of scientific groups outside the Organisation, while the latter was called to provide for
technical facilities such as engineering of satellites and complex payloads; for general instrumentation
like telemetry or stabilisation; for rockets, launching ranges and launching operations; for tracking of
satellites, data recording and reduction; and so on. It was also proposed that ESRO provide scientific
fellowship for training and research tenable at its technical establishment or, where appropriate, at any
of the national laboratories. No mention was made of the applied research programme which had been
recommended at the London meeting of the GEERS in October 1960.
The rationale "for ESRO not having its own scientific groups" was explained by Hultqvist on the basis
of four arguments. Firstly, he feared that there would be a brain-drain from national scientific
activities to the central scientific laboratory. Secondly, he feared that ESRO scientific groups would
rapidly become privileged groups with the best staff, best facilities and the best experience, and so
might come to monopolise the most sophisticated and challenging satellite experiments. Thirdly, he
believed that if there were no such research groups within ESRO, the scientific activity would be more
readily distributed among the participating countries, to the overall benefit of ESRO and of the
European space effort in general. And finally, he was concerned that the in-house scientific staff
would have privileged access to satellites. Proposals for space experiments from such groups,
Hultqvist stressed, would have to pass through exactly the same channels as those coming from
national teams.120
Hultqvist's position reflected the variegated character of space science as well as the lack of a common
tradition within the space science community (a situation very different from that of particle physics).
This community, in fact, could hardly accept a central research establishment when the power
relations between its various sectors had not yet been tested and clear priorities had not yet been
established. This position, however, was not held unanimously among those involved in the discussion
on the role and aims of the future organisation. Introducing in fact the second session of the COPERS,
held a few days after the STWG London meeting in The Hague, Massey invited the Delegations "[to]
speak their minds quite frankly" on the suggestions contained in the STWG's report.121 Hulthen, for his
part, introduced this report recalling the specificity of space science and its various research fields.
This, he argued, made ESRO quite different from an organisation like CERN and justified both the
lack of a detailed scientific programme and the suggested organisation:
Obviously the scientific planning and responsibility in such an enormous field of research
could not be left entirely to a relatively small group of scientists at a central institute. In a
European Space Research Organisation, when it came to scientific initiative, ideas and
119 COPERS/20, cit., p. 1.
120 COPERS/GTST/I/l, 15 June 1961. This is a letter from Hultqvist to Lines to be used in the discussions at
the third meeting of the STWG. It is to be noted that friction between in-house staff and "outside users",
and the tendency for the former to dominate the latter, is a common feature of high-energy physics
laboratories. This matter has been discussed extensively by Pestre in Hermann et al. (1990), chapter 8,
and by Krige in Krige ed. (1996), chapter 5.
121 COPERS, 2nd session (17-18 May 1961), COPERS/Min/2, 25 May 1961, p. 1.
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planning, we would depend very much on the scientists all over Europe, not only those
who were attached to the central establishments of ESRO.122
This restriction on ESRO's activities was supported by the Dutch delegation but strongly contested by
the Belgian, French and Swiss delegations. Here is how the French put it:
It would be contrary to the Meyrin Agreement to consider that the sole aim of the
European Space Research Organisation was to put at the disposal of Member States a
certain number of technical facilities, the initiation and execution of scientific
experiments being left entirely to national institutions. If scientific research were only to
be conducted in national institutions, there was a risk that some of the smaller countries
which did not possess the necessary resources would feel themselves badly served.123
The vagueness of the scientific programme was also criticised in The Hague, while the Belgian
delegation blamed the STWG's report for not having "any mention of advanced scientific studies" and
for limiting the role of ESRO "to the application of techniques already known". In the event, the
Preparatory Commission requested the STWG to perform more detailed studies about the objectives of
the scientific programme and the way to implement it. They also requested to examine the desirability
of establishing ESRO laboratories for pure and applied research.
When the STWG met again, on 12-13 June 1961, the case for an active role of ESRO in pursuing
original research was made by Vandenkerckhove, Pecker and M. Golay, the director of the
Observatoire de Genève. According to these three scientists it was a serious mistake for ESRO "to
keep outside the European programme the development of fundamental researches and new
technologies as well as the exploitation of the results of this programme". On the contrary, ESRO had
to play an important role in promoting and funding advanced research programmes both in pure and
applied science, and this could be done by setting up new laboratories and research groups, partially or
totally funded by ESRO, and by supporting already existing laboratories.124
No conclusion having been reached at the meeting, the STWG's subgroup on scientific programme
was called to discuss the matter further and to suggest a new scheme. It in fact required two more
meetings of this subgroup, a joint meeting of the members of the COPERS Bureau with the officers of
the STWG, and a further meeting of the latter, in order to reach what Hulthen presented as "the result
of a long and difficult discussion and [...] a compromise between two opposing points of view".125
This compromise, carefully worded in the Blue Book, stated that ESRO, besides providing technical
facilities, would also provide "opportunities for original research beyond those which exist in
individual countries". To meet this aim a small research group was envisaged, "at the same place as
the European Space Technology Centre but not under the same direction", whose main functions were
so defined:
To undertake theoretical studies and fundamental theoretical research of importance to
space science [and] to provide experimental facilities to enable individuals and small
institutions to undertake research in space science.126
122 Ibidem, p. 2.
123 Ibidem, p. 4.
124 M. Golay, J.C. Pecker, J.A. Vandenkerchkhove, Remarques sur le programme de la COPERS,
COPERS/GTST/6, 12 June 1961. The quotation is our translation from the French original. STWG, 3rd
meeting (12-13 June 1961), COPERS/GTST/11, 14 June 1961. A list of "arguments for and against the
scientific laboratories of ESRO" was prepared by Pecker, COPERS/GTST/I/8, 20 June 1961. It should be
noted that both Golay and Vandenkerckhove were members of the Swiss and Belgian delegations,
respectively, which raised the objections made in The Hague.
125 COPERS, 3rd session (24-25 October 1961), COPERS/Min/3, 16 November 1961, p. 2. STWG, 4th
meeting (27-28 July 1961), COPERS/GTST/22, 28 July 1961. See also: Report from Subgroup I to the
Scientific and Technical Working Group, COPERS/GTST/I/21 (rev. 1), 13 July 1961.
126 Blue Book, p. 24. ESRO's research laboratory was eventually called ESLAB.
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The Research Group would have its own building and a small permanent staff (typically 1 scientific
director and 2 assistants, with technical, administrative and secretarial staff) and facilities for some 50
research workers (fellows and guests). Its running budget was fixed at 1 MFF (million French francs),
namely 0.4 % of ESRO's total budget. ESRO's scientific activity also included a fellowship
programme with a budget of 2.4 MFF.
The Blue Book also established that ESRO should perform applied research in space technology. A
distinction was made between short-term research, whose aim was "to offer better facilities for a more
advanced programme in space science", and long-term research, "associated with forward looking
assessments of space missions, in order to indicate technical possibilities for space science". While it
was clearly stated that short-term research had to be pursued at ESRO's technical establishment
(ESTEC), with close links with the development of the agreed scientific programme, the wording
about the long-term programme reflected the laborious compromise:
It is possible to envisage [long-term applied research] being carried out by some other
means under ESRO control. [...] It is not considered desirable, at least in the initial
period of build-up of ESRO, to set up separate institutes under ESRO control for carrying
out long-term applied research. It is believed that such institutes would be less likely to
produce results, which can form the basis of equipment development, than groups in
contact with project work. However, it is considered that ESRO should support some
applied research of a long-term nature for space application in universities and research
institutes where work of an allied nature is already in progress.127
If we consider the vagueness that still persisted in the scientific programme described in the Blue
Book (see below), we can conclude that the compromise was much closer to the position of the
majority of the STWG's scientists rather than to that of COPERS government officials and scientific
policymakers. The former aligned on the conservative mode, looking at ESRO as an instrument to
give international momentum to already established national research programmes and a technical
institution not to be involved as a protagonist on a competitive ground. The latter considered the future
space agency from the viewpoint of scientific and technical development in a strategic domain and
thus were pushing towards a more advanced frontier.
2.1.3 The Blue Book
The so called "Blue Book" (this was the colour of its cover) is a 77-page report prepared by the STWG
and approved by COPERS at its third session, on 24-25 October 1961 in Munich.128 All the main
features of the future European Space Research Organisation are established in this document. The
report is divided into 5 chapters, devoted respectively to a general outline of ESRO, to the scientific
programme, to the technology centre, to the data handling, and to the ranges and vehicles.
ESRO's scientific programme, as described in the Blue Book, extended over eight years and presented
the usual division into short-, medium- and long-term projects. The first category covered rocket
experiments "which could be carried out using means which exist or which could be quickly
developed". Three fields of study were included in this programme, on the basis of 75 experiment
proposals suggested by European research groups, following a questionnaire circulated to COPERS
Member States. The first was essentially Hultqvist's original proposal to investigate upper atmosphere
phenomena in the auroral zone. Fifteen experiments were listed in this field and the main
characteristics of the envisaged programme were discussed in terms of scientific objectives and
apparatus. Moreover, the establishment of a northern launching range of the Organisation, near the
Kiruna  Geophysical  Observatory,  was recommended  (eventually called ESRANGE).  The two other
127 Blue Book, p. 38-39.
128 Report of the Scientific and Technical Working Group to the European Preparatory Commission for
Space Research, 2nd edition, December 1961. This is the final version of the document approved by the
COPERS at its 3rd session (24-25 October 1961), COPERS/Min/3, 16 November 1961.
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fields of study were far less detailed. The first consisted in the extension, where possible, of the upper
atmosphere research programme to lower latitudes, using existing national ranges in Europe. The
second was generically indicated as "astronomical studies", including solar ultraviolet and X-ray
radiation; lunar and planetary ultraviolet and infrared radiation; solar corona, zodiacal light and
albedo. As to the time schedule and launching rate, the Blue Book considered that a small number of
rockets could be launched in the first year of ESRO's existence, going up to about 40 rockets in the
second year and reaching in the third year an annual launching rate of 65 "standard" rockets (50 kg
payload to 150 km altitude).
The medium-term programme included experiments involving small satellites in near Earth orbits and
small deep space probes, each spacecraft carrying about five experiments. About 75 experiments had
been suggested by interested groups and the list of proposed fields of study included practically all
fields of space science. No priority was given but it was underlined that, owing to the limited time for
preparation of the answers to the questionnaires, "the list must be regarded as a very preliminary
one".129 The time schedule and launching rate forecast for this programme was rather ambitious: it
envisaged the successful launching of two small satellites in the fourth year of ESRO and three small
satellites and/or deep space probes per year from the fifth year. It was assumed that the small satellites
should be launched by the American Scout launcher, while the space probes and the large satellites of
the long-term programme, should be launched by a heavy launcher of the class of the forthcoming
ELDO vehicle or the American Atlas-Agena B.130
As to long-term programme, it was proposed that one large project be commenced as soon as possible
after the establishment of ESRO and that a second be established two years later. Following Boyd's
original proposal, the first project foresaw the development and launching of satellite astronomical
observatories stabilised in sidereal co-ordinates and the second foresaw the development of lunar
satellites. The first large satellite was to be launched in the sixth year of ESRO, followed by a second
one during the two following years. The lists of scientific objectives for both projects was very long
and heterogeneous but it appeared that the first astronomical observatory would be the large satellite
for high resolution, UV stellar spectroscopy already under study in Great Britain.
The Blue Book also reaffirmed that, for all projects, most of the scientific work, including the design
and construction of the measuring instruments and the interpretation of the results, should be done by
research groups in the participating countries. The costs of the experiments (a relatively small fraction
compared with the cost of satellite development and launching) were to be borne by national funds in
the case of small satellites and space probes and by ESRO for the long-term projects.
In conclusion, the Blue Book foresaw the firing of some 435 sounding rockets and the successful
development and launching of 17 satellites in the 8 years covered by the ESRO Convention, namely
11 small satellites, 4 space probes, and 2 large satellites (Table 2-1). It must be noted, however, that it
was assumed that 2 launchings would be required to orbit one successful spacecraft, so that the
number of satellite and space probes launchings budgeted for was doubled.131 The total cost of the
satellite programme was estimated at 733.5 MFF, of which 450 MFF was for launchers and launch
operations and 283.5 MFF for spacecraft development.
The launching programme and its scientific content proposed by the Interim STWG in the Blue Book
and approved by the COPERS in October 1961 was accepted more or less unchanged by the
Conference of Plenipotentiaries which signed the ESRO Convention in June 1962. They resolved that
during the eight-year period the Organisation should aim to achieve the sounding rocket programme
building up to a steady level of about 65 medium sized vehicles per year by the third year of its
129 Blue Book, p. 32.
130 The Blue Book also took into consideration the possible use of the British Black Knight and the French
Diamant as light launching vehicles. At that time, however, the adaptation of Black Knight for satellite
launching was still under preliminary study and Diamant was still at the design stage.
131 Blue Book, tables on pp. 15 and 38.
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existence, as well as a successful launch of two small satellites in near-Earth orbits from year four
onwards (so ten in all), and two space probes or major satellites from year six onwards (so six in
all).132 It was an aspiration which was to prove wildly optimistic in the light of available resources.
Concluding this section, a number of comments are called for. The first regards the significance of the
large satellite projects in this programme. In a context in which major European countries, notably
Britain and France, were willing to build up strong national space programmes, these "long-term"
projects provided an important rationale for them to collaborate in a joint European effort. "The real
raison d'être of Organisation", said Alexander Hocker, ESRO's second Council chairman, was "to
carry out projects of a scale and technical complexity beyond what the European countries could
achieve within the framework of their individual national programmes". And, he added, "this was the
reason why, right at the outset, consideration was given to the project for a Large Astronomical
Satellite".133 In other words, the large projects were a way of cementing Britain in particular, with her
important human and material resources, in a European programme. They also incidentally provided
the rationale for a clause in the ESRO Convention stipulating that no member state could withdraw
before the eighth year, and for establishing an eight-year budget for the body. This was seen in 1962 as
a way of ensuring that funds would be available for a long-term project.134
Secondly, it must be stressed that when the scientific programme was initially put forward in May
1961 it was defined as the minimum programme, and a special provision was made in the Convention
for its extension. In particular, taking CERN's Convention as a model, a distinction was drawn
between a basic or initial programme, and a supplementary programme which could later extend the
basic programme if two-thirds of the Member States agreed to it.135 The whole idea was soon dropped
on the insistence of the British. They claimed that no clear distinction could be made between a basic
and a subsequent programme. They also refused to have the former defined in a formal document like
a Convention in terms of a number of devices to be launched.136 As a result, there was no provision
made in the ESRO Convention for the organic growth of the agreed programme. Article VII dealing
with launchings stipulated simply that the organisation would launch sounding rockets, and small and
large satellites and space probes, the number of launchings to be decided by the Council, "with a view
to providing reasonable opportunities for scientifically valuable experiments [...] to be carried out".
This is not to say that no provision was made for new projects in the ESRO Convention. However
these were not seen as extensions of some basic programme, and so necessarily springing from within
the framework of the organisation. Rather they were treated as additional initiatives coming from
within the Member States who sought certain forms of support from ESRO. The matter was covered
by Article VIII of the Convention which read:
If, outside the agreed programme but within the scope of the Organisation, one or more
Member States engage in a project in connection with which the Council decides, by a
two-thirds majority of all Member States, to make available the assistance of the
Organisation or the use of its facilities, the resulting cost to the Organisation shall be
refunded to the Organisation by the State or States concerned.137
132 For the conference resolution see ESRO/Conference/3, 17 May 1962.
133 Forward by A. Hocker to ESRO General Report 1966.
134 See the report of the Budget Subgroup: COPERS/AWG/II/2 (rev. 1), 19 March 1962.
135 See Krige in Hermann et al. (1987), chapter 8.
136 See CPERS/AWG/18 (add. 2), 5 September 1961, a note by the British delegation on the article of the
Convention dealing with the scientific programme inter alia.
137 A typical application of this clause would be a request by a member state to use the ESRO launching
range at Kiruna for its national sounding rocket programme. We shall see in chapter 4 that Article VIII
was also invoked for implementing the TD-1 satellite programme when Italy refused to continue
supporting it.
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In short, there was no legally-enshrined opportunity for expansion and increased expenditure inside
the ESRO programme as there was in CERN's.
A third comment regards the role and aims of the new space organisation. Conceived and advocated as
an international organisation devoted to space research, ESRO did not in fact come out as a scientific
institution, with its own scientific staff, a scientific programme clearly defined according to
established priorities and objectives, a recognised leadership role among similar scientific institutions
in Member States, and a strong negotiating power vis-à-vis Member States' governmental institutions.
It eventually presented itself in the twofold aspect of a rather cumbersome multinational bureaucracy
and a technical establishment conceived to use most of its operational budget for industrial contracts in
Member States according to the just return principle (see below). It rapidly became a sort of
battleground where difficult and complex negotiations among various interest groups were required in
order to reach compromise and agreement.
Finally, we should remark that the scientific programme that the COPERS' Scientific and Technical
Working Group elaborated for ESRO was more of the kind of a manifesto of interests and expectations
(should we say a book of dreams?) than a concrete working hypothesis. It reflected the intentions and
hopes of important sectors of the European scientific community that lacked, however, the strength
and the lucidity that can only derive from an established tradition, from a common patrimony of
professional values, and from a substantial homogeneity of aims and methods. When ESRO moved its
first steps from the inspired vision of a few pioneers to the hard political and financial reality of space
policies and technical difficulties, it was inevitable that the transformation of the manifesto into a true
operational programme should be a long and laborious process and the results sometimes
disappointing.
2.2 Facilities and establishments
2.2.1 ESTEC and ESLAB
From the outset it was assumed by the scientists planning ESRO that its core facility would be an
establishment responsible, either itself or through contracts with industries and national institutes, for
the engineering and testing of satellites and their payloads, the integration of scientific instruments in
these payloads, and for making arrangements for launching. These activities were to be undertaken by
what was initially called a Payload Engineering Unit and, later, the European Space Research and
Technology Centre (ESTEC). The organisation of the scientific work foreseen in the Blue Book
divided experimental projects into three categories by source of funding. Firstly, there were pure
ESRO missions, i.e. those paid for entirely by ESRO (typically, the large satellite projects). Such
projects would be engineered at ESTEC though the scientific payloads, even if paid for by ESRO,
would be contracted out to a large extent to European industries and scientific groups in universities
and national institutions. Secondly, there were combined national and ESRO missions, in which the
scientific instrumentation would be built in the Member States and paid for exclusively from national
funds, ESRO's task being to engineer the satellites. This would be the case with most experiments.
Thirdly, there were what were called national missions undertaken with ESRO help, in which once
again the scientific payload would be paid for from national budgets, but ESRO facilities, e.g.
launching ranges, would be used and perhaps even paid for by the national group. In all cases then it
was assumed that the construction of scientific instruments flown on ESRO satellites would normally
be under the control of national groups, even when all the costs were being borne by ESRO. The
STWG stressed that an additional 16 MFF annually would be needed for such activities over and
above the money required for the ESRO budget.138
The size of the ESRO in-house scientific staff allowed for by the Interim STWG reflected the
determination to deny them space on satellite payloads. The laboratory (ESLAB), as we have
mentioned, was provided with a building and equipment for about 50 research workers and technicians
138 COPERS/GTST/I, 15 June 1961. See also Blue Book, pp. 12-13.
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as well as a permanent staff, typically comprising one scientific head with two scientific assistants
along with administrative officers, technicians and a maintenance staff. This was in fact smaller than
the so-called standard scientific group which the STWG estimated to be necessary for preparing
experiments to fly on satellites, and which comprised four scientists, four technicians and three
auxiliary staff.139 These limitations were reflected in the Convention. According to Article VIb,
ESLAB was to be situated "near" ESTEC and its task was "to undertake joint research programmes on
the minimum scale deemed necessary by the Council [...] to complete or complement the scientific
studies carried out in Member States". These formulations were not simply a victory for those who
wanted to ensure that a strong in-house staff did not come to dominate the scientific programme. They
were also a symptom of the determination of space scientists to protect their national efforts. And an
index of their perception of the role of ESRO in European space science: for many of them it was,
indeed, to be a service organisation.
2.2.2 ESRANGE, ESTRACK and ESDAC (ESOC)
Three other facilities were required in addition to ESTEC and ESLAB. These were a sounding rocket
launching range, a data analysis centre, and a network of tracking and telemetry stations. The first,
labelled ESRANGE, caused little difficulty. It was generally agreed that it was important to carry out a
sounding rocket programme in the auroral zone, and for this reason it was essential that ESRO equip
itself with a suitable range in the northern latitudes. The STWG considered three possible places for
the launching range. The first was in Greenland (Narssarssuaq), the second in Norway (Andøya), and
the third in Sweden (Kiruna). Of these three, the last was deemed the most suitable. Firings at the
bases in Greenland and Norway would be respectively over the ice cap and over the sea, making
payload recovery difficult. At Kiruna they were over the land. The first two were remote and
accommodation was likely to be difficult. Access to Kiruna was good by air, road and rail, and the
launching range was close to a fairly large town of the same name. Finally and perhaps decisively,
ESRANGE could be located near Hultqvist's Geophysical Observatory. The only disadvantage with
Kiruna appeared to be "the fact that one or two dozen Lapps may be in the area during certain
periods". This safety problem, the STWG thought, was not a serious one and it strongly recommended
that the Kiruna site be chosen as the location for the ESRO Northern sounding rocket range.140 Apart
from that, there seemed to be no need for ESRO to have any additional ranges of its own. Its sounding
rocket programme in medium latitudes could, it was felt, be adequately supported by using existing
national ranges. And although there were certainly some advantages to be had from creating a special
satellite launching range under ESRO control, the STWG concluded that "up to the present the
creation of such a new range does not appear to offer any scientific advantage".141
Data handling had two aspects. Firstly, it required the setting up of a network of tracking and
telemetry stations which could receive signals from spacecraft (ESTRACK). Secondly, it required a
central laboratory which would edit and process the information from the tracking network. This data
centre would have scientists and engineers on its staff who would not only concern themselves with
the technological problems of data recovery, processing and analysis, but also with fundamental
questions associated with the prediction and analysis of satellite orbits. The facilities at the centre,
initially labelled ESDAC (European Space Data Acquisition Centre), were essentially to be a large
mainframe computer or computers, which would be made available both to its in-house staff and to
visiting scientists and fellows who wished to use them to analyse and study the recovered data.
There only seemed to have been two points of ambiguity, and possibly of controversy, surrounding
these several facilities. Firstly, there was the question of the relationship between ESDAC and
ESTRACK. The first report prepared by the STWG in May 1961 explicitly stated that the data centre
would, "in addition to data handling, also control a number of tracking and telemetry stations".142 By
October that year this seemed no longer necessarily to be the case. There is no explicit reference in the
139 Blue Book, pp. 24-25, 30 and 34.
140 Blue Book, pp. 35 and 64-67. See also COPERS/GTST/I/16, 6 July 1961.
141 Blue Book, p. 18.
142 COPERS/20, 11 May 1961, p. 2.
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Blue Book to ESDAC actually controlling the telemetry and tracking stations and indeed when ESRO
was born the control centre for managing tracking and data acquisition facilities was situated at
ESTEC. It was an unhappy decision. Within a few years it was reversed and satellite tracking reverted
to ESDAC which was renamed ESOC, the European Space Operations Centre.143
The second possible point of friction concerned the nature and distribution of the ESTRACK facilities.
In the Blue Book it was proposed that ESRO set up four new radio tracking and telemetry stations, and
three optical tracking stations. Three of the radio stations were to be distributed roughly along
longitude 135° East, and the fourth around longitude l5° East. They could be supplemented by stations
on these longitudes which were part of the U.S. Minitrack network. In this way, two new chains of
stations, one running through Japan and Australia, and the other through Europe and the African
continent, could be added to an American chain running roughly down longitude 75° West. As for the
three optical stations, the Blue Book insisted that these were urgently needed to support a variety of
studies, e.g. gravitational, geodetic and atmospheric structure studies as well as certain ionospheric
investigations. There were far too few of these stations in existence in the world at the present time,
claimed the report, and it seemed clear that ESRO should make as large a contribution as possible to
their extension, in consultation with the COSPAR.
The STWG regarded this set-up of four radio tracking and telemetry stations and of three optical
tracking stations to be an absolute minimum, a network "capable, if need be, of operating
independently of existing networks, but capable also of being linked with them where possible".144
Indeed the concept of having a network which could operate independently was built into one of the
earliest drafts of the Convention.145 It did not survive for very long. The British delegation soon
objected, and at a meeting of the LAFWG in September 1961 it was decided to omit all reference to
the coverage, and so location, of tracking and telemetry stations from the final Convention.146 Thus
Article VId of the ESRO Convention simply stated that in order to meet its initial requirements, the
Organisation would establish and operate "a Data Centre and tracking, telemetry and telecommand
stations" suitably equipped. Once again the Member States, apparently with little resistance from the
scientists, had succeeded in pruning back the scope of the ESRO programme.
2.2.3 The sites of the main establishments
The choices of the locations of ESRO's three main establishments, i.e. the headquarters, the payload
engineering unit with its associated scientific laboratory, and the data centre, were essentially
determined by political considerations: there were no overriding scientific arguments for any particular
site. By contrast, scientific concerns, as we have seen, were dominant as regards the siting of the
sounding rocket launching range, which necessarily had to be placed in northerly latitudes so as to
carry out geophysical studies in the auroral zone. Scientific as well as political considerations finally
played a role in the siting of the tracking stations.
By October 1961 several Member States had expressed an interest in having one or more of the ESRO
main facilities on their soil.147 France and the Netherlands had submitted bids for the headquarters
in Paris and The Hague respectively. Six Member States had proposed sites for ESTEC: Germany near
143 For information on the control centre at ESTEC see Fraysse (1966) and Tootill (1967). The transfer of
this centre to ESDAC was a consequence of the recommendations made by the Bannier report in 1967
(see below).
144 Blue Book, pp. 54-56.
145 The system of tracking stations, it was said, should "complement the existing world network", but should
also be "capable of giving reasonable coverage by itself". See COPERS/AWG/18 (add. 1, rev. 2),
20 July 1961.
146 LAFWG, 4th meeting (28-9 September 1961), COPERS/AWG/38, 9 October 1961. See the UK note
COPERS/AWG/18 (add. 2), 5 September 1961.
147 For the information that follows see the folder "Enplacement des Etablissements" in Mussard files
(HAEC).
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Munich; France at Bretigny, about 30 km from Paris and alongside the Centre d'Essais en Vol; the
United Kingdom at Bracknell which was near the Royal Aircraft Establishment in Farnborough as
well as other facilities engaged in space research; Switzerland at a site 15 km from Geneva, near the
Observatoire de Genève and also close to CERN and to several universities; Belgium at Zaventem,
near Brussels and close to several universities, aeronautical research centres and other research
laboratories; and the Netherlands, adjacent to the Technische Hogeschool and the Central Organisation
for Applied Scientific Research in Delft. At the third COPERS session in Munich at the end of
October, the Belgian and Dutch delegations said "that they wished their separate proposals for ESTEC
to be viewed as variants of one proposal".148 As for ESDAC, by mid-October there had been just one
offer of a site: from Germany, near Darmstadt.149 In Munich the UK added the candidature of
Bracknell.
The delegates to the Munich session instructed the COPERS Bureau to continue to collect factual
information relevant to the various sites proposed. They also authorised it to set up, if need be, a
Working Group on Sites to facilitate the final choice which, it was hoped, could be made by the
COPERS at its fourth session scheduled for 23-24 January 1962. This session was, in fact, postponed
by about a month. In the interim, on 25 January 1962, the Bureau decided not to set up a site panel.
Instead, "in view of the delicate nature of the matter", it invited O. Dahl to study the proposals that had
been received, "consulting with the appropriate authorities in the Member States as necessary, and [to]
present a confidential report to the Bureau".150
Consistent with his brief, Dahl did not go on further fact-finding missions. Instead, he sounded out
senior government officials and scientists in the several countries which had made proposals for sites.
As he made his rounds, and explained the various offers and possible combinations, the number of
candidate sites grew rapidly. Countries, wrote Dahl, tended to work "on the assumption that something
is better than nothing", and it "became apparent that if a filed proposal were not to be upheld, a
proposal for one or more of the other establishments would come forth". Thus when Dahl sat down to
draft his report in March 1962 he found himself with a long "semi-official" list of proposals. France,
Switzerland and the Benelux countries had all offered to host the Headquarters. Germany had
effectively withdrawn its proposal for ESTEC, while Italy had added a site at the old airport just
outside Rome and associated with Broglio's aeronautics experimental facilities. As for ESDAC,
Switzerland had added its bid to those already on the table from Britain and Germany.151
In Dahl's report and in the subsequent debate, three considerations more or less explicitly informed the
negotiations: whether the sites should be concentrated or dispersed, whether ESRO's headquarters
should be close to ELDO's headquarters or remote from it, and whether or not it was desirable to put
ESRO's headquarters near to ESTEC.152 There were of course strong arguments on both sides as
regards all three of these criteria.
Cost, efficiency, and the possibility of making a quick start to the European space effort weighed in
favour of concentrating the establishments. As Dahl put it, "ESRO will cost relatively more, we will
move slower and it will be more difficult to have control", if the establishments were dispersed.
"There [would] be a tendency towards independent growth of establishments as administration and
services must in certain ways be duplicated".153 Against that, there were obviously strong political
148 COPERS, 3rd session (24-25 October 1961), COPERS/Min/3, 16 November 1961. For more on the
Bracknell site and its advantages, see Massey and Robins (1986), p.127.
149 LAFWG, 3rd meeting (14-15 September 1961), COPERS/AWG/33, 27 September 1961.
150 This is the procedure outlined by Auger in a circular letter dated 7 February 1962 and sent to all
delegations to the COPERS - see e.g. folder "Denmark" in Mussard files (HAEC).
151 Dahl's report is reproduced as Annex 11 in Massey and Robins (1986). There is also a copy in the
Mussard files (HAEC), folder "Emplacement des Etablissements".
152 These considerations were spelled out in Dahl's report and in COPERS/87, 4 May 1962. The latter is a
summary report of meetings held between the Bureau and the heads of member state delegations on 26-27
March and 4 April 1962.
153 From Dahl's report, cit.
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considerations in favour of dispersing the establishments. Not only would it enable more Member
States to have a direct stake in the joint effort, so making it more "truly European". It was also a means
of stimulating space activities in those countries, particularly smaller ones, which were relatively
backward in this regard. What is more, it was not obvious that dispersion necessarily meant a loss of
efficiency. As the Belgian delegation and the LAFWG's budget subgroup pointed out, NASA's
establishments were widely dispersed across the United States and this did not seem to create
intolerable inefficiencies.154
Opinions were also divided over whether or not ESRO's and ELDO's headquarters should be in the
same place. Massey, for example, was very much against the idea or even against any close
cooperation. "His main argument [was] that ELDO [was] a 'commercial' set-up", while ESRO was
strictly scientific.155 Some delegations, e.g. Austria, also feared that if ESRO and ELDO were tied too
closely together it would limit ESRO's freedom to purchase rockets from NASA. Against that, it was
felt that there would obviously have to be very close contact between ESRO and ELDO, and that it
was highly desirable that they share certain "neutral functions" (e.g. administrative services) in the
interests of saving money and of efficiency.156
Finally, there were clearly advantages to having ESRO headquarters close to ESTEC, so facilitating
the lines of communication between the administrative arm of the Organisation and the most important
ESRO establishment. This in fact was the combination preferred by the scientists in the STWG.157 The
picture was however blurred by the fact that some people, particularly the British, felt that there should
also be very close technical collaboration between expert groups in the ELDO headquarters and the
engineers in ESTEC. Thus the question of whether or not the ESRO headquarters should be near the
payload engineering unit became intertwined with the question of whether or not it should also be
close to the ELDO headquarters.
When Dahl came to frame his proposals, it was already known that ELDO's headquarters would be in
Paris. That granted he opted for moderate concentration, suggesting that ESRO's headquarters should
be located together with ESTEC (and ESLAB) on the proposed site in Delft, Netherlands, while
ESDAC and the tracking centre be located in Darmstadt, Germany. His report was laid before a joint
meeting of the COPERS Bureau and the heads of the delegations on 26 and 27 March 1962, and his
recommendations were summarily dismissed. A number of delegations, we read in one report of the
proceedings, "while acknowledging the difficulty of Dr Dahl's mission and thanking him for the
considerable amount of work which it had involved, considered that the report touched on matters of
opinion as well as of fact and in this regard was not an appropriate basis for discussion".158 Whereupon
the hard bargaining and political horse-trading began.
Three points emerged at this very tense and difficult meeting. Firstly, it was generally agreed that
ESRO's headquarters would be in Paris along with ELDO's. The French were extremely keen to have
them there, letting it be known that they would withdraw the bid for ESTEC at Bretigny if successful.
154 COPERS/87, cit. It is to be noted that in a trip to NASA at the end of 1961 by some members from the
budget subgroup, NASA recommended that ESDAC and ESTEC be located in the same place:
COPERS/AWG/II/2 (rev. 1), 19 March 1962.
155 Memorandum for Prof Auger from Odd Dahl, Meetings in London, February 12, in Mussard files,
HAEC, folder "Emplacement des Etablissements".
156 From Dahl's report, cit. See also COPERS/87, cit, p. 2. Austria also stated that it was against putting the
headquarters of ESRO and ELDO close to one another for "political reasons", by which it probably
expressed a desire to distance itself from the military associations of the launcher development
organisation.
157 COPERS/36, 19 October 1961. This document listed the STWG's criteria for the location of ESTEC
which were: within some tens of miles of liquid oxygen and liquid nitrogen plants, near an international
airport and central with respect to the Member States, near small electronic and electric factories, near an
industrial area, near a technical college, near a university, suitable accommodation available, and near
ESRO headquarters. All the sites offered satisfied the first seven of these eight criteria.
158 COPERS/87, 4 May 1962.
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There were also some advantages to having ELDO's and ESRO's administrative and policymaking
centres close to one another, as we have said. Secondly, the choice of a site for ESTEC was more or
less reduced to a two-cornered contest between Bracknell and the Belgian/Dutch proposals. The other
remaining candidates, Italy and Switzerland, were poorly supported. Finally, Italy, finding itself
marginalised, made a bid for ESLAB. There was apparently "strong support" for this idea, even
though the draft of the Convention, agreed after months of negotiations, specifically said that ESLAB
should be near ESTEC, and there was "no suggestion at the meeting that ESTEC also should be in
Italy".159 No definite decisions were taking at the meeting in March. Those present agreed to
reconvene on 4 April. This time the climate was, apparently, more relaxed. The British, having found
that only the Scandinavians were in favour of having ESTEC in the UK, had decided in the interim not
to press their case for the payload engineering unit, even though they were convinced that the human
and material resources in and around Bracknell provided the best way "to ensure quicker development
of a subject in which Europe was already a long way behind the United States and the USSR". The
Swiss too came to the meeting willing to withdraw their candidature for ESTEC, "in order to facilitate
a solution'', they said, preferring to put up a fight for ESDAC.160 A secret ballot was held on the
location of the payload engineering unit, the vote being 6 to 4 in favour of Delft over Brussels
(Belgium and The Netherlands did not participate). The voting for ESDAC, now a choice between the
Swiss site in Commugny and the German site in Darmstadt, was 8 to 4 in favour of the latter, only the
two "neutrals" Austria and Sweden, along with Spain, joining the Swiss in preferring the site near
Geneva. The headquarters, as expected went to Paris, by 10 to 2 (Norway and Sweden), the latter
insisting that its objection was not "to be construed as anything other than the expression of their
conviction that the Headquarters should be located at ESTEC". It was also unanimously agreed that
the Nordic launching base of the ESRANGE complex should be at Kiruna. In fact so sure were the
Swedes of their case, and so keen were the scientists to get started, that there was already a bill before
the Swedish Parliament, due to be passed in May, proposing that the existing site near Hultqvist's
laboratory be made available to ESRO.161
2.2.4 ESRIN: a new research laboratory for ESRO
This left the thorny question of Italy's offer to host ESLAB. The British were strongly opposed to this.
The laboratory, they said, had been conceived as a small centre close to ESTEC, which would now be
in Delft. Hulthén, speaking on behalf of the Interim STWG, backed up the UK delegation. The Italian
proposal was contrary to the "carefully worded compromise" regarding this facility which had been
arrived at by the Group after months of discussion. One could not now redefine the nature of the
laboratory without referring the matter back to the STWG, so introducing additional delays. Broglio,
however, was emphatic, though he did imply that the laboratory which the Italians wanted need not in
fact be ESLAB, but an additional facility with a rather different focus. This broke the deadlock. The
majority of the delegations felt that the Italian demands had to be met, and voted 9 to 3 (Norway,
Sweden and the UK) to recommend to the COPERS "that a laboratory of a size and scope to be
decided by the Council should be established in Italy".162 The COPERS accepted these proposals with
some misgivings at its fifth session, and they were confirmed by the Conference of Plenipotentiaries
on 14 June 1962.163 Thus was born ESLAR: a laboratory for advanced research in addition to ESLAB.
It was later renamed ESRIN, and acronym for European Space Research Institute. The problem was
now to define a precise role for it.
When Italy made its unexpected bid for an advanced laboratory on its soil, it had an ambitious
programme of activities in mind. It was proposed that ESLAR (as it was then called) set up groups to
159 For this paragraph see Dahl's report on the French position, and Massey and Robins (1986), p. 129,
COPERS/74, 28 March 1962 and COPERS/87, cit
160 Massey and Robins (1986), p. 127 and 129 on the UK, and COPERS/87, cit.
161 COPERS/87, cit., pp. 6-8, and Massey and Robins (1986), pp. 129-130.
162 COPERS/87, cit., pp. 9-10, and Massey and Robins(1986), pp. 130 et seq. The proposals for the sites are
summed up in COPERS/82, 27/ April 1962.
163 COPERS, 5th session (10-11 May 1962), COPERS/Min/5, 12 June 1972, and ESRO/Conference/3/,
17 May 1962.
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explore, e.g., the feasibility of planetary probes and to study drag-free non-relativistic satellites. The
basis for theoretical and experimental research required for these programmes was also indicated, and
included studies on advanced systems for energy conversion, on small nuclear rockets for satellite
stabilisation and control, and on scientific spacecraft for solar sail propulsion. This programme was
rapidly scaled down in the Council of the COPERS so as to keep the laboratory small. Its research was
also reoriented, under the impulsion of the Council chairman Massey, so that when ESRO came into
being, ESLAR's function was defined as being "to undertake laboratory and theoretical research in the
basic physics and chemistry necessary to the understanding of past and the planning of future
experiments in space". Subsequently, considerable stress was laid on plasma physics studies, the
characteristics of a plasma most nearly corresponding, on a laboratory scale, to those of space.164
The first director of ESRIN, H.L. Jordan, was appointed on 29 July 1964. The two most eligible sites
for his laboratory were at Arcetri, near Florence, which had an important centre in astronomy research,
and which was preferred by the Italian delegation, and at Frascati, near Rome. A laboratory in Frascati
would be close to a high-energy physics centre equipped with an electron-positron collider, and to
Broglio's aeronautical research laboratory. Jordan preferred Frascati to Arcetri because of this
concentration of establishments with similar interests, and the Italian delegation reluctantly respected
his wishes in March 1965.165
Nine months later, a small group of five scientists, six technicians and four administrators were
installed in temporary accommodation in the Park hotel near Frascati. They quickly arranged their first
conference on plasma physics to be held in May that year. It took some time to find a permanent site
for the laboratory – indeed the cornerstone for its new building was only laid in September 1968.166
ESRIN was always the Cinderella of the ESRO establishments. Its building was hardly completed
before there were serious proposals that the facility be closed down (see chapter 8 below). In the event
it survived, but only with a sharp reorientation of its mission.
2.2.5 Choosing a new site for ESTEC
The difficulties of siting the ESTEC laboratories at Delft were quick to emerge. The temporary
accommodation offered by the Technical University was inadequate for the rapidly increasing ESTEC
staff. The assumed advantages of being attached to a centre of learning turned out to be limited, as the
courses were all in Dutch. Local industry objected to ESTEC recruiting technical labour in the area,
where it was in short supply. It was difficult to get secretaries and typists to move from The Hague,
where they easily found work, to Delft, where living conditions were less attractive. Above all though
there was the problem of the stability of the soil in the polder on which ESTEC was to be built. "I
know now why the cows are always running on the land offered to us by the Dutch", Freddy Lines is
reputed to have joked to Jean Mussard, a senior colleague in the COPERS secretariat, "as soon as they
stop, they sink". More technically, as a group of experts pointed out to the ESRO Council in June
1964, a building on the site at Delft would need to be located on stilts 16 metres above the firm
underlying layer of sand, the 16 metres being filled with waterlogged soil. The characteristics of the
soil in terms of vibration, transmission and stability were suspect and, concluded the experts, a site on
coastal sand was preferable. It would be "more predictable in terms of foundations and more flexible
in terms of internal modifications and extensions".167
In response to this report, the Dutch government offered a new coastal site at Noordwijk, which was in
turn inspected by experts in July 1964. This site, too, was less than ideal. Ground conditions were
better than at Delft but, on the other hand, the proximity to the sea created additional concerns
regarding the effects of salinity and of blowing sand on delicate apparatus.168
164 COPERS/89 (rev. 1), 9 May 1962, and Massey and Robins (1986), Annex 12.
165 ESRO Council, 5th session (25-26 November 1964), ESRO/C/MIN/5, 11 January 1965, and 6th session
(24-25 March 1965), ESRO/C/MIN/6, 14 June 1965.
166 Jordan (1968).
167 ESRO/C/12, rev. 1, 5 June 1964; Lines (1966).
168 ESRO/C/43, 10 July 1964, and ESRO/C/53, 28 September 1964.
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The question of ESTEC's site was one of the major preoccupations of the ESRO Council during the
first six months of its life. There was general disillusion among the Member States' delegates over the
inadequacy of the accepted location in Delft. Spain and Belgium were particularly militant, insisting
that the whole question of the site should be reopened and, if necessary, another conference of
plenipotentiaries held to settle the issue. Council chairman Massey, on the other hand, stressed the
delays to the build-up of the organisation, and the dangers to staff morale and to ESRO's reputation,
which would be caused by moving the laboratory out of the Netherlands. Finally, in October 1964, as
the possibility of reaching a compromise through normal procedures seemed increasingly remote,
Massey implored the Council to accept the Noordwijk site "in the interests of European collaboration
and the future of ESRO". This they did, and on 1 March 1965 the first foundations of a 33,000 m2
building planned to house 800 people were laid at Noordwijk.169
2.2.6 Finding a role for ESLAB
The ambiguities surrounding the role of ESLAB, which were indeed the ambiguities surrounding the
role of ESRO itself, persisted throughout most of the first years of the Organisation. Once it was clear
that ESRIN would do fundamental research in physics and chemistry, the original concept of the
laboratory was reduced to assisting visiting scientists, primarily from the smaller Member States, who
lacked the financial and technical means for carrying out space experiments. This role was gradually
refined and expanded between 1964 and 1966, though never fully clarified. To give the laboratory an
identity of its own and to attract top-quality scientists who could liaise effectively between national
groups and ESTEC engineers, it seemed essential that ESLAB do advanced scientific research in-
house. This of course conflicted with the conviction, strongly held in some quarters, that a powerful
in-house scientific staff with its own research programme would have a major competitive advantage
over national groups.
The first formal steps towards placing senior scientific staff in ESLAB were taken in June 1964. At
this time, the plans for the sounding rocket programme and the payloads for the first two small
satellites, ESRO I and ESRO II, were well under way. The project scientists whose task it was to
provide an interface between the national scientific groups and the engineers at ESTEC were,
however, based at headquarters in Paris. This was plainly unsatisfactory: it was essential that they be
geographically close to the payload engineering unit. Thus, soon after ESRO came into being, the
Council accepted a proposal from the interim STWG that three or four posts for project scientists be
created in or near ESTEC to ensure coordination with the technologists in the preparation of payloads.
Later that year the role of ESLAB was defined as threefold: assisting visitors from Member States to
prepare experiments (originally intended as its main function); providing the interface between
national scientific groups and ESTEC engineering groups (project scientists); and coordinating the
work on scientific payloads for the LAS, the large astronomical satellite. To implement this scheme, it
was understood that it was essential to provide scientists at ESLAB with opportunities for doing their
own research for as much as 50 % of their time.170
But what research were they to do? In an ideal world they would have been given a leading role in
building the payload for the LAS. However, in endless and confused debates in 1965 and 1966 the
British, whose group at Culham was eventually awarded the contract to build the telescope, insisted
that the LAS project manager be based at their national facility.171 In the light of this opposition, it was
agreed in the latter half of 1966 that ESLAB's scientists conduct research in three main fields: particle
169 ESRO Council, 3rd session, 28-9 July 1964, ESRO/C/MIN/3, 2 September 1964; and 4th session
(22 October 1964), ESRO/C/MIN/4, 4 November 1964.
170 For this paragraph see ESRO/C/34, 16 June 1964; ESRO/C/110 10, 18 March 1965; ESRO/C/125,
13 July 1965; ESRO Council, 2nd session (15-17 June 1964), ESRO/C/MIN/2, 8 July 1964, and 5thsession
(25-26 November 1964), ESRO/C/MIN/5, 11 January 1965.
171 The LAS programme will be discussed in detail in chapter 5. See also ESRO/ST/158, 26 October 1965
and the comments by the Danish and Italian delegations on this paper: ESRO/ST/158, add. 1,
10 February 1966, and ESRO/ST/158, add. 2, 10 March 1966. See also ESRO/ST/182, 28 January 1966
and accompanying paper ESRO/C/178, 11 March 1966.
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physics, ionospheric physics, and surface physics. Their work was set back by a fire on 14 October
that year in the temporary premises they occupied at Noordwijk. All of the equipment as well as the
personal files of the ESLAB staff members were lost and it was not until the summer of 1967 that the
laboratory was fully operational. A year later, on 1 September 1968, and in line with the
recommendations of the Bannier report (see below) ESLAB became a fourth department of ESTEC. It
was renamed the Space Science Department (SSD).172
2.2.7 Setting up a tracking network
A word is in order about ESTRACK, if only to bring out the extent to which political considerations
and national interests, along with a passionate determination by Member States' delegates to control
costs, impeded the rapid establishment of the network. The network foreseen for the first phase of
ESRO's programme consisted of four stations: at Redu, in the Belgian Ardennes, which was to be used
for tracking and telemetry, at Fairbanks in Alaska, at Spitzbergen in Norway, and on the Falkand
Islands off the coast of Argentina. Only the first of these was set up without considerable difficulty.
The French consistently opposed the site in Norway, because this country had not joined ESRO after
participating in the COPERS work. The site in the Falklands, which was foreseen as an enlargement of
an existing British radio and space research station, was also most unpopular. Technically there was
the danger that the UK's communications transmitter would interfere with incoming satellite data.
Administratively there was the feeling in the Council that the case for the station had not been
properly prepared by the ESRO Secretariat, which was anxious to get a site in the region approved
quickly in anticipation of the launch of ESRO I and ESRO II. Politically, there were repeated
objections from Spain against ESRO funding a station in, what it said, was a territory with disputed
sovereignty. Despite these difficulties, the Council managed, in March 1966, to agree to install a
telemetry station in the Falklands, the vote being six in favour with four abstentions - only to have the
French delegation insist that, according to the Convention, this decision was null and void as it should
have been taken by a two-thirds majority. The French let the matter pass at the time, but within a
month the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had approached the Council chairman insisting that the issue be
reopened at the next Council session. This it was, and in the face of a very determined statement by
the United Kingdom, the Council voted by eight to one (Spain) to pay Britain for the work it had done
to date on providing a telemetry station for ESRO on the Falkland islands.173
The establishment of a telemetry station at Fairbanks created a quite different set of difficulties.
NASA, which was responsible for operating the station, demanded that it have the right of access to
the scientific data received. The members of ESRO's Scientific and Technical Committee, supported
by some Council delegates, were most unhappy about this. NASA's demand, they felt, violated their
intellectual property rights, as well as ESRO's arrangements with its own experimenters. After lengthy
negotiations, a compromise was reached. In December 1966, the Council agreed that ESRO should
provide NASA with any raw or unreduced data that it wanted and was prepared to pay for. In turn, the
use of unpublished data by the American agency required the prior permission of ESRO.174
2.3 The ESRO budget and its control
The first estimates of the level of ESRO's budget were quickly made by the Interim STWG. Their
figures were then gradually revised upwards, initially by the scientists themselves and later by the
administrators in the LAFWG's budget subgroup. In parallel with these developments, and partly
172 For this paragraph see Manno et al. (1968), and ESRO/AF/613, 15 November 1966, ESRO/C/251,
29 November 1966, and ESRO/C/266, 14 February 1967 on the fire at Noordwijk.
173 See ESRO/C/171, 9 March 1966; ESRO/AF/472, 19 April 1966; ESRO/C/203, 22 June 1966;
ESRO/C/236, 23 November 1966; ESRO/C/254, 15 February 1967. ESRO Council, 10th session,
24-25 March 1966, ESRO/C/MIN/10, 10 June 1966, and 11th session, 22-24 June 1966,
ESRO/C/MINIl 1, 15 July 1966.
174 For the debate on the Falklands, see ESRO Council, 12th session, 18-20 July 1966, ESRO/C/MIN/12,
1 September 1966, and 14th session, 30/11-2 December 1966, ESRO/C/MIN/14, 20 January 1967.
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spurring them on, some of the Member States began to worry about how best to keep ESRO's budget
under control. The British were particularly determined to install a set of mechanisms to ensure that
governments retained the power to limit ESRO's expenditure. The solution that they came up with,
after some difficulty, combined the imposition of financial ceilings with the right of any member state
in the Council to veto a proposal to exceed these ceilings. The UK delegation's determination to fight
for this kind of solution was directly linked to a recent painful experience it had just had at CERN. If
they achieved their objectives with far less rancour in this case, it was because in ESRO, unlike in
Geneva, the British had wider support among the Member States and, indeed, were not strongly
opposed by the European space science community.
2.3.1 ESRO's eight-year budget estimates
The earliest estimates of the costs of ESRO were prepared by the interim STWG in time for the second
session of the COPERS, held at The Hague from 17 to 18 May 196l.175 Their annual and overall eight-
year figures are presented in column 2 of Table 2-2. It shows costs rising steadily during the first three
years, when the construction of buildings and the acquisition of capital equipment dominate
expenditure. As these fell off in years four and five, so their place was taken by the growing needs of
the medium-term scientific programme based on the launching of small satellites. There was then a
sharp jump in year six to a level of expenditure which remained constant in years seven and eight as
the space probes and large satellites were launched. With this distribution of expenditure, over half the
burden of financing ESRO fell in the last three years of the eight-year plan.
A word is apposite on how costs were distributed between the different sectors of the organisation's
activity. Fifty per cent of the overall estimate of 1360 MFF was for the payload engineering unit. Of
this, about half again was for the three project groups whose task it was to engineer sounding rocket
payloads and satellites. The costs of acquiring and launching light and heavy launchers counted for
another third of the overall expenditure. No provision was made by the STWG for the costs of
building and running ESRO's headquarters. Nor did the figures include the 16 MFF per year required
to fund the construction of scientific instruments in the various Member States.
In presenting this first budget the scientists insisted that the numbers that they had come up with were
"to be a minimum below which it would not be worthwhile having such a programme at all".176
Several "possible additions" to this programme were identified, including a new launching site for
light and heavy satellite launchers (costing about 300 MFF) and an additional large satellite project
(costing about 90 MFF).177 The paper also stressed that the costs for vehicles had been calculated
using figures provided for NASA's Scout launcher for the small satellites and the costs of Blue Streak
as provided by the UK Ministry of Aviation for space probes and large satellites. The latter was "a
marginal cost", and it assumed that ESRO effectively bought the rocket off the shelf. As we remarked
earlier it was also assumed, for budgetary purposes, that two launchings would be required to put one
satellite or space probe successfully into orbit. At the same time it was mentioned that if the Atlas -
Agena B rocket was used instead of Blue Streak additional resources to the tune of 90 MFF per year
during years six to eight would be required.
Despite its provisional nature and these various qualifications, the scientists in the STWG made
relatively few additions to their first estimates. The main increases asked for in the Blue Book (column
3, Table 2-2) were some 35 MFF for expenditure in industry by ESTEC and an additional 12 MFF for
ESLAB.178 These estimates were further increased after a visit to NASA on 1 and 2 September 1961
175 COPERS/20, 11 May 1961.
176 This is in fact the way in which the British delegation put it at the meeting in The Hague. See COPERS,
2nd session (17-18 May 1961), COPERS/Min/2, 25 May 1961, p. 8. Massey, who was the chairman of the
session, replied to the British delegation that "there could be no doubt at all on this point".
177 Other new projects envisaged were a pilot meteorological experiment costing some 4 MFF per year and
an additional project group to study advanced methods of propulsion (initially 2 MFF/year).
178 The arrival of ESLAB at this point has been explained in the previous sections. For an anticipation of the
figures given in the Blue Book see also document COPERS/GTST/14, 19 July 1961.
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by a small party headed by C. de Jager. Their aim was to discuss satellite tracking and data acquisition
facilities and to explore the possibilities of future collaboration with the USA in these fields. They
came home convinced of the need to increase their earlier estimates of expenditure in these areas.179
The cost of both was thus pushed up by a little over 30 MFF with respect to the Blue Book figures to
give a final STWG estimate of 1473 MFF in January 1962 (column 4, Table 2-2). This was less than
10 per cent above the first estimate provided in May 1961. If the budget subgroup's costing of the
headquarters is added we arrive at an estimate for the scientists' eight-year programme of a little over
1500 MFF (column 5, Table 2-2).
2.3.2 The debate on financial control
These relatively minor and carefully calculated increases to the STWG's global budget estimates took
place against the background of a debate in the LAFWG and in the COPERS Council about how best
to control ESRO's finances. It was a debate which led some members of the budget subgroup to insist
that the scientist's figures would have to be revised upwards if the programme was not to be seriously
reduced. The first steps towards defining a set of budgetary rules for ESRO were taken by the British,
quickly supported by the French, in September 1961. They rapidly proved to be controversial and the
LAFWG decided that the issues were best left to the Munich session of the COPERS to be held the
following month.180 There were two aspects to the problem. Firstly, Britain and France wanted the
major contributors to the budget to have a veto over the expenditure on particularly costly
developments. "Experience with CERN", said the French delegation in Munich, "whose annual budget
was now twice as much as originally planned, had caused the larger countries to ponder what they
might be letting themselves in for in ESRO's case".181 Budgets at CERN were voted by simple
majority. The British and the French felt that this would not do for ESRO. They suggested that any
modifications to ESRO's programme of work or to its facilities should be agreed by a qualified two-
thirds majority, the qualification being that each member state paying more than 10% of the ESRO
budget (i.e. the "big four": France, Germany, Italy and UK) should be among the concurring majority.
This effectively gave these states the power to veto the proposed expenditure.
The second way in which the British hoped to exercise some control over ESRO's expenditure was by
establishing "a procedure for keeping the whole financial development of the organisation under
review".182 For this purpose the British proposed having three-year budgetary periods introduced, with
the Council determining the level of expenditure in each year of the first three-year period and, at the
same time, giving an indication to member state governments of the annual level of expenditure during
the successive three-year period.
The first of these proposals was vigorously opposed by the Dutch delegation. They did not object to
there being a two-thirds majority vote in certain cases; what they disliked was a qualified two-thirds
majority. It was unwise in practice: complicated voting procedures impaired the efficiency of the
organisation, they said. And it was offensive in principle: the low percentage contribution of a country
179 COPERS/GTST/lII/9, 20 October 1961, with attached COPERS/GTST/1II/8.
180 COPERS/AWG/18 (add. 3), 5 September 1961; COPERS/AWG/18 (add. 4), 11 September 1961.
LAFWG, 3rd meeting (14-15 September 1961), COPERS/AWG/33, 27 September 1961; and 4th meeting
(28-29 September 1961), COPERS/AWG/38, 9 October 1961.
181 See COPERS, 3rd session (24-25 October 1961), COPERS/Min/3, 16 November 1961, p. 6. For the
French determination to have a veto over expenditure see letter from the French president V. Giscard
d'Estaing to his Prime Minister, 14 December 1961 (Mussard files, HAEC, folder "France"). In his letter,
Giscard pointed out that France's contributions to international organisations had increased by a factor of
155 between 1955 and 1962. He was determined, he said, that his country should not be put before a "fait
accompli" in terms of financial commitments at the international level, and that the only way to brake the
growth in expenditures was by the means of a veto.
182 COPERS/Min/3, cit., p. 8.
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like the Netherlands to ESRO's budget was, in absolute terms, a lot for it, and was not a reason to
restrict its formal power to decide the level of the budget. In the event no decision was taken, the
delegates being divided on the issue. The three Scandinavian delegations along with the Swiss
supported the Dutch, while the German, Belgian and Spanish delegations favoured some kind of
qualified majority.183  The UK's proposals for forward planning were also greeted with some
scepticism. Most delegates apparently agreed in principle with the idea. However, the French for one
felt that it was "impossible to give meaningful figures, at this distance in time for the fourth or fifth
year onwards". Undeterred, the British "suggested that informal discussions should soon take place
between the Member States through diplomatic channels on the actual figures" to be inserted into the
financial protocol to be attached to the ESRO Convention.184
In the month after the October session of the COPERS, the UK refined its proposals to control ESRO's
expenditure. It suggested that, on further reflection and in the light of further informal discussions,
there appeared to be a "strong desire [...] by many delegations" to have an overall eight-year ceiling
imposed on ESRO's expenditure. This ceiling would need to be settled at an intergovernmental
conference of the Organisation's Member States to ensure that it was binding. The same meeting
would also set a ceiling for the first three years of ESRO's expenditure. It would agree on the annual
budget for each year within that first three-year envelope, and it would provide an indication of
expenditure for years four to six. Two alternative procedures were proposed for subsequent triennial
reviews. Either the Council itself, meeting at ministerial level, could agree on a ceiling for the next
three years by a qualified two-thirds majority. Or the Council could simply propose a level of
expenditure, and leave it to governments to agree among themselves on a final figure for the next three
years. Governments could settle this matter either through diplomatic channels or by an
intergovernmental conference especially convened for the purpose.185
As the British grew more determined to tighten the controls on ESRO's expenditure, so the LAFWG
continued to search, without success, for a compromise on the UK's proposals. Serious doubts were
again raised at its sixth meeting, early in December, by both scientists and the members of its budget
subgroup on the feasibility and advisability of setting firm ceilings for the later periods of ESRO's life.
These doubts were reinforced after a visit paid by some members of the budget subgroup to NASA.186
Three considerations in particular led the science administrators to conclude that it would be foolish to
try to fix expenditure using firm and difficult-to-change ceilings for anything but the first three years.
Firstly, there were the likely cost escalations in the large satellite projects. Europe, it was pointed out,
had as yet no experience in any satellite project taken to completion and no-one anywhere in the world
had experience of very large projects. Experience at NASA however showed that the initial cost would
certainly rise as scientists and engineers modified their designs in the light of new information. Thus
the cost of NASA's large astronomical satellite, due to be launched at the end of 1963, had risen from
an initial estimate of $ 21 million to $ 75 million.187 Secondly, echoing the earlier remarks made by the
STWG, there was the question of the launcher. If instead of using Blue Streak, ESRO was forced to
rely on American  Thor and Atlas rockets for its large projects,  the budget would have to be increased
183 Ibidem, p. 5-6.
184 Ibidem, p. 8, and document COPERS/AWG/18 (add. 8, rev. 2), 31 October 1961.
185 For the British memorandum see COPERS/AWG/19 (add. 9), 29 November 1961. We have described the
content of this note in some detail because a very similar debate was occurring at CERN at this time.
We shall go into this debate in more detail later.
186 LAFWG, 6th meeting (7-8 December 1961), COPERS/AWG/51, 2 January 1962. See also letter from
F. Bath of the British DSIR (Department of Scientific and Industrial Research) to J.J. Beattie of the
COPERS Secretariat, 16 November 1961, and letter F. Bath to C. Hoogeweegen, 17 November 1961,
both in folder "AWG Budget Subgroup. Correspondence", Mussard files (HAEC).
187 This information is taken from a NASA trip report written by members of the budget subgroup which is
Annex 3 to Document COPERS/AWG/II/2 (rev.1), 19 March 1962.
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by almost 100 MFF annually from year six onwards.188 Finally, as German delegate Frank pointed out,
during the last few years of the eight-year period one needed to provide for an as yet undefined follow-
on programme if the work of ESRO was not to be disrupted.189 In sum the budget sub-group
concluded, as an internal French document put it, that
The imposition of a "ceiling" is altogether illusory. NASA has concluded that it cannot
foresee its expenditures more than three years in advance, and even then, has to make
allowance for unforeseen expenditures of 20 to 30 per cent. In these circumstances, the
STWG's estimates after the third year are uncertain and those after the fifth year are
wholly illusory.190
Consistent with these convictions, the budget subgroup revised upwards the estimates of expenditure
proposed by the STWG. They increased the global estimate of some 1550 MFF by 100 MFF, most of
the additional expenditure being for ESTEC (column 3, Table 2-3). And they proposed that a 20 per
cent contingency be added on the total amount of the budget and that a 15 per cent allowance be made
for growth during the last two years of the organisation's life. This brought the subgroup's proposal for
ESRO's eight-year budget to a little over 2100 MFF (column 4, Table 2-3).
The British meanwhile, having just suffered a major setback in their attempt to impose ceilings at
CERN, decided that the same mistakes (as they saw them) were not going to be made at ESRO.191 In
January 1962, Her Majesty's Government again circulated a document to the governments of the other
Member States of the COPERS. In it they insisted on the need for "a system of really firm triennial
ceilings", to be fixed by a unanimous vote of the Council, preferably meeting at ministerial level.
These ceilings, the document went on, should be "coupled with the overall eight-year ceiling,
reviewable every three years, but only in the light of major changes in scientific or economic
circumstances". If their requirements were met, the British went on, they would no longer press for a
qualified majority on the programmes, annual work plans and budgets of ESRO. A simple two-thirds
majority would suffice. Nor would they seek to have financial ceilings determined by negotiations
between governments outside the framework of the ESRO Council.192
This note was followed by another in February, this one concerned with the level of the eight-year
ceiling and the shape of the expenditure curve. Here the UK objected to the upwards revision of the
eight-year budget estimate from 1500 MFF to 2100 MFF, as well as to the provision for rising
expenditure in the last three years of ESRO's life. This expenditure curve "puts Her Majesty's
Government in the greatest difficulty", the note said. If implemented, it would push British
expenditure on scientific space research beyond what was deemed reasonable, and the field would
"claim for itself too large a share of the total national effort in pure science". Elaborating, the British
stressed that it was of "cardinal importance" for the UK that ESRO's costs during the first eight years
of its life should remain at 1500 MFF and that its rate of expenditure in the last three years of this
eight-year period should be stable and should not exceed 240 MFF per year. The government realised
that it may not be possible for ESRO to carry out the envisaged programme within these limits, as
indeed the budget subgroup had stressed. However, it believed that if this were not possible the
programme would simply have to be pruned back in line with the money available.193
188 For a detailed analysis of the financial implications of replacing Blue Streak with equivalent US
launchers, see the paper COPERS/GTST/IV/7, 10 November 1961.
189 See letter from Frank to Hoogeweegen, 22 December 1961, folder "AWG Subgroup Budget.
Correspondence", Mussard files (HAEC).
190 We only have a section of this document which is initialled RR on notepaper headed "Finance Extérieur".
It is available in folder "AWG Subgroup Budget. Correspondence", Mussard files (HAEC).
The translation is ours.
191 We shall return to the difficulties which the British were having at CERN in a few moments.
192 For this material see COPERS/AWG/19 (add. 12), 19 February 1962, Annex 2.
193 COPERS/AWG/19 (add. 12), cit., and Annex 1 to the same document.
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The British proposals were discussed in the COPERS by both scientists and science administrators
during the first three months of 1962. As one might imagine there was considerable debate both on
how ceilings ought to be set, i.e. by unanimity or by majority vote, and on what those ceilings should
be. Regarding the former point, the members of the STWG were clear. A unanimous Council vote for
a three-year ceiling, they said, "could paralyse the working of the organisation". To reach a
compromise on such a ceiling, the STWG said, delegates may find themselves setting a figure which
was too low to allow for effective work. Member states representatives in the LAFWG, on the other
hand, were more or less split on the question. Britain and France, along with Sweden and Austria
made it absolutely clear that they wanted unanimity for fixing ceilings and, in particular, would not
support a German proposal that ceilings be settled by a qualified two-thirds majority.194
As for the level of the eight-year ceiling itself, the striking point is that it was the scientists, rather than
the administrators, who were persuaded to accept the figures proposed by the British government. In
January 1962 the budget subgroup insisted that the overall figure for ESRO should not be less than
2000 MFF for the first eight years. The majority of the LAFWG also apparently supported this
figure.195 The scientists, by contrast, were less convinced. At an inconclusive meeting of the STWG in
January 1962, both Boyd and Lines (UK) claimed that there was probably no need to provide for a
contingency on the total ESRO budget, "since certain items already included a safety margin and
others did not need one". At the same meeting, Hultqvist (Sweden) "expressed the opinion that Europe
could make a substantial contribution in space research staying within a limit of 1650 MFF"
(column 3, Table 2-3).196 This tendency to accept a lower level of expenditure than the administrators
deemed advisable was confirmed once the British government had insisted that the overall ceiling be
1500 MFF. An ad hoc committee of experts chaired by van de Hulst was asked to report on what the
scientists felt. In a highly uncharacteristic statement - at least if one takes the behaviour of the CERN
scientific staff vis-à-vis their fund givers as one's point of reference - the expert group effectively
accepted the British restrictions. The Blue Book, van de Hulst's committee claimed, did not represent a
detailed scientific programme, and the budget figures presented therein and in its subsequent
amendments were not to be regarded as highly precise. "It is considered improbable but not impossible
that the approximate programme as outlined in the Blue Book", the committee went on, "can actually
be carried out within the adopted ceiling of 1500 MFF". If it could not, it would be necessary simply
to reduce the number of launchings. Despite these restrictions, the committee concluded, "the
consensus of opinion was that a programme thus reduced would still yield valuable scientific
results".197 In other words, the STWG was no longer going to fight for its proposed programme on the
grounds that it was the minimum compatible with a viable European space science effort, as they had
stated less than a year earlier.
There was one other financial point that needed to be settled before the Convention could be signed.
This concerned the ceiling for the first three years of ESRO expenditure. As we can see from column 4
of Table 2-3, the preferred figure of the budget subgroup was approximately 490 MFF. This was cut
by removing the allowance for contingencies and by reducing the staff foreseen for headquarters.198 It
was reduced further at the fourth session of the COPERS in February. Here delegates from nine
Member States agreed, without opposition, to allocate 380 MFF to ESRO for its first three years and
600 MFF for the second three years - roughly the figures proposed by the STWG (columns 4 and 5,
194 For the scientists' position see COPERS/AWG/18 (add. 27), 25 January 1962. For the debate inside the
LAFWG see the summary report of its 7th meeting (23-25 January 1962), COPERS/AWG/58,
15 January 1962. (This document seems to have been incorrecfly dated by the COPERS Secretariat. The
date should presumably be 15 February 1962).
195 See LAFWG, 7th meeting (23-25 January 1962), COPERS/AWG/58, 15 January 1962 for the opinion of
the subgroup and COPERS/45 (rev. 1), 14 February 1962 for the opinion of the LAFWG as a whole.
196 STWG, 5th meeting (22 January 1962), COPERS/GTST/31 (undated).
197 COPERS/64, 14 March 1962.
198 COPERS/45 (rev. 1), 14 February 1962, and COPERS/AWG/1I/2 (rev. 1), 19 March 1962, summary
table S3 in Annex 2. The 490 MFF were cut to 450 MFF in January by shuffling the envisaged
conungencies in the first three years of expenditure and by reducing headquarters staff by 30 %. It was
then further reduced to about 400 MFF by doing away with the allowance for unforeseen expenditure.
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Table 2-2). Only the Belgian government abstained, not on principle, but because it had no
information on how the programme would be reduced to remain within these limits.199
It goes without saying that the British triumphed at the conference of plenipotentiaries held in June
1962. Their various demands were enshrined in the Convention, in its associated financial protocol,
and in an additional protocol concerning the financing of ESRO during the first eight years of its
existence. Article X.4 of the Convention stipulated that the Council would determine every third year,
by unanimous decision of all the Member States, the level of resources for ESRO for the succeeding
three-year period. At the same time it would determine, on a provisional basis, and by unanimous
decision of all the Member States, the level of resources for the succeeding three-year period. The
annual budget was to be adopted within these limits by a simple two-thirds majority of Council. One
of the protocols also stipulated that the overall eight-year ceiling was to be fixed at 1500 MFF, at price
level ruling at the date of signature of the protocol. This corresponded to 306 million Accounting
Units (MAU), a conventional monetary unit used for ESRO financial dealings, based on a gold
standard.200 Provision was also made for the Council unanimously to adjust this figure in the light of
"major scientific or technological developments". As for the initial phases of ESRO's life, the budgets
were set at 78 MAU (380 MFF) for the first three years, while a provisional ceiling of 128 MAU
(600 MFF) was agreed for the second three-year period after the entry into force of the Convention.201
2.3.3 The factors at work in this debate
Two factors lay behind the British government's determination to impose a ceiling on ESRO's
expenditure, and to ensure that it was binding on the Member States. The first, based on their
experience at CERN, was to restrict the power of the ESRO Council. The second was their estimate,
made towards the end of 1961, of the acceptable levels of UK expenditure on space science, national
and international, for the next six to eight years. To appreciate the first point we need to digress for a
moment and to explain the experience which the UK government had had at CERN. As early as 1957
it became clear that the costs of running CERN were going to be far greater than anyone had ever
anticipated. As new and more powerful high-energy accelerators began to be commissioned in the
United States in the mid-1950s, it emerged that sophisticated and complex detection equipment was
required to exploit the machines properly. The CERN management were caught off their guard by
these new developments and let it be known that they would need as much money to run CERN's new
accelerators as it had cost to build them. Alarmed, the British government decided in 1957 that some
sort of forward planning should be instituted at CERN, and that two or three-year ceilings should be
imposed on expenditure.202
These proposals were greeted with widespread hostility both by the high-energy physics community
and by many of the other member state delegates on the grounds that it was impossible to predict in
advance the costs of research and development, and that the policy of ceilings would stifle the growth
of the laboratory. Matters came to a head in 1961. On the one hand, the British Treasury had found its
CERN Council delegates incapable of persuading their colleagues to accept a firm and binding ceiling
policy. At the same time, there was growing pressure coming from within the laboratory and from
199 COPERS, 4th session (21-23 February 1962), COPERS/Min/4, 13 March 1962, p. 3. See also letter from
Holvoet to Auger, 15 March 1962, folder "Belgique", Mussard files (HAEC).
200 One Accounting Unit was defined as the value of 0.88867088 grammes of fine gold, and at the time was
equivalent to one US dollar: see Article 6 of the financial protocol annexed to the convention for the
establishment of ESRO, document COPERS/AWG/19 (rev. 6), 23 May 1962.
201 The "Convention for the Establishment of a European Space Research Organisation" can be found for
example in Annex 1 to ESRO General Report, 1964-1965. The financial protocol annexed to the
Convention is document COPERS/AWG/19 (rev.6), 23 May 1962. The protocol concerning the financing
of ESRO for its first eight years is document COPERS/AWG/19 (add. 13), 12 March 1962. Alternative
labels for these two protocols are ESRO Conference/5, 23 May 1962, and ESRO Conference/6,
23 May 1962.
202 For an extensive discussion of the debate described in this paragraph see Krige in Hermann et al. (1990),
chapter 10, and Krige (1991).
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some of the Member States, notably France, that forward planning should make allowance for an
annual growth rate of about 8 % in real terms. Frustrated by the power of the CERN Council to thwart
the preferred policies of the major contributor to the CERN budget, the Foreign Office took the
unprecedented step (for CERN) of circulating an aide mémoire to its counterparts in the Member
States in November 1961, precisely at the time when it was suggesting that similar steps would be
needed at ESRO. In this aide mémoire it was proposed that, instead of leaving the CERN Council to
set the levels of CERN expenditure, the level should be set between governments themselves, leaving
the Council simply to adjust its programme within the limits decided between ministers.
The British government's move was greeted with intense hostility by the CERN Council at its meeting
in December 1961. By challenging the authority of the Council in this way, said Dutch delegate
H. Bannier, the British were challenging the very foundations of CERN's success. The French delegate
F. de Rose went even further. Referring to ongoing and extremely delicate negotiations between the
British and the French over the use of Blue Streak as the first stage of a jointly built European
launcher, de Rose said that he would advise de Gaulle not to agree to the British proposals if they were
not willing to abandon their attempt to impose firm ceilings on CERN, and to impede the "automatic"
growth of the laboratory. In the face of this threat the British had little choice but to back down. The
power of the CERN "lobby", a small core of senior science administrators and scientists dedicated to
defending the laboratory's interests before their national bureaucracies, and determined to put up a
united front along with the laboratory management in the face of any "external" threat, had carried the
day.203
The British manoeuvres inside ESRO were a direct consequence of these experiences. Her Majesty's
Government had learned a lesson. That lesson was that in future, when setting up any new
organisation for scientific collaboration, strict limits should be imposed on the Council's power to
decide budgets. The way they chose to do this was by insisting that appropriate safeguards be built
into ESRO's constitution so as to ensure that financial control over the laboratory's expenditure was a
legally enshrined principle. This is undoubtedly why the British were so emphatic about having
ceilings written into ESRO's basic documents. It is also why they insisted that these ceilings would
have to be set between ministers, and not by the ESRO Council, if their demands were not written into
the Convention and its accompanying protocols. They were determined never again to be at the mercy
of a CERN-like "lobby" as had happened in Geneva in December 1961. Governments also learn!
The second reason for the UK's firmness was the constraints that the government, in consultation with
the its space science community, had decided to impose on expenditure in the field during the years
ahead. As early as July 1961, Massey submitted to the British National Committee for Space Research
an estimate of the UK's contribution to the costs of ESRO using the first set of figures available from
the STWG (column 2, Table 2-2). He added the estimated costs of the national programme, including
a budget line for UK/NASA bilateral arrangements. His paper foresaw annual expenditure climbing
steadily until, in ESRO's sixth year, Britain would be spending a total of £5.65 million on space
science, £4.1 million of which (i.e. about 58 MFF) was the estimated UK share of ESRO (25% of
232 MFF). These figures were submitted to the minister for science. After discussion within the
government it was agreed, by the end of 1961, that Britain should be prepared to spend up to
£6 million for what was called the "steady state" of funding for space research. From then on,
according to Massey and Robins, this limit was "sacrosanct". Correlatively it was implied that, "for the
balance of the UK programme", ESRO costs should be confined to about 250 MFF per year during the
last three years of its first eight-year period. The British space science community, in other words, in
consultation with their government, was quite satisfied not to see ESRO's budget go above an overall
ceiling of 1500 MFF and to level off in years six to eight.204
203 See Pestre in Hermann et al. (1990), chapter 7, for an elegant description of the activities of the CERN
lobby.
204 For the material in this paragraph see Massey and Robins (1986), pp.117-127. The adoption of these
figures by the COPERS was judged by Massey and Robins to have been "a completely satisfactory
outcome for the UK". This quotation and the others are from pp. 124 and 126.
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It was perhaps to be expected that the British space scientists would only be prepared to join the
COPERS, "provided that the UK national space research programme was not prejudiced".205 Yet it is
significant that they apparently met little opposition from scientists from other Member States. This
was possibly due to the wish to keep the British involved in the scheme - after all they were the most
experienced and advanced community at the time and would bear a substantial fraction of the costs -
and the realisation that they would only participate on their terms. At the same time, it is surely a
symptom of a more deep-seated ambivalence of the continental space science community vis-à-vis
"their" organisation. After an initial burst of enthusiasm, in fact, many members of the community
seem to have been less than convinced of ESRO's merits and were not opposed to seeing its budgets
severely restricted and brought under tight control.
Why should this be so? Part of reason lies surely in the fact that space science communities in both the
larger and the smaller Member States, and not just in Britain, were more or less convinced that their
governments would support national programmes. From this perspective ESRO was a potential
competitor, a situation which the national bodies were determined to avoid, as the debate over ESLAB
has shown. The interest of building a strong national programme was further reinforced by a generous
offer made in 1959 by NASA. At an international meeting of space scientists in The Hague in March
that year, the American delegate announced that his government, through NASA, would be willing to
launch suitable experiments proposed by scientists from other countries. The technical support of
NASA's experienced engineers was guaranteed. European scientists could either go and work in an
American laboratory on the construction, calibration and installation of their equipment in the research
satellite. Or, if the intention was to launch an entire payload comprising various experiments, NASA
would be prepared to advise on the feasibility of the package, and on its design and construction, as
well as help with the pre-flight environmental testing. In discussion, NASA made it clear that it was
seeking bilateral agreements for joint programmes. It also let it be known, at least to the British, that it
was prepared to launch at least some equipment free of charge.206 That granted, why spend scarce
resources on setting up an entirely new organisation, particularly if that meant a reduction in the funds
made available for nationally built experiments and a "national" programme?
ESRO struggled into life then a fragile and vulnerable creature. Governments, though not uninterested,
were not prepared to invest heavily in it. Scientists, though not uninterested, were not prepared to see
it develop at the expense of national programmes. It could not compete with the United States, as
CERN aimed to do. It was not to replace national programmes, as CERN was expected to do in many
Member States. It is hardly surprising that it required a fundamental revision of ESRO's aims, to wit, a
shift away from pure science to applications, to revitalise an organisation that had all but lost its way
in the mid-1960s.
2.4 The organisation and functioning of ESRO in the "Auger years" (1964-67)
The ESRO Convention entered into force on 20 March 1964. The ten founding states were Belgium,
Denmark, France, (Federal Republic of) Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and
United Kingdom. Two other countries which had participated in the early COPERS activities, Austria
and Norway, decided not to join the new Organisation and retained an observer status. The first
meeting of the Council opened in Paris three days later with Harrie Massey in the Chair. Pierre Auger
was appointed ESRO's first Director General. Thus it was up to one of its main founding father, to lead
the European Space Research Organisation during the critical first three years of existence.
2.4.1 The "legislative" and "executive" arms
ESRO's institutional structure was very similar in conception to that of CERN. At the decision making
level (the "Legislative" in the ESRO jargon), the supreme governing body was the Council, made of
delegations from its Member States. Each member state had one vote in the Council, where it could be
205 Massey and Robins (1986), 117.
206 Massey and Robins (1986), Annex 11, describes the NASA offer.
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represented by not more than two delegates, one of whom was generally a scientist, the other an
important national science administrator. One or more advisers were usually included national
delegations. The main tasks of the Council were to determine the Organisation's scientific, technical
and administrative policy; to approve its programme and annual work plans; and to determine its level
of resources both annually, and every third year for the subsequent three-year period. A. Hocker was
the chairman of the Council in the period we are considering.
The Council was advised by two subordinate bodies, the Administrative and Finance Committee
(AFC) and the Scientific and Technical Committee (STC). The AFC, which was composed of Member
States' delegates drawn from the appropriate positions in national bureaucracies, advised it on legal,
administrative and financial matters. It also took decisions in some key areas, notably on the award of
contracts to industry. The STC, including delegates who were expected to be "competent scientists and
technologists", had the task of advising the Council and the ESRO Director General on all scientific
and technical matters affecting the work of the Organisation, including the recruitment of staff, the
educational activities and the cooperation with non-Member States.
There was some debate over the composition of the STC. When ESRO was formed, it was suggested
that scientific and technological matters be split from one another. This was because, in the light of the
experience gained during the COPERS, it was clear that the STC would devote a great deal of its time
to technical and financial affairs, at the expense of scientific debate, so proving a somewhat
unattractive committee to the best scientists in Europe.207 In the event, this proposal was rejected.
ESRO's STC, unlike CERN's SPC (Scientific Policy Committee) was inevitably "politicised". The
members of CERN's SPC were chosen essentially on merit. The delegates to ESRO's STC were not
only scientific experts but also representatives of their Member States, two roles which could easily be
in conflict with one another. Reimar Lüst was the first chairman of the STC, followed by Jean
Coulomb and Hendrik van de Hulst.
The STC considered recommendations laid before it by a Launching Programme Advisory Committee
(LPAC), whose task it was to define an appropriate sounding rocket and spacecraft launching
programme in the light of proposals it received from the European space science community.208 The
LPAC, which was chaired by Lüst in the whole period considered here, was a small body of four or
five eminent European scientists whose task it was to combine experiment proposals from the
European space science community into scientifically and technically suitable payloads, taking
account of the financial and other resources available. The experimental proposals considered by the
LPAC were funnelled to it by six ad hoc groups representing various disciplines in the field and
identified by easily recognisable acronyms: ATM (atmospheric physics and chemistry), ION
(ionospheric and auroral phenomena), SUN (solar physics), PLA (moon, planets, comets and the inter-
planetary medium), STAR (stars and stellar systems), COS (cosmic rays and trapped radiation).209
At the executive level, between 1964 and 1967 ESRO was managed by a Directorate based in Paris,
including the Director General (Auger) assisted by a Scientific Director (B. Bolin, succeeding
R. Lüst), a Technical Director (A.W. Lines) and a Head of Administration (J. Crowley). The directors
of ESRIN, ESDAC and ESLAB reported to the Scientific Director; the director of ESTEC, who had
also responsibility for ESRANGE and ESTRACK, reported to the Technical Director. The
"Executive", as it was eventually called, was responsible for the implementation of approved
programmes within the established financial envelope and under general control from the STC. It was
also called to perform feasibility studies of space missions proposals coming from the scientific
community and recommended by the STC, in view of their eventual adoption in the programme.
207 ESRO/C/4, 21 March 1964.
208 ESRO (1966). See also ESRO Council, 1st session (23-24 March 1964), ESRO/C/MIN1, 21 April 1964,
and 2nd session (15-17 June 1964), ESRO/C/MIN2, 8 July 1964.
209 A more detailed discussion on this scientific advisory structure is in chapter 4.
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2.4.2 The "Bannier report" and the modification of ESRO's structure
Within a little over two years of ESRO being established, the Council began to have serious doubts
about the proper functioning of this structure. It was finding its already crowded agenda cluttered with
relative trivialities like the venue of a proposed summer school or the design of a suitable emblem for
ESRO. The AFC was bogged down in seemingly endless debates over the award of individual
contracts to industry, and in formulating a policy for the geographical distribution between the
Member States. And there were growing doubts over the efficiency of the management in-house. Time
and again the Executive was accused of preparing its case badly, so that the AFC and the Council were
forced to take decisions in haste and on the basis of limited information. The internal staff structure
and complements were causing concern and indeed a special committee was set up in order to advise
on this issue very soon after ESRO officially came into being. Finally the organisation's expenditure
profile was tilting heavily in favour of administrative expenses. In 1963 it had been agreed that
internal expenditure should not exceed 45 % of total expenditure. By mid-1966 it had climbed to
50 %, placing enormous pressure on the operational programme.
In response to what was perceived to be a "state of crisis" in the Organisation, the Council, at its
twelfth session in July 1966, set up a group of experts to study the internal structure, procedures and
methods of work of ESRO. The chairman of this group was J.H. Bannier, who was the director of the
Nederlandse Organisatie voor Zuiver Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (ZWO) in the Netherlands and, as
a former chairman of the CERN Council, was intimately aware of how ESRO's sister organisation
functioned. Bannier was assisted by five experts selected from administrative, technical and scientific
fields. The secretary of the group, W.O. Lock, was provided by CERN.210
The most important proposal made by the Bannier commission, as summarised by the chairman
himself in one phrase, was "delegation of authority". There was a "crisis of confidence" in ESRO,
Bannier wrote, because there was not a clear enough distinction between the legislative and executive
arms of the organisation. The Council and the AFC were having to take decisions on so many minor
matters because insufficient power had been concentrated in the hands of the Director General. As a
result, neither body was able to concentrate on its main task. For Bannier, this meant that the Council
should limit itself to discussing broad issues of policy and to taking decisions of major importance.
The AFC's functions were to supervise the financial management of the Organisation and to
concentrate on certain, particularly important executive tasks, notably the adjudication of certain
contracts, the authorisation of certain expenditures, and the recommendations of budgets to the
Council.
The AFC was particularly overwhelmed with work. In the 12 months from November 1965, for
example, it had held 20 meetings spreading over 54 days and attended by 46 different delegates,
compared to the theoretical minimum number of 10. The most significant practical recommendation
which Bannier made for relieving this load was to change the limits below which the Executive could
award contracts without first having to seek the committee's approval. The changes recommended
were dramatic: from 100,000 AU (approximately 0.5 MFF) to 500,000 AU for normal contracts
awarded competitively; from zero to 20,000 AU for contracts awarded to non-Member States, and
from 20,000 AU to 100,000 AU for contracts placed by direct negotiation with the tendering firm.
Bannier pointed out that in 1966 alone the AFC had discussed no less than 53 contracts at 15 meetings
which had been either wholly or partly devoted to contract matters. If the limits which he proposed
were adopted, this number would have been reduced to twelve. And only two of these contracts, the
chairman noted, were worth more than 5 MFF.
Another important revision proposed by Bannier's group concerned the functions of the LPAC and the
STC in the decision-making process. The LPAC, it was suggested, should put its proposals directly to
the Directorate, rather than having them funnelled through the STC. It would then be up to the
210 For this paragraph and for what follows, see the Bannier report, ESRO/C/APP/48, 29 March 1967, as well
as ESRO/C/192, rev. 1, 21 July 1966.
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Directorate to draw up a proposed programme for the Organisation in consultation with the STC and
the AFC, before laying it before the Council for final approval. By this means, Bannier hoped to
loosen the bonds between the LPAC and the STC. At the same time, he aimed to give the STC the
status of an independent and "objective" judge of ESRO's scientific programme. Its membership, he
proposed, should no longer be based on national representation but solely on recognised expertise in
the scientific and technical aspects of the programme which the Organisation was following at any
given time.
At the most superficial level, Bannier's proposals for redefining the decision-making structure for
ESRO were simply an attempt to transport the CERN model into the space research organisation. His
insistence that more authority be delegated to the Directorate, and his wish for "independent" scientific
advice to be available through the STC were part of a general desire to roll back the influence of
member state bureaucracies and their interests in the functioning of the Organisation. It was, he said
tactfully, understandable that in the early days of ESRO each participating country wanted to ensure
that its interests were properly protected inside the Organisation. Now that the body was established
though, it was essential that the reigns be loosened, that confidence be placed in the Directorate, and
that its newly granted executive authority be supervised by proper forward planning and careful
a posteriori control.
All of the Bannier group's proposals for streamlining the committee structure of ESRO were
welcomed bar that referring to the STC role. In mid-1967, in fact, the STC decided to maintain the
status quo regarding its composition and its own terms of reference.211 Bannier's recommendations
were instead accepted as regards the LPAC, which became an advisory body of the Director General,
the latter then reporting to the STC. As a matter of fact, it cannot be doubted that in the first period of
its existence it was extremely difficult for the Directorate and the Council to have neutral advice on
the content and direction of the scientific programme. Looking at the annexes to ESRO General
Reports for these years, which list the membership of the Council and the various committees and
working groups, one sees that a relatively small group of space scientists were present at several levels
of the decision-making process, sometimes having key positions of power in more than one of the
three main bodies concerned (i.e. Council, STC and LPAC).212 As scientists they competed to have
their preferred scientific payloads flown. As national representatives they competed to protect the
interests of their own countries. The fragmentation of the field, and the limited resources available for
satellites, meant that the battles between scientific groups to get a mission and an experiment accepted
were intense. They were reinforced by the "political" exigencies of the national bureaucracies.
Bannier's failure to push the system towards greater "objectivity" was indicative of the determination
of scientists and of their governments alike to fight for every kilogram of a satellite payload.
The Council and its committees apart, the Bannier commission made a number of important recom-
mendations regarding the internal organisation of ESRO. Their thinking was shaped by two main
considerations. Firstly, they were emphatic that the executive function of the organisation should be
clearly separated from the policy and the planning function. Secondly, as far as the scientific pro-
gramme was concerned, they recommended that there be a clear institutional distinction drawn
between spacecraft development and spacecraft operation after launch. To achieve these objectives,
the Bannier group suggested that ESRO's top management structure be completely changed. The
dichotomy between scientific and technical directorates was, in Bannier's view, wrong in principle for
an organisation like ESRO. To overcome it, he suggested that the two posts be abolished. In its stead a
new structure was proposed. It comprised the Director General (DG) plus four directors, two of whom
were essentially responsible for policy-making and two for policy execution. A new post was to be
created in the first category, a so-called Director of Programmes and Planning (DPP), whose task it
would be to prepare draft programmes of the  Organisation, based on the scientific, technical, financial
211 ESRO/C/303, 27 July 1967, and ESRO/C/306, add. 4.
212 A quick list should include J. Blamont (F), R. Boyd (UK), C. de Jager (NL), M. Golay (CH),
B. Hultqvist (S) R. Lüst (D), G. Occhialini (I), B. Peters (DK), H. van de Hulst (NL).
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and time implications of the different proposals. The second member of the directorate concerned with
forward planning would be the Director of Administration (DA) whose task it would be to prepare
policy on the future needs of personnel, finance and contracts, and to organise and implement the
necessary procedures to maintain an a posteriori control over the Organisation's functioning. The two
posts in the Directorate having executive authority would be filled by the director of ESTEC and of
ESDAC, which was to be renamed ESOC, the European Space Operations Centre. As for ESRIN, the
Bannier group judged its research to be marginal to the major activities of the Organisation. Its
director, they felt, should not be a member of the directorate but should rather report directly to the
DG.
The Bannier group did not doubt that the geographical dispersion of ESRO was detrimental to its
proper functioning and was one important factor responsible for the prevailing malaise in the
organisation. On the other hand, they realised that there was little that could be done to remedy the
situation. What they did instead was to map the functional divisions they were recommending on to
geographical ones. ESRO headquarters was to become essentially responsible for policy, planning and
a posteriori control. ESTEC and ESOC would, roughly speaking, respectively have executive
authority for spacecraft development and spacecraft operation. To fulfil these objectives it was
recommended that ESLAB be merged with ESTEC and that the satellite control centre be moved from
Noordwijk to Darmstadt. Being essentially responsible for launch and post-launch operations, ESOC's
director would be responsible for ESRANGE and for ESTRACK.
By the end of 1968, the Bannier group's recommendations on internal structure had been more or less
fully implemented.213 J.A. Dinkespiler had been brought into the new key post of Director of
Programmes and Planning, while the post of Head of Administration (occupied since 1967 by M.
Depasse) was upgraded to Director level. A new director had been appointed for ESTEC, W. Kleen,
who replaced M. Schalin, who in turn had briefly taken over from ESTEC's first director, E.
Kesselring. ESOC too had a new man at the top, U. Montalenti, who had replaced S. Comet, the
previous director of ESDAC. H.L. Jordan remained the director of ESRIN. Two deputy directors of
ESTEC had also been appointed. One was P. Blassel, the head of the satellite and sounding rocket
department. The other was R. Gibson, who had taken up post in January 1967, and headed a greatly
expanded administrative department whose size reflected the increased executive authority of the
Noordwijk establishment. The "geographical" reorganisation proposed by the group of experts was
also implemented during 1967 and 1968. ESLAB was fused with ESTEC on 1 September 1968,
though not without considerable regret being expressed by the scientists. As van de Hulst put it, they
had found "a more pleasant welcome there [i.e. in ESLAB] than would have been possible in an
establishment the size of ESTEC and basically devoted to technical activities".214 ESLAB's director,
E.A. Trendelenburg, was retained and became the head of what was now called the Space Science
Department (SSD). The control centre was moved to Darmstadt, the timing being complicated by
concerns that it would clash with the launching of the ESRO I and ESRO II satellites.215 Finally, as
part of the overall "rationalisation" of ESRO's activities, it was decided to move the headquarters from
its temporary accommodation in 36 rue La Pérouse to new rented quarters in Neuilly-sur-Seine. This
was a significant break with the past. For seven years the organisation's secretariat had been installed
in the premises from which Auger's tiny group had helped lay the foundations first of COPERS and
then of ESRO. It was also a pointer to the future. ESRO was to share accommodation in the building
known as Neuilly/Hôtel de Ville with a rehoused ELDO headquarters. The change was indicative of a
renewed determination in the Member States to forge a coherent, integrated space policy for Europe.
213 For the debate see restricted Council session, 25-26 April 1967, ESRO/C/APP/54, 22 May 1967, and
Council Resolution ESRO/C/XVI/Res. 3, 27 April 1967.
214 From the minutes of the restricted Council session referred to in the previous note.
215 ESRO/C/292, 20 July 1967.
72
2.4.3 Relations with industry: the geographical distribution of contracts 216
When ESRO's Convention was first drafted, no specific provision was made to distribute the contracts
passed by the organisation on a geographical basis. The Convention was modelled on CERN's, in
which major contracts were awarded competitively, the successful bidder being the one who made the
lowest offer satisfying the laboratory's technical and delivery requirements. It was the Austrians who
suggested to the COPERS that some attempt should be made to ensure that all Member States had a
guaranteed return from the European space effort. As a result, the conference of plenipotentiaries
which met in June 1962 resolved that "the Organisation shall place orders for equipment and industrial
contracts amongst Member States as equitably as possible, taking into account scientific,
technological, economic and geographical considerations. The principle having been affirmed, it took
several years of discussion, notably inside the Administrative and Finance Committee, as to what
interpretation should be put on the requirement of geographical distribution and how that
interpretation should be administered. We do not intend to follow this extremely complex debate in
detail. Rather, what we shall do is to identify the key issues which dominated the proceedings between
1964 and 1966, when a compromise satisfactory to the majority of the Member States was finally
arrived at.
It was generally understood that the attempt to distribute contracts geographically would only be one
criterion, and not necessarily the most important one, when ESRO awarded contracts. It was the last of
the considerations mentioned in the resolution adopted in June 1962 and that, as the Swiss delegate
pointed out, was indicative of the weight that it should have. Put differently, scientific, technical and
economic considerations were to take precedence over geographical ones. Just what geographical
distribution meant was also the subject of some discussion in the AFC. The principle adopted was that
the distribution of contracts by value should be proportional to the Member States' contribution to the
ESRO budget (the so-called principle of just return).
Three questions dominated the debate over the implementation of this principle. The first concerned
the range of the contracts over which it should apply. It was obvious that the policy could only be
applied to that part of the budget which was spent inside the Member States. The purchase of
equipment and services, notably launching services, made in non-Member States fell outside its
purview. But within that framework was the distributive principle to be applied to all expenditure,
including buildings, land and even the salaries of the ESRO staff? Or was it to apply only to contracts
involving a component of research and/or development, i.e. contracts of technical interest? The second
main question was whether or not the financial advantages accruing to a host state from having an
establishment on its soil should be taken into account when awarding contracts. There was a bias,
insisted the British, in favour of firms in host states which built and furnished the facilities and
supplied them with everything from paint to paperclips.217 For some delegations affirmative action in
the non-host states was required to redress these alleged imbalances. Of course, countries like the
Netherlands and Germany, which had such establishments, disputed that there were any particular
advantages accruing to them at all.
The third cardinal issue debated by the AFC concerned the time which should be allowed, and the
procedures to be used, to establish rough parity between contributions and contracts. By mid-1965
some striking "inequalities" had already emerged. Consider the Dutch. About 7.8 MFF worth of
contracts, the majority of low technical interest, had been awarded to the Netherlands. This was 8.7 %
of the total value of contracts placed or authorised since 1962 - about double the Dutch percentage
contribution to the budget. Similarly the French contract/contribution ratio was about two, with the
216 This section is based predominantly on the debate surrounding ESRO's financial rules found in document
COPERS/AWG/Fin/57, rev. 10, Addenda 1-17, 14 May 1965 to 31 August 1965 as well as documents
ESRO/AF/361, 27 October 1961; ESRO/AF/461, rev. 6, 14 November 1966; ESRO/C/139,
16 September 1965; ESRO/C/139, rev. 1, and rev. 2, 10 March 1966 and 4 November 1966; and ESRO
Council, extraordinary session, 24 September 1965, ESRO/C/MIN/8, 19 November 1965.
217 Krige, in Hermann et al. (1990), chapter 11, has illustrated the enormous advantages accruing to France
and Switzerland in the award of contracts by CERN, which has no principle of just return.
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added twist that no less than 48 % by value of all the technically interesting contracts had been placed
in that country. This, it was said, was due to the strength of the French electronics industry. These
imbalances perturbed most members of the AFC, and they spent a good deal of time trying to decide
by when, and by what means, ESRO should aim to achieve a more equitable distribution of its
resources.
It was obvious that the Netherlands were never going to support a distributive policy which treated
contracts for "cement, bricks and stationery" as equivalent to those for a spacecraft. They made several
proposals aimed at discriminating between these two categories. The procedure finally agreed on at
the end of 1965 was to use a weighting factor for this purpose. Put loosely - for these concepts had to
be translated into ESRO budget headings for procedural purposes - technically interesting contracts
would be counted at 100 % of their value. The value of contracts for land and buildings, and for
administration and transport equipment, would be counted at 25 % when calculating the amount of
money spent in a member state for distributive purposes. Other expenditures, notably running
expenses and, of course, expenditures in non-Member States, were effectively weighted 0 % on this
system. As for redressing the already existing imbalances in returns between different Member States,
it was accepted that these were initially unavoidable but that they should be gradually reduced over
ESRO's lifetime. Typically it was proposed that excesses of 100 % (i.e. by a factor of 2) at the end of
1965 should not exceed 50 % three years later, 20 % six years later, and 10 % nine years later. Ideally
this alignment should happen "automatically", as space industries in the relatively "backward"
Member States acquired the capacity and the know-how to compete on a more equal footing with the
advanced countries. Failing that, various measures were proposed to force down the contracts to
contribution ratios which were in excess of unity. For example, it was suggested that countries which
were above the agreed targets at a given date in time should be treated as if they were non-Member
States. Their industries could still compete for ESRO contracts, but their tenders would only be
considered if a substantial scientific or technical advantage, or a substantial price advantage (10-20%)
could be obtained.
The French, with some support from the British, vigorously opposed this idea. Being the country
whose space industry was the most likely to be "penalised" for having a "disproportionate" share of
the contracts, it was not at all keen on the principle of just return being applied too rigidly. It was also
totally against the idea that Member States which had exceeded their quotas should be treated as if
they were non-Member States. As an alternative they proposed that ESRO promote close collaboration
among European firms through the formation of consortia. By sharing the know-how and the skills
acquired by the more advanced firms, engineers in new firms could make a significant contribution to
the organisation's work. To implement this idea, the French proposed that countries which had been
awarded contracts in excess of a certain percentage of their contribution, should be informed that from
henceforth tenders submitted by their industry would only be valid if their firms linked up with firms
in other, less favoured Member States. This was, in fact, a reflection of a trend which was already
establishing itself inside the European space industry. Individual firms had competed for the contracts
for the relatively simple satellites ESRO I and ESRO II. As the spacecraft became more complex,
however, and under pressure from the debates regarding geographical distribution which were taking
place in the AFC between 1964 and 1966, bids from individual firms began to give way to bids from
consortia. Prime contractors began to choose some of their associates on geographical grounds so as to
enhance the consortium's chances of being awarded the contract. Three consortia emerged in this
period, which competed for ESRO contracts. These were the MESH consortium, including as its core
members Matra (F), ERNO (D), SAAB (S), Hawker Siddeley Dynamics (UK) and Aeritalia (I); the
COSMOS consortium, including as its core members SNIAS (F), MBB (D), Marconi (UK), Selenia (I)
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and ETCA (B); and the STAR consortium, including as its core members Thomson-CSF (F), Dornier
(D), British Aircraft Company (UK), FIAR (I), Fokker (NL), Contraves (CH) and Ericsson (S).218
By the end of 1966, the Administrative and Finance Committee had more or less agreed on its policy
regarding the geographical distribution of contracts. Weighting factors distinguishing technically
interesting contracts (100 %) and contracts for lands and buildings as well as administration and
transport equipment (25 %) had been accepted. No limit to the excess of expenditure over contribution
was fixed, in order to retain flexibility in the award of contracts, though it was agreed that as soon as
possible no Member States should be more than 100 % above its ideal share. As for affirmative action
in favour of countries which were well below parity, it was accepted that the Organisation did have the
right not to award a contract to a firm which made the most advantageous offer, if this was deemed
desirable to achieve a more equitable geographical distribution of contracts. Following the French
proposal, this derogation from the competitive criterion was to be particularly favoured if it
encouraged an association of firms belonging to different Member States. At the same time, the AFC
insisted that a tender could only be accepted to improve geographical distribution if its price was not
more than 10 % higher than that of the lowest acceptable tender.
One of the first things that the new Director General Hermann Bondi did on taking office in November
1967 was to reorient ESRO's policy for the geographical distribution of contracts. In a major statement
to the Council, Bondi undertook to ensure that by 1971 each member state would have achieved a
return coefficient of at least 0.7, using the weighting factors for the value of contracts agreed under the
Auger regime. This policy had two important advantages. Firstly, as Table 2-4 shows, Bondi's figure
was already within striking distance for most of the disadvantaged states at about this time. It was thus
realistic. Secondly, Bondi's policy completely inverted the procedures discussed previously for
compensating inequalities in the geographical distribution of contracts. Whereas until this time the
idea had always been to penalise states which were performing "too well", now the aim was rather to
encourage those that were performing badly. In other words, it was less important that the percentage
of contracts awarded to a country like France should be reduced than that the value of contracts
awarded to countries like Spain or Denmark be increased. This is not to say that Bondi's proposals
satisfied everyone, or that they resolved what was an extremely difficult problem. On the contrary,
dissatisfaction over their share of the contracts was one of the main reasons leading the Italians to
threaten withdrawing from ESRO in 1968, and eventually to withdraw from the TD satellite
programme (see chapter 4).219 The tortuous debate over the geographical distribution of contracts is
noteworthy for the importance attached by Member States to the strategic significance of the space
sector. Nothing comparable occurred in the case of CERN, for example, simply because it was
believed that the technologies required for high-energy physics were of such little interest for research
and development that it was not worth trying to hammer out an agreed policy of just return. At the
same time, while ESRO's scientific programme undoubtedly provided firms in the Member States with
opportunities to develop advanced technology, its importance should not be exaggerated. As the
Executive pointed out frequently, only about half of the overall eight-year budget of 1500 MFF could
reasonably be said to concern technically interesting contracts, i.e., on average about 100 MFF per
year. Indeed it was the prospect of including telecommunication satellites in ESRO's mission, and so
of applying its contracts procedure in this domain, that gave the debates in the AFC an added urgency
in 1966. If compromises were reached after three years of tortuous discussion, it was also because the
AFC realised that it needed to converge rapidly on a workable system in anticipation of calling for
tenders in the potentially lucrative field of applications.
The debate was also protracted because the protagonists had very different conceptions of what
the  aims  of a policy  of  just return were.  At one extreme there were the British, who interpreted it in
218 For the formation of consortia see Beattie & De la Cruz (1967). See also Schwarz (1979) and
Dondi (1980a).
219 FIN/WP/85, 21 December 1967 and ESRO Council, 20th session, 29-30 November 1967,
ESRO/C/MIN/20, 13 December 1967.
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strictly financial terms. For the UK it was important that as much as possible of its contribution to
ESRO should be spent in the country of origin. Logically therefore, any distinction between different
kinds of contracts was irrelevant in the UK's eyes. It made no difference whether ESRO spent its
money on stationery or on spacecraft. What mattered was that the amount of money flowing back to a
country roughly balanced the amount of money that it put into the central budget. For the majority of
the Member States, however, the value of contracts was to be assessed qualitatively, and not simply
quantitatively. For them, the prime aim of ESRO was to promote space research and technology in all
the participating nations. It was not simply meant to channel their contributions back to the Member
States in accordance with the policies and programmes adopted by the Council. These very different
points of view, the one stressing the financial aspect, the other the technical, made it extremely
difficult for the AFC to achieve a compromise. It led the British consistently to oppose the imposition
of weighting factors for different kinds of contracts and indeed to object that the 25 % that was finally
agreed on for non-technical contracts was far too low: they preferred at least 50 %. It also led the UK
to insist that the benefits of the host state should be compensated. It was the amount of money that
flowed back into the Netherlands, rather than what that money was spent on, that counted. The policy
which the British adopted inside ESRO was, therefore, of a piece with their attitude towards ELDO.
Whereas Britain tended to see both organisations in strictly commercial terms, their partners were
more inclined to see them as involving long-term investments intended to build up a European
capability in advanced sectors of high technology.220
2.4.4 Relations with NASA 221
From its very inception, NASA showed itself willing to cooperate with a European space science
effort. As we mentioned previously, as early as March 1959 the American delegate to the COSPAR
undertook to launch "suitable and worthy experiments proposed by the scientists of other countries".
NASA was prepared to launch single experiments as part of a larger payload or groups of experiments
comprising an entire payload. To achieve these objectives, it offered a range of assistance, including
advising on the feasibility of experiments, hosting foreign scientists in American laboratories, and
performing the necessary pre-flight environmental testing. This offer was rapidly taken up, and
arrangements quickly reached with Britain, France and Italy to fly nationally built experiments on
American rockets. In addition, the Italians took steps to have American rockets built under licence in
their country and to have NASA cooperate in their San Marco programme. This involved the
construction of a launching range consisting of two towable platforms which could be fixed to the sea
bottom by means of movable legs.222
This wish to collaborate continued once ESRO was set up. A Memorandum of Understanding
concerning the preparation, launch and use of ESRO's first two small satellites ESRO I and ESRO II
was signed by Auger on behalf of the European organisation and by Hugh L. Dryden for NASA on
8 July 1964. It had the unusual feature that NASA offered to launch these first two satellites with a
Scout rocket free of charge as a "christening gift" for ESRO.223 And in 1966 the American agency
suggested a joint project to the Europeans. It was particularly interested in having them contribute
500 MFF to the costs of a Jupiter probe. The initiative failed, essentially for lack of resources. Despite
the scientific interest of the venture, and the opportunities to gain experience in project management,
the ESRO space science community were emphatic that this scheme was not to be funded at the
expense of their existing, and already reduced, satellite programme. The need to find an additional
340 MFF during ESRO's first eight-year period, and the prospect of probably needing a new
conference of plenipotentiaries to authorise the NASA/ESRO project were enough to kill off the
scheme.224
220 Krige (1992b)
221 On this topic see also Krige & Sebesta (1994) and Chapter 12 of this volume.
222 The San Marco programme was described in a memorandum submitted by Broglio to the COPERS
Bureau meeting on 17-18 June 1963, Mussard files, folder "Bureau", in HAEC.
223 ESRO/25, 18 July 1964.
224 ESRO/C/199, 16 June 1966; ESRO/ST/200, 21 April 1966, and ESRO Council, 11th session, 22-
24 June 1966, ESROIC/MINIl 1, 15 July 1966.
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There was of course a large element of self-interest involved in NASA's approaches. The proposed
joint venture to Jupiter was surely intended to help the Agency sell the programme domestically. It
would save costs on an expensive mission at a time when space science was overshadowed by the vast
Apollo programme: indeed, NASA made it clear that it was only seeking partners for a large project. It
would also help foster the "peaceful" image of the American space effort at a time of heightened
military competition with the Soviet Union, and increase NASA's good standing at home and abroad
as a force for international collaboration. Strategic considerations were also certainly involved in the
offer to launch scientific satellites built in Europe. As we have pointed out, by effect, if not by
intention, the offer diluted European space scientists' enthusiasm for ELDO, and was one factor
leading to Europe entering space with two rather than just one organisation. The offer to launch also
served to keep Western Europe's space programme in the USA's orbit, and might well have been
deliberately intended to discourage the French, in particular, from collaborating too closely with the
USSR (in fact, a first French satellite was launched by a Soviet rocket in 1971). Finally, the
availability of American launchers might also have been intended to impede, if not totally stop,
Europe developing her own powerful rocket/missile. As we shall discuss in chapter 3, there was the
wish of certain officials in the US Department of Defense to see Britain abandon the development of
Blue Streak, not wishing the UK to gain control over IRBM launchings in the European theatre. There
is no reason to think that this view no longer prevailed in the United States in the 1960s.
It goes without saying that ESRO was in a weak position when it came to negotiating the use of
NASA's facilities. The enormous disparity of resources, both human and financial, between the two
organisations, necessarily meant that NASA negotiators could impose conditions on their ESRO
counterparts which the latter did not like. The negotiations over the Memorandum of Understanding
concerning the furnishing by NASA of satellite launching and associated services, which took place
throughout much of 1966, are a case in point. There was one clause in this document which the
European scientists found particularly offensive. It was the clause granting NASA unrestricted access
to the raw and reduced data from any satellite that it launched, regardless of the fact that the launch
was paid for by the client and that the data were collected and processed in centres outside the USA.
The ESRO scientific community found this to be an infringement of intellectual property rights, and a
derogation of their responsibilities to the scientific groups who flew experiments on the satellite, and
who obviously wanted prior and undiluted rights of access to the data obtained therefrom. NASA was
however adamant. In the words of NASA Administrator James Webb, it was "important that NASA be
in a position to report to Congress and the people that it [did], in principle, have full access to data
acquired by any satellite launched from US territory". The only negotiable section of this clause, as far
as he was concerned, regarded not the access to, but the use of, the raw or reduced data. Regarding the
latter, NASA negotiators did agree to respect existing practice. They accepted that ESRO's
experimenters could retain privileged use of the data for one year, and in any case not to violate the
intellectual property rights of the scientists.
There was a lesson to be learned from this. In dealing with NASA, it was clear that ESRO would often
have to stomach terms and conditions which, it felt, were against its interests. There were cases in
which, as the Executive put it, if ESRO wanted an agreement, no constructive purpose could be served
by its persisting with its demands. At the heart of the matter was the fact that NASA had launchers
which neither ESRO nor any of its Member States could provide. If they wanted to pursue a space
programme under these conditions, even a scientific programme, the Europeans necessarily had to
make concessions. Put differently, European "independence" was impossible without of powerful
European launcher. It was a point which was not lost on many European governments in the 1960s.225
225 For the negotiations with NASA see ESRO/C/198, 9 June 1961 and Add. 1, 18 July 1966; ESRO/AF/548,
7 July 1966; ESRO/C/233, 14 November 1966. See also STC, 10th meeting (21 June 1966),
ESRO/ST/MIN/l0, 6 July 1966 and ESRO Council, 12th session (18-20 July 1966), ESRO/C/MIN/12,
1 September 1966 and 14th session 30/1l-2 December 1966, ESRO/C/MIN/14, 20 January 1967.
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The first three or four years of ESRO's official life were indeed sombre and difficult ones (we will
discuss in detail in chapter 4 the difficulties in the development of ESRO's first satellite programme).
The heady euphoria of the early 1960s, fuelled by the relative ease and rapidity with which European
governments set up the organisation, soon gave way to disillusionment. There were the problems over
the ESTEC site. There were endless discussions over relatively minor issues like the installation of the
telemetry network, and over more important policy matters like the geographical distribution of
contracts. There were sometimes strong disagreements inside the scientific community, which were
sharpened by tight resource constraints imposed on the programmes. And there was growing criticism
of the Executive by the Member States' delegates, who judged it incompetent and irresponsible. By
1966 there was, as Bannier noted, a crisis of confidence throughout the organisation. As if to confirm
the malaise, first the Director General Auger and then his Technical Director Lines were forced to take
a few months' sick leave that year. In summer 1967 the staff committees of ESTEC and ESLAB, in
open revolt, addressed a note complaining about their working conditions to the Dutch queen. And to
crown it all, the launch of the first small satellite (ESRO II) was a failure. The third stage of the Scout
rocket which blasted off from the Western Test Range on 29 May 1967 malfunctioned, and the fourth
failed to ignite. ESRO II was dumped unceremoniously into the ocean, and with it the hopes of all for
at least one major success during Auger's term of office.
It was into this strained context that Hermann Bondi stepped as Director General in November 1967.
Realistic about government intentions (he had already had considerable experience in dealing with the
British Ministry of Defence) and sensitive to scientists' needs (he was one himself, a professor of
applied mathematics at the University of London), he played a key role in rebuilding confidence in the
organisation. He was helped, of course, by the lessons learned during the Auger years, and by the
successful launch of the first three satellites during the first year of his office (ESRO II in May,
ESRO I in October and HEOS A in December 1968). By the end of 1968, the future of ESRO seemed
secured. Indeed its success was one key factor counteracting the powerful centrifugal forces which
threatened to tear apart the fabric of the European space effort as the 1970s dawned.
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Table 2-1
Launching programme as proposed in the Blue Book











Total ca. 435 11 4 2
Two points must be noted about the figures in this table. Firstly, the number of sounding rockets
was based on a "standard vehicle capable of firing a 50 kg payload to an altitude of 150 km.
Secondly, it was assumed that two launchings would be required to orbit one successful spacecraft,
so that the number of satellite and space probes budgeted for was double the numbers given in this
table.
Table 2-2











1 61.9 69.7 73.8 82.4
2 123.0 121.2 104.9 115.5
3 150.6 148.7 157.5 169.0
4 156.0 162.2 168.2 177.7
5 172.5 181.2 187.7 198.5
6 232.1 243.2 262.0 272.8
7 232.1 243.1 259.4 270.3
8 232.1 242.6 259.6 270.6
Total 1360.3 1411.9 1473.1 1556.8
Sources: Column 2: COPERS/ 20, 11 May 1961; Column 3: Blue Book, pp.18-9; Column 4: COPERS/ 30,
22 January 1962; Column 5: as for column 4, with LAFWG's data on headquarters taken from same source.
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Table 2-3








1 82.4 89.6 107.5
2 115.5 135.8 163.0
3 169.0 185.2 222.2
4 177.7 190.4 228.5
5 198.5 212.6 255.1
6 272.8 285.7 342.8
7 270.3 281.8 389.6
8 270.6 283.1 398.1
Total 1556.8 1664.2 2106.8
Sources: Column 2 & 3: COPERS/ 30, 22 January 1962; Column 4: Report of the budget subgroup,
COPERS/AWG/II/2/Rev. 1, 19 March 1962, Annex II, Summary Table S5.
Table 2-4










Belgium 7.1 6.99 4.42 1.58
Denmark 0.1 0.68 2.21 0.31
France 41.4 38.90 19.10 2.03
Germany 12.8 12.30 22.60 0.54
Italy 9.7 8.90 11.70 0.76
Netherlands 2.5 6.40 4.24 1.51
Spain 1.1 1.00 2.66 0.38
Sweden 2.2 3.30 5.17 0.64
Switzerland 7.1 6.50 3.43 1.90
United Kingdom 15.8 15.09 25.00 0.60
Key:
a Percentage by value of technically interesting contracts (weighted 100 %)
b Percentage by value of all contracts both technically interesting and contracts weighted at 25 %
c Percentage contribution of the member state to the ESRO budget
Source: ESRO/AF1461, rev. 6, 14 November 1966
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Chapter 3: 
The Launch of ELDO
J. Krige
In chapter 1 we explained how, during 1959 and 1960 the European space science community took a
number of initiatives directed towards establishing a collaborative enterprise in their field.226 We
stressed that, while the original idea was that Europe should have just one organisation dedicated to
both the development of launchers and of satellites, by the end of 1960 it was generally accepted by
scientists and politicians alike that these activities should be split from each other.
These deliberations among scientists and administrators in 1960 took place against a background of
important political negotiations between Britain and France over the desirability of developing
together a European heavy launcher. The cost of this venture, the technical and managerial risks that it
entailed, its unavoidable military connotations, and the availability of American launchers all
persuaded scientists that their space research organisation should be kept quite distinct from the
Anglo/French rocket project.
We have already described, in chapter 2, the steps taken in 1961/62 to place European space science
on a sound footing within the framework of what came to be known as ESRO, the European Space
Research Organisation.227 In this report we will explore in greater depth the intergovernmental
negotiations which led to the signature of a convention in April 1962 establishing ESRO's sister
organisation, ELDO, the European Space Vehicle Launcher Development Organisation. The initial
programme of this organisation foresaw the construction of a three stage rocket capped by a satellite
test vehicle, with the work on each component spread between the four major western European states.
After describing the British military origins of the first stage, called Blue Streak we shall go on to
explore how the UK managed to persuade first France, then Germany, and finally Italy to participate
in the programme. We shall argue that it was a programme which was determined far more by political
aims than technical realities, a programme which only managed to take shape because of the very
specific political situation prevailing in Europe at the time, and in particular because of the
simultaneous negotiations underway for Britain's entry into the Common Market.
3.1 The military origins of Blue Streak
In spring 1954 the US Secretary of Defense, Charles E. Wilson, suggested to the then British Minister
of Supply, Duncan Sandys, that the UK might like to collaborate in the development of long range
ballistic missiles. The British, said Wilson, could concentrate on a missile with an intermediate range
of 1500 miles (an IRBM). The Americans, for their part, would work on an intercontinental ballistic
missile of 5000 miles range (an ICBM).228
While it is difficult to be sure about American motives, it does seem that the division of responsibility
proposed by Wilson may have been suggested to him by Trevor Gardner. Gardner was a recently
appointed special assistant in research and development to the Secretary of the Air Force. A passionate
believer in the importance of ICBMs, Gardner was most reluctant to see scarce resources diverted to
IRBMs. He was aware that the Air Force was looking seriously at the possibilities of a 1000-mile
range ballistic missile. Anxious to avoid a competition for human and material resources with his
preferred ICBMs, "and cognisant of the fact that a missile of intermediate range would serve British
226 Krige (1992a).
227 Krige (1992b).
228 Unless otherwise stated all of the information in this section is derived from Krige (1992c), where a
lengthier account with more detailed references may be found, and from Twigge (1990), chapter 7, and
section 8.3.5.
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strategic needs, [Gardner] suggested that investigations be undertaken to determine whether the British
were capable and willing to assume responsibility for its development."229
The stimulus from Britain's side for this invitation can apparently be traced back to a reassessment of
the country's interest in IRBMs which occurred at about this time. The idea of developing such a
missile had been mooted in military circles since the end of the war. None of the early discussions
however came to much. The technology was sophisticated and costly, nuclear warheads were
relatively heavy and would require an enormous thrust to launch them from the ground, and there was
the inevitable opposition from the Royal Air Force, who saw missiles as a threat to their V-bomber
force and to their monopoly on Britain's nuclear deterrent. In summer 1953, however, a systematic
appraisal was made of the issue, and it was apparently concluded that an IRBM development
programme was within Britain's capabilities, particularly if US help was forthcoming.
Sandys' interest in an IRBM also occurred against the background of a decision, taken in June 1954,
that Britain should build its own H-bomb. Only if Britain had such a bomb, it was argued, could she
hope to influence US policy in its use, and prevent its possibly "misguided" deployment. Fears were
also expressed that the US could not be counted on to defend London from a nuclear attack once the
Soviets could retaliate against New York with their ICBMs. Policy makers realised that the V-
bombers would remain the major weapons delivery system for some time to come. But they also felt
that they would have to be supplemented in the medium to long term by long range missiles capable of
hitting Soviet targets from British soil. In short, British interest in building an IRBM was an important,
if not central component in a renewed determination to develop an independent nuclear deterrent.
When Sandys first went to Washington to discuss the mutual development of a missile programme
with Wilson, he was both optimistic and enthusiastic about the possibilities of UK-US collaboration.
He felt that a 1500-mile range weapon would be of immeasurable strategic importance to Britain, and
that it might be possible to agree on a "joint project" with the Americans in which the UK would have
"complete access to their expertise." These hopes were soon dashed. For one thing the US Joint Chiefs
of Staff quickly imposed security restrictions on certain crucial, militarily sensitive technological data.
For another, mutual inspection of the facilities available for missile development on both sides of the
Atlantic quickly revealed that, technically speaking, Britain was behind the US in most areas of
interest. Indeed on 8 November 1955 Defense Secretary Wilson, spurred on by reports of America's
vulnerability to surprise attack, decided to go ahead without the British. He informed all the armed
services that an IRBM was to be developed at the "maximum speed permitted by technology." Within
weeks Werner von Braun and his Army team had their Jupiter IRBM project authorised. The Air
Force, not to be outdone, quickly advanced plans for their rival Thor missile, whose structural
configuration was frozen by January 1956. In parallel, probably sometime in 1955, Britain too
embarked on an independent IRBM programme, the product of which was the Blue Streak missile.
Though Britain embarked an IRBM programme of its own, it maintained important technical links
with the US on some aspects of the project. De Havillands collaborated closely with Convair on the
structure of the rocket. Rolls Royce acquired the design rights on the engines developed by the
Rocketdyne division of North American Aviation. An official forum for an exchange of technical
information was established where the British design of the rocket was evaluated by American
experts.
While assisting the UK develop its own IRBM, the US also made a number of informal approaches in
1956 suggesting that its Thor IRBM should be deployed on British soil. One reason for this was the
determination by some US officials not to "turn the control of the IRBM over to the British," so giving
the US greater control over the deployment of the weapon in the European theatre.230 The initiative
was also partially intended to persuade Britain to abandon the development of Blue Streak, so avoiding
229 Armacost (1969), pp. 59-60.
230 The quotation is from Clark and Angell (1992), p.155. This paragraph draws heavily on this paper,
particularly pp. 153-9.
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duplication of the American effort, and reducing British R & D in a sector where it was lagging behind
the USA.
The American offer was attractive. It would enhance UK-US collaboration in the nuclear field. It
would give Britain access to design information on the Thor, which would be useful for the
development of Blue Streak. And it would provide the UK with an IRBM capability some five years
before its own missile was due to be operational. The outcome of these discussions was an agreement
in February 1958 for the installation of four squadrons (60 missiles) of Thors on British soil. At the
same time, to avoid "duplication", Blue Streak's range was increased to 2500 miles, so bridging the
gap between Thor/Jupiter and the Atlas ICBM, and provision was made to house the missile
underground.
These modifications were not however enough to save the missile. For one thing, Blue Streak was a
first-strike weapon. The fact that it was not mobile made it even more vulnerable to enemy attack. The
resulting dilemma, as Twigge puts it, "was that in a time of crisis a choice would have to be made, to
either show caution and risk being disarmed, or react immediately and risk starting a nuclear war."231
Secondly, there was the question of cost. An internal British document circulated in February 1960
estimated that, in addition to some £60 million already spent on the missile, about another
£240 million of research and development money would be needed to complete it. Added to this it was
estimated that a further £200 million-odd would be needed by 1967/8 to produce and install 125
missiles in hardened underground silos.232 In sum the deployment of Blue Streak as an element in
Britain's independent deterrent was going to cost (at least) £500 million spread over eight years.
To assess the future of the rocket a special committee was set up in 1959 to report on all aspects of
Britain's nuclear strike force. It submitted its report to the Chiefs of Staff early in February 1960, who
in turn submitted their findings to the Defence Committee. This Committee met on the 24 February
1960. There was a general consensus that, as the Minister of Defence put it, "both militarily and
politically it was unacceptable to rely on a "fire-first" weapon" and that, if better alternatives could be
provided by the United States, Blue Streak should not be deployed operationally. The alternatives
particularly favoured by the Minister were the WS 138A (Skybolt) missiles which could be fired from
V-bombers and Polaris missiles which would be housed in nuclear submarines. The attraction of these
systems was that, provided they were kept on patrol in times of tension, there was no need to use them
as first-strike weapons.
Despite the feeling that Blue Streak was too vulnerable and costly as a weapon, the Defence
Committee was loath to cancel it outright. They put forward several arguments for not doing so, of
which the most important, in the Minister's eyes, was that the rocket could be used for conducting a
wholly British programme of satellite space research. Indeed the possibility of using Blue Streak as the
first stage of a satellite launcher, rather than just as a ballistic missile, had been actively considered by
the engineers involved in the project for some time. This alternative was not only of potential interest
for the UK's already well-advanced (civilian) space research programme. It would also serve the
military's requirements for reconnaissance and telecommunications satellites.
A month later a British delegation headed by Prime Minister Macmillan himself visited the USA to
seek further information on the American plans for Skybolt and Polaris. They were led to believe that
the former would be deployed by the US Air Force in 1963, and that Britain could have the weapon a
year or two later. As for Polaris, the Americans indicated that a first model would be introduced by
the Navy in 1961 to be followed by a longer-range version in 1964. On returning home the British
delegation found the Royal Navy unenthusiastic about Polaris. The Air Force, however, saw in
Skybolt the means of preserving the operational life of its V-bomber force. In the light of these
231 Twigge (1990), p. 347. What follows owes much to his section 7.3.
232 For these figures see the document reproduced in Twigge (1990), p. 353.
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attitudes the Cabinet formally decided to cancel Blue Streak as a military weapon and to purchase in
its stead the Skybolt air-to-ground missile from the United States.233
The decision was announced to Parliament on 13 April 1960. It was justified by the new minister of
defence, Harold Watkinson, on the grounds that an immobile Blue Streak protected in silos would be
very vulnerable to Soviet missiles and that it were best replaced by weapons of considerable range
which could be launched from mobile platforms. In the uproar that followed the main objection was
not that Blue Streak had been cancelled as such, but that the decision had not been taken earlier. It was
an argument which was to weigh heavily on the minds of those who sought to preserve the rocket in a
new role.
3.2 Converting Blue Streak into a civilian satellite launcher
The cancellation of Blue Streak as an IRBM was followed by a detailed assessment inside the UK
government of whether it should, indeed, be developed as a civilian satellite launcher. The issues at
stake were spelt out in a long report of senior officials in the various departments concerned which
was produced shortly after the April decision.234 The best path to follow was far from clear; the costs
and benefits of the various options were difficult to assess and sometimes incommensurable. A
decision on this matter, said one of Prime Minister Macmillan's closest advisers early in July, is "like
trying to do a calculation in imponderables" because the various factors involved could only be
estimated "in the vaguest terms".235 Predictably perhaps the ministers played it safe. Rather than take a
decision with irreversible consequences they chose to let matters drift while seeking partners for a
joint cooperative effort.
In deciding on what to do with Blue Streak, wrote the government officials, one had to bear in mind
that space research was "opening a new field of human endeavour, which [might] have significant
commercial, military, scientific and technological implications." Satellite communication systems, as
well as meteorological satellites, were interesting for both civil and defence purposes. International
telecommunications traffic was expanding rapidly, and "the high potential capacity and great
flexibility" of satellites made them ideal candidates to supplement cables, which had a limited capacity
and were susceptible to accidental or deliberate interruption. Satellite communication systems were
also "the most promising means yet available for the world-wide relaying of television." In the purely
military sphere there were potential applications in the field of photographic and electronic
reconnaissance for intelligence gathering and as early warning systems against surprise attack by
ballistic missiles. The interest in satellite applications was indeed so great that the Post Office had
already started funding a development programme for items like the large steerable aerials and the
radio equipment needed for a pilot satellite communications system; and the Minister of Defence had
let it be known that his department would consider contributing up to £5 million a year to a space
programme based on Blue Streak. Some scientists too were enthusiastic about the prospects opened up
by having a research programme based on the use of heavy launcher, which would also "provide
potentially valuable growing points for the physical and engineering sciences, replacing those
provided in the past by the development of radar and nuclear energy." 236
The exploration and exploitation of space by satellite was then clearly of great importance to a major
world power like Britain, a national imperative even. Far more problematic was the policy to be
adopted for the launchers needed to achieve these objectives. Here Britain was faced with two main
233 For this paragraph see Pierre (1972), Chapter 9.2 and Newhouse (1970), chapter 7. These authors describe
the later drama surrounding the Skybolt offer in detail.
234 The memorandum Space Research: Blue Streak. Report by Officials is on file FO371/149657 in the PRO,
London.
235 Memo headed Blue Streak from FB, doubtless Freddy Bishop, one of Macmillan's Private Secretaries, to
Macmillan dated 5 July 1960, file PREM11/3098, PRO, London.
236 For this paragraph see the Report by Officials cited in note 10, section II.
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alternatives: either to cancel Blue Streak altogether, and to rely on America for her future space needs,
or to convert the missile into a civilian satellite launcher.
Several arguments were adduced for not cancelling the British rocket programme altogether. It would
be a blow to national prestige. It would provoke a "row in some newspapers and from a small but
vociferous body of starry-eyed space enthusiasts." Considerable sums had already been spent on the
rocket, and these would simply have been wasted if the programme was halted. There would be some
technological benefit.237 It would create a delicate situation with Australia, whose range in Woomera
was being prepared for Blue Streak launchings. By keeping Blue Streak alive, Britain would "retain
current first-hand experience of the design and construction of large rockets, and would be free to
develop them for military purposes," should this prove desirable at a later stage.238 Finally, it would
avoid dependency on the United States. Not only would the British have to fit their launches into the
American schedule. More importantly there was no guarantee that the US would launch British
telecommunication satellites at all. It was, the officials thought, unlikely that the Americans would
impose "unfair conditions" on the use of one of their launchers in such cases, but there was always the
risk "that they would pay some regard to their own interests, particularly if commercial applications
emerged."239
For each of these arguments in favour of continuing the development of Blue Streak there was an
argument against. Considerations of prestige cut both ways. The successful launch of a large satellite
using a British rocket would undoubtedly be to the country's credit. On the other hand, if the
development of Blue Streak as a satellite launcher "obviously strained our resources, it could be
positively harmful to our prestige," warned the government officials. 240 The spin-off argument was
weak. Technological spin-offs accruing from continuing the programme were difficult to evaluate,
while cancellation would certainly "release valuable scientific and technical resources for other work."
The claim that developing the rocket would preserve a useful technological capability was also of
dubious merit. As the Chief Scientific Advisor, Sir Solly Zuckerman stressed, Blue Streak was a liquid
fuelled rocket, and this was now an obsolete technology. 241 As for dependency on the US, its dangers
were difficult to assess, as the costs and benefits fluctuated with the overall state of Anglo-American
political relationships. Finally, and importantly, there was the danger that the continuation of the
rocket programme, particularly if funded from the civilian science budget, would completely distort
the pattern of science expenditure. Zuckerman was particularly emphatic about this, preferring, as he
put it, "to spend the money on better instrumentation and better satellites using American
launchers."242 At the same time a vigorous debate was conducted among the British space science
community through the columns of New Scientist, pitting two of the most eminent members of the
field against one another. Bernard Lovell (Jodrell Bank), was in favour of developing an independent
British launcher, while Fred Hoyle (Cambridge University) felt it would be "ridiculous" to devote so
much money to one field of science.243
In the absence of unambiguous arguments as to how to proceed, Macmillan and his cabinet decided in
July 1960 to continue the development of Blue Streak on a provisional basis until the end of the year,
and to explore the possibilities of continuing thereafter in the framework of a cooperative programme
with European countries and, at least, Australia. At an abstract level their reactions were typical of
237 For these arguments see a briefing paper for Macmillan dated 5 July 1960, file PREM11/3098, PRO,
London.
238 The argument of building up a strong in-house technical capability is in the Report of Officials cited in
note 10, p.11.
239 See the Report by Officials cited in note 10, p. 6 and section VI.
240 These latter arguments are in their Report on pp. 11 and 12.
241 Zuckerman's rebuttal is in the document cited in the following note. Macmillan's advisers seemed to have
laid great store by Sir Solly's claim — see the note for the Prime Minister dated 5 July 1960 in file
PREM11/3098, PRO, London.
242 For Zuckerman's views a Note for the Record dated 5 July 1960 reporting a meeting between Macmillan,
Zuckerman and Bishop, file PREM11/3098, PRO, London.
243 For their arguments see Hoyle (1960) and Lovell (1960).
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decision-makers faced with alternatives neither of which was particularly better (or worse) than the
other: they decided not to choose.244 More concretely, political considerations seemed to have
dominated their thinking. On the one hand the Prime Minister was reluctant to abandon a key symbol
of British prestige, autonomy, and great power status, originally intended to keep Britain abreast of the
latest developments in defence technology. "If we now cancel Blue Streak altogether", mused
Macmillan, "will the decision generally be regarded as a further step in the direction of prudence and
realism, or will it be held to mean that we are becoming increasingly, and to an undesirable extent,
dependent on the USA."245 On the other hand a joint European programme was perceived as a move
towards closer cooperation with the continental powers, and with de Gaulle in particular. "Many recent
developments confirm my belief," wrote Bishop to his Prime Minister "that we should consider the
possibilities of closer collaboration with the French, not excluding collaboration in military fields and
in policy towards NATO."246 A cooperative effort around Blue Streak certainly fell within these
spheres.
The first jointly developed launcher which Britain proposed to her potential European partners was
based almost exclusively on UK technology. The launcher, it was suggested, would have three
stages.247 Blue Streak would be the first. Black Knight, a rocket which the UK had been developing for
four years, and which had already undergone some test firings, would be the second. The third stage
had still to be developed, though privately the UK government knew that this was not a significant part
of the work.248 The development of the first and second stages and the facilities required to test them
had cost £60 million to date. Britain had no intention of recovering these costs. What she was hoping
for was a participation by other countries in the cost to completion of the project, claimed to be some
£50 million spread over five years.249 In return, member countries would acquire the right to fire
satellites (which might otherwise be denied them by the Americans).250 Partners would also acquire
first hand knowledge of the development and production of powerful rockets and their associated
technology. "Each participating country," it was stressed, "would have rights of access to and
information on the work proceeding in the other participating countries."
At the same time the British government sounded out reactions to its proposal in Canberra and in
Washington. The Australians, while not objecting to Britain making a preliminary approach to
European powers, had three main concerns. Firstly, they were worried that, if Blue Streak were
cancelled, Britain might abandon rocket development not only for civilian but also military purposes.
Secondly, they wanted assurances that if they participated in the further development of, say, a
telecommunications satellite, the UK would not "hold them to ransom in any commercial exploitation
[...]," and that they would have full partnership rights. Thirdly, and most importantly, they wanted
assurances that the UK would not strike a deal in which Woomera was sacrificed for Colomb-Bechar,
244 For a discussion of this feature of decision-making behaviour, see Schilling (1961).
245 See the note by the Prime Minister headed Blue Streak, written around 25 July 1960 in file
PREM11/3098, PRO, London.
246 See a memo to the Prime Minister dated 5 July 1960 headed Blue Streak, and signed FB, file
PREM11/3098, PRO, London.
247 For this information see, for example, telegrams 3498 and 3499 from the Foreign Office to Washington
dated 12 August 1960 in File FO371/149654, PRO, London.
248 See the Report by Officials cited in note 10, section IV.
249 This figure is five times less than the estimate, made only a few months before, of what it would cost to
develop Blue Streak as an IRBM. It seems, and indeed turned out to be, hopelessly unrealistic. The
satellite launcher obviously did not need such a sophisticated guidance system as the missile, nor did it
need a nosecone able to withstand the searing heat of re-entry into the lower layers of the Earth's
atmostphere. It is hard to believe that these features of the weapon composed some two-thirds of the
overall R&D expenditure though.
250 The weights and orbits of the kind of satellites that could be launched by the envisaged rocket were added
by way of illustration. It was estimated that a further £12 million would be needed to develop them.
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France's Saharan launching base. Such a deal, the British were warned, would have a "disastrous
effect" on Anglo-Australian relations.251
Clearance from the United States was required on the commercial, political and military aspects of any
collaborative European programme. North American Aviation and Convair had made major
contributions to the development of Blue Streak's rocket engines and frame. And the State Department
would have to be persuaded that there were no risks in having France and Germany, in particular, as
partners. This was a delicate point as it was US policy not to do anything which might help either
nation develop an independent IRBM capability. 252
None of these difficulties seemed insurmountable in British eyes. In anticipation of Australian
reactions they had told the French from the start that the UK regarded the use of Woomera as essential
in any cooperative programme involving the use of Blue Streak.253 To meet potential US objections,
they undertook not to divulge any United States commercial information or classified defence
information embodied in the first stage of the envisaged rocket. More to the point they stressed that, in
converting Blue Streak from a missile to a satellite launcher, it would be stripped of its military
characteristics. The civilian version would have no inertial guidance or re-entry properties, and would
not embody any US classified information above the "confidential" level. 254
The United States reacted very positively to the British initiatives. Consistent with its prevailing policy
of encouraging collaborative European ventures, it was reported from Washington that the Department
of State not only had no objection, but "might react favourably, to the proposed European
organisation, including the United Kingdom [...]." The Americans saw no objection to the
transformation of Blue Streak into a satellite launcher, felt that there was no great risk of military
information being divulged if the vehicle was used for civilian purposes, and agreed that UK firms
could have exploratory discussions with their American counterparts about the "Europeanisation" of
the programme.255
The initial reactions of Britain's potential partners on the continent were also positive. It was the
position of the French though, regarded by Minister of Aviation Peter Thorneycroft as "the potential
cornerstone of an international organisation [...]," which mattered most, and which we shall now
consider in some depth. 256
3.3 Bringing the French on board
The idea that France may like to collaborate with Britain in the joint development of a launcher had
been floated in Paris as soon as it was decided to abandon the rocket as a weapon. The issue was left
on the back burner while the UK established the American position. Then, from September onwards,
according to a French source, the pressure on Paris to reach a favourable decision increased
substantially. Several French technical teams visited Britain and there were discussions at the
251 For these first Australian reactions see the telegram 827 from Canberra to the Commonwealth Relations
Office, 31 August 1960, in file FO371/149675, PRO, London.
252 See Telegram from Washington to the Foreign Office, 27 July 1960, in file PREM11/3098, PRO,
London.
253 See aide mémoire sent to the French on 25 July 1960, file PREM11/3098, PRO, London.
254 See telegram 3497 from the Foreign Office to Washington, 12 August 1960, file FO371/149654, PRO,
London.
255 See telegram 1722 from Washington to the Foreign Office, 1 September 1960, file FO371/149655, PRO,
London.
256 The quotation is from Thorneycroft's memorandum for the Cabinet Ministerial Committee on Blue Streak
dated 28 November 1960 in file CAB134/1428, PRO, London.
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ministerial level. The French space science community also looked into the British proposal in mid-
November. Soon thereafter the Quai d'Orsay had clarified its position.257
The French were cautious. Certainly, they thought that it would be of "great interest to study the
possibilities of producing in Europe a system of rockets to permit the placing of heavy satellites in
orbit." 258 But they had serious technical and financial doubts about Britain's proposal. According to an
internal French document, the use of Black Knight as a second stage was without interest. It would not
accelerate existing developments, it would be of no use to French national military projects, which
were judged to be more modern and technically very different, and it would be of little benefit to
French industry. Then there was the problem of cost. The space scientists were particularly emphatic
about this, insisting that if France entered this venture the funds for it — estimated at 250 MFF over
five years — should not come from the allocations just made to the national scientific space research
programme. At the same time to bring home to their government their lack of interest in the scheme,
they pointed out that, like their British colleagues, they would be looking into an offer by the
Americans to launch national satellites.259 And indeed in December 1960 one of their number, Jacques
Blamont, made a trip to Washington to discuss arrangements for a collaborative effort with the NASA
authorities.260
The answer from the Quai d'Orsay reflected these concerns. The French government was willing, they
said, to make a joint approach along with Britain to other European governments to discuss, without
prejudice as to the final result, the possibilities of producing a heavy launcher in Europe. Their
eventual participation however, depended on two considerations. Firstly, one of the stages of the
launcher, preferably the second one, should be built in France. And rather than it being Black Knight,
"they would want it to correspond to a type for which the French military authorities had already made
provision in their plans." Secondly, the cost of any joint programme would "have to be made the
object of a most precise study."261
The French wish to replace Black Knight with one of their own rockets did not worry the British
unduly. The pairing of Blue Streak with Black Knight had already been criticised by G. Pardoe, a chief
engineer at de Havillands at the time, on the grounds that it underexploited Blue Streak's
capabilities.262 During the following two or three weeks technical missions from both Britain and
France visited the installations of their potential partners across the Channel to explore the possibilities
of building an Anglo-French launcher. On 12 December Thorneycroft himself came to Paris to spell
out the UK's position, a position which, in the eyes of the French at least, completely changed the
terms of the debate. The Minister's main point was that a launcher with a French second stage would
cost more than one based on the Blue Streak—Black Knight combination. He was certainly in favour
of the two countries declaring an interest in building together a launcher based on Blue Streak as a first
stage, a French second stage, and a third stage to be built on the continent. However he felt that, in this
case, costs would have to be shared on a 50/50 basis between Britain and France, the financial burden
being reduced by contributions from other Member States who might want to participate in the project.
257 See Examen de la Proposition Britannique par le Comité des Recherches Spatiales, 16 November 1960,
Rapport personnel du Professeur Auger, 16 November 1960, and Proposition Britannique de
collaboration dans le domaine spatial, unsigned, from the office of Le Délégue Général of the Délégation
Générale à la Recherche Scientifique et Technique, 21 November 1960, all in file Re130/31, liasse 620,
Archives Nationales, Paris (cf. Note 1).
258 Telegram from Paris to the Foreign Office, 24 November 1960, file PREM11/3513, PRO, London.
259 The material in this paragraph is based on the documents cited in note 33. The government had agreed to
spend 130 MFF over five years on the national research programme. The French contribution to ESRO
was likely to cost a further 100 MFF between 1961 and 1965.
260 Minutes of the meeting of the Sous Comité des Programmes Scientifiques held on 24 February 1961, an
annex to the minutes of the meeting of the Comité des Recherches Spatiales held on 8 March 1961, Re
130/31, liasse 620, Archives Nationales, Paris.
261 For this response see the telegram cited in note 34.
262 See his remarks cited by Goldring (1960), p. 1333.
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The French reaction was immediate and firm: they were not willing to pay 50% of the cost of such an
operation — except perhaps under one condition.... The money for the launcher could not come from
the science budget. The minister responsible for scientific research (Guillaumat) pointed out to
Thorneycroft that at the Meyrin conference of plenipotentiaries which had just been held it had been
suggested to hive launchers off from satellites. His ministry was only prepared to take responsibility
for the latter. It was therefore up to the Ministry for the Armed Forces to foot the bill. And as the
representative of this ministry (General Lavaud) made clear, there was simply no way in which he
could find 50% of the costs of a heavy launcher in the money that had been set aside for the
development of rockets for space science. Savings of this magnitude were only possible from the
military side of the balance sheet — notably in the areas of inertial guidance and nose cone re-entry. In
sum, then, what the French were demanding was access to highly sensitive military technology in
return for their participation in a joint venture to develop a heavy launcher with the British.263
French military interest in such a project came as no surprise in London. In line with de Gaulle's wish
to develop an independent "force de frappe", in 1960 Parliament voted funds for the so-called
"precious stones" rocket programme (Emeraude, Topaze, Saphir for the military and Diamant for the
civil programmes). When the British first proposed a joint venture in spring that year, the French
immediately sought to have a team appointed by their Ministers of Scientific Research and of the
Armed Forces "to have access to some precise facts about certain technical questions connected with
the missile [...]", and to establish the extent to which the British were prepared to share their know-
how with their French counterparts.264 In similar vein, the British government officials who had
explored the arguments pro and contra the continued development of Blue Streak had remarked that
Paris was likely to be interested in a joint venture "because the large rocket techniques involved [were]
relevant to the delivery of nuclear weapons and other purposes," and more broadly "as promising
closer Anglo-French activity in the nuclear field, and in aviation and weapons generally."265 It was not
the military dimension as such, then, that wrong-footed the British. It was rather the specific request
for technical information on inertial guidance and the characteristics of re-entry heads, and the
coupling of the provision of this information with French participation in a joint project.266
The diplomatic implications of acceding to the French request caused considerable concern in Britain.
As one of Macmillan's private secretary's put it, to divulge militarily sensitive information on ballistic
missiles to them would be "a reversal of current Anglo-American policy and could certainly not be
done without deep consideration here and consultation with the United States authorities [...]." The
Foreign Secretary, for his part, was sure that the Americans would be very unhappy about any such
arrangement. "Do we and the Americans want France to get ahead quickly with the military side of
rocketry?", he asked in alarm. "The Americans would certainly not give France information if there
was the least danger she would hand it on, and who would say she would not?"267 To circumvent these
objections the proponents of the scheme pointed out that, in fact, Britain had made important
contributions of her own to the key military components of Blue Streak. In particular, it was said that
the re-entry head was of British design and that, although the guidance system was American, UK
firms were producing similar equipment which might be of equal value to the French. The opinion
263 These two paragraphs are based on the (apparently verbatim) report of the meeting with Thorneycroft
made by François de Rose at the 22nd meeting of the Comité des Recherches Spatiales held on
14 December 1960, Re 130/31, liasse 620, Archives Nationales, Paris. For the process leading up to the
splitting of satellites from launchers at the Meyrin conference and to the birth of two European space
organisations, see Krige (1992a).
264 Aide-mémoire from the French government dated 31 May 1960, file FO371/149654, PRO, London.
265 For these quotations see the Report by Officials cited in note 10, pp. 7 and 9.
266 For the growing realisation in Britain of the importance of the military interest of the heavy launcher to
the French, see minutes of the meeting of the Cabinet Ministerial Committee on Blue Streak held on
30 November 1960, document BS(60), file CAB134/1428, PRO, London, and note for Macmillan signed
PdZ (Philip de Zulueta) and dated 15 December 1960, file PREM11/3513, PRO, London.
267 For these reactions see the note for Macmillan signed PdZ and dated 15 December 1960 and the memo
from the Foreign Secretary to the Prime Minister dated 30 December 1960, both in file PREM11/3513,
PRO, London.
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thus gained ground that it might be possible for Britain to draw up a bilateral arrangement with France
for the transfer of that part of the militarily sensitive information which was "technically within our
own disposition", so hopefully satisfying Paris without unduly offending Washington.268
As the British grappled with the implications of their request for military technology, the French
became increasingly unwilling to commit themselves to a joint project. In mid-December 1960
Thorneycroft and the French Minister for the Armed Forces (Messmer) agreed that an
intergovernmental conference should be called for the second half of January, and that the invitations
would stipulate its aim as being to study the development in common of a launcher based on Blue
Streak as first stage, a French second stage, and a third stage to be built on the continent. When it
came to settling the wording of the joint invitation, however, the French would not agree to the
inclusion of any reference to their building the second stage. What is more, according to UK sources,
they refused to allow the visit of a British technical team who wanted to estimate the effect on the
project in terms of time and money of substituting a French second stage for Black Knight. As a result
there were also no specific proposals in the invitation as to how costs might be shared.269
Then, within days of the conference, scheduled for 30 January in Strasbourg, the French attitude
changed. A British technical team was invited to Paris on 27 January. And on the eve of the
Strasbourg conference they withdrew the condition that all funds for the new organisation had to be
found from their military budget i.e. the release of military information was no longer a precondition
for French participation in the project.270 There is no single, or simple, reason for this change of heart.
Perhaps the French always intended to join in the venture, and their request for military information
was simply a bargaining card to be withdrawn at the last minute if it proved too difficult to satisfy.271
They sought key technical data that the British had. They also knew that Britain's position was weak,
and that the longer the negotiations dragged on the more concessions Thorneycroft would have to
make. It was costing £350,000 a month to keep the Blue Streak team and facilities on hold, and there
would be serious domestic political repercussions if the rocket was finally cancelled. It was only
natural that they would try to take advantage of the situation, and wring every possible concession out
of Thorneycroft and his team. Even then one must be careful. In mid-December one British observer
remarked that the French had "now come out into the open and made it quite clear that what they
[were] really interested in [was] knowledge about ballistic missiles (so-called inertial guidance and re-
entry)." (my italics).272 This is too simple. The explicit request for this knowledge arose in response to
the scientist's demand that their funds not be cut, with the implication that the money for the Anglo-
French launcher would have to be found in the defence budget. And, as the Minister for the Armed
Forces explained, to have the French Assembly accept that some £20-30 million be spent from his
budget for "a project that had no possible military application at all," it would useful if Britain could
"make some gesture with regard to the re-entry head or the guidance system [...]."273 The request for
military know-how was thus less a point of principle than of domestic political need and, as the British
soon realised, the precise content of the military technology that was transferred was negotiable.
268 For this paragraph see minutes of the Cabinet Ministerial Committee on Blue Streak, meetings held on
19 December 1960 and 17 January 1961, documents BS(60) and BS(61), file CAB 134/1428, PRO,
London.
269 For this material see the documents referred to in the previous note, the brief for the United Kingdom
delegation to the Strasbourg conference, prepared by the Cabinet's Official Committee on Blue Streak,
document BS(0)(61)6, 26 January 1961, and a document labelled SECRET from about February 1961 on
file PREM11/3513.
270 See the minutes of the meeting of the Cabinet Ministerial Committee on Blue Streak, 1 February 1961,
document BS(61) 2nd meeting, in file CAB134/1428, PRO, London.
271 For example Messmer told Watkinson, the UK Defence Minister, that "he thought his government was in
general willing to support the idea of joining with other European nations in using Blue Streak as a space
launcher [...]", record of a conversation between the two on 17 December 1960, file PREM11/3513, PRO,
London.
272 From the note from PdZ to his Prime Minister cited in note 42.
273 See the record of the conversation between Messmer and Watkinson, the UK Minister of Defence, in
Paris on 17 December 1960, in file PREM11/3513, PRO, London.
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But the most important reason why the French position changed was that de Gaulle himself
intervened. From 27-29 January Macmillan and the French President held confidential talks at Château
de Rambouillet. The climate was cooperative: within six months the British Premier would announce
that the UK would apply for admission to the EEC. The two men discussed the heavy launcher during
a walk on the afternoon of the 28th. According to a British record of their conversation, de Gaulle was
"attracted by the idea of Europe becoming "the third space power." He would take a constructive line
about Blue Streak at Strasbourg. He did not mention the military aspect." 274 Confirmation of the
importance of this meeting is provided by the remark, made many years later by a French source, that
de Gaulle personally, and "against the advice of all the experts", took the decision in January 1961 to
associate his country with the Blue Streak project. 275 Indeed even at the time the British believed that
the General's intervention had been crucial. Later in that year the view was expressed that the
conversation between Macmillan and de Gaulle at Rambouillet in January "had been decisive in
persuading the French to join with us in sponsoring ELDO." 276
De Gaulle's support for Macmillan at Rambouillet in January 1961 was informed by very different
motives to those of the British Premier. De Gaulle and the French were keen to have access to British
advanced technology for their "force de frappe." Collaboration in the development of a rocket, parts of
which had been built under license from the USA, was a useful channel for gaining access to UK and,
indirectly, US know-how which could be used for both civil and military purposes. Technological
exchange was far less important for the British. In the 1950s they were one of the leading nuclear
powers in the world, and had a very advanced aeronautical industry. There was little that the French
could teach them. Their objectives in seeking a joint venture with the French were primarily political.
London had originally stood aloof from the negotiations surrounding the formation of the Common
Market and, indeed, had spearheaded a campaign to form an alternative free trade area (EFTA) with
the "outer six" plus Portugal.277 Doubts about the wisdom of this move, and the view that Britain
should also actively seek full membership of the European Community, became increasingly
widespread in the country in 1960, as the Common Market began to take shape. By the end of the year
Macmillan had decided that an application should be made. His meeting with de Gaulle at Rambouillet
in January 1961 was the first occasion he had to sound out the General's attitude to his plan.
Correlatively, de Gaulle's willingness at Rambouillet to take a cooperative line at the Strasbourg
conference doubtless encouraged Macmillan in his view, which grew increasingly immune to
contradictory signals, that the French President would favour UK membership of the EEC. The
French, or at least de Gaulle, decoupled technological collaboration from economic and political
union. The British, or at least Macmillan, did just the contrary. Technological collaboration was one
dimension of a wider strategy aimed at closer integration with the Six, and was seen in Whitehall as an
important "proof" of Britain's (new) European credentials. It was a fundamental difference in
perception for which Macmillan, in particular, was to pay a high price.278
3.4 The Strasbourg conference
The jointly called Anglo-French conference was duly held in Strasbourg from 30 January to
2 February 1961 with Thorneycroft in the chair. Invitations were sent to Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. All of these countries were
274 See document headed Rambouillet 3 on file PREM11/3513, PRO, London.
275 See Rhenter (1992).
276 See the minutes of the Cabinet Ministerial Committee on Blue Streak held 24 November 1961, document
B.S. (61) 8th meeting, file CAB134/1428, PRO, London.
277 The seven members of EFTA were Britain, Norway, Sweden and Denmark, Austria and Switzerland, and
Portugal.
278 For a concise account of the circumstances surrounding Macmillan's application for EEC membership,
see Ward (1992). For the importance to the French of having access to UK technology, see e.g. Newhouse
(1970).
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represented at the conference bar Austria, who sent an observer. Australia did not attend. In
anticipation of the meeting the British Minister of Aviation made a tour of European capitals. He
stressed the importance of not allowing the USA and the USSR to have a monopoly in the launcher
field, the "unrepeatable opportunity to take a decision to go into space" provided by the cancellation of
Blue Streak, the possible television, navigational and aeronautical applications of satellites, and the
"immense political advantages in Europe getting together on a project of this kind which would
straddle the existing divisions between Six and Seven." 279
Granted the complexity of the issues involved, and the short time which most delegations had had to
prepare themselves, it was understood that the meeting would be essentially exploratory in character.
After three days of deliberations the text of an Anglo-French memorandum summarised the main
conclusions reached. It defined the initial programme of the envisaged organisation, should it be set
up, as "to study, plan, develop and manufacture a rocket system using Blue Streak as the first stage
and a French rocket as the second stage. The development and manufacture of the third stage," the
memorandum went on, would "be carried out on the Continent." The programme would also include
the planning and construction of a first series of satellite test vehicles. The existing facilities already
created would be put at the disposal of the Member States, who would only be asked to pay the
additional capital expenditure and running costs arising from the programme. The contracts for
carrying out this programme would be placed by the participating governments themselves and not by
the executive of the organisation itself. However all technical information arising from the work
already done on Blue Streak and the French second stage, as well as from the initial programme itself,
would be freely available to the participating states. These arrangements were not necessarily binding
on any subsequent programmes, nor would any member state be obliged to take part in any such
programmes. At the request of delegates from Belgium, the Netherlands and Spain, the memorandum
specifically allowed for the possibility of there being a merger between the launcher organisation and
ESRO. 280
The British faced two particular problems at the meeting. Firstly, there was the position of Australia.
The Australians had agreed to put Woomera at the disposal of a European launcher "club," and would
continue to pay their share of the costs of the range as agreed in the existing UK-Australia Joint
Project (i.e. £9.5 million per annum). This, they felt, was to be regarded as a contribution in kind to
any future European heavy launcher organisation which would entitle them to full membership rights.
Britain agreed to stand by this position. And while it appears that most other delegates did not object
to this idea, they were less convinced that Australia could continue to participate in any subsequent
programmes on this basis. She too would have to begin to make direct financial contributions to the
costs of the organisation.281
279 See the record of Thorneycroft's talks on Blue Streak with German, Danish and Norwegian ministers
presented to the Cabinet's Official Committee on Blue Streak, document B.S.(0)(61)4, 23 January 1961.
The reference to straddling the divide between the Six and the Seven is, of course, to building a bridge
between the EEC and EFTA member countries — see note 53.
280 For this paragraph see the final version of the memorandum by the French and British delegations dated
2 February 1961, and attached as Annex I to the report of the proceedings at Strasbourg prepared by the
committee established to consider the administrative, organisational and financial aspects of the proposed
joint venture, document B.S. (0) (61)7, 6 February 1961, PRO, London.
281 For this paragraph see the brief for the UK delegation cited in note 45, and the telegram sent to London
from Strasbourg that was discussed at the Cabinet Ministerial Committee meeting on Blue Streak held on
1 January 1961, document B.S. (61) 2nd meeting, file CAB134/1428, PRO, London.
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The second main area of difficulty concerned the basis for sharing the costs of the initial programme.
The British estimated this at £70 million spread over five years.282 The original UK proposal was that
this amount should be shared in the same way as were contributions to CERN, i.e. proportionally to
gross national income with a maximum of 25% for any one country. On this scheme the UK would
have paid just under 25% of the overall cost, and France just over 20%.283 It rapidly emerged that other
countries did not like this idea. The small countries were not prepared to commit themselves to
expenditures of this magnitude. France offered to share only 15% of the burden which, it claimed,
would amount to less than half of the actual costs of developing the second stage of the launcher.284
And the British delegation found themselves forced to telegram home for authority to pay up to 40%
of the budget of any new organisation.285 In the event Britain undertook to pay 33.33%, on the
understanding that France, Germany and Italy should pay the same percentages as they were
contributing to CERN for 1961/62, i.e. respectively 20.57%, 18.92% and 9.78%. The remaining 17.4%
would be divided among the other eight participating countries proportionally to their gross national
incomes. In effect this meant that the UK was willing to pass on its "excess" contribution of something
over 8% to the smaller countries. It was agreed that if nevertheless any of these decided not to join the
new organisation, the "big four" would negotiate among themselves as to how its percentage was to be
made up.286
This was not the only concession that the UK had to make in order to tempt its European partners to
join in the scheme. Before the Strasbourg conference British officials had thought, rather naively, that
the ongoing costs of maintaining the Blue Streak programme should be shared by potential partners.
These should be asked to begin payments two weeks after the conference, and to decide by the end of
May whether they wanted to be full members or not. This was softened after the Strasbourg meeting,
and a memorandum was drafted suggesting that other parties might be invited to share costs as from
1 April 1961. As far as we can establish, no one did so.287
The Strasbourg conference provided the first opportunity for a thorough exposé of the Anglo-French
heavy launcher project among the dozen potential European partners. Too much could not be
expected. The meeting was called in haste and, until the last minute, it was not clear on the UK side
just what line Paris would take — they even allowed beforehand for the possibility that the French
might try to "sabotage the Conference from within." 288 Certainly, after the meeting the British could
be sure of French financial and political support up to a total of some 20% of the budget.289 That was
reassuring, but it was not enough. In fact, in a sense, it simply increased Britain's vulnerability. To
cancel the Blue Streak programme now would involve a loss of face for Macmillan, who had
personally prevailed on de Gaulle and who was preparing Britain's application for EEC membership.
282 This figure was made up as follows. The original estimate for a rocket with all three stages built in the
UK was £35m. With a 50% contingency and with £6m added for a satellite test vehicle, this brought the
cost of an all-British project to £58m. It was thought not unreasonable to add £12m to this figure if the
other stages were not British, though it was remarked that "we have no valid basis for estimating the
additional cost of other than U.K developed 2nd and 3rd stages." See brief for the UK delegation referred
to in note 45.
283 See Annex IV to the report dated 6 February 1961 cited in note 56.
284 For the French position see the first paragraphs of the annex to the final version of the joint Anglo-French
memorandum dated 2 February 1961 which was cited in note 56.
285 See the telegram mentioned in note 57.
286 See the paper on financial contributions annexed to the final version of the joint Anglo-French
memorandum dated 2 February 1961 and cited in note 56.
287 For this paragraph see the brief for the UK delegation to Strasbourg cited in note 45 and Annex V to the
report of 6 February 1961 cited in note 56.
288 This is from the brief for the UK delegation cited in note 45.
289 In the minutes of the meeting of the Comité consultatif de la recherche scientifique held on
10 February 1961 we read that "la participation française, de l'ordre de 22%, paraît acquise.", file 28/CC,
2/D27 PV, AN810401 art 54 liasse 123, Archives Nationales, Paris.
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On the other hand to continue the programme on a purely national basis for much longer while
searching for additional partners was also likely to be embarrassing, both at home and abroad. The
Labour opposition could be guaranteed to demand justifications for continuing to spend £350,000 a
month on a militarily obsolete rocket. And, as Macmillan himself pointed out to Thorneycroft in April,
there was "a point beyond which we cannot hawk this around Europe without becoming slightly
ridiculous."290 What British Ministers wanted above all was that matters came to a head quickly. They
were to be disappointed.
3.5 German and Italian objections
The main parameters shaping Germany's position on the Anglo-French venture had been explained
before the Strasbourg meeting to Thorneycroft. Foreign Minister von Brentano expressed his strong
support, this being "dictated by the political advantages which would accrue from the joint project."
Minister of Economics Erhard did not foresee any financial difficulties. It was on the technical aspects
of the envisaged launcher that the Germans had their doubts. Though awaiting confirmation from their
experts, they felt that "serious thought should be given to whether it might not be preferable to use
American rockets." This line of argument subsequently gained ground. In March the Federal Republic
informed the British government of its "willingness to participate in the consortium for building
launchers and satellites." At the same time they suggested "that there should now be discussions on
whether the consortium should construct a launcher based on Blue Streak or an American launcher
under license."291
This move was most unwelcome for Britain. If the idea was widely accepted — and there were already
signs that many European countries favoured the German line — it would completely sabotage the
British project. It was therefore agreed that under no circumstances should the UK contemplate
participating in a consortium to build American launchers under licence, nor in a second Strasbourg-
like conference to discuss such a project. Instead Britain pointed out to Germany that the new US
administration had just confirmed that the "mass of technical data" embodied in Blue Streak, much of
it of American origin, could be disseminated to any new European organisation which used the rocket,
and that there would be scope for further collaboration as regards the third stage and the satellite test
vehicle. At the same time it was argued that the existing Anglo-French project would be better value
for money than any alternative, as Britain was offering it the work already done on Blue Streak as a
"free gift". 292
As time dragged on so the pressure on Germany to take a favourable decision mounted. A meeting
was arranged between Strauss and the UK Minister of Defence in May "to press the advantages of the
project." It was suggested that Macmillan send a personal note to Kennedy "asking him to tell the
other governments concerned, and in particular the Germans, that the United States administration was
well disposed towards, or at least saw no objection to, the formation of the proposed consortium."
Close contact was maintained with Adenauer, who had already told Macmillan that he supported the
idea of a cooperative venture "with all his heart; Europe must play its part." 293 At the same time the
British Cabinet, realising that cancellation would now be even more damaging than these seemingly
interminable delays, pondered proposing again a joint venture to the French on a 50/50 basis in return
for "certain information relating to guidance systems and to some aspects of the design of re-entry
290 Personal minute from Macmillan to Thorneycroft, 24 April 1961, file AIR8/2255, PRO, London.
291 For this paragraph see the document cited in note 55, the record of a conversation between the Secretary
of State (Home) and the German Ambassador on 20 February 1961 (file PREM11/3513, PRO, London),
the record of a meeting between Macmillan and Adenauer on 23 February 1961 (ibid.) and the minutes of
the Cabinet Ministerial Committee on Blue Streak held on 29 March 1961, document B.S. (61) 3rd
meeting, file CAB134/1428, PRO, London.
292 For this paragraph see the minutes of the meeting on 29 March 1961 cited in the previous note.
293 See record of a meeting between Macmillan and Adenauer on 23 February 1961, file PREM11/3513,
PRO, London.
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heads, which was not of the highest secrecy [...]." 294 In the event this did not prove necessary. The
high-level lobbying paid off. On 29 June Adenauer personally informed Macmillan that the Federal
Government had approved German participation the day before provided, as a commission of experts
had put it, "that German science and industry [were] given an adequate share of the work to be done."
He hoped, Adenauer added, that this agreement would pave the way for the establishment of a
European organisation "to secure for European science and technology a proper place in the field of
space travel and space research." 295
To encourage Germany's participation in the Anglo-French project they were promised the third stage
of the launcher. That left Italy. And the Italians, like the Germans before them, were most
unenthusiastic about the scheme: there was, as CERN and ESRO pioneer Edoardo Amaldi put it,
"solid opposition" to it in the country. He explained the grounds for his opposition, and that of the
majority in Italian scientific and technical circles, to an Anglo-French technical delegation who visited
the Foreign Ministry in Rome on 21 September 1961. 296
Amaldi had three main objections to the project. Firstly, he stressed that there was nothing of interest
in it for Italian industry. Each stage of the envisaged "European" rocket would, in fact, be built in the
country to which it had been attributed. This would effectively exclude not only Italy's industry from
the most important parts of the project, but also her scientists and technologists. The situation, Amaldi
went on, was to be contrasted with that at CERN. Here scientists and engineers from all the
participating countries had been involved from the very start in defining the project, designing the
machines, and bringing them to completion. Industrial contracts were awarded competitively on the
basis of merit. In the Anglo-French proposal, by contrast, industrial contracts would be awarded "a
priori, for either historical or political reasons, but not on the basis of scientific-technological
arguments." 297
Amaldi's second concern regarded the management scheme. Large projects of this kind were difficult
to coordinate. These difficulties would surely be far greater in an arrangement which had stage one of
the rocket built in the UK, stage two in France and stage three in Germany. "Any reasonable person",
he wrote later, "sees the difficulty of matching three stages and the satellite made in 4 different
countries and one can easily foresee the disputes that will arise if these do not fit well together." 298
Finally, there was the projected rocket itself, which Amaldi judged as not being worth the money to be
spent on it. Europe, he pointed out, was being asked to make a major investment in a rocket which
would use a technology which was already available in other countries. Echoing the sentiments of Sir
Solly Zuckerman, he stressed that this technology would undoubtedly be obsolete by the time the
rocket was ready, in five, or more likely seven years. In sum, Amaldi concluded, the Anglo-French
project would not contribute to "the scientific and technical development of Europe. For Italy it [was]
essentially a form of friendly contribution to the development of U.K. (and French) industry in this
294 For the information in this paragraph other than that just cited, see minutes of the Cabinet Ministerial
Committee on Blue Streak held on 10 May 1961, document B.S. (61), 4th meeting, file CAB134/1428,
PRO, London.
295 Letter Adenauer to Macmillan, 29 June 1961, file PREM11/3515, PRO, London.
296 Minutes of this meeting entitled Verbale della riunione che ha avuto luogo al Ministero degli Esteri in
data 21 corrente con la missione tecnica Anglo-Francese per il progetto Blue Streak, as well as a report
of Amaldi's personal contribution (Intervento del Prof. E. Amaldi....) to that meeting are in the Amaldi
Archives, Box 210, Universita di Roma "La sapienza". The quotation is taken from a meeting of scientists
held a few days later, Verbale della riunone tenuta a Roma il 25 settembre 1961 presso l'Istituto di Fisica
dell'Universita, in the same box (cf. note 1).
297 See the personal intervention by Amaldi at the meeting on 21/9 cited in the previous note. De Maria
(1993) has analyzed Amaldi's position on the European space effort in great detail.
298 See Amaldi's intervention in the meeting held on 21 September 1961 cited in note 71 and letter Amaldi to
Adams, 15 December 1961, Amaldi Archives, Box 210, Università di Roma "La Sapienza."
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field." If his authorities wanted to participate, he added, they should be clear that they were doing so
purely for political reasons. 299
Amaldi's statements were informed by the determination to protect an Italian national space
programme which was being spearheaded by Luigi Broglio. Broglio was both the director of the
Institute of Aeronautical Engineering at Amaldi's University of Rome 'La Sapienza', and a colonel in
the Italian air force. 300 Already in July 1960 the Italians had succeeded in building an American Nike
sounding rocket under licence. In August 1961 the government approved a three year space
programme which included the construction, in collaboration with the USA, of the San Marco near-
equatorial launching platform. And indeed, ten days after the meeting with the Anglo-French team in
Rome, Broglio left for the United States to define the details of the San Marco project with his NASA
colleagues. In short, in September 1961, the Italian experts' main concern was to place their national
programme on a sound footing within the framework of collaborative ventures with the United States.
The implications of Italy refusing to join the proposed organisation had serious consequences for
Britain, from a financial and above all a political point of view.301 By mid-September 1961 Austria,
Norway and Switzerland had all let it be known that they were not interested in membership. If Italy
followed suit the ensuing organisation "would not be truly European in scope [...]." What is more there
might be other defectors. Both Germany and Denmark had accepted in principle, but on condition that
the new organisation had "as broad a European base as possible, i.e. the participation as soon as
possible [...] of all the states represented at the Strasbourg Conference." If they and other smaller
countries dropped out, for reasons of cost and/or to protect their neutrality, Britain would find herself
saddled with a project which had "most of the economic disadvantages of a multilateral enterprise
conducting an expensive and complicated business" with none of the hoped for political benefits. In
short, it was politically imperative in British eyes that Italy join in the launcher development project as
soon as possible.
During the latter half of September "considerable pressure" was put on the Italians.302 The British and
French ambassadors in Rome made a joint approach to the government, German experts entered into
direct contact with their Italian counterparts, and steps were taken to arouse the interest of Italian
industry. A personal message from Macmillan to Italian Prime Minister Fanfani was delivered on
3 October. At the same time the cabinet ministerial committee responsible for Blue Streak considered
alternative courses of action if Italy did not participate. All had serious disadvantages, particularly
from a political point of view.
Cancellation, though the cheapest alternative, was out of the question, at least in Thorneycroft's eyes.
"I regard Blue Streak as probably the most important technical project in my ministry," he said,
reiterating the now standard arguments for continuation. Blue Streak, he insisted, was to be continued
to avoid US dependency, particularly in telecommunications, to benefit industry, to enable Britain to
be well placed to take advantage of possible military applications of space, and to avoid parliamentary
criticism for not having cancelled earlier.303 But if the UK proceeded without the Italians, what was the
best basis on which to do so?304 Britain could again consider going it alone, which would be more
efficient and probably cheaper — but this would cast serious doubts over her claims to be interested in
European collaboration and might have "an unfortunate effect on our negotiations with the European
299 See Amaldi's contribution on 21/9 cited in note 72 and his letter to Adams cited in the previous note.
Amaldi's emphases have been suppressed.
300 For this paragraph see De Maria (1993), section 5.
301 This entire paragraph is based on a note by the secretaries of the Cabinet Ministerial Committee on Blue
Streak, document B.S. (61)2, 21 September 1961, file CAB134/1428, PRO, London.
302 For this paragraph see the minutes of the meeting of the Cabinet Ministerial Committee on Blue Streak
held on 2 October 1961, document B.S. (61) 5th meeting, in file CAB134/1428, PRO, London.
303 See the memorandum by the Minister of Aviation, document B.S. 61 (3) of 28 September 1961 on file
CAB134/1428.
304 For what follows see document B.S. (61) 2 cited in note 77 and the minutes of the meeting held on
2 October 1961 cited in note 78.
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Economic Community." She might seek a purely bilateral Anglo/French arrangement — but this
might "reinforce pressure for the supply to France of purely military information [...]," and create
difficulties in Washington. Or she might work for a tripartite Anglo/Franco/German consortium — but
this might encourage the "smaller European countries to believe that we were now prepared to accept
in other fields as well the idea of a tripartite directorate in Europe, to which they are strongly
opposed." In addition if Germany built the third stage of the rocket on her own "Soviet propaganda
against West German militarism, and allied encouragement of it, would be provided with a useful
theme." In sum the most preferable alternative in Britain's eyes was to push for as wide a European
participation as possible, encouraging the French and the Germans to share any ultimate shortfall in
contributions, including that of the Italians (about 10%), on at least a pro rata base with the UK.
In an effort to bring matters to a head, the British and French governments called a meeting of all the
European states represented at Strasbourg, plus Australia, for 30 October in London. Its aim was to
discuss the draft of a convention establishing a European launcher development organisation. The
week before Britain was still far from sure that a suitable basis for collaboration could be found. The
Italians seemed to be insisting that Blue Streak be abandoned as a condition for their participation,
though it was possible, said Thorneycroft, that their ministers "had agreed that it was for political
reasons desirable for them to join ELDO, but felt constrained to take account of the fact that their
technical advisers had reported unfavourably." The French, for their part, had refused to accept to
share pro rata with the British (and the Germans) the shortfall in the ELDO budget if Italy should not
participate, and had suggested cancelling the meeting if their Latin neighbour withdrew.305 And there
were continuing difficulties with the Australians, who persisted in their view that their contributions in
kind to the development of Blue Streak should also entitle them to continuing rights, without further
payment, in the subsequent period of satellite research and the commercial exploitation of
telecommunication satellites. This line was sure to antagonise other potential European members of
the consortium.
To deal with this situation there was little Thorneycroft could do, given his determination to press on,
but to seek authority to offer even more generous financial incentives to the delegates to the London
conference. To save the meeting from possible failure caused by a breach with Australia it was
decided to offer to set aside £1million over five years from Canberra's contribution to the Joint Project
to be used as an Australian financial contribution to possible post-Blue Streak ELDO programmes.306
To make up the Italian shortfall should they not participate, Thorneycroft requested permission to pay
up to 60% for a UK/France/German project, reducing to 50% as other countries were brought in.307
The Minister of Aviation was then prepared to spend up to £42million on a "European" project —
compared to the original £50 million estimate for a Blue Streak—Black Knight combination.
These moves were of course indicative of the increasing vulnerability of the UK and of the Minister of
Aviation in particular. Britain had now been "hawking" this project around the continent for almost 18
months, and had spent some £6million on keeping the Blue Streak teams at work. The political
repercussions of withdrawal, both at home and in terms of the Macmillan government's European
aspirations, would be extremely serious. In addition Thorneycroft was under pressure from the
European space industry. In September 1961 it established a supranational body called EUROSPACE,
which included among its members all the leading European companies in aircraft and missile
manufacture. Its aim, according to its constitution, was "to promote the development of aerospace
activities in Western Europe," which included helping the embryonic European space organisations to
carry out their programmes. More specifically, sectors of this industry, both in Britain and in France,
were keen advocates of the Blue Streak-based European launcher. As F. Vinsonneau of the French
305 See the minutes of the Cabinet Ministerial Committee on Blue Streak meeting on 23 October 1961 docu-
ment B.S. (61) 6th meeting, file CAB134/1428, PRO, London.
306 For the Australian position see document B.S. (61) 2 cited in note 77. For the UK proposal as to how to
assuage the Australians, see the minutes of the Cabinet Ministerial Committee on Blue Streak held on
27 October 1961, document B.S. (61) 7th meeting, file CAB134/1428, PRO, London.
307 For this proposal see document B.S. (61) 3 cited in note 79.
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company SEREB put it, "What we did say, and repeat with conviction, was that the only solution in
the [space] field was a united Europe [...] experiences and methods gained by the United Kingdom
formed a large part of our common fund of knowledge and it would be our duty to support them and
prevent their dispersal." 308 There were undoubtedly strong technical and managerial arguments against
going ahead with ELDO in the form being considered in 1961. But they seemed to be more than
outweighed, at least in the eyes of the product champions, by the assumed industrial and above all
political benefits of pressing ahead.
3.6 The Lancaster House conference
The UK duly convened a meeting of potential Member States to draft a final version of the ELDO
convention at Lancaster House in London. It lasted from 30 October to 3 November 1961.
Thorneycroft was in the chair, and representatives were sent by Belgium, Denmark, France, The
Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the UK. Australia also attended officially
this time. Norway, Sweden and Switzerland, who were represented at Strasbourg, only sent observers.
After the opening plenary session, in which the Italians explained the doubts they had about the
project, the conference broke down into an administrative and financial working party and a technical
working party. These presented their results to plenary sessions where the main difficulties that had
arisen were discussed. In general, according to an internal British document, "the representatives of
other countries supported the formation of a European Launcher Development Organisation and were
sympathetic towards the difficulties which the U.K. Government in particular was experiencing in its
efforts to found the Organisation." At the end of the meeting an agreement was reached on the form of
a suitable convention.309
Four main problems arose at the meeting. Firstly, of course, there was the question of Italy. According
to one source, by the time the meeting took place, Italian engineers had come around to the view that,
for all its limitations, ELDO had certain advantages for them. In particular the building of a test
satellite for the launcher dovetailed neatly with their plans for the national space programme. Also
they hoped, with the support of Germany, to push ELDO in the direction of studying advanced
launcher technologies, particularly cryogenic propulsion. In the event they were unable to enter into
formal commitments at Lancaster House. Apparently Prime Minister Fanfani, at the last minute,
instructed the delegates to remain temporarily aloof since negotiations with the USA over the San
Marco platform had reached a particularly important stage, and he wanted to do nothing which might
hinder their successful conclusion. 310 Under these circumstances, the conference could do no more
than strongly encourage Italian participation. To tempt them it was agreed that £2 million be set aside
in the initial programme for a two-year study of future possibilities and the need for vehicles and
ranges, preferably led by a suitably qualified Italian. The French delegation also suggested that Italy
should take the lead in any advanced propulsion research which ELDO might undertake, a project that
was close to Broglio's heart.
The second problem concerned the free exchange of information. Failure to agree on these rights
would have imperilled the whole project, because the availability of information for use by other
countries was fundamental to the British proposals. The German delegation had particular difficulties
here because design and patent rights under German law belonged to the inventor. It was thus difficult
for the government to get free access to this information for other Member States participating in
ELDO. In the prevailing spirit of compromise a suitable way around the difficulty was devised.
308 For more detail on the lobbying activities of the European space industry see De Maria and Krige (1993).
The quotation can be found in Aviation Week, 3 July 1961, p. 31.
309 For this paragraph and the quotation see the Report on the Lancaster House Conference prepared for the
Cabinet Ministerial Committee on Blue Streak, document B.S. (61) 6, 13 November 1961, in file
CAB134/1428, PRO, London.
310 For this paragraph see the interview of C. Buongiorno with L. Sebesta, Rome, 23 June 1992, ESA ar-
chives, Florence. For additional information see also Sebesta's interview with L. Broglio, Rome,
22 June 1992.
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Then there was the ongoing problem of Australia. The French, in particular, strongly objected to
making commitments in the convention to future programmes, and Britain tended to sympathise with
their position. The question was not resolved at the conference. Instead Britain accepted that Australia
should circulate a note to other ELDO member countries repeating its offer to make the facilities
available for the first programme also available as contributions in kind to any subsequent
programmes. In return for this Australia would continue to have full membership rights in the
organisation. Britain agreed to inform its ELDO partners that it was willing to go along with this
arrangement. At the same time, in view of the attitudes expressed by other parties at the Lancaster
House conference, she made it clear to Canberra that she would not put pressure on any country who
was not prepared to accede to Australia's request.
The final important aspect discussed at the meeting was the financial one. Spain said that if it joined it
could not afford to pay more than £1million to the organisation. The small countries, particularly the
Netherlands and Denmark, wanted the absolute value of their contributions limited to their share of the
£70 million estimate for the initial programme, i.e. they wanted this to be treated as a ceiling on
expenditure. Britain and France would have none of it. They insisted that, while this was the best
available estimate of the cost of ELDO, they could not guarantee that it would not be exceeded in a
development project of the type being considered. The compromise found was to insert a clause in the
financial protocol which stated that, if the £70 million limit should be exceeded, the Member States
would discuss among themselves as to how to deal with the excess. The other financial problem dealt
with at Lancaster House was how to share the shortfall should the Italians not join. France and
Germany made it clear that they were most unlikely to help, despite considerable pressure put on them
by the UK delegation. Instead, they suggested that, if Britain paid the Italian contribution of 9.78%
they might be willing to share any outstanding shortfall due to the defection of smaller Member States.
This was coupled with the demand by the big countries that the annual budget of the organisation be
voted by a qualified two-thirds majority, the qualification being that it be accepted by those
contributing 85% of the budget. This destroyed any hope that states like Belgium or the Netherlands
might have had of restricting expenditure using formal voting mechanisms. 311
In the light of these developments Thorneycroft's immediate problem was to persuade his colleagues
that Britain should be prepared to pay Italy's contribution to a future ELDO. The matter was discussed
by the Cabinet committee on 24 November 1961. It was badly received by the Chief Secretary to the
Treasury and by the Minister for Science. Both insisted that further expenditure on ELDO would be at
the cost of other more worthwhile scientific projects. There were certainly going to be sharply
increasing demands for science and technology over the next five years from both the Research
Councils, whose forward estimates increased by 10% per annum, and the universities. Why spend
more money on a launcher with no guaranteed important civilian use? American launchers could be
used to put scientific satellites into orbit. In telecommunications the Americans were far ahead, and
had let it be known that there would be room for only one international system. Britain's contribution
to ELDO would involve developing an already obsolete first stage, and her large stake in the
organisation might well preclude her from having ESRO's satellite engineering laboratory, where the
greatest technological advantages were to be obtained, on her soil. In sum, according Lord Hailsham,
the science minister, if Britain took on the entire Italian share of the budget, it should be clear that this
was being done "for reasons other than scientific", and the scientific effort in other fields should not be
reduced to pay for it.312
The immediate purpose of the Cabinet meeting was to advise Macmillan on the line that he might take
with de Gaulle in  discussions  which were due to  begin that afternoon.  There was  general agreement
311 All of the material in the preceding paragraphs dealing with the Lancaster House meeting is from the
document cited in the previous note. See also ELDO (1965), pp. 8-10.
312 This paragraph is based on the minutes of the Cabinet Ministerial Committee on Blue Streak held on
24 November 1961, document B.S.(61) 8th meeting, and Hailsham's paper prepared for it, document
B.S.(61)7, 16 November 1961, both in file CAB134/1428, PRO, London.
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that he should ask the French President to join him in urging the Italian government to make a
favourable response. If that happened Britain would be prepared to share the remaining shortfall
equally with France and Germany. If Italy should stay out the question of whether or not Britain
should itself make up the difference would have to be reconsidered, though Macmillan was told of the
divided opinions at the meeting. The Prime Minister duly took up the issue the next day. de Gaulle
said that France would be willing to bear more of the total cost of ELDO, but only to cover the deficit
caused by non-participation of the smaller countries, not Italy. 313
Our documents do not permit us to follow the subsequent evolution of the negotiations over Italian
membership in any detail. When the ELDO convention was signed on 30 April 1962, though, Italy
was among one of the seven participating states, the others being Britain, France and Germany,
Belgium and the Netherlands, and Australia. In the agreed division of labour the Italians were given
responsibility for the first series of satellite test vehicles, while Belgium would provide down range
guidance stations and the Netherlands the long range telemetry links, including the requisite ground
equipment. In 1963 negotiations were opened between Britain, France and Germany on how to share
the shortfall of contributions to the budget, amounting to a little under 12%. It was agreed that this
would be done pro rata according to the scale of contributions to the initial programme. In practice this
meant that the UK absorbed almost half of the deficit, its final share rising to 38.79%. France,
Germany and Italy were to pay respectively 23.93%, 18.92% and 9.78%. Belgium, at 2.85% and the
Netherlands, at 2.64%, made up the balance. Australia's contribution was the provision, free of charge,
of the range and rocket firing facilities at Woomera. The convention establishing ELDO came into
force on 29 February 1964. 314
3.7 Concluding remarks
The most striking feature about the birth of ELDO, and one that has been noted many times before,
was the scepticism, and even opposition, to the project by many experts in the main participating
countries. In the case of scientists this was mainly based on fears that the enormously costly rocket
would be financed at the expense of their research programmes. Engineers stressed the obsolescence
of the technology in the first stage, and the complex managerial problems that would be created by
building bits and pieces of the system in different countries. These expert opinions were overruled in
France, in Germany, and in Italy, along with the counter-suggestion that if Europe wanted to enter
space rapidly it would be advised first to try to negotiate to build a heavy American launcher under
licence.
ELDO then was a child of political, not technical parentage. 315 In particular, it was a child of the
Macmillan government, which saw the rocket as at once enabling it to achieve a measure of
independence from the United States and to draw closer to its continental partners, and indeed to the
newly-fledged European Economic Community. There were other arguments of course for continuing
with the project — to save costs, to boost industry, to preserve in-house skills — but it was these
political concerns that dominated the thinking of Macmillan and Thorneycroft from the time the Blue
Streak missile was cancelled.
It has been pointed out that Macmillan's decision to apply for Common Market membership in July
1961 was hopelessly ill-timed, that he placed far too encouraging an interpretation on the signals
coming from the Elysée, and that if he had been more attentive the fiasco of de Gaulle's veto in
313 See Aide memoire from Macmillan dated 26 November 1961 in file PREM11/3515, PRO, London.
314 For this paragraph see ELDO (1965), pp. 11-15. For the position of the Italian ministers see the statement
by Thorneycroft made at the Cabinet meeting on 24 November 1961, cf note 88.
315 The phrase is a deliberate allusion to the remark made by ESA's then Director General in 1984, Erik
Quistgaard, that ELDO was "a child of non-technical parentage, of blindness to technical reality" — see
ESA (1984). De Maria and Krige (1993) survey a number of arguments in similar vein in the introduction
and conclusion to their paper.
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January 1963 might have been avoided.316 While there is doubtless much truth in this, one can forgive
Macmillan for feeling that de Gaulle was seriously interested in closer ties with Britain, at least in
advanced technology. It was de Gaulle who, by all accounts, and against the opinion of all his experts,
instructed his delegates at the last minute to take a cooperative line at the crucial Strasbourg meeting
in January 1961. It was de Gaulle who accepted, in November 1961, that France share the shortfall of
the contributions to the ELDO budget due to the non-participation of smaller countries. And it was
while Britain's application to the EEC was pending that France and Britain agreed (in November 1962)
to enter together another major, and financially disastrous project, the development of a supersonic
airliner significantly labelled Concorde. In sum the negotiations over the setting up of ELDO took
place in a context of a growing wish by Britain to become part of the European club, of an associated
willingness on her part to make major compromises to achieve that objective, and of at least some
positive signals from across the Channel that her membership would be welcomed. The difference, of
course, was that whereas de Gaulle decoupled technological collaboration from the British application
for membership of the EEC, Macmillan did just the opposite.
The possibilities inherent in this very specific political conjuncture, such as they were, were only
exploited because of the determination of the British Prime Minister and of his Minister of Aviation.
Thorneycroft never wavered in his conviction that it was essential for Britain to continue the
development of Blue Streak as a civilian launcher. Macmillan never hesitated to contact now de
Gaulle, now Adenauer, now Fanfani, and to ask them to intercede before their governments in favour
of the British proposals. These personal ties were of crucial importance in bringing otherwise reluctant
partners into line.
The British domestic political situation also played a key role in keeping Blue Streak alive. The
moment it was decided to try to convert the missile into a civilian space launcher the Macmillan
government exposed itself to charges that it was wasting money. As time passed, and hundreds of
thousands of pounds a month were spent in anticipation of finding partners, so did these accusations
become more difficult to rebut. What the Conservatives needed above all was a quick decision from
other European governments. However the political symbolism was so great, the military interest so
limited, and the technical aspects of the project so unsound, that this was just not possible. As the
weeks and months dragged by so Britain's need to make ever more costly concessions to bring other
partners on board increased. Each step forward, each partner acquired, was at once a sign of progress
and a further impediment to the government extricating itself from the project. It gradually lost control
over a process which steadily gathered its own momentum, and it paid a heavy price for it. By 1963
the UK not only found itself committed to paying almost 40% of the budget of the new organisation
— far more than the 25% it had thought to pay when it initiated the scheme two years before. It also
found itself brutally excluded from the Common Market by an uncompromising de Gaulle. Britain had
failed to meet either its financial or its political objectives, and it was saddled with developing a
technically obsolete rocket. It is hardly surprising that it very quickly began to reconsider its
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Towards a Coordinated European Space Effort317
J. Krige & M. de Maria
4.1 The activities of the ELDO Preparatory Group
The governments represented at the Lancaster House conference in October-November 1961 realised
that the signature and the ratification of the ELDO convention might take many months. Anxious to
move ahead rapidly, they drew up a protocol, dated 9 May 1962, establishing an ELDO Preparatory
Group (PG). This temporary body was instructed to make plans for the setting up of the organisation,
pending the coming into force of the convention, and to co-ordinate the work already under way on
ELDO’s Initial Programme. In particular the PG was to invite the participating states to place the
contracts in industry, at their own expense and risk, for those parts of the programme which were not
yet started.
ELDO’s Initial Programme (IP) involved developing a three stage launcher, labelled ELDO A
(or sometimes Europa 1), and capable of putting 1000 kg into a near circular, low Earth orbit
(300-500 km). This performance was, in fact, defined to meet the needs of ESRO’s planned Large
Astronomical Satellite (LAS -see chapter 6). The IP was initially scheduled to run for five years, and
to cost £70 million (196 MAU, millions of monetary units, where 1MAU = $1). Following a proposal
by the Italian delegation, those meeting at the Lancaster House conference also agreed to set aside
£2 million to undertake, in parallel, the study of more advanced launchers and ranges. This was to be
concluded by a report about the possible re-orientation and/or upgrading of the IP. The final
distribution of the global budget between the participating states was Belgium 2.85%, France 23.93%,
Germany 22.01%, Italy 9.78%, the Netherlands 2.64% and the United Kingdom 38.79%. Australia’s
contribution in kind consisted of making available range and supporting facilities in Woomera.
The Preparatory Group held its first meeting from 11-13 December 1961. It elected General
E. Cigerza (Italy) as its chairman and set up a Technical Committee, chaired by W.H. Stephens (UK)
and an Administrative Committee chaired by M. Depasse (Belgium). This structure was reconfigured
over the next year. In October 1962, when the ELDO Secretary General, Ambassador R. Carrobio di
Carrobio (Italy) attended the first meeting of the Preparatory Group, Cigerza handed over the
chairmanship to D.W.G.L. de Havilland from Britain. Stephens was nominated Technical Director,
H.L. Costa was appointed Administrative Director and G. Bock (FRG) took over Stephens’ role as
chairman of the Technical Committee.318
The Technical Committee’s main task involved coordinating the Initial Programme, including setting
up the launch facilities, the guidance system and the satellite test vehicle. It was also asked to study
future programmes. While it existed it held twelve meetings and was assisted in its work by a
Technical Planning Staff which was, in fact, the precursor of the ELDO Technical Directorate.The
Administrative Committee, for its part, was required to draw up the diplomatic and legal texts
regulating the activities of the Preparatory Group and, later, ELDO itself. It defined the structure of the
organisation, and drew up the rules of procedure of the ELDO Council, as well as the ELDO financial
317 Parts 1 and 2 of this chapter are based on M. De Maria, The History of ELDO. Part 1: 1961-1964,
ESA HSR-10. The remainder is based on original archival research by John Krige. All of the material
cited is in the ESA archives based in Florence.
318 ELDO Preparatory Group, First Meeting (11-13 December 1961), ELDO/PG/1ère Réunion,
18 December 1961; ELDO Preparatory Group, Report by the Technical Committee, ELDO/PG/13
(Revised), 13 December 1961; ELDO Preparatory Group, ELDO/PG/PV 5, 12 July 1962; Structure
Provisoire jusqu’à mars 1963, ELDO/PG/A/81, 14 September 1962; ELDO/PG/T(62), 6th Meeting,
29 October 1962; ELDO/PG(63), 21 February 1963.
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rules, contracts and security regulations, including a patents protocol, and staff rules, including a
protocol on privileges and immunities.319
In terms of the ELDO convention each member state was responsible for managing the part of the
work on the Initial Programme which was assigned to it. This meant that the Preparatory Group, and
ultimately the ELDO Secretariat itself, had very restricted powers of technical and financial control.
Both were reduced to coordinating activities in the Member States’ industries as best they could. The
Preparatory Group was further hampered by its lack of legal personality, which prevented it from
being able to make any financial commitments (like the signing of contracts for feasibility or
development studies, staff recruitment etc.). All its decisions had to be taken unanimously and the
Group relied “on the good will of Member States” to see that they were enforced. Staff were seconded
by national governments, but somewhat reluctantly, so that by the end of 1962 only 53 people had
been put at the PG’s disposal, quite insufficient to guarantee even a minimum functioning of its
structures. It also proved extremely difficult to vote its annual budgets. Notwithstanding all these
difficulties, considerable progress was made in the period prior to the ratification of the ELDO
convention.320
At the end of 1963 the launch pad developed by the Australian Department of Supply’s Weapons’
Research Establishment was ready. Blue Streak reached Woomera for its first full static firings by
Christmas that year. The first full live firing was fixed for 25 May 1964. Bad weather delayed the test
to 2 June, when there was another disappointment. The rocket’s engines were stopped automatically
just three seconds before the launch because of a “fault of an obscure nature” in the safety system of
both the rocket and the ground installations. Three days, later, however, a “textbook launching” took
place. On 5 June 1964, in a flight lasting 10 minutes Blue Streak rose to a height of 170km and a
speed of 10,000 kph. Its trajectory was, however, prematurely curtailed six seconds before schedule.
As the tanks containing propellants emptied, the remaining fuel began to slosh about. The rocket
started rolling, and then cartwheeled spectacularly across the sky before the engines cut out and the
rocket crashed into the desert. This setback notwithstanding, the British Minister of Aviation Julian
Amory could justifiably claim that “Britain and Australia [could] meet their obligations under the first
ELDO programme”.321 Indeed the second launch of Blue Streak, on 20 October 1964, was uneventful,
as was the third test firing on 22 March 1965.322
Work in France also proceeded steadily. By the end of 1963 some twenty static trials had been made
of the individual engines for the second stage, Coralie, at the LRBA’s test bench at Vernon, near Paris.
All were satisfactory. The French engineers still needed to test the ensemble of four engines together.
The first test of the rocket itself was scheduled for spring 1965, and it was hoped to follow this up,
during the same year, with two or three launchings with a dummy third stage and a satellite payload
designed with the same aerodynamic configuration as foreseen for the whole launcher.
At the start of 1960 West Germany did not, of course, have any military medium or long-range
ballistic missile or space programme. It thus started its space activities more or less from scratch and
linked them closely with the development of an industrial capability. Up to 1961 the country had no
government agency in a position to organise and control space activities in its firms, however. The
government thus established a non-profit organisation, the GfW (Gesellschaft für Weltraumforschung)
to supervise and administer its participation in ESRO and ELDO on behalf of the Ministry of Atomic
Energy, to which responsibility for space matters was initially assigned. During the same year a new
German aerospace consortium, ASAT (Arbeitsgemeinschaft Satelliten-trägersystem), was put together
out of ERNO Raumfahrttechnik and Bölkow Entwicklungen KG. This organism began work on the
third stage of the European rocket in 1961.
319 See ELDO Council, 1st Session (5-6 May 1964), ELDO/C(64)PV/1, 22 June 1964, p.10.
320 ELDO(1966), pp. 11-13, 29-30.
321 The Times, 26/5, 3/6, 6 June 1964.
322 For details on the Blue Streak launches see Morton (1989), pp. 462-4.
105
At the end of 1962 responsibility for space research in Germany passed to the Space Research
Department (SRD) of the newly formed Ministry of Scientific Research. The director of the SRD,
Max Mayer insisted that a national programme should be developed in conjunction with the European
programme. Germany’s contributions to ESRO and ELDO, he said, “cannot be effective without a
national programme in similar fields […]. We do not want to make purely financial contributions, but
rather to contribute technically […]. What matters in our opinion,” Mayer went on, “is to activate
German science and technology through effective co-operation in space research in such a way that no
one can later say that Germany has been eclipsed by other countries in relevant fields”. In line with
these sentiments, in 1963 the SRD, along with its engagements in ESRO and ELDO, began planning a
national space programme which included the construction of test facilities, recoverable sounding
rockets, a space transporter, a multipurpose satellite and a high-energy third stage for an eventual
second-generation ELDO launcher. As for the first ELDO rocket, by the end of 1963 German
engineers had built a structural dummy of their third stage and the main motor had run successfully in
a number of static firings.323
Italy was to develop the Satellite Test Vehicle fitted with a variety of sensors to study the performance
of its injection into orbit and the characteristics of its orbital test motion. The STV also had to probe
the environmental conditions during launch and subsequent dynamic behaviour, data considered
crucial to any future user of the rocket. The Italian component also allowed for a number of important
experiments related to satellite technology, like satellite tracking, command transmission from the
ground, tape recording and playback of measurements in orbit. Contributing firms included FIAT
(firings), Aerfer (structure), Montecatini (pulse code modulation telemetry) and Selenia (check-out
and telemetry equipment).
Belgium’s task in the Initial Programme was the construction of a down range station which was to
provide guidance, tracking and control of the third stage by accurate angular and distance
measurements with a radio interferometry system. The development of the guidance station, built at
the Gove Peninsula, Northern Australia, 1200 miles down range from the Woomera launch site, was
assigned to three firms, ACE (Ateliers des Constructions Electriques de Charleroy), Bell Telephone
and MBLME (Manufacture Belge des Lampes et de Matériel Electrique).
Finally the Netherlands was to develop an advanced design telemetry system, aimed at following the
performance of the third stage and receiving telemetered signals from the satellite. This system, as
well as the vehicle borne telemetry and the telemetry station at Woomera were entrusted to the Dutch
firm Philips. An independent telemetry station, to be installed at Gove, was also in the hands of this
company.324
In spite of the difficulties of starting a complex technological project in an international framework,
and the weak powers of the ELDO Preparatory Group, we see then that between the signature and
ratification of the ELDO convention work proceeded on the development of the launcher, on
optimisation and control systems, on the satellite test vehicle, and on the guidance, telemetry and
attitude reference systems. In April 1962 a new, and more realistic timescale was drawn up for the
Initial Programme, which foresaw its completion by December 1966. Events would show just how
optimistic that was.
4.2 The proposed re-orientation of ELDO’s programme to meet the needs of
telecommunications satellites
The ELDO convention entered into force on 29 February 1964 when five countries contributing 85%
of the total financial contributions (Australia, France, Great Britain, the Netherlands and West
323 Hochmuth (1974), p. 72, Wetmore (1963), pp. 67-77.
324 ELDO(1966), pp. 53-6.
106
Germany) had ratified it. Belgium followed suit on 2 April 1964, while Italy’s signature was ratified
on 4 March 1965.
The ELDO Council met for the first time on 5-6 May 1964 and was immediately obliged to reassess
the whole situation. The United States was forging ahead with the development of communications
satellites. On 10 July 1962 NASA launched Telstar which used ground stations in France (at
Pleumeur-Bodou) and Britain (Goonhilly Downs) to transmit live television broadcasts across the
Atlantic the very first day it reached orbit.325 Plans for a telecom satellite in geostationary orbit were
well under way.
The need to adapt the ELDO launcher to this new application dominated the opening address of the
French minister in charge of scientific research and atomic and space problems, G. Palewsky. He
listed the budgetary, technical and commercial issues which the organisation had to confront,
problems aggravated by limited resources in which governments “must often solve economical and
social problems of primary urgence” and so decide on the “priorities to be established”. Palewsky was
particularly concerned about the need to define a long-term programme which clarified whether it
would be sufficient to modify the existing launcher or whether one needed to make a “more radical
transformation” by changing the nature of the stages so as to develop a telecommunications satellite
launcher. Finally he wondered whether a new equatorial launching site was needed to increase the
useful payloads.326
The internal difficulties facing ELDO were also brought home by the British chairman of the
Preparatory Group, de Havilland. ELDO’s task, he said, was not only technically complicated by its
very nature. It was aggravated by the way in which work had been distributed among Member States
and by the Secretariat’s lack of real powers. The total expenditure in the first three years had increased
to 151.7 MAU out of a total ceiling of 196 MAU (=£70 million) initially foreseen for the Initial
Programme. Insisting that further delays had to be avoided if costs were to be kept under control, and
if ELDO was to have a rocket “within the time limit needed for its commercial exploitation”, de
Havilland went on to suggest that “if we want the ELDO launcher to be used in the frame of a world
telecommunication satellite system, the performances of Europa 1 should be improved […]”. The
decision on these matters of principle, he suggested, should be left to an intergovernmental conference
to be held later that year.327
Two matters preoccupied the ELDO Council in the months leading up to this conference: the cost and
the re-orientation of the IP. The Secretariat proposed, on the basis of data supplied by the Member
States, that the cost of the programme be increased to 329MAU, at April 1964 prices. It also suggested
that a substantial contingency margin be allowed for, bringing the total cost of the programme up to
some 400MAU, so more than double the figure adopted at the Lancaster House conference. The
delegations to the ELDO Council were extremely concerned about the imprecision in these figures and
the terms under which the contingency could be used. They ultimately agreed that the basic cost of the
IP proposed to the conference of plenipotentiaries should be 339MAU, and that a contingency for
technical factors be allowed for. Fearing that this would serve as little more than a pretext for
uncontrolled overspending, the Council left the conference to lay down the “main principles” of its
use.328 The main objective of the revised programme was, as we have said, to develop a launcher
capable of placing a telecommunications satellite in orbit. The European telecommunications organ,
the CETS, let it be known that it hoped to launch experimental telecom satellites of an operational type
325 Daniel R. Glover, “NASA Experimental Communications Satellites, 1958 - 1995”, chapter 6 in Butrica
(1997).
326 ELDO Council, 1st Session (5-6 May 1964), Minutes ELDO/C(64)PV/1, 22 June 1964, pp. 3-4.
327 Ibid., pp. 10-15.
328 ELDO Council, 4th Session (7-9 December 1964), ELDO/C(64)PV/4, 13 January 1965, ppp. 3, 6-9. See
also The Estimated Cost to Completion of the ELDO Initial Programme, Note by Secretariat, ELDO/CG
(Jan 65), 18 December 1964.
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in 1970-71. CETS was a conference of European states created in 1963 as a forum for the discussion
of European interests in the prospective world organisation of satellite communications (Intelsat),
initially from the point of view of telecommunications traffic, but also with a view to European
participation in the supply of equipment. To enter this field the Secretariat proposed a two-phase
programme. In the first, the ELDO A/S launcher would be developed. This was based on ELDO A but
had an extra apogee stage powered by a solid propellant motor. To make optimum use of the
additional stage it would be necessary to modify Europa 1 slightly, and to include an inertial guidance
system to ensure maximum flexibility in the choice of orbits, irrespective of the launching site. The
Secretariat proposed that a first orbital launch of this rocket would be possible in 1968, that the
programme would be completed a year later, and that its cost would be 50 MAU spread over five
years (1965-69).
ELDO A/S was designed to put 110 kg into a polar orbit, and to carry about 40 kg of
telecommunications equipment. It did not have a geostationary capability nor could it orbit an
operational communications satellite. For this the Secretariat proposed the ELDO B launcher, also to
be based on Blue Streak but having one or two high-energy upper stages using liquid oxygen and
liquid hydrogen as propellants. More precisely the ELDO/B programme proposed by the Secretariat
comprised two models, a two-stage (ELDO B1) and a three stage (ELDO B2) launcher, to be realised
successively. To achieve ELDO B1 Blue Streak and the associated ground facilities needed to be
modified to accommodate a liquid fuelled second stage having a maximum thrust of six tons, and
fitted with the apogee stage developed for ELDO A/S. Completion of the rocket, which was designed
to place up to 600kg in a polar orbit, or to orbit quite large geostationary satellites if launched from an
equatorial launching site, was scheduled for the early 1970s. Its cost was estimated to be 140 MAU
spread over seven years. ELDO B2 was designed to put up to 1000 kg in geostationary orbit. It would
be derived from the ELDO B1 system, augmented by another more powerful hydrogen-oxygen stage.
ELDO B2 called for significant changes in the Blue Streak first stage. The vehicle loading and first
stage control problems were severe. What is more additional development work was required on the
B1 high-energy stage and its engine if it was to be suitable as a third stage for B2, for high orbits and
for deep space missions. If its development got under way by 1966, the Secretariat estimated that it
would be operational by 1972-73 and at a cost of some 100MAU spread over seven years.329
Meeting in December 1964 the ELDO Council took a generally favourable approach to these
proposals. Of course there were concerns about the reliability of the estimates, which would need to be
firmed up on the basis of firmer estimates from the participating states. There was, however, general
support for the French proposal, backed by Germany, that both programmes presented “the most
desirable orientation” for the development work of ELDO in the period 1965-72. The Council invited
the conference of plenipotentiaries to give its opinion on the reconfiguration of ELDO’s programmes
along these lines, and to indicate an “order of magnitude” of funding acceptable to governments. It
also expressed the hope that the high-level meeting would work towards the definition of a European
space policy bearing in mind both the needs of ESRO and CETS, and coordinating the activities of
these bodies with those of ELDO.330
329 This data from Proposals for Future Activities of the Organisation, Note by the Secretariat, ELDO/C(64)
38 rev., 2 December 1964 and Proposals for Future Development Work of the Organisation, Note by the
Secretariat, ELDO/CG (Jan 65) 1 rev., 15 January 1965. See also ELDO/C(64) 12, 25 June 1964 and
ELDO/T(64) 2, 2 September 1964.
330 ELDO Council, 4th Session, (7-9 December 1964), ELDO/C(64)PV/4, 13 January 1965.
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4.3 1965/1966 The French and British attempts to reform ELDO
4.3.1 France’s suggestion: why not leapfrog straight to ELDO B?
The intergovernmental conference foreseen by the ELDO Council was duly held from 19 to
21 January, 1965.331 The Council laid before the delegates the revised cost estimates for the Initial
Programme for the development of ELDO A, and its suggestions for improving its performance by
developing ELDO A/S and ELDO B. This plan was immediately challenged by the French delegation,
however. The French accepted that ideally it was preferable to advance to ELDO B through ELDO A
and then ELDO A/S with the apogee stage. However, they felt that this programme was too expensive
and would unnecessarily delay a useful operational launcher. They proposed instead that the whole of
ELDO’s activity should be directed at once to ELDO B. Work on the two upper stages of ELDO A
was to be stopped, and the firings cancelled after F4. Only those parts of the Initial Programme which
contributed directly to ELDO B should be maintained, and the apogee stage programme was to be
discontinued. The French delegation insisted that the technical risks engaged in leaping over the
intermediate stage of the technology were more than outweighed by the potential savings, and that
only in this way could Europe hope to have an advanced launcher adapted to its requirements in the
early 1970s.
The conference set up a Working Group under W.H. Stephens to consider these proposals. Its findings
were ready two months later. While unanimous in agreeing with the French that ELDO B should be
the ultimate objective in the early 1970s, the majority report rejected the French way of achieving this
goal as detrimental to the organisation, as having unacceptable technical risks and as of minor
financial significance. It proposed an alternative way of making savings which was, however, rejected
by the French participants in the Group.
In the view of all representatives but those from Paris, the most drastic effect of the French suggestion
would be that most current work would have to be stopped and contracts cancelled. Work would stop
on the development of the first stage structure and its associated systems, and on the manufacture of
engines. Nothing more would be done on the second or third stages or on the test vehicle and on their
components. The result was that there would be a period of comparative inactivity ranging from three
to five years in several Member States. Experienced personnel would have to be dismissed. The
resulting loss of experience from the ELDO A programme, and the lack of adequate flight testing of
the ELDO B engines, as well as adequate testing of inertial guidance, separation techniques and the
apogee system would increase the technical risks, delay the programme and increase its cost.
Confidence in ELDO would be undermined in government circles, among the remaining personnel
and with the general public. Europe’s ability to cooperate in space technology would be questioned.
And the savings would be minimal. The Working Group estimated that it would cost about 245 MAU
to terminate the IP and maintain the minimum infrastructure needed for ELDO B. 80 MAU more
would be needed for testing and developing equipment which would otherwise have been produced in
the ELDO A and A/S programmes. The total cost of the French proposal, 325 MAU, was thus only
130 MAU below the estimated cost of ELDO and ELDO A/S (455 MAU). And this difference was
likely to be whittled away as new teams were recruited and trained for the ELDO B programme, and
as schedules slipped due to their lack of experience. This was likely to substantially reduce the
estimated maximum saving of 130 MAU.
This did not mean that the only technically and financially meaningful path to ELDO B was through
ELDO A and ELDO A/S. The Working Group considered a number of other options. The best, the
majority felt, was to build a two-stage launcher which omitted the French second stage Coralie
altogether. “A detailed examination showed”, said the Group, “that it was more advantageous to
eliminate the second stage of ELDO A rather than the third stage because the orbital payload
capability of the first and second stage alone is very small and it would be necessary to relocate the
guidance and the telemetry equipment in the second stage with consequent problems of redesign.”
331 For a survey of the meeting see Report of the Working Group Set up by the Intergovernmental
Conference in January 1965, ELDO/CG(65)WG/13, 23 March 1965.
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This solution would produce a rocket slightly superior to the immensely successful American Thor
Delta for a net saving of about 50 MAU. It would keep most of the teams intact, and would enable the
organisation to build up the requisite experience for ELDO B1 and to test much of the equipment
needed for it. Of course, the Working Group noted in its report, this alternative “does not take
advantage of the work already carried out on the second stage, and in consequence, French firms
engaged on the Initial Programme would suffer a break in activity and the first orbital experiments
would take place with no important part played by France”.332 The French members of the panel
naturally refused to go along with this alternative.
The French initiative failed to win general support at the reconvened intergovernmental conference in
April. Those present accepted that it was necessary to maintain the ELDO A programme as a basis for
the development of a more powerful launcher. The ELDO Council meeting in December 1965 agreed
that the cost of the Initial Programme indeed be increased to 335 MAU (£120 million). The United
Kingdom delegation insisted that these commitments should not be entered into, and that expenditure
should be limited to essential items pending a re-examination of policy and programmes at Ministerial
level foreseen for March 1966. Overruled, the UK let it be known that its agreement to the 1966
budget was conditional on such a re-examination taking place. It was the start of a major reappraisal
by Britain of the need for ELDO and of her role in the organisation which she had founded.
4.3.2 Britain’s threat to withdraw from ELDO and the concessions made to her
In anticipation of the Ministerial meeting, on 16 February 1966 the United Kingdom circulated an
Aide-Mémoire to its partners in ELDO. In it the government expressed grave doubts as to “whether
the Organisation now is likely to produce a worthwhile result, and whether it would be in the general
interest to continue to contribute to and participate in its work”. The British case was amplified by
Fred Mulley at the Ministerial meeting which opened in Paris on the afternoon of 26 April 1966.333
The British government’s argument began by drawing attention to the cost increases in the Initial
Programme and the slippage in its time schedule. Of course, said Mulley, it was “one of the facts of
life that in the course of large scale development programmes, costs inevitably go up and the time
scale is extended”. Indeed the UK government had made provision for a contingency of 30% in the
initial five-year programme from the inception of the scheme. This estimate had proved far too low.
And understandably so. This was the first international development programme of its kind, and one in
which three of the partners, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, had little or no experience in
space activity when the business got under way. Costs had risen and delays had occurred for which no
individual Member State could be blamed, said Mulley. But all the same one had to face the scale of
the problem: the estimated cost of ELDO A had now more than doubled and it was expected to take
seven and a half years rather than the original five. “When costs have increased substantially and there
has been a considerable delay,” said the British Minister, “we have had to ask ourselves whether the
objectives which can still be achieved are worth the required expenditure of our limited resources of
money, facilities and scientific effort, or whether it would be more sensible to bring the projects to an
end and cut our losses”. Nor should one think that European projects were immune to this kind of
consideration, Mulley said. On the contrary, he believed that it would do “the cause of European unity
a disservice” if they were isolated from the usual assessment applied to national programmes and
allowed to “persist in expensive ventures which seem unlikely to prove viable.”
The ELDO programme, Mulley went on, risked being just that. The original plan foresaw a launcher
able to put 1000kg in circular orbit at 550 km which would also be suitable for ESRO’s scientific
payloads. However, the expected performance of the upper stages had fallen below expectations and
their weight had increased, so diminishing the payload capability of ELDO A. What is more it
had now emerged that telecommunications satellites would need to use the geostationary orbit and that
332 The quotations are from the Report just cited, at pp. 4-5.
333 The UK Aide-Mémoire is annex 1 to, while the minutes of the first session of the Ministerial conference
are ELDO/CM(Apr. 65)PV/1, 26 April 1965.
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ESRO’s Large Astronomical Satellite would require a capability of 800 kg in 600-700 km orbit.
ELDO A fired from Woomera could not meet either of these requirements. It would need to be fired
from an equatorial launch base and upgraded using inertial guidance, adding another £20 million to the
cost. All of this to provide ESRO with the two launchers it would need by 1972, launchers which
could almost certainly be acquired more cheaply from the United States. Indeed, Mulley pointed out,
ELDO A would not be competitive in performance or price with the American Titan IIIC launcher,
which would be available in 1967, two years before the expected date of ELDO A’s final test
launching. As the Aide-Mémoire put it, “Her Majesty’s Government accordingly have difficulty in
escaping the conclusion that, even if present estimates are fulfilled, ELDO will produce in 1969 a
vehicle which will be obsolescent and non-competitive in cost and performance with launchers
produced by the United States”.
Then of course there was ELDO B in its different variants. The increased capability was needed if
Europe was to acquire independent access to the geostationary orbit. However, if developed, and
making allowance for a 40% contingency, the cost of the programme would rise to £365 million or
1,022 MAU, said Mulley. Surveying the potential market for this launcher he was convinced that it
would make far greater economic sense to rely on American launchers or to have European industry
participate in consortia with American firms. Other arguments for continuing, like the acquisition of
technological know-how, or the development of a European “capability” in space could be made,
Mulley agreed, but insisted that they were of secondary importance. Summing up the British Minister
repeated that the UK “doubted whether it was worthwhile going on with the ELDO Initial Programme
or embarking on future programmes at much greater cost”, though he did add that his government was
willing to listen to the points of view of her partners “very carefully” before deciding what to do.
It is important not to lose sight of why the British adopted this position. Mulley’s economically
inspired cost-benefit analysis cannot simply be reduced to a narrow commercial logic. It was rather an
immediate consequence of the uneven development of rocketry in the collaborating partners and its
impact on the ELDO A programme. As Mulley pointed out to his colleagues, before the foundation of
ELDO Britain had already spent about £87 million on the development of Blue Streak, of which about
£65 million was relevant and necessary for the purposes of the ELDO. Of the £80 million
subsequently spent on the organisation, £31 million had been contributed by the UK government. Thus
Britain had spent almost £100 million on the development of the first stage already — double what all
her partners together had spent on ELDO to date.334 And with tangible results. The year before, in
June, Blue Streak had been successfully commissioned. This meant that she could now develop a
national heavy launcher of her own if she wanted to by combining Blue Streak with Black Knight, as
the Minister responsible at the time, Julian Amory, was quick to point out.335 But instead of doing so
— though Mulley did not say this openly — she was financing a project whose original technological
and political justification had evaporated, particularly after de Gaulle had vetoed the UK’s application
to join the Common Market in 1963. And she was financing it to the tune of almost 40%, most of
which would now to be used to develop the French and German stages of the rocket. It was a difficult
pill to swallow.
All the Ministers shared Britain’s concerns about the rising costs and delays in the ELDO programme.
All of them insisted, though, that this was only to be expected, granted the imprecise data used to
estimate the cost of the Initial Programme, the lack of experience in the space sector in many
countries, and the organisational novelty of the project. And no one was prepared to see the demise of
ELDO. Reform not abolition was needed. Thus it was generally agreed that the powers of the ELDO
Secretariat had to be strengthened, and that any additional programme should be carefully costed and
controlled. More fundamentally, though the question of ELDO’s existence and its future was seen by
Britain’s partners as one of policy and politics, not as one of immediate economic returns or of
commercial viability.
334 Minutes of the 4th meeting of the Ministerial Conference held on 28 April 1998, ELDO/CM(Apr.66)PV/4,
28 April 1966.
335 The Times, 6 June 1964.
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Behind this determination lay the commercial and cultural importance of the telecommunications
market. On 6 April 1965 the US launched the Early Bird satellite. Commercial service began on 1
June. Its 240 voice-channel capacity almost equalled the 317 channel capacity of all existing Atlantic
telephone cables, and it cost much less. Of these 240 channels AT & T wanted to use 100; Canada,
Britain, France and West Germany were also anxious to participate.336
It was obvious to Britain’s partners that a European capability in this sector was imperative. They
identified technological independence with national sovereignty and global power and would readily
subscribe to NASA’s claim made to the Congressional budget hearings in 1965 that “[…] knowledge,
more than guns or butter, is the true power of modern states, and the technological balance of power is
increasingly the major concern of the leaders of both weak and strong nations”.337 The delegates
recognised that Europe started way behind the Superpowers and could not hope to compete with the
United States or the Soviet Union. But nor was that the prime objective in establishing ELDO. What
we are trying to do, said German Minister Stoltenberg, is not simply to develop a launcher, but to
enable Europe to carry out space missions “out of its own resources, on the basis of its own knowledge
and experience, at its own discretion, [and] for specifically European motives and requirements.”
There were two aspects to this demand for autonomy. On the one hand there was the reluctance to rely
on others to satisfy Europe’s needs in the scientific or application satellites areas. To do so, said
Stoltenberg, “would be tantamount to conceding to the supplier country from the outset a scientific,
technological and economic monopoly”. The effects of this were difficult to foresee, but potentially
very damaging. As the Secretariat pointed out in its submission, the heavy demands made by the US
programme on its launchers meant that there was no guarantee that NASA could launch European
satellites at the appropriate time; already the American space agency had said that it could not ensure
that its tracking services would be available on demand for the ELDO and ESRO programmes. Then
of course there was the risk that when commercial systems like telecommunications were involved
“the economic interests of the supplier country and Europe [would] cut across one another or fail [..]
to coincide” (Stoltenberg), with negative consequences for Europe.
The reluctance of the Ministers to be hostage to US programme schedules and economic interests was
coupled with the conviction that if they had their own, autonomous programme they could collaborate
on better terms with the United States. What was wanted, said The Hague in its reply to the British
Aide-Mémoire, was “equitable Atlantic cooperation”, a “two-way traffic in know-how” as Brussels
put it. Only in this way could “technological cooperation with the United States […] be economically
as well as politically advantageous.” The Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pierre Harmel,
hammered the point home.338 The European science ministers meeting in January 1966 under the
auspices of the OECD, he said, were concerned by the “technological imbalance” between Europe and
the US. They were convinced that a “dialogue with the United States would only again become fully
fruitful when Europe had reduced its lag and so strengthened its partner’s willingness to cooperate.
[…] How can we prove to the Americans that we should be worthwhile partners if by ourselves we
have never achieved anything of significance?”, he asked rhetorically. And he gave a concrete
example of the implications of dependence. When in 1964 the Europeans had asked to be admitted as
equal partners with equal rights to Intelsat, the US “took the view that there could be no possibility of
discussing on equal footing with a partner who had nothing to add to their programmes.” We need “an
autonomous capability for launching spacecraft”, Harmel concluded so as to have some control over
the management of the world telephone and television satellite systems.
336 David J. Whalen, “Billion Dollar Technology: A Short Historical Overview of the Origins of
Communications Satellite Technology, 1945 - 1965”, chapter 9 in Butrica (1997).
337 Quoted in the ELDO Secretariat’s response to the UK Aide-Mémoire, Annex II to ELDO/CM(Apr.66)5,
p. 3.
338 For Harmel’s contribution see ELDO/CM(Apr. 66)PV/2, Annex I, 27 April 1966.
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Space policy was not simply a question of international policy though, but also of industrial policy. No
one believed that there were direct ‘spin-offs’ from space. But many stressed the stimuli which
advanced aerospace technologies provided to firms in key sectors, notably electronics, automation and
special metallurgy. If Europe withdrew from space these benefits would be lost, and the technological
gap widened even further.339
Space policy was also linked to European policy. Britain’s partners welcomed her participation and
valued her role in European technological collaboration, and saw it as a way of strengthening her ties
to the Common Market. As the Belgian government put it in its Aide-Mémoire, it “sets the highest
value on maintaining and developing the technological collaboration that has brought together the
United Kingdom and the countries of the European Economic Community in the space sector, and in
so doing established a principle of far wider significance”. The point was elaborated by Foreign
Minister Harmel. Science policies, he said, were becoming part and parcel of national and
international economic policies in Europe. If Britain now loosened the ties binding it to the Six in
ELDO its move “would inflict a serious blow on the efforts of those who are trying to achieve a wider
union in Europe”. In short Britain’s willingness to collaborate technologically with her partners across
the Channel was an important bargaining chip for those, including Belgium, who wanted to overcome
French opposition to her membership of the EEC.
In the light of these considerations Mulley’s fellow ministers made it clear that it was essential in their
view to keep ELDO in being. It made no economic sense to stop now, said Italian Minister Rubinacci.
Many Member States had already invested heavily in the Initial Programme, industries had enlarged
and modernised their facilities, and the suppression of ELDO A at this stage of its development was
likely to cost as much as its completion.340 There were political considerations to bear in mind too. As
the German Aide-Mémoire put it, if ELDO was abandoned without achieving a tangible result, it
would, “especially in the United States, result in a considerable loss of confidence in Europe’s
technological potential, besides impairing Europe’s political image in general. Once cooperation
within ELDO had been discontinued”, the document went on, “it could hardly be taken up again for
similar purposes, and this would inevitably have damaging effects on European collaboration in other
fields too”. In short, as the French Minister put it rather dramatically, “Verily, there is no more time
for shilly-shallying and half-measures: we have our backs to the wall; we are condemned to agree, in
other words, to succeed”.341
That granted it was clear that some basic policy decisions were needed. The Italians took the lead in
insisting on the need for a coherent and integrated space policy. This would imply the use of ELDO
launchers by ESRO and by CETS. It would imply the coordination of national policies with respect to
these European organisations with, for example, the heads of delegations being the same in all three. It
might also involve setting up a single organisation, though it was recognised that to integrate all
activities into one body was a rather remote possibility at the time. One thing though that was stressed
was that any such single body would need to be flexible, and that “not all Member States would need
or wish to participate in all programmes” (Rubinacci). Indeed the Italian delegation even went as far as
to propose a draft convention for such an organisation along these lines.342
Coming back to Britain, it is clear that her partners meeting in Paris recognised that her fears were
well-grounded, and were most reluctant to see her withdraw from ELDO. A compromise had to be
found. Indeed on the very first day the German Minister Stoltenberg made it  clear that if a country did
339 See the Aide-Mémoires by the German, Belgian and Dutch governments, Annexes III, IV and VI to
ELDO/CM(Apr 65)5.
340 In the minutes of the first meeting held on 26 April 1966, ELDO/CM(Apr. 66)PV/1, 26 April 1966, p. 14.
341 See the statement by the French representative, ELDO/CM(Apr 66)PV/2, Annex II.
342 The Italian position is in the Minutes of the meeting on the first day, ELDO/CM(Apr. 66)PV/1,
26 April 1966, and in their Aide Mémoires, ELDO/CM(Apr. 66)5, Annex V and ELDO/CM(Apr. 66)11,
22 April 1966. For support for the Italian position see, for example, the French reaction, ELDO/CM(Apr.
66)9, Annex III. The Italian draft convention is document ELDO/CM(Apr. 66)WP/5, 26 April 1966.
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not want to carry on with the whole programme its wishes should be accommodated. His Dutch
counterpart, Plate, conceded that “the United Kingdom’s scale of contributions was large in relation to
the initial programme and this would have to be reconsidered for future programmes”.343 Faced with
this goodwill, and immense political pressure, the British could not but reconsider their position. And
indeed Mulley’s’ speech on the last day, while maintaining a hard line by threatening to leave ELDO,
also accepted to consider contributing to an improvement of the ELDO A rocket by the addition of
apogee and perigee motors. But, he said, this had to be considered a new programme, i.e. the UK’s
financial contribution had to be reassessed. One point was made clear though: “to avoid any
misunderstanding”, said the Minister, “in any event my Government will not feel able to support the
ELDO B programme or to agree to undertake any commitments in respect of them”.344
While most delegations were keen to find a compromise with the British, the French took a harder
line.345 London may have made sacrifices for ELDO but so had Paris, said their representative. After to
all it was thanks to de Gaulle that the Macmillan government was able to recycle Blue Streak as a
satellite launcher. And if that decision was taken it was because France believed in the European
programme, and believed in it enough “that she rejected at that time the possibility open to her of
building her own national launcher”. She was less certain now that the sacrifices were worth it, and
she was sorely “tempted to go it alone with our national resources”. Instead she was willing to take a
new step forward in the ELDO framework. In particular she would consider buying two ELDO A
launchers. But under certain conditions. Firstly, the participating states had to jointly enter into a
delivery commitment, backed by well-defined penalty clauses for any defaulter. Secondly,. the new
civilian equatorial launching base being developed at Kourou in French Guyana had to be used for the
operational launches of the European rocket, Woomera’s role being restricted to trials. This latter
arrangement, said the French representative, was a “sine qua non” of France’s continued commitment
to ELDO.
The French attitude was doubtless deliberately intended to embarrass the British. The willingness to
buy two launchers was an attempt to show the UK that there were users for the launcher. Tying that
offer to the demand for a delivery commitment, however, forced London to face the consequences of
its arguments. What the French wanted were “adequate guarantees that the common efforts deployed
to date cannot be brought to naught by the failure of any one of us”. This meant, the delegate went on,
that the “obligations of each supplier would not lapse upon completion of that part of the programme
with which he has been charged, but would continue for the greater benefit of the whole community”.
In short what the French were trying to do was to make the UK stand by her Continental partners,
participating in all the ELDO programmes.
The insistence on the use of Guyana similarly put the British in a difficult position, this time with
respect to their Commonwealth partner, Australia. Indeed the April 1966 conference had before it
three offers for a new equatorial launch base, the Italian San Marco platform, which was to be
anchored off the Seychelles, the new French base in Guyana, and Darwin in North Australia. And
during the meeting the French did all they could to discredit the last. On the second afternoon of the
conference, for example, an enraged Senator Henty remarked that the “French Delegation has seen fit
to distribute this morning what claims to be a comparative study between the Australian and French
proposals”. This “so-called comparative document”, the Australian Senator went on, “should not
necessarily be accepted on its face value”. “Better climate, better communications, better amenities
[…]” were just some of the factors in Australia’s favour, he said, asking that the three proposals be
considered together under conditions “conducive to sensible and practical conclusions”.346 But Paris
had already made up its mind, Guyana was a sine qua non of her ongoing participation, and her
partners, including Britain, would have to do what they could to pacify an Australia which was to be
sacrificed in the interests of keeping France in ELDO.
343 ELDO/CM(Apr. 66) PV/1, 26 April 1966, pp. 12, 13.
344 ELDO/CM(Apr. 66) PV/4, 28 April 1966.
345 The French representative’s statement is ELDO/CM(Apr. 66)PV/2, Annex II, 27 April 1966.
346 For Australian wrath see ELDO/CM(Apr. 66)PV/3, 27 April 1966.
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The conference in April ended after an important exchange of views but without taking clear
decisions. These were foreseen for a reconvened meeting scheduled for the 9 June.347 A week before,
on 3 June the British government circulated another Aide Mémoire which effectively re-iterated
Britain’s position and cast a pall of gloom over her partners. “The latest proposals” the document said,
still did not “constitute a sufficient basis for continuing United Kingdom participation in ELDO”. Her
Majesty’s Government had thus decided that “they cannot agree to participate in development of the
apogee/perigee system”, and that they “cannot continue to share in the financing of the ELDO Initial
Programme beyond the extent to which they are already committed”.348
The immediate result of the British initiative was a manifest hardening of attitudes among her partners.
It was pointed out to Britain that she was legally obliged, in terms of the ELDO convention, to
complete any programme which had been started. More fundamentally, though, it was stressed by the
Dutch and the Italians that the United Kingdom had a “moral” responsibility to stay in ELDO. Both
remarked that their governments had been initially very reluctant to join ELDO, but had been satisfied
by the assurances and explanations given by Her Majesty’s Government in the months after the
Lancaster House conference. Now, said the Dutch delegate, ELDO “seemed in danger of being
torpedoed by that same government”. The “bitter disappointment” felt by The Hague, “who had
always been a champion of the most extensive co-operation in Europe, including the United
Kingdom” led Plate to go further. Britain, he stressed, was contemplating withdrawal now that its own
launcher had been fully developed. It had reaped the full benefits from the Initial Programme, a
programme from which The Netherlands had benefited very little to date. “By withdrawing now”,
Plate insisted, “the United Kingdom would not be giving her partners a reasonable deal”.349
This was indeed an inopportune moment to withdraw. On 24 May 1966, just ten days before the UK
circulated its Aide Mémoire, the F4 firing of Europa 1 took place at Woomera. It was the first time the
entire rocket had been launched, with dummy second and third stages. Though the flight was aborted,
probably unnecessarily, a little after two minutes, the relative success was most encouraging. Under
these circumstances the Dutch accusations that Britain was “torpedoing” a potentially successful
venture hit hard, and Mulley did not totally close the door to a compromise. In two restricted sessions
the Ministers concentrated on ways to reduce Britain’s percentage contribution to ELDO, and to come
up with a preliminary redistribution of the financial load to submit to their cabinets. They agreed to
meet again a month later to ratify this arrangement, to settle the question of the equatorial launch site,
and to agree on measures for better financial control of ELDO’s programme.350
4.4 The reform of ELDO and the pleas to coordinate the space effort
The ELDO Ministerial conference reconvened for the third and last time on 7 and 8 July, 1966. A
number of extremely important decisions were taken, and were expressed in two major resolutions,
one concerning ELDO’s programmes and activities, the other concerning the co-ordination of
European space activities.351 The most important result of these negotiations was that the United
Kingdom dropped its threat to withdraw and agreed to participate in the funding of both ELDO A
and its upgrade. As a press release issued after the conference put it, all the Member States
had agreed to undertake, as from 1 January 1967, a  “reorientation” of the Initial Programme as well as
347 The Conference resolution is ELDO/CM(APR 66)17, 28 April 1966.
348 The Aide Mémoire is ELDO/CM(June 66) 12, 3 June 1966.
349 See the Minutes of the first meeting of the resumed Ministerial Conference, ELDO/CM(June 66)PV/1,
9 June 1966.
350 The minutes of these meetings are ELDO/CM(June 66)PV/2, 15 June 1966 and ELDO/CM(June 66)
PV/3, 16 June 1966. The Confidential Resolution taken is ELDO/CM(June 66) 16, 10 June 1966.
351 The minutes of these meetings are ELDO/CM(July 66)PV/1 and PV/2 for the 7 July 1966, PV/3 and PV/4
for the 8 July 1966. The resolutions passed are documents ELDO/CM(July 66)16 and 17, 8 July 1966.
Their contents are summarised in a Press Release, ELDO/CM(July 66)18, 8 July 1966.
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“a supplementary programme” involving the development of ELDO A fitted with a perigee/apogee
system (PAS) able to put 150 kg in a geostationary orbit, of inertial guidance and of an equatorial
launch base. Two major concessions were made to Britain in return for this act of solidarity. Firstly,
the scale of contributions was reorganised in her favour (see Table 4-1), Italy only accepting her
increased burden on condition that she was given prime responsibility for the apogee stage. Secondly,
to ensure better financial control over the programme, global and annual ceilings for 1967 to 1971
were imposed on the programme. The overall ceiling for expenditure from 1967 onwards was set at
331 MAU, which brought the total cost of the programme to 626 MAU. This was about £225 million
or three times the original estimate made at Lancaster House in 1961. In an attempt to ensure suitable
returns to the participants, the Ministers also agreed that each partner should receive industrial work
corresponding to not less than 80% of its financial contribution.
Table 4-1. Redistribution of the ELDO financial load between its Member States agreed
at the ELDO Ministerial Conference in July 1966
Country Original % % as from 1/67
FR Germany   22.01% 27%
France   23.93% 25%
Italy     9.78% 12%
U Kingdom   38.79% 27%
Belgium     2.85%




The decision to adopt Kourou as the European equatorial launch base was also confirmed. Italy was
relatively reconciled to the rejection of its offer of the San Marco platform. The Australians, by
contrast were extremely angry about the refusal to use Darwin. They went out of their way to make the
offer technically and financially attractive and felt that they were not given a fair hearing. In June they
made what the Secretariat deemed “a very fierce, somewhat bitter and […] unfair criticism” of its
presentation of the three candidates, believing that the arguments against Darwin were biased. In July
Senator Henty accepted the loss with dignity after a “most exhaustive and interesting discussion”.352
France, for its part, accepted prime responsibility for the construction of the base in Guyana,
guaranteed free access to it, and proposed that the ELDO states contribute 25 MAU inclusive of
contingencies to setting it up.353 Woomera, as we mentioned earlier, would remain in use for
development rather than operational launchings.
Britain’s argument that there was no market for ELDO A, and its attempt to withdraw on those
grounds, boomeranged. With France having agreed to buy two ELDO As and its insistence that there
was an important market for ELDO’s rockets, the Ministers agreed that from henceforth the
organisation should not only develop and construct “prototype” launchers, but should also produce
“ready-for-use vehicles and launch [..] them on behalf of users”. This went along with a demand that
ELDO’s programme management methods and its organisation be reviewed and perfected. Of course
measures were also taken to discourage a producer state from withdrawing and, in any event, to ensure
that it continued to make available the facilities needed to build its part of the rocket. Britain thus
found herself trapped into an ongoing commitment to build Blue Streak and to play a role in ELDO
despite her doubts and hesitations about its viability. The Ministers were now also quite emphatic that
steps had to be taken to coordinate the European space effort. The Belgian Prime Minister himself
attended  the  meeting to  draw  attention  to the  importance  he attached  to  this  matter.  He  stressed
352 ELDO/CM(July 66)PV/2, 7 July 1966 for the quote by Henty and Annex II for the Secretariat’s
complaint.
353 There was an extremely unpleasant exchange six months later when the French delegation insisted that
this figure did not include contingencies related to changes in economic conditions,
ELDO/CM(December 66) PV/1, 14 December 1966.
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the lack of coordination.  The ELDO PAS launcher  was being developed  “without knowing whether
a European communications satellite will be built and whether we [i.e. Belgium] will have a share in
its construction”. He pointed to the unnecessary duplication of work. Vital components of the
experimental satellite designed to test the perigee/apogee system would not be reusable for a
telecommunications satellite. ELDO and ESRO were building independent tracking stations. He
remarked how difficult it was to distribute industrial contracts equitably between the partners when
one had three independent instead of one overall space programme. And he made it clear that Belgium
was not prepared to enter into further important financial commitments until the European space effort
was put on to a rational, coordinated basis.354 The Ministers meeting in July 1966 recognised that it
would be difficult to set up a single European space organisation immediately. Instead they decided,
first, that their conference, as then constituted, should take steps to transform itself into a standing
body meeting at least once a year, and open to representatives from ESRO and CETS in particular.
They also decided to establish a Committee of Alternates who would prepare their meetings and make
recommendations to them for a coordinated space programme. The Alternates would be advised by a
Study Committee whose task it would be to “examine the problem of amalgamating the existing
European space institutions”. The Ministers meeting in July also proposed that the Councils of ESRO,
ELDO and CETS should set up a Coordinating Committee with representatives from each. It would
meet at least every three months and its aim would be the “immediate coordination of the functioning
of the three bodies […]”.355 To give effect to this resolution, the Ministers decided to meet again on 13
and 14 December 1966. The first steps along the path to the re-orientation of ELDO and the
coordination of European space activities had been taken.
4.5 1966/1967: The European Space Conferences and the moves to coordinate
programmes
The December Ministerial conference got under way in a buoyant atmosphere. One month before, on
15 November 1966, the fifth launch of Europa I with two dummy upper stages had been a complete
success and plans were under way to commence the F6 firings with a live Coralie. The ELDO
Secretary General confirmed that the powers of control of the Secretariat had been strengthened by
appointing Project Management Directors for the ELDO A and ELDO PAS (i.e. Europa 1 and Europa
2) programmes. An international Industrial Integrating Group, as independent as possible of particular
national and industrial interests was being constituted to watch over the implementation of the
supplementary programme.356 And there seemed a genuine willingness to coordinate activities. In fact
the meeting on 13 December 1966 was attended by representatives of all the Member States of ELDO
and ESRO, and 97.4% of the Member States (by percentage contribution of course) of CETS. The first
day of the meeting thus inaugurated the European Space Conference. The second day was restricted to
a meeting of the Ministers of the ELDO Member States.
The most important decision taken by the Ministers, on the initiative of the Belgian Prime Minister,
was to set up an ad hoc group “to make a detailed inventory of the programmes, both international and
national with full details, technical and financial”, “and the policy behind them […]”. All the Member
States were to collaborate fully with this group, which was to put forward “broad proposals for a
programme and the means to assure real co-ordination and integration”. This idea was warmly
received. Max Mayer from Germany, for example, agreed that national programmes, “had not been
harmonised. There was a danger of parallel work and overlapping,” he said, and it was necessary “to
create a truly co-ordinated activity” in Europe. French Minister Peyrefitte was similarly positive. “It
was essential to introduce homogeneity”, he said, and “coherence into programmes having a certain
tendency to expand each along its own lines without regard for the others. […] hence the need for
jointly prepared and coordinated projects”. A resolution calling for the stocktaking of programmes was
354 ELDO/CM(July 66)PV/2, Annex I, 7 July 1966.
355 The Resolution, we repeat, is ELDO/CM(July 66)17, 8 July 1966.
356 The Secretary General’s report is ELDO/CM(Dec. 66)4, 6 December 1966.
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thus duly passed by the European Space Conference on 13 December and confirmed by the ELDO
Ministers the next day. Michel Bignier was asked to head the ad hoc group, and invited to submit his
report in time for the next Ministerial meeting six months hence.357
Two sources of conflict were simmering just beneath these fine sentiments. Firstly, there was the
balance to be struck between scientific research and applications within the coordinated European
space effort. And things were looking bad for science. French Minister Peyrefitte was emphatic that
space activities were important to his country by virtue of their “technological interest […] and by
reason of their practical utility”. “Research must go on”, said Peyrefitte, “but the governments were
forced to conclude that research was not the only interest possible, and they could not content
themselves with that alone: as soon as an application emerged its use must be envisaged. The scientists
must not be offended by this […]”, he added, in an attempt to reassure them.358 But the debates then
under way in ESRO gave one a foretaste of what this might mean. For the ESRO Executive and the
scientific community, already struggling to develop a viable programme with restricted resources, had
been dismayed to find that their Council refused to allow them to carry over 122 MFF of monies
unspent between 1964 and 1966 and, in December 1966, and had refused to vote the ceiling of
expenditure for the next three years. This was left to the ESRO Ministerial conference also scheduled
for July 1967.359 The second source of conflict was that of overlap between national and European
programmes. On the one hand, the CETS was planning a communications programme at the European
level. As A.E.K. Hartogh, the President of the CETS-Conference explained to Ministers, three months
before their Technical Planning Staff had suggested the development of a series of communications
satellites, which would include a television distribution satellite geared to European conditions and to
be launched by Europa 2. A draft agreement had been drawn up with ESRO who was requested, in
consultation with ELDO, to carry out a detailed study of a European experimental telecommunications
satellite programme.360
In parallel, and notwithstanding their expressed wish for coordination and the avoidance of
duplication, France, Germany and Italy all also wanted to develop a communications satellite of their
own. France wanted one to meet the need for links with the francophone parts of Africa. Germany was
developing a satellite for television transmissions from the Olympic Games scheduled in Munich in
1962. And Italy was insisting that the test satellite it was developing for the ELDO launcher should be
able to “carry out communication functions”, and should be able to provide data for the ESRO/CETS
studies on a European satellite. It was this situation that had led the Belgian Prime Minister to attend
the meeting personally and to demand co-ordination, expressing the “hope that it would be possible to
achieve a single communication satellite programme”. He was assured by France that there was “no
incompatibility” between the French national satellite and the CETS satellite. He was told by Germany
that “the fact of common activity did not exclude national programmes, equally the existence of
national programmes in no way meant a lack of loyalty to the international programmes”. Italy argued
that its aim was simply to ensure that “the technical content and possibilities of the European satellite
[were] not sacrificed”. Faced with this determination the Belgian Prime Minister could not but agree,
if only reluctantly, “that independence must be allowed to exist within European interdependence”,
leaving the subject to be pursued further “on a later occasion”.361 But the writing was on the wall.
When the Ministers next met in Rome from 11 to 13 July they took further steps towards coordinating
the European space effort. The report of the Bignier ad hoc group was presented to them. It identified
a number of gaps in the European programme.  There was,  for example,  no launcher foreseen to put a
357 The minutes of the first European Space Conference are CSE/CM(Dec. 66)PV 1, 13 December 1966, the
two Resolutions are CSE/CM(Dec. 66)5, 13 December 1966 and ELDO/CM (Dec. 66)6,
14 December 1966
358 In CSE/CM(Dec. 66)PV 1, 13 December 1966.
359 See Krige and Russo (1994) chapter 4.
360 See the remarks in CSE/CM(Dec. 66)PV 1, 13 December 1966.
361 The debate is Item 4 in ELDO/CM(December 66)PV/1, 14 December 1966.
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heavy payload for direct TV broadcasting in geostationary orbit, little progress had been made in the
field of applications, and very little had been done in the area of component reliability, which was an
essential requirement of the whole field of space technology. To overcome these deficiencies in the
short term, the Bignier panel suggested that studies to improve or develop new launchers be
undertaken, that all communications satellite programmes, including their ground station needs, be
“carefully co-ordinated”, and that special attention be given to an applied research programme for
scientific and application satellites. Most fundamentally though the ad hoc group insisted that the
European space effort lacked a long-term space plan and that the resources devoted to it were far too
limited in comparison with what was spent by the Superpowers. They suggested that the Ministers
thus consider a ten-year programme based on a main theme, e.g. the realisation of a direct television
broadcasting satellite capability including a related applied research programme. They also proposed
that the participating governments consider doubling their annual contributions to the space field from
its then current level of 0.05% of the European GNP to 0.1% of the GNP (or about $600 million) by
1970.362 To implement these proposals the Ministerial Conference set up a new Advisory Committee
on Programmes. Its Chairman was J. P. Causse, who was the Director of France’s Bretigny Space
Centre at the time. The committee was to include economic and financial experts nominated by the
Member States. Its task was to frame proposals and to establish priorities for a European space policy
with special reference to the building of improved communications satellites and the elaboration of a
“meaningful scientific programme concentrated on activities few in number but opening up new
prospects in the research area”. It was to come up with suggestions for a “balanced and co-ordinated
programme”, whose financial implications and economic impact were to be assessed. This was to be
presented to the next meeting of Ministers to be held in Bonn in 1968. Here the Ministers hoped to use
it to define the “medium and long term objectives of European space policy”.363
The Ministers also took the necessary measures to formally stabilise their existence and to bestow
their decisions with executive authority. They resolved that the European Space Conference would
become a permanent body meeting at Ministerial level at least once a year, and open to all Member
States of ESRO, ELDO and CETS. Its task would be “to elaborate a coordinated European space
policy and supervise its execution”. Decisions were to be taken unanimously and were to be binding
on all participating governments. The Committee of Alternates would prepare the meetings of the ESC
and the secretariat would be provided by the Coordinating Committee of the three space
organisations.364
Notwithstanding the steps taken towards a coordinated space effort, difficulties persisted in all sectors,
science, applications and launchers. Much to its disappointment, and in spite of pleas by the German
and British delegations, ESRO’s three-year ceiling was not voted, and it was not authorised to carry
over the unspent money from the previous triennial exercise. As for applications, the paralysing effects
of duplication in the key field of telecommunications were beginning to be felt. On 6 June 1967, a
month before the conference, France and Germany had formally agreed to halt their independent
communications satellites programmes and to build together Symphonie. This immediately impacted
on the CETS plans. The day before, on 5 June, CETS had received ESRO’s detailed proposals for a
possible European satellite for television distribution. It had also received the results of a report by the
European PTTs on the economic viability of European telecommunications satellites. It seemed clear
to CETS President Hartogh that, in the light of these reports and events, a European programme now
had to overcome a number of new hurdles. This was, firstly, for financial reasons. The economic study
had indicated that “European communications satellites for telephony and telegraphy alone would
not be  conomically  viable at present”,  while for television  distribution  “they  are  likely  to  become
362 For the Bignier report see CSE/CM(July 67)5, and CSE/CM(July 1967)16, 7 July 1967.
363 On the  Causse Committee see CSE/CM(July 67)14, 13 July 1967, CSE/CM(July 67)13, Resolution No.
4, 13 July 1967, and the Press Release emitted after the conference, CSE/CM(July 67), 22 (rev.1),
13 July 1967.
364 See Resolution no 4, CSE/CM(July 67)13(Final), 13 July 1967.
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profitable by the period 1970-1980”. The dampening effects of this conclusion were reinforced by the
“anxiety of some member countries to ensure that there shall be no duplication between the joint
project and other projects, in particular the ‘Symphonie’ project”. As a result CETS was likely to
support a programme involving only one, and not two satellite models, as the ESRO study had
proposed. It would also need to consider carefully the precise specification of the satellite to avoid
duplication and to make the best possible allowance for all countries to participate in its technological
development.365
The hesitations now plaguing the CETS distressed some of the delegations to the Rome Ministerial
conference. It was becoming clear that, technically and politically, the joint European communications
satellite risked being sabotaged by the centrifugal pull of national interests. The head of the Belgian
delegation, J. Spaey was quite explicit about this. “We wish to state quite clearly”, he said, “that our
preference is for ESRO to carry through without delay the programme presented by CETS with the
three principal European countries participating in all phases of the programme.” Going on to remark
that the design of Symphonie was very similar to the first phase of the CETS programme (CETS-A),
he wanted to be “very clearly informed” as to whether France and Germany were “willing to commit
themselves financially and industrially to the execution of the entire CETS programme in a framework
of European co-operation concurrently with their bilateral programme […]”. His fear was that
Symphonie would replace CETS-A, which would not only delay decisions on the complete
programme, but would also practically exclude a country like Belgium “from the very important first
stage of development of application families, which would place their industry at a disadvantage for
subsequent participation”.366
Belgium’s demands made little impact. German Minister Stoltenberg insisted that there was no need
for the CETS to postpone its decisions until national or bilateral projects had been defined. He hoped
rather that CETS would take the initiative and conclude its studies, so that other projects could be
“harmonised” with it. The Italians, on the other hand, were less discrete and seemed ready to jettison
the CETS programme altogether. Senator Rubinacci went on record as stating that his country was
interested in contributing to a joint programme “either through some form of participation in the
German/French bilateral programme or, which they would prefer, by further development of the PAS
satellite, which they were preparing for ELDO, and which could be improved to become the European
telecommunications satellite”. His statement was subsequently amended and all reference to direct
participation in the Symphonie project was removed.367 But the implication was clear: France,
Germany and Italy were not going to wait for the CETS to define jointly a European communications
satellite; the commercial stakes were too high for them to delay any longer —  or for their industries to
remain spectators while the requisite technologies were developed across the Atlantic.
The launcher programme, for its part, was moving to a new crisis. Firstly, it had suffered another
political setback. After a major Cabinet meeting on 2 May 1967 Prime Minister Harold Wilson
announced that the British Labour government would apply for full membership of the European
Community. On the 10 May the House of Commons endorsed this decision by an overwhelming
majority of 488 votes to 62. A week later the whole project shuddered to a halt. On 16 May General de
Gaulle vetoed the British application, announcing that the UK was not yet ready to join the Six.368 To
this political blow would soon be added a major technical setback. A few weeks after the Rome
conference, on 4 August 1967, firing F6/1 of Europa I took place with live first and second stages and
a dummy third stage. Coralie’s engines failed to ignite after separation. F6/2 four months later was
also a failure. This time Coralie failed to separate altogether from Blue Streak.369 1968 was to be
dramatic year for the European space effort.
365 Hartogh’s report is CSE/CM(July 67)8, 6 July 1967.
366 CSE/CM(July 67)PV/2, Annex I, 11 July 1967.
367 CSE/CM(July 67)PV/2, 11 July 1967, and PV/2 add.2, Request for amendment, 27 December 1967 and
PV/3, 12 July 1967.
368 Sked and Cook (1980), pp. 267-8.
369 Carlier and Gilli (1994), p. 109 and Morton (1989), p. 471.
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Chapter 5: 
Implementing ESRO's First Scientific Programme
A. Russo
The scientists who, in 1959-60, set up the first initiatives to create a European organisation for space
research had in mind the model of CERN. This was an example of a successful multinational
organisation of European countries dedicated to fundamental research in a field of science (high
energy elementary particle physics) where real progress could only be realised by big and expensive
technical equipment (large particle accelerators and detectors) that no individual country could build
by itself. Space research, however, is quite different from particle physics and if the CERN model
could still provide evidence that European cooperation in a highly sophisticated scientific and
technological domain could actually work, the institutional framework and the programme of the new
organisation were to be significantly different. A rapid discussion of the main differences between
these two examples of contemporary "big science" is useful to highlight the most significant aspects of
the story we are about to tell in this chapter.
The first difference lies in the organisation of the research work. In the case of particle physics, this is
arranged around a large accelerator and supported by the facilities of a large laboratory. The laboratory
and its "big machine" represent an intrinsic, stable and permanent component of the research
organisation, which sees different research groups sharing these facilities and alternating in
performing experiments. Space research, on the contrary, is conducted by means of scientific
instrumentation carried on board rockets or satellites and eventually destined to be lost with the
spacecraft. Space missions can be more or less sophisticated and long lasting, from a simple sounding
rocket to a complex space telescope, but each of them represents a definite and self-consistent
element, involving at one and the same time the definition of a scientific aim, the building of the
technical hardware, and the setting up of a specific managerial framework to link together scientific
groups, technical teams, industrial firms, launching facilities, tracking and data handling facilities.
The second main difference between particle physics and space science regards their content. The
former is a well defined research field, whose objectives and methods are continuously discussed and
re-defined by a strongly homogeneous and influential sector of the scientific community. Space
science, on the contrary, is defined by its technique rather than its objectives: it includes, in fact, any
kind of scientific investigation conducted by the use of rockets, Earth-orbiting satellites, and deep-
space probes. In terms of established scientific disciplines, it covers fields as different as atmospheric
physics and chemistry, ionospheric physics, geophysics, plasma physics, cosmic-ray physics, the
various branches of astronomy and astrophysics (solar, stellar and planetary; from radio wavelengths
up to the gamma-ray region of the electromagnetic spectrum), and even material sciences, biology and
medicine. Each of these disciplines and sub-disciplines is characterised by its own aims and methods,
by its own intellectual and institutional framework, by its own approach to the opportunities offered by
space technologies.
Finally, one must mention the different roles of particle physics and space science in the general
framework of national and international policies for scientific and technological development. Particle
physics is undoubtedly pure research, with very limited, if any, possibilities of practical applications.
Its large-scale development in the post-war period was mainly due to the prestige and influence that
this sector of the physics community enjoyed thanks to their wartime work. The fortunes of the field
depend not on the promises of economic profits or better human welfare but rather on the leading
influence this community exerts within scientific and political circles. It is quite different for space
research. In fact, the techniques that render this research possible, rockets and satellites, have evident
civil and military applications and their development largely depends on political choices based on
extra-scientific considerations.
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In two previous chapters, we have discussed the process which led to the definition of ESRO's first
scientific satellite programme. This chapter will deal with the implementation of ESRO's programme
in the "Auger years" (1964-1967). The scientists who contributed to this process, either in the capacity
as national delegates in official bodies or as experts in advisory committees, were not members of one
scientific community, with a well structured set of common cultural and professional values spread
across national borders. Their task was not choosing the best instrument or the most promising
experiment proposal within the framework of a shared disciplinary paradigm. They represented
instead various scientific and national interests, and were called to establish priorities and to make
choices between competing scientific disciplines and research programmes, between radically
alternative technical options, and between different national policies. They were not members of an
influential, international scientific elite who could confront the political decision-makers with the only
arguments of their research goals. They were rather advocates of a variegated set of old and new
scientific disciplines who had to negotiate among themselves and with national governments the place
and fortunes of these disciplines in the wider framework of space activities.
5.1 Preparing for the implementation of the scientific programme
5.1.1 The interim period
The Meyrin Agreement which created the COPERS came into force on 27 February 1961 and was due
to terminate one year later, when it was expected that the new ESRO Convention would have been
ready for signature by the Organisation's Member States. As early as July 1961, at the 4th meeting of
the STWG, it was decided to start an interim programme in order to lay the basis of the forthcoming
Organisation, in terms of personnel and technical facilities.370 In the event, due to delays in the
preparation of the Convention, the Meyrin Agreement was duly prolonged and the interim period
extended up to March 1964. In spring 1962, with the ending of the preliminary planning, the
preparation of the launching programme became the most urgent task and it became clear that a new
committee structure had to be defined for the interim period, modelled on that proposed for the
permanent ESRO. The STWG then decided to dissolve the 4 sub-groups which had helped work out
the Blue Book and to set up a Launching Programme Sub-Committee (LPSC) whose task was defined
as follows:
To propose the programme of payloads for sounding rockets and satellites to be
submitted to the Scientific and Technical Working Group (later to the Scientific
Committee which is expected to be set up by the Council of ESRO) for final approval. The
task of [the LPSC] will be to combine proposals for experiments into a programme of
integrated payloads, with tentative dates of firings and an indication of the ranges from
which the launchings will take place.371
Reimar Lüst was chosen as the chairman of the LPSC, whose first membership included Robert Boyd
and Odd Dahl, together with the Head of the Programmes and Facilities Division and the Finance
Officer of COPERS. Subsequently, the French physicist Jacques E. Blamont joined the membership of
the LPSC.372 To advise the LPSC in the consideration of the experiment proposals presented by
research groups, a number of ad hoc working groups was created, whose members were to be chosen
among European scientists expert in the different fields of space science (Tables 5-1a and 5-1b).373
370 STWG, 4th meeting (27-28 July 1961), COPERS/GTST/22, 17 May 1962. See also COPERS/33 (rev. 1),
29 November 1961.
371 STWG, 6th meeting (9 May 1962), COPERS/GTST/40, 17 May 1962, p. 2. See also COPERS/GTST/37,
30/40/62.
372 STWG, 7th meeting (29-30 October 1962), COPERS/GTST/61, 10 December 1962.
373 The membership of the ad hoc groups is given in the series of documents COPERS/LPSC/5, in particular
COPERS/LPSC/5 (rev. 2), 7 January 1963 and COPERS/LPSC/5 (rev. 3), 15 February 1964. For the
evolution of the working groups see: LPSC, 6th meeting (29 April 1963), COPERS/LPSC/84,
7 May 1963; STWG, 9th meeting (30-31 May 1963), COPERS/GTST/98, 20 June 1963; STWG, 10th
meeting (3-4 October 1963), COPERS/GTST/126, 29 October 1963.
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Finally, questionnaires concerning experiment proposals to be carried out with the first ESRO
sounding rockets and satellites were sent out by the COPERS Secretariat.374 The operational procedure
to start the first European co-operative effort in space research was thus initiated. By the Spring of
1963, 71 proposals for satellite and space probe experiments had been received and discussed by the
various working groups (Table 5-2). About 40 proposals were considered scientifically acceptable and
classified in three groups: those requiring simple non-stabilised satellites, those requiring some kind of
stabilisation of the spacecraft and those requiring a highly eccentric orbit satellite or a deep space
probe.375 By the same time, it was decided that the first Large Astronomical Satellites (LAS) of the
long term programme should be devoted to high resolution (1 Å) stellar spectroscopy in the UV range,
from the Lyman limit (912 Å) to about 3500 Å, on the basis of preliminary studies already performed
in Great Britain.376
Following the discussions in the ad hoc working groups, the LPSC recommended that the first ESRO
satellites should be two small non-stabilised satellites devoted to the study of the polar ionosphere and
to solar astronomy and cosmic rays respectively. These satellites were eventually called ESRO I and
ESRO II.377 A simple glance at Table 5-2 explains this choice: it satisfied the interests of the largest
fraction of the European space science community. The logic of numbers can be supplemented by the
consideration that physicists involved in the study of ionospheric and auroral phenomena represented
at that time the leading sector in the space science community, owing to their established experience in
rocket experiments in the framework of national programmes. Moreover, most experiment proposals
recommended by the ionospheric group did not require stabilisation and the group itself had suggested
an integrated payload containing experiments "for measurement of the ionising agents, corpuscular
and electromagnetic, as well as of the ionisations and excitations produced by those agents in the
upper atmosphere".378
As to the experiment proposals requiring stabilised satellites, the LPSC limited itself to a classification
according to the proposing group and to the kind of stabilisation required (i.e.: Earth pointing, Sun
pointing and stabilisation with respect to celestial co-ordinates). Subsequently, it was agreed to devote
the first stabilised satellite to non-solar astronomy experiments, thus satisfying the interests of the
second large sector of the astronomical community.379
Finally, the LPSC considered the proposals for highly eccentric orbit satellites (HEOS) and space
probes (SP). Both the group on interplanetary medium and the cosmic ray group had stressed the great
desirability for ESRO to have a spacecraft journeying very far away from the Earth as soon as
possible, and the LPSC invited the two groups to co-operate in order to define a good scientific
mission for such a spacecraft. At the same time, the LPSC requested that a technical study be made on
374 Letter of P. Auger, Executive Secretary of COPERS, 21 May 1962. The questionnaire for sounding
rocket experiments is COPERS/39, that for satellite experiments is COPERS/96. New versions of these
questionnaires were prepared in 1963 and 1964.
375 COPERS/LPSC/32, rev. 2, 7 May 1963. An earlier version of this document, COPERS/LPSC/32, rev. 1,
dated 21 January 1963, lists 67 experiment proposals with no classification. The terms "highly eccentric
orbit satellite" and "space probe" were used rather interchangeably in this phase. As a matter of fact, the
former is a satellite whose orbit is a highly eccentric ellipse with apogee of more than 50,000 km; a space
probe is a spacecraft injected into an escape orbit.
376 The story of the LAS will be discussed in detail in the following chapter and therefore will be dealt with
here only when necessary.
377 LPSC, 5th meeting (6-7 March 1963), COPERS/LPSC/70, 2 April 1963. See also COPERS/LPSC/80,
26 April 1963 and COPERS/GTST/82, rev. 1, 14 June 1963. In view of difficulties which arose in the
preparation of the payload for the polar ionospheric satellite, it was eventually agreed to launch first the
solar and cosmic ray satellite: LPSC, 7th meeting (26 August 1963), COPERS/LPSC/95, 30 August 1963.
ESRO II thus became the first satellite launched by ESRO.
378 Ad hoc group B, 5th meeting (14-15 February 1963), COPERS/LPSC/59, 8 March 1963, p. 9.
379 LPSC, 8th meeting (7-8 February 1964), COPERS/LPSC/123, 3 March 1964; first meeting of the Interim
LPSC (23 April 1964), ESRO/ST/14, 4 June 1964; second meeting of the Interim LPSC (30 July 1964),
ESRO/ST/60, 31 August 1964.
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possible orbits and the associated tracking and telemetry problems.380 Eventually, at its very last
meeting, the LPSC agreed to recommend that the first ESRO highly eccentric orbit satellite (HEOS A)
should be devoted to cosmic ray studies. It also recommended that a second HEOS or a space probe
should be launched one year later and that primary consideration should be given to studies of the
interplanetary medium.381 If we consider these first decisions and the work in progress on the LAS, we
see that, thanks to the work of the LPSC and its advisory groups, the first phase of ESRO's satellite
programme was reasonably well defined when the Organisation came into being, with a fair balance
among different scientific fields and technical options, and with about 20 research groups already
involved in the preparation of the experiments. This was in line with the programme presented in the
Blue Book and even though, owing to legal and financial reasons, the official life of ESRO was to start
two years later than originally foreseen, scientists could feel confident that their optimistic plans could
still be fulfilled.
5.1.2 ESRO's committees and advisory bodies
With the coming into force of the ESRO Convention, in March 1964, the STWG and the LPSC were
dissolved and replaced by the Scientific and Technical Committee (STC) and its Launching
Programme Advisory Committee (LPAC), respectively. The STC was made up of delegates from each
Member State, preferably "competent scientists and technologists", with the task of advising the
Council and ESRO's Director General on all scientific and technical matters affecting the work of the
Organisation. Among its terms of reference there was in particular:
a To recommend to the Council the scientific and technical programme of the
Organisation, having regard to the Organisation's financial and other resources, and
to keep under review the progress made in carrying out this programme.
b To examine proposals for space experiments and the composition of payloads, to
approve where appropriate, and to make recommendations to the Council or the
Director-General as appropriate regarding the timeliness and suitability of their
inclusion in launching programmes.382
R. Lüst and the Danish physicist B. Peters, from the Niels Bohr Institute in Copenhagen, were
unanimously elected chairman and vice-chairman of the STC.383
As to the LPAC, its terms of reference were defined as follows:
The Launching Programme Advisory Committee (LPAC) shall prepare the scientific and
technical programme of the Organisation for submission to the Scientific and Technical
Committee.  In particular,  the Committee shall combine proposals for space experiments
380 LPSC, 6th meeting (29 April 1963), COPERS/LPSC/84, 7 May 1963; 8th meeting (7-8 February 1964),
COPERS/LPSC/123, 3 March 1964.
381 Interim LPSC, 2nd meeting (20 July 1964), ESRO/ST/60, 31 August 1964.
382 Meeting of the Interim Scientific and Technical Working Group, 25-26 May 1964, ESRO/ST/32,
11 June 1964, p. 1-2. Document ESRO/ST/12, 6 May 1964, contains the terms of reference proposed by
ESRO's Secretariat that were eventually amended at the meeting. The most important differences are that
the initial proposal considered that the STC should be composed of one delegate per Member State and
that it should advise only the Council and not the Director General. At the meeting there was some
discussion as to whether one or two delegates would be preferable and the matter was put to the vote:
Sweden, Belgium, Spain and the United Kingdom voted in favour of two delegates and the other
delegations abstained. Eventually, the Council decided that the number of delegates should not be limited.
Council, 2nd session (15-17 June 1964), ESRO/C/MIN/2, 8 July 1964. Other tasks of the STC included to
advising on technical facilities and on the recruitment of staff, and advising on the Organisation's
educational activities and co-operation with non-Member States.
383 STC, 1st meeting (10-11 September 1964), ESRO/ST/MIN/1, 14 October 1964.
125
into a programme of integrated payloads for sounding rockets, satellites and space
probes. It shall also propose tentative dates of firings and indicate ranges from which the
launchings will take place. In its work the LPAC shall take into account the financial,
technical and scientific resources of the Organisation.384
The membership of the LPAC consisted of four (eventually five) scientists nominated by the STC who
were to be elected for a period of two years and were eligible for re-election. The initial membership
included Lüst (chairman), Boyd, Blamont and Cornelis de Jager (Table 5-3). Also carried over from
the COPERS was the system of ad hoc working groups called to assist the LPAC in its consideration
of the experiment proposals. The groups were identified by easily recognisable acronyms and their
chairmen were appointed by the STC; their members were to be co-opted by the chairmen as experts
(Table 5-4). The chairmen of the ad hoc groups were generally invited to the meetings of the LPAC,
together with other persons such as the chairman and vice-chairman of the STC, the chairman of the
Administrative and Finance Committee (AFC) and some members of the ESRO staff. Eventually, the
LPAC decided that the number of members of a scientific working group should be between 9 and 12
and one third of the members should be replaced every year. The chairmen should act for a period of
three years and they could not be members of the LPAC at the same time.385
5.1.3 Scientists and ESRO
The standard procedure to get an experiment included in one of ESRO's satellites provided that
experiment proposals be presented by European scientific groups or individual scientists and discussed
by the interested ad hoc group(s). If recommended from the scientific point of view, the proposal was
then submitted to the LPAC for eventual inclusion in a satellite payload, according to the agreed
scientific programme and scientific mission of the satellite. In this phase, ESTEC engineers, in
consultation with the proponents, were called to assess the various experiment proposals and their
compatibility with each other and with the spacecraft from the technical point of view. Finally, the
LPAC combined the various experiments into integrated payloads which were presented to the STC
and then to the Council for final approval. The system thus worked along two lines: on the one hand,
the STC and the LPAC discussed and approved, at political and scientific level respectively, the
overall programme of the Organisation and the scientific missions of its satellites, within the financial
limits imposed by the Council; on the other hand, the scientific community at large suggested
scientific objectives and specific experiments in the various fields of space research.
The LPAC represented the place where the two lines converged and where a suitable compromise had
to be worked out between the expectations of the scientific community and the political and economic
constraints of ESRO's agreed policy. The members of the LPAC were at one and the same time
scientists and scientific policymakers: representatives of the interests of the scientific community and
guarantors of the technical and financial feasibility of the proposed experiments within the framework
of ESRO's programme; authoritative spokesmen of national scientific communities and research fields
and persons responsible for making choices on behalf of purely scientific interests in a multi-national,
multi-disciplinary organisation; strong personalities called to mediate between competing political,
economic and scientific interests.
Above the LPAC, the STC was called to discuss and to recommend to the Council the overall
scientific policy of the  Organisation.  This  regarded  the launching programme and other matters such
384 STC, 1st meeting (10-11 September 1964), ESRO/ST/MIN/1, 14 October 1964, p. 2. Also ESRO/C/75,
13 November 1964. LPAC, 1st meeting (6 November 1964), ESRO/ST/80, 20 November 1964.
385 LPAC, 9th meeting (18 October 1965), ESRO/ST/154, 9 November 1965. The functions of the ad hoc
working groups are described in ESRO/ST/40, 17 July 1964, with rev. 1 (26 August 1964) and rev. 2
(18 December 1964). The initial membership of the groups is in ESRO/ST/88, 9 December 1964. A
partial renewal of the membership was approved at the 10th meeting of the LPAC (13 December 1965),
ESRO/ST/168, 4 January 1966. In ESRO's annual General Reports one can find the membership of all
ESRO's official bodies and advisory committees.
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as the applied research programme; the technical facilities required for the integration, engineering and
testing of rockets and satellites, for the launching operations and for tracking and data handling; the
research programmes of ESLAB and ESRIN; the relationship of ESRO with national space agencies in
the Member States and with NASA. In its membership, the essential tension between the members
states' different interests, represented by the debates between national delegations, was interlaced with
the several aspects of competition and cooperation between the different sectors of the space science
community, expressed by the scientists present as delegates or advisers.
Under the LPAC, the discussions within the various ad hoc groups reflected the great variety of the
scientific community interested in space research. For those scientists, the use of space technologies
represented a new exciting frontier of experimental research. By sending instruments to the outer limit
of the atmosphere and beyond it became possible to study a wide range of otherwise inaccessible
phenomena such as the structure and properties of the ionosphere, the ultraviolet and X-ray
components in the solar and stellar radiation, the structure of the Earth's magnetic field and its
interaction with the interplanetary plasma, the primary cosmic radiation, the solar wind and the Sun-
Earth relationship, the structure of the moon and of the other planets in the solar system.
In order to understand the evolving debates within ESRO's committees and advisory groups, it may be
useful to discuss a few aspects of the internal dynamics of this variegated scientific community. A first
dividing line can be drawn between the disciplines interested in the Earth's space environment and the
Sun-Earth relationship and those interested in the study of celestial bodies (roughly speaking:
geophysics and astrophysics). The most important research field in the first group concerns the study
of the ionosphere and the magnetosphere, and their modulation under the influence of the solar
radiation. The introduction of rockets and satellites made it possible to study in situ these phenomena,
thus changing dramatically the shape of this discipline which became the first research field to come
of age in space science. The use of satellites in this field required relatively small and simple
spacecraft and one can easily understand the important role played in ESRO by the ION ad hoc group
and by its influential chairman (and then LPAC member) Bengt Hultqvist.
Another important group of research fields was the domain of astronomers, a far from homogeneous
community, however, as their partition into three different ad hoc groups reveals. In this domain, the
availability of space technology had opened up two new perspectives: the possibility to study the
moon and the planets at close range (planetary science), and the possibility to study electromagnetic
radiation from celestial bodies in spectral regions where it is prevented from reaching the Earth's
surface by atmospheric absorption, in particular UV and X-radiation (solar physics and astrophysics).
While it appeared quite difficult for Europe to compete in the former field, in view of the vigorous
programmes pursued by the two superpowers, the possibility to enter the fascinating field of UV
astronomy was an obvious call for European astronomers, both those interested in solar physics,
among whom the chairman of the SUN group and (LPAC member) Cornelis (Kees) de Jager was a
recognised world spokesman, and those interested in stars. On the other hand, owing to the kind of
detectors involved, X-ray and gamma-ray astronomy fell more into the competence of cosmic ray
physicists.
By the early 1960s, cosmic ray physics was at a turning point. For about three decades the study of
cosmic ray phenomena had been the experimental ground for the investigation of high energy particle
interactions. The building of large accelerators in the 1950s had now shifted particle physicists to the
new laboratory facilities and the interest in cosmic rays developed more and more in relation with
other celestial phenomena. Here too a significant transformation was taking place. At the beginning of
the space age, in fact, cosmic ray physics could be included in the domain of space geophysics.
Cosmic ray physicists investigated the solar wind and its interaction with the Earth's magnetic field
and measured the composition and energy spectrum of non solar particles in the vicinity of the Earth.
Being charged, these particles are affected by interstellar magnetic fields and reach our planet having
lost any memory about the position of the source. The emergence of the new fields of X-ray and
gamma-ray astronomy, which required detecting techniques drawn from experimental physics, opened
the domain of astrophysical research to cosmic ray physicists (high energy astrophysics). X rays and
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gamma rays, in fact, propagate along straight lines from the sources and their investigation provides
direct information on high energy processes in celestial bodies.386 In this situation of rapid evolution of
the discipline, which placed itself in a domain overlapping both geophysics and astrophysics, it is not
surprising that the COS Group became one of the most dynamic and successful. Its first chairman was
one of the most important pioneers of cosmic ray physicist in Europe, the Italian Giuseppe (Beppo)
Occhialini, who eventually was co-opted in the LPAC.387
5.2 The sounding rocket programme388
A significant aspect of the scientific programme described in the Blue Book, is the important role
played in it by the sounding rocket programme. Whatever doubts some may have had about their
value, the fact remains that there was a strong demand for them in Europe. According the Blue Book, a
survey undertaken early in 1960 revealed that there were about 55 groups comprising some 300
qualified scientists interested in doing space research. They proposed about 150 groups of experiments
for ESRO's initial programme, no less than half of them with sounding rockets (and the remainder
with satellites and probes).
Several factors accounted for this strong interest. First was the lack of homogeneity of the "discipline"
of space science. As L. Hulthén, the chairman of the STWG, pointed out to the second session of the
COPERS, "space research was not a well-defined discipline, like nuclear physics or organic chemistry.
[...] In terms of well established sciences, it covered practically all astronomy and branches of physics
and chemistry, e.g. geophysics, upper atmosphere physics and chemistry, cosmic radiation physics".389
By launching a large number of sounding rockets one could hope to cover large sections of the field at
relatively low cost, adding to rocket research already under development in several European
countries.
Then there was the fact that the rockets provided a hedge against disappointments in the satellite
programme, a programme in which competition was intense and lead times were long. Individual
researchers, small groups or graduate students might have to wait years before actually getting a
scientific experiment flown on a satellite. They were more or less assured results within one or a few
years on a sounding rocket.390 The relative inexperience of the European space science community was
another argument in favour of sounding rockets. No less than 40 of the 55 groups surveyed had no
flight experience, and were either already planning experiments or simply hoping to enter the field.
Sounding rockets provided a useful means for novices to cut their teeth in the new, challenging
domain. Finally, sounding rockets were of particular interest to groups in some of the smaller
countries with relatively low budgets for space research. They enabled scientists in those countries to
participate alongside their colleagues from Britain and France who had well developed national space
programmes, and who had the experience and the resources required to fly also the (technically) more
sophisticated and expensive satellite experiments.391
The first sounding rockets were launched under the auspices of ESRO from the Salto di Quirra range
in Sardinia on 6 and 8 July 1964. In both cases a boosted (British) Skylark rocket carried a canister
which  released  barium  and  ammonia "clouds" into the ionosphere.  The experimental packages were
386 For the origin and early evolution X-ray astronomy see Hirsch (1983).
387 On Occhialini see Russo (1996).
388 This section is essentially based on ESRO Annual Reports, and on Eaton (1989), Jaenschke (1971), and
Rocket (1967).
389 COPERS, 2nd session (17-18 May 1961), 25 May 1961, p. 2.
390 This point was stressed in Hultqvist (1967).
391 Massey and Robins (1986), p. 121, have stressed the importance of sounding rockets for "small" countries
during the negotiations for the definition of the scientific programme.
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provided by researchers from the Institut d'Astrophysique in Liège and the Max-Planck-Institut für
Extraterrestrische Physik in Garching. One other launch, somewhat less successful, was carried out
that year. A (French) Centaure rocket was launched from the Ile du Levant on 30 October 1964 but no
useful data were obtained as the scientific instruments failed. The first launches from ESRANGE took
place in November 1966 and their number increased rapidly. Indeed when the sounding rocket
programme was terminated in 1972 about half of all launches had been made from Kiruna. Other
frequently used ranges were the Italian base in Sardinia and the Norwegian base in Andøya.
The number of launches carried out annually climbed gradually during the following years
(Table 5-5). The figures for 1966 are somewhat misleading as they include nine launches made during
a special solar eclipse campaign at Karystos on the Greek island of Euboea. Seven rockets, two
Centaures and five (American) Arcas were launched within a narrow time window centred on the total
eclipse of the Sun, while one Centaure and one Arcas were launched a few days earlier. The French
Centaure and British Skylark rockets were the workhorses of the programme, supplemented by the
American Arcas (Table 5-6). It is noteworthy that the size and length of the payload sections
(i.e. excluding the rocket itself) increased considerably during this period. The first Skylark and
Centaure payloads weighed 140 kg and 40 kg respectively and their lengths were 2.7 m and 1.2 m.
During the course of the programme these parameters increased to maximum weights of 310 kg and
lengths of 5.55 m. In fact each payload generally included more than one experiment, with the
exception of the larger and more complicated astronomical experiments.
Of the 168 launches carried out between 1964 and 1972 about half were dedicated to ionospheric and
auroral studies and about a quarter to atmospheric physics. Solar, stellar and gamma-ray studies were
made in about 20 % of the launches. It was general ESRO practice to have duplicate launchings of
each payload, but for the much more expensive pointing rockets only single payloads were built. At
the other extreme, some experiments were launched as many as 25 times. With an average of over
three experiments for each payload ESRO's sounding rocket programme provided a service to over 40
scientific groups from the various Member States. British and German scientists were the most
conspicuous users, contributing about two-thirds of there experiments launched. By contrast there
were surprisingly few experiments from French groups, their number being roughly the same as those
from Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden. Italy was almost completely absent.
These figures, when compared with those foreseen in the Blue Book (Table 2-1), suggest that there
was a large gap between planned and actual annual launch rates. The gap, however, is much lower
than this evidence would imply; in fact the ESRO sounding rocket programme did not fall that short of
earlier expectations. The original figures in the Blue Book, it will be remembered, refer to "standard"
launchings of a 50 kg payload to an altitude of 150 km. As we have seen, from the very beginning the
average capability of ESRO rockets was better than this and kept increasing in the course of the
programme's implementation. The payloads became increasingly heavy and complicated both
technically and organisationally, the scientists increasingly calling for stabilisation, attitude control,
and payload recovery.
This is not to say that the programme did not suffer from difficulties and setbacks. There were teething
troubles with the rockets at the beginning, notably the French Centaures and Dragons. These caused
some experiments to be postponed and others to be abandoned. There were budgetary difficulties due
to the fact that no additional funds were made available when the greater complexity of approved
payloads called for increased expenditure on facilities and launching services provided by ESRO.
There were staff problems. The failure to recruit personnel at ESTEC for payload assembly caused
delays and more payloads than expected had to be contracted out to industry. ESRANGE imposed
constraints of its own. Besides the severe climatic conditions on a site well beyond the Arctic Circle,
the ionospheric and auroral phenomena studied there occurred seldom and were frequently of short
duration. Launch windows were correspondingly narrow, and were sometimes missed altogether.
Prevailing wind directions and the limited size of the range meant that a firing could not take place for
fear that the rocket would be dragged out of the allowed impact area. Nature, too, did not always
behave as was hoped. In 1968 eleven rockets were set aside for a polar cap absorption campaign at
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Kiruna. It did not take place because no solar proton event of sufficient magnitude occurred during the
two months allocated for the programme. In short, the sounding rocket programme combined the
pleasure of risk with the frustration of opportunities missed, the exhilaration of success with the
disappointment of failure.
The sounding rocket programme, and in particular the early launching campaigns, played an important
part in the life of the young ESRO. They provided opportunities for scientific research during the long
waiting period until the first satellites were orbited, and established a nucleus around which a
European space science community could grow and accumulate technical know-how. The very nature
of the work at the time generated durable bonds of comradeship and solidarity. These campaigns were
adventures, and those who took part in them still recount with pleasure the many unforgettable
experiences that they had - from shovelling cow-dung out of a casamatta in Sardinia to prepare a
"clean room" for developing film, to banqueting on the fish that took the place of a lost payload in the
hold of the boat sent out to recover it! This was the world of "little science", with relatively small
budgets, relatively short delays from payload approval to launch, and with that sense of involvement
which came from people having hands-on experience of the design, construction, test and launch of
flight hardware. Add to this the romance of experiencing a solar eclipse on a remote Greek island, and
the closeness that comes from spending long nights together waiting for appropriate launch conditions
at Kiruna, and one has all the ingredients for building a community tied together by strong bonds of
professional and personal allegiance. Their spirit of companionship was heightened by the feeling that
they were the underdogs in an organisation with far greater ambitions, and that theirs was a vanishing
world which would sooner or later have to yield to the anonymous rationality of large and complex
technological projects. Indeed as sounding rockets became increasingly sophisticated, as failure
became more costly, scientifically, financially, and personally, so were the risks reduced. But at a
price. Sounding rocket activity was institutionalised, and its pioneers looked back with nostalgia on
those early days in which, together, they had laid the foundations of ESRO's space science community.
5.3 The revision of the 8-year satellite programme
The first problem the LPAC had to deal with was the revision of the eight-year programme in the light
of information acquired since the writing of the Blue Book. This was a difficult exercise, which
brought into evidence the several problems and contradictions which affected the early development
of ESRO as regards both its financial conditions and its scientific constituency.
As discussed in a previous chapter, the programme approved by COPERS foresaw that most of
ESRO's satellites were to be launched by Scout rockets (Table 2-1). Subsequent discussions among
scientists, however, indicated an increasing interest in more sophisticated satellites than could be
launched by the Scout vehicle. In particular, considerable interest was expressed in the use of the Thor
Delta as a satellite launcher, capable of launching larger and stabilised spacecraft. As a consequence,
in the Summer of 1963, the COPERS Secretariat was requested to make proposals for a possible
programme based on a larger fraction of satellites and space probes of the Thor Delta (TD) type.392 In
the new proposal, the number of satellites to be launched was reduced to 14, namely 4 Scout-type
satellites, 4 TD-type satellites, 4 highly eccentric orbit satellites or space probes, and 2 large satellites.
The total expenditure, budgeted over ten years, was estimated at 852 MFF, i.e. about 16 % higher than
in the Blue Book. The cost breakdown was radically different, however, as the costs for launchers and
launch operations was now estimated at 317 MFF, including 11 backup launchings, while the
expenditure on spacecraft development had risen to 535 MFF. A warning was added, however:
By their very nature the above estimates are inexact since so far no technical studies have
been conducted which will give more reliable figures. 393
392 STWG, 9th meeting (30-31 May 1963), COPERS/GTST/98, 20 June 1963. See also, for the financial
implications of using different launch vehicles, COPERS/GTST/91, 15 May 1963.
393 COPERS/GTST/116, 3 September 1963, p. 6; COPERS/GTST/117, 27 September 191963.
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Some COPERS delegations, however, considered that the new operational programme and its
budgetary version were rather optimistic and therefore they agreed to the proposal only for the first
year of ESRO (1964). This year's budget was to be prepared accordingly, while the budget proposals
for the two following years were to be considered only as a planning exercise.394
5.3.1 The LPAC plays its role
It was now up to the LPAC to discuss a sound scientific programme fitting this operational programme
and to make a recommendation to the STC.395 A "lengthy discussion" on this topic started at the
second meeting of the LPAC, in November 1964, and continued in the following three months.
Eventually, definite conclusions were reached at an informal LPAC meeting, on 25 February 1965,
and presented to the STC (Table 5-7).396 The first decision regarded the Scout-type satellites: on the
basis of new information about the cost of the Scout and Thor Delta launchers, it was recognised that
the latter was definitely to be preferred because of the lower cost per kilogram of payload. Therefore it
was agreed not to start any further project of this type after ESRO I and ESRO II, both scheduled for
launching in 1967. This freed resources for the TD-type satellites and, in fact, it was recommended to
increase their number to six, on the assumption that they should be based on a common basic structure
and stabilisation system (the so-called "streetcar" concept). The scientific missions of the first four
payloads were also agreed as follows:
• TD-1, stellar astronomy
• TD-2, solar astronomy
• TD-3, ionospheric studies
• TD-4, atmospheric studies
It was assumed that the solar satellite TD-2 and the ionospheric satellite TD-3 were to be launched in
time for the solar maximum in 1968/69 in order to study the relation between solar activity and
ionospheric phenomena.
The new policy in favour of the Thor Delta launcher also affected the programme of highly eccentric
orbit satellites. In fact, it was recommended that they too should all be launched by Thor Delta rockets
into orbits extending out to 200,000 km (i.e. outside the magnetosphere) and that the telemetry
network would be worked out on this basis. As to the scientific missions of this kind of satellites,
following the first HEOS devoted to cosmic ray studies, it was agreed to devote the second to
experiment proposals from the PLA group and the third to ionospheric studies. No choice was yet
made for the fourth.
Finally, regarding the major projects, three large astronomical satellites (LASs) were proposed, the last
to be launched in the 9th year. Preliminary studies for the second major project were also under way, in
particular on the feasibility of a fly-by mission to a comet and on a large solar satellite proposed by the
SUN group. It was underlined, however, that "the necessary delays caused by the initial studies may
394 COPERS, 12th session (30-31 October 1963), COPERS/MIN/12, 15 November 1963.
395 In November 1964, the ESRO Council officially asked the LPAC to review the 8-year programme and to
submit its proposal to the STC and the Council itself: Council, 5th session (25-26 November 1964),
ESRO/C/MIN/5, 11 January 1965.
396 LPAC, 2nd meeting (24 November 1964), ESRO/ST/89, 18 December 1964. The February 1965 meeting
was intended to be the fifth meeting of the LPAC, but as only two members of the Committee could
attend (Lüst and Boyd), together with members of the ESRO Secretariat, it was not considered a formal
LPAC meeting. The report on this meeting is in ESRO/ST/114, 16 March 1965. The conclusions were
presented in the report of the LPAC chairman to the 4th meeting of the STC: ESRO/ST/109,
3 March 1965.
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result in the launching of [the cometary] mission outside the 8-year period", while the solar satellite
"might, if accepted, be able to use the same basic vehicle as the LAS series".397
The expenditure estimate for this satellite programme was at 455 MFF for spacecraft development and
225 MFF for launchings, both figures at 1962 prices. An additional amount of about 40 to 50 MF was
to be added for the realisation of a deep space telemetry network. The total cost of the programme thus
remained within the estimate in the Blue Book. It is remarkable, however, that in the three years since
the writing of the Blue Book, the cost estimate for spacecraft development had doubled while the cost
of launchings had been halved only because all backup launchings were dropped. On the one hand,
this reflected the fact that now a larger number of more complex spacecraft were foreseen; on the
other hand, the total number of satellites had also been reduced from 17 to 15 and industrial
development work had actually started only for ESRO I and ESRO II, therefore any cost estimate for
the other projects still suffered from a large margin of uncertainty.
5.3.2 The STC fails to reach agreement on the LPAC'S recommendations
When the LPAC's conclusions were presented to the STC, the chairman of the LPAC felt it necessary
to put forward "a word of explanation [...] regarding the distribution of funds between the various
projects":
The policy has been to maintain a fair distribution in the scientific programme between
the various fields of activity in space science. [...] In these various fields the cost of
making worth-while observations varies considerably.398
Observations in the atmosphere and lower ionosphere could be made by relatively inexpensive
rockets, Lüst argued, whereas a good astronomical programme required very expensive large satellites
with high pointing accuracy and stability. Therefore, the attempt to keep a fair balance in scientific
effort over the various fields of space science resulted in a disproportion in the distribution of money
over the programme. He then concluded:
Any apparent excess in emphasis towards astronomy does not, in fact, mean that more
astronomical observations are being done, but follows from the fact that astronomical
observations require very expensive instruments if they are to be done at all.
This argument, however, did not convince some members of the STC. Hultqvist, in particular, who
was a Swedish delegate besides being the chairman of the ION group, argued that the balance of
experiments was unfair since the proposed programme gave astronomers a much larger share in
satellite space than what would be suggested on the basis of the interest of European scientists in the
various disciplines of space science. According to him, satellite space appeared to be divided about
fifty-fifty between astrophysical experiments and geophysical experiments, while:
Of the total number of satellite experiments proposed (about 83 at present), those
disciplines represented by the SUN and STAR groups submitted 24 % of experiments,
whereas those represented by the groups such as ION and COS submitted 66 %.399
397 ESRO/ST/109, cit., p. 4.
398 Report of the chairman of the LPAC to the 4th meeting of the STC, ESRO/ST/109, 3 March 1965, p. 2.
Lüst, in fact, was the chairman of both the LPAC and the STC. However, he could not attend the STC
meeting and the document was presented there by the Scientific Director of ESRO: STC, 4th meeting (10-
11 March 1965), ESRO/ST/MIN/4, 3 May 1965.
399 STC, 4th meeting (10-11 March 1965), ESRO/ST/MIN/4, 3 May 1965, p. 2. Remark that cosmic ray
studies were included by Hultqvist in the category of geophysical investigations because at that time they
involved mainly the analysis of the solar wind and of the cosmic corpuscular radiation in the near Earth
environment.
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Hultqvist's arguments represented here more the opinions of the ION group than those of the Swedish
Delegation. The former, in fact, had already claimed that "the proposed allocation [by the LPAC] of
spacecraft to ionospheric and magnetospheric studies is totally inadequate to the needs". As an
alternative, the ION group proposed a "minimum programme" consisting of no fewer than 11
spacecraft of different kind in order to deal with the various scientific problems in the field and to
match the capacity of the scientific groups proposing experiments.400 On the other hand, the other
member of the Swedish Delegation, Y. Ohman, a veteran astrophysicist, underlined the need of
pursuing most experiments in the astronomical field in order to gain experience before starting major
projects. Astronomers, continued Ohman, "have been slow to see the advantages of space science",
and they should not be discouraged, should the division of the programme be changed.401
Beyond the statistics, Hultqvist's arguments against the LPAC's proposed programme raised a question
of scientific policy, namely whether to prefer a large number of small, non-stabilised multi-experiment
satellites or a smaller number of large, stabilised observatory-like satellites. The first option was
suitable for the study of the environment of the vehicle itself, i.e. the particles and fields present in the
regions of space visited by spacecraft; the second was that of interest for astronomical and
astrophysical studies, namely the study of distant objects. Connected to this question was the main
controversial issue raised at the meeting, namely the idea of using streetcar-type satellites for the TD
series. Several delegations, notably the French and the German, considered that a streetcar satellite
would have serious scientific limitations which would not be counterbalanced by financial and
technical advantages. The reasons were explained by the president of the French Centre National
d'Etudes Spatiales (CNES), Jean Coulomb, in a document prepared for the following Council session:
There is no justification for the development of a "standard", or "omnibus" or "tramway"
vehicle for the Thor Delta satellites. If that method can provide good results in the USA
for OSO [Orbiting Solar Observatory], OGO [Orbiting Geophysical Observatory] and
POGO [Polar Orbit Geophysical Observatory] satellites, it is essentially because the
experiments grouped in each type of satellite are of the same character and the satellites
therefore carry out fairly similar experimental programmes; there is justification in this
case for planning a vehicle in which the various scientific experiments can easily be
accommodated. On the contrary, the ESRO Thor Delta series will include one solar, one
stellar, one ionospheric and one geodetic satellite, and the experiments will be very
different. It is in fact planned to develop a vehicle having the combined capacities of OSO
and OGO, with severe limitations in size and weight. It is difficult to see how that can be
done without introducing considerable limitations in the vehicle experimental
programmes. There would be such great problems of adaptation that the final cost of the
four vehicles may well be greater than that of the four ad hoc vehicles.402
Here again, behind the technical and financial uncertainties of the streetcar concept, an important issue
of scientific policy was also involved, namely whether to base ESRO's programme mainly on the
realisation of a number of specially designed satellites, in order to meet the requirements of very
different scientific objectives, or to design a standard vehicle whose specifications (mechanical and
electrical interfaces, attitude control, power, telemetry system, etc.) had to be met by the set of
scientific experiments included in the payload. Obviously, these specifications were not "neutral" with
respect to the kind of scientific mission the series of satellites was mainly called to accomplish: as the
American case demonstrated, a geophysics standard satellite could be very different from an
astrophysics standard satellite. Space scientists in the United States could benefit from the bonanza of
400 SCI/WP/12, 25 January 1965, p.1. See also Hultqvist's remarks at the 4th meeting of the LPAC
(1 February 1965), ESRO/ST/106, 17 February 1965, p. 5.
401 ESRO/ST/MIN/4, cit., p. 3, 4.
402 ESRO/C/114, 24 March 1965, p. 2. To Coulomb's list of American standard satellites one should add the
OAO (Orbiting Astronomical Satellites) series. A technical proposal for "A multi-purpose Thor Delta
satellite", offering "a reasonable compromise between the requirements made by the experiments for
solar, ionospheric and cosmic ray research", was discussed in SCI/WP/27, 23 April 1965.
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the Apollo programme and then have independent programmes for the three main domains of space
science (solar astronomy, stellar astronomy and geophysics); in Europe they had to fit everything in
one.
Finally, at the STC meeting, technical and financial questions were put forward by ESRO's Technical
Director A.W. Lines. He stressed that the concentration of launchings to meet the solar maximum in
1968/69 would run the Organisation into a peak of expenditure and pose a severe stress on ESTEC's
resources. A more rapid build-up of staff than planned was then required in order to successfully
implement the envisaged programme. Lines also urged an immediate decision for endorsement of the
programme and, in particular, an agreement on plans for the second year of the Organisation as soon
as. In order to start investigating the possibilities of a basic design for a standard satellite, detailed
information on at least two TD payloads was required while, at that moment, only the payload of TD-1
had been agreed on, the Technical Director stressed.
The meeting closed without reaching agreement, much to the regret of Boyd who complained that "the
STC was unable to agree a programme on which the LPAC had spent a great deal of time, and which
it genuinely believed was the best possible solution". The Committee, nevertheless, agreed on the
reduction in the number of Scout-type satellites and on the increase in the number of TD satellites,
with the proviso, however, that the use of stabilised satellites should not exclude experiments not
requiring stabilisation from the launching programme. They also approved the LPAC's
recommendation as to the scientific aims of TD-2 and TD-3, with the agreement that they should be
known as solar maximum satellites and that the division of experiments between the various
disciplines should remain flexible. Finally, after a long discussion, it was decided (with the abstention
of Belgium and France who doubted the financial feasibility of the project) to recommend the payload
already agreed on by the LPAC for the first highly eccentric orbit satellite. This decision, however,
was subjected to the still controversial question of providing ESRO with a suitable deep space tracking
and telemetry network (see below).403 No agreement, on the contrary, was reached about the principle
of using a multi-purpose vehicle for the TD satellites, thus leaving the core of the Organisation's
operational programme pending.
Before the Council session, the LPAC held a meeting in order to consider the comments of the STC on
the proposed programme. Here again it came out that the controversial parts of the programme were:
(a) the feasibility and the advisability of a standard spacecraft; (b) the necessity of a deep space
telemetry network; and (c) the possible underestimation of the costs for the LAS project. In the event,
the LPAC agreed that the realisation of TD-3, TD-5 and of the second highly eccentric orbit satellite
"would depend finally on a review in two or three years' time when a more precise idea of the costing
would be available". Therefore, the TD-2 satellite had to be regarded as a "solar, ionospheric and
geophysical satellite" and the scientific ad hoc groups were invited to submit new proposals for its
payload accordingly. Meanwhile ESTEC could start working on this spacecraft according to "probable
specifications [...] based on present knowledge of experiments available".404
That was a poor compromise. When the realisation of ionospheric satellite TD-3 actually proved
impossible, the payload composition of TD-2 became a ground for harsh competition. It was bound to
be a very hard job, in fact, to include in the same spacecraft experiments aimed at studying the Sun as
a star that happens to be near the Earth (the way astronomers do) and experiments aimed at studying
the influence of solar activity on the Earth's near space environment (the way geophysicists do).
403 The results of a preliminary study on a possible ESRO's tracking and telemetry network for highly
eccentric orbit satellites and space probes are in ESRO/ST/111, 4 March 1965. This paper was circulated
at the meeting but not discussed because it had to be submitted first to the ad hoc groups. The French
Delegation, however, expressed strong reservations about the opportunity of building a European deep
space telemetry network.
404 LPAC, 5th meeting (19 March 1965), ESRO/ST/116, 2 April 1965, p. 6. The revised programme, with
TD-3, TD-5 and the third HEOS listed in brackets and including new expenditure forecast, is presented in
annex II to the minutes of the 6th Council session (24-25 March 1965) ESRO/C/MIN/6, 14 June 1965. See
also ESRO/ST/128, 2 June 1965.
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Moreover, this task had to be accomplished by a set of experiments and a satellite design compatible
with the already agreed payload of TD-1.
5.3.3 No decision taken on the 8-year satellite programme
In the presence of these divisions within the scientific community and lacking definite
recommendations from its advisory bodies, the Council could only agree on the most conservative
attitude, thus leaving any decision on the 8-year programme pending. Provisional approval was given
to the small satellite programme and to the TD programme, "on the understanding that should costs
prove much higher than anticipated, TD-3 and TD-5 might be abandoned". The Council also approved
HEOS-A and its recommended payload, but it refused for the moment to endorse any extension of the
existing ESRO tracking network (ESTRACK), in the hope that this, assisted by the French CNES
stations, would make it possible "to obtain tracking and stored telemetry data sufficient for the
proposed experiments". Finally, lack of understanding was still registered about the number of LASs
to be included in the programme in order to save sufficient resources for starting a new major project
(the so called SLEP: Second Large ESRO Project). Several Delegations felt that the costing of the
major projects was unrealistic and it was agreed that the financial implications of the 8-year
programme should be studied by the AFC before final proposals were submitted to the Council for
approval.405
When the STC met again, in June 1965, only 5 projects plus the first LAS had been definitely
approved (ESRO I and II, TD-1 and TD-2, and HEOS-A), and the whole operational programme was
still under discussion. No step forward was taken at the meeting, given the persisting uncertainties
about expenditure forecasts and the different opinions between delegations.406 The French Delegation
insisted that ESRO should keep financial estimates within the limits laid down in the Convention,
which implied, according to their estimates, that TD-3 and TD-5 had to be definitely abandoned, as
well as one HEOS (leaving only three) and one large satellite (leaving only two). The problem of the
feasibility, scientific advisability, and cost of a single purpose vehicle for the TD series remained
unsolved, because of the opposition of those who felt that this would impose too strict limitations to
experiments aimed at different scientific objectives and advocated the use of small dedicated satellites
instead of large spacecraft carrying many experiments with different scientific aims and technical
requirements.
The following STC meeting had no better success in finding an agreement. The main issues regarded
the expenditure forecast, in particular the fact that an expenditure peak was going to occur in 1967/68
and the budget exceeded the ceiling imposed by the Financial Protocol annex to the Convention. The
STC agreed to maintain the earlier recommendation that only the spacecraft projects already agreed on
should go ahead and no new projects should be started for the time being.407
The 7th meeting of the STC was not even able to discuss the matter of the revision of the 8-year
programme, owing to the budget problems raised by the fact that the AFC had placed a limit on
expenditure in 1967 at 230 MFF while, according to the Technical Director, 270 MFF would be
needed in order to carry out the agreed programme. The French Delegations argued that should the
1967 budget be restricted to 230 MFF, cuts should be made not in the operational programme but
rather in the internal expenditure (buildings and personnel), which they felt was excessive. Waiting for
more light about the financial problems, the STC concluded with a discouraging resolution:
405 Council, 6th session (24-25 March 1965), ESRO/ST/MIN/6, 14 June 1965, p. 7-9.
406 STC, 5th meeting (10-11 June 1965), ESRO/ST/MIN/5, 13 August 1965. The operational programme
under discussion, with financial and budgetary implications, is in ESRO/ST/128, 2 June 1965 (with annex
ESRO/AF/246). See also the comments of the French Delegations in ESRO/ST/128, add. 1,
14 June 1965.
407 STC, 6th meeting (5-6 October 1965), ESRO/ST/MIN/6, 26 October 1965.
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The STC does not yet feel in a position to determine whether [...] it will be possible to
complete the adopted programme within the time envisaged as regards [the approved
projects] ESRO I, ESRO II, TD-1, TD-2, HEOS and LAS.408
In fact, by the end of 1965, contracts had been signed and industrial development work started only for
the construction of ESRO I and II (in April 1965 and December 1964, respectively). Tender action had
been concluded for HEOS-A and development work started in January 1966, but only on the basis of a
preliminary letter of intent while the contract itself was signed only in November that year. As to the
TD-1/TD-2 project, the payload composition of the two satellites was approved by the Council in
November 1965, but tender action was delayed and no definite information about the cost of the
project was available. Finally, the LAS was still in the phase of design studies.
In conclusion, by the end of its second year (not considering the COPERS period), ESRO was still
lacking a definite operational programme for its first 8-year lifetime, its management was still unable
to make long-term plans on the basis of definite cost estimates and budgets, and European scientists
had not even certainty about the actual possibility of launching all satellites under development. The
final blow to the optimistic hopes expressed in the Blue Book came when the Member States refused
to revise the ceilings which in 1961 the scientists had considered sufficient for an ambitious
programme and which now proved dramatically insufficient to support even a much reduced
programme.
5.3.4 The 1966 crisis and the abandonment of LAS
The year 1966 was the last of ESRO's first 3-year period (1964-1966), a period which was controlled
by a financial ceiling of 385 MFF at 1962 prices, established by the Financial Protocol annex to the
ESRO Convention. The Protocol also established a ceiling of 602 MFF for the second 3-year period
(1967-1969), which left MFF 523 for the last two years of the initial 8-year programme to bring the
total up to the ceiling of MFF 1510 set for that period.
During 1966 it became evident that the Organisation was unable to implement during the first three
years all the capital investment and construction work for which the budget provided and in fact, after
adjustment to 1965 prices, an underspending of 122 MFF was foreseen. In the spring of 1966, in view
of the forthcoming Council session called to decide on the budget for the second 3-year period, the
STC discussed again the revised 8-year programme and endorsed the proposal of the ESRO Executive
that unspent funds allocated to the first 3-year period should be carried forward to the second. On this
basis, a budget of 808 MFF (at 1965 prices) for the second 3-year period could be assumed, which
implied that work could be begun on a pair of TD satellites roughly every 1.5 to 2 years and on a space
probe at intervals of 2 years. The programme would be extended up to 1974 to complete all
launchings.409 The Council, however, did not endorse this position and reaffirmed that the ceiling for
the second 3-year period should be kept at 602 MFF at 1962 prices, i.e. 686 MFF at 1965 prices. The
budget for 1967 was fixed at 230 MFF at 1965 prices as against the 260 MFF requested by ESRO.410
Facing this situation, a severe revision of the programme was required on the basis on the new figures
about available resources. Assuming that work on the projects already started (ESRO I, ESRO II and
HEOS-A) proceeded as planned, it was clear that "funds are not available to proceed with work on
408 STC, 7th meeting (5 November 1965), ESRO/ST/MIN/7, 16 December 1965. See ESRO/ST/161,
2 November 1965, with attached FIN/WP/40, rev. 1, 29 October 1965.
409 STC, 9th meeting (2-3 May 1966), ESRO/ST/MIN/9, 7 June 1966, and 11th meeting (15 July 1966),
ESRO/ST/MIN/11, 24 August 1966. See also ESRO/ST/201, 27 April 1966. The financial situation and
the budget proposal from the ESRO management are in ESRO/AF/476, 20 June 1966.
410 Council, 12th session (18-20 July 1966), ESRO/C/MIN/12, 1 September 1966. The Council went even
beyond the recommendation of its AFC, which had proposed to carry forward about half of the unspent
money and to set the budget level for the second 3-year period at 750 MFF: see ESRO/AF/549,
7 July 1966, and rev.1, 8 July 1966.
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TD-1 and TD-2 and the LAS, even if no new satellites (TD 3/4 and HEOS-B) are started before about
1970". The conclusion:
The launching of the LAS during the first 8-year period could therefore only be made
possible by either abandoning the TD-1 and TD-2, or reducing the LAS aims and
devoting only 160 MFF to the spacecraft and 35-40 to the scientific package.411
Should neither of these alternatives be accepted, the launch the LAS would probably result impossible
in 1971, within the 8-year period, and no new satellite project apart from TD-1 and TD-2 could be
started before this date. In addition, owing to the approved budget for 1967, it was impossible to
maintain the launching schedule for the TD satellites and therefore "some reduction of the aims of
these satellites, or some delay, [was] necessary". This was not easy to do, however, for two main
reasons: firstly, TD-2 was closely linked to the occurrence of the solar maximum and therefore any
delay implied that its payload had to be dramatically reconsidered; secondly, a tender for both TD
satellites had been requested and any phasing out of them required a new tender action. Again, two
alternative options were presented, both of which foresaw the launching of the LAS outside the 8-year
period. In the first, the two TD satellites would be slightly simplified and the LAS programme would
be slowed down in such a way as to launch it in 1973-74; in the second, one of the TD satellites would
be cancelled from the programme, and the LAS would go ahead more rapidly, with an anticipated
launch in 1972-73.
A dramatic discussion took place in the LPAC when they were called to give their advice; all aspects
of ESRO's financial matters were analysed in order to avoid any reduction in the operational
programme and keep "the viability of ESRO as a reputable scientific organisation". In the event, the
LPAC recommended to reduce as much as possible the programme for capital investment, going as far
as to propose the elimination of applied research contracts, the moving of ESRO's headquarters and
ESDAC to ESTEC and the elimination of ESRIN. Even the abandonment of the sounding rocket
programme was considered. As to the main issue, the LPAC strongly affirmed the highest priority of
the TD-1/TD-2 programme and recommended that a ceiling of 300 MFF should be imposed on the
LAS, of which no more than 200 MFF in the 8-year period. This would leave some money for starting
new projects and the LPAC stressed that:
ESRO should undertake medium satellites and space probe projects at such level as to
ensure that two launchings take place on the average every year. This is considered a
minimum programme.412
The LPAC's recommendations were endorsed by the STC after a long discussion that again dealt with
all aspects of ESRO's activity and management.413
By the end of 1966, the situation of ESRO was dramatic, with the budgetary difficulties seeming to
jeopardise even the programmes already approved. In the operational programme the Executive
presented to the STC in November, no funds were available for the LAS in 1967 and only 1 MFF
could be allocated to the TD-1/TD-2 programme, with the possibility of allocating some 6 MFF from
the contingency fund. This programme, however, was due to start in early 1967 and the cost
development plans submitted in the tenders foresaw payments of about 20 MFF for that year. This was
to be maintained if they wanted to launch TD-2 in the first half of 1970, in time for the solar
maximum, and TD-1 six months later. Two alternatives existed in order to keep an acceptable launch
411 SCI/WP/66, 19 August 1966, p. 4. Also in ESRO/ST/215, 9 September 1966.
412 LPAC, 13th meeting (27 August 1966), ESRO/ST/218, rev. 1, 28 September 1966, p. 6. The conclusions
are also reported in ESRO/ST/215, 9 September 1966. The draft budget for 1967 and the forecast estimate
for the 1967-69 period based on this recommendation is presented in ESRO/AF/561, 7 September 1966;
also in ESRO/ST/216, 9 September 1966.
413 STC, 12th meeting (22-23 September 1966), ESRO/ST/MIN/12, 2 November 1966.
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date for TD-2, namely either to get at least 250 MFF available for 1967 from the Council or to reach
an agreement with the successful tenderer on a payment plan for 1967 with payments of about 5 MF.414
A long and nervous discussion took place in the STC about the whole of ESRO's grim situation. The
key issue was again the LAS, the large project which had been thought to be the main rationale for
ESRO coming into existence but whose eventual realisation also hampered any other project. Again,
the STC agreed (with the only abstention of the United Kingdom) to accord absolute priority to the
TD-1/TD-2 project while, by a few painful votes, it was substantially decided to halt the LAS until the
Ministerial conference scheduled for the next year examined the new cost estimate and decide on the
future of the project.415
The Council meeting in December could not find unanimous agreement (as required by the
Convention) on the level of resources for the second 3-year period, thus preventing the Organisation
from planning ahead on a secure basis. It agreed however on a 1967 budget of 240 MFF and,
endorsing the priorities established by the STC, requested the Secretariat to make proposals for
savings in order to allow additional expenditure in the order of 4 to 7 MFF for TD-1 and TD-2.416
Thus, by the end of January 1967, a contract for the construction of TD-1 and TD-2 could finally be
awarded.
This set of decisions probably represented the decisive blow to the LAS and, in fact, they showed the
prevailing interest among European space scientists in a programme largely based on medium sized
satellites, meeting the various scientific objectives and managerial capabilities of several groups,
against a programme largely based on large and sophisticated spacecraft.417
*   *   *
By the end of ESRO's first 3-year period, and 5 years after the Blue Book, the comparison between the
present situation and the original plans was not exciting. Only five small and medium size satellites
were under development and could be launched within the 8-year period covered by the Convention;
no other project of this kind had been approved yet; the large astronomical satellite was definitely
jeopardised and with it any hope to develop large space projects from which ESRO had mainly
derived its raison d'être; scientific competition, technical and financial difficulties, and lack of
confidence from Member States made any long-term planning almost impossible.
Four main reasons can be given for this resounding set-back. The first regards the multinational
character of ESRO and its institutional framework. The Convention had designed an organisation on
which tight control was to be kept by member state delegation. This applied to the scope of its
scientific programme, the extent of its facilities, and above all its budget, which was fixed over eight
years and with fixed ceilings on expenditures at regular intervals. Painful negotiations at several levels
were required for most decisions and the executive branch of the Organisation suffered from weakness
and lack of autonomy. This was the malaise that J.H. Bannier so vividly described in March 1967,
presenting his report on the structure and procedures of ESRO and on the changes deemed
necessary.418
The second reason derives from the high fragmentation of space science, which implies a wide
diversity of interests within the scientific community. The course chosen by the ESRO pioneers to
respect this diversity in order to keep a united front in the early development of space research in
Europe now collided inevitably with financial realities. When it started to become clear that not all
research fields could be pursued and priorities had to be established, the competition among scientists
414 ESRO/ST/229, 28 October 1966.
415 STC, 13th meeting (8-9 November 1966), ESRO/ST/MIN/13, 27 December 1966.
416 Council, 14th session (1-2 December 1966), ESRO/C/MIN/14, 20 January 1967.
417 More details on the LAS story in the following chapter.
418 See chapter 2:
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became so fierce as to paralyse ESRO's advisory bodies. At the end of this phase one can already
recognise one loser, namely the community of astronomers. Those interested in stars had lost the
Large Astronomical Satellite and those interested in the Sun were to fight for the TD-2 payload and
eventually lost. When, by the end of 1966, the LPAC started to discuss ESRO's new satellite projects,
it was evident that the decision making process would not be painless.
Thirdly, one must mention the dramatic underestimation of the financial resources necessary to
support the space research programme anticipated in the Blue Book and the glaring inability of ESRO
to arrive at definite evaluation of the costs of projects. The lack of experience among engineers and
industrialists in Europe about the requirements of space activities was certainly the main reason for
this inability. To this one can add the illusory belief in the so-called "transatlantic factor", namely the
idea that costs could be significantly lower in Europe than in the United States.
Finally, Member States were not ready to support ESRO by itself. This Organisation, in fact, was but
an element in a complex framework which also included several others: the Member States' national
space programmes; the European launcher to be developed by ESRO's sister organisation ELDO; the
rising interest in application satellites and the commercial implication of space activities; the complex
relationship of cooperation-competition between Europe and the United States; the ongoing process of
European economic integration. It was in this framework that ESRO's crisis reached its peak. Precisely
in December 1966, following one year of negotiations among ESRO, ELDO and CETS (Conference
Européenne des Télécommunications par Satellites), the first European Space Conference (ESC) was
convened in Paris, with the aim of defining a co-ordinated space policy in Europe. The task could not
be accomplished easily, however, and it was only in November 1968 that the third session of the ESC
was able to find a tentative solution, thus smoothing the way for the ESRO Council to agree finally on
a level of resources for a new 3-year period (1969-71). Only then was ESRO allowed to make plans
again.
5.4 Choosing ESRO's first satellites
Within the general framework discussed in the first part of this chapter, we shall now analyse the
choice of the scientific payloads of ESRO's first generation of satellites. These were the two small,
non-stabilised satellites ESRO I and ESRO II, launched in 1968 and renamed after launch Aurorae and
Iris respectively; the two small highly eccentric orbit satellites HEOS-A and HEOS-A2, launched in
1968 and 1972 and then renamed HEOS-1 and HEOS-2; the medium size, stabilised satellite TD-1,
launched in 1972; and the small satellite ESRO IV, also launched in 1972, which replaced the second
satellite of the TD series (TD-2). All these were multi-experiment satellites, i.e. the spacecraft carried
a payload comprising several instruments provided by different research groups, according to the
agreed scientific mission of the satellite and to its technical specifications.
At every level, the selection of a satellite mission and of a specific experiment in its payload involved
several intertwined scientific and political aspects. A quick list, in a rather arbitrary order, should
include: the proper assessment of the scientific importance of the various research fields in a long term
perspective; the financial constraints which limited the range of good projects that could actually be
implemented; the scientific and technical assessment of the various experiment proposals, both by
themselves and with regards to their compatibility with other experiments in the same satellite
payload; the unavoidable competition within the multi-national and multi-disciplinary space science
community; the need to comply with the principle of just return in the geographical distribution of
industrial contracts; the consideration of the scientific programmes of national space agencies in
Europe and of the American NASA; the different views of ESRO's Member States about the place of
space research in the general framework of national space policies; and also the feelings, ambitions,
expectations, idiosyncrasies and mutual relationships of the rather restricted number of scientists
involved in ESRO's advisory bodies.
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In the following pages, we will concentrate on those aspects that involved more directly the scientific
community and emerged as major issues in the discussions in the LPAC. The main theme will be, as to
be expected, the growing competition between the various fields of space science within the
progressive retrenching of the satellite programme because of the constraints of the Organisation's
financial resources. After a general overview of the status of the programme by the end of 1966, the
section is divided into two main parts. The first deals with the choice of the first small satellites'
payloads (ESRO I and II, and HEOS-A) and with the difficult definition of the TD satellite
programme. This part covers a time span going from early 1963, still in the COPERS period, when the
scientific missions of ESRO I and II were defined, to the spring of 1966, when the payload
composition of TD-2 was finally approved by the STC and Council. In the second part, the narrative
starts from the spring of 1967, when the decision to recommend a second HEOS-type satellite was
taken, and then analyses the complex situation determined by the crisis of the TD programme in 1968,
and the debates which eventually led to the abandonment of TD-2 and the start of the far less
ambitious ESRO IV project.
5.4.1 The status of the scientific satellite programme in 1966
By mid-1966, more than two years after the official inception of ESRO and more than four years after
the creation of COPERS, only six satellite projects had been approved by the ESRO Council, of the
fifteen included in the revised 8-year programme of the Organisation. These were grouped in four
separate families with different technical and orbital characteristics (Table 5-8).419 The first family
included the two small non-stabilised satellites ESRO I and ESRO II: these spacecraft had been
designed for launching by Scout rockets into low polar orbit and were devoted to the study of the polar
ionosphere, and to solar astronomy and cosmic ray studies respectively. The second family consisted
of small, highly eccentric orbit satellites with apogees of about 200,000 km, to be launched launching
by means of a Thor Delta rocket. Three to four satellites of this type were included in ESRO's
programme and the first member of the family, the 105-kg spin stabilised spacecraft HEOS-A, was
devoted to the study of plasma, magnetic fields and cosmic rays inside and outside the magnetosphere.
The third family consisted of heavier, stabilised satellites whose weights, dimensions and
characteristics had been designed with a view to their launching by means of a Thor Delta rocket into
near Earth orbits. The satellites in this family were planned to be built according to a standard design
("streetcar" concept) and, in fact, it was hoped that the TD-type spacecraft might be a sort of
workhorse for the development of the main part of ESRO's satellite programme. Only the first two
satellites had been approved, out of the four to six included in the programme, and they were being
studied jointly. The first, named TD-1, was devoted to non-solar astronomy; the second, TD-2, carried
experiments aimed at investigating the electromagnetic and particle radiation from the Sun and their
influence on the ionosphere during the period of maximum solar activity in 1968-69. Finally, the last
family included three large satellites for astronomical studies, the first of which was the Large
Astronomical Satellite (LAS) to be devoted to high resolution stellar spectroscopy in the UV range.
They were to be launched either by the rocket being developed by ELDO or, failing that, by an Atlas
Agena launch vehicle.
The scientific missions and the payload composition of these satellites had been agreed on in 1964-65
by the STC, on the basis of the recommendations of the LPAC, and then approved by the Council. Of
the 110 proposals for satellite experiments received by ESRO by the end of 1965 (Table 5-9) and
numbered from S-1 to S-110, 70 had been recommended by the ad hoc working groups and more than
half had been allocated room in the payloads of the satellites under development.420
419 ESRO, General Report, 1964-65.
420 The list of experiment proposals, with proper classification, is reported in the series of documents
COPERS/LPSC/32, rev. 1-3, from 21 January 1963 to 12 November 1963, and ESRO/ST/87, plus rev. 1-
2, from 25 November 1964 to 7 March 1967. See also ESRO's General Report, 1964-1965.
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5.4.2 The small non-stabilised satellites ESRO I and ESRO II
The scientific mission and the payload composition of ESRO's first two satellites was recommended
by the COPERS Launching Programme Sub-Committee (LPSC) in the spring of 1963 and then
approved by its Scientific and Technical Working Group (STWG) (Tables 5-10 and 5-11).421 These
satellites were also proposed to NASA as a co-operative effort, and eventually NASA offered to
provide free launchings of both satellites by Scout rockets.422
While keeping their original scientific missions, the payloads of the two satellites underwent a few
important changes before final approval by the ESRO Council. In fact, by early 1964, experiment S-
31, aimed at measuring micrometeorites, was withdrawn from ESRO II, while the LPSC agreed that
experiment S-42 should not be included in ESRO I. It was also agreed to extend the aims of
experiment S-71 in ESRO I and to include in ESRO II experiment S-72, proposed by J. Labeyrie and
L. Koch of the Centre d'Etudes Nucléaires de Saclay and aimed at measuring solar protons.423
Subsequently, preliminary design studies showed that the weight of the scientific payload was too
high. This posed a question of priorities which, as was pointed out, "affect[ed] the whole philosophy
of the satellites".424 It was decided to ask the ad hoc Working Groups to discuss a "negative priority"
list for the experiments already included in both satellites. This was not an easy operation, however.
On the one hand, K. Rawer, from the Ionosphären Institut in Breisach, who had joined E. Vassy in the
preparation of experiment S-70, strongly objected to the ION Group's recommendation to drop this
experiment from ESRO I. On the other hand, R. Boyd preferred to withdraw his experiments S-42 and
S-48 when he discovered that both were on the negative priority list for ESRO II. Eventually, the STC
confirmed the exclusion of these three experiments in spite of the objections of the German Delegation
in defence of Rawer's arguments (Tables 5-12 and 5-13).425
Two considerations are suggested by inspection of Tables 5-10 to 5-13. The first is the clear leadership
of British groups in European space research, in particular those at University College (Boyd) and
Imperial College (Elliot). As the German delegation in the STWG put it: "These two satellites seemed
more national than international in character".426 British space science had certainly a leadership role in
Europe: it had started as early as in 1953 a rocket programme for ionospheric studies, with launchings
going on since 1957, and was involved since 1959 in the Ariel satellite programme in collaboration
with NASA. The British scientists, among whom Boyd and Elliot were authoritative spokesmen, had
been enthusiastic about the perspective of European collaboration in space research and contributed
significantly to the definition of the institutional framework and the scientific programme of the new
Organisation.427
421 LPSC, 5th meeting (6-7 March 1963), COPERS/LPSC/70, 2 April 1963; 6th meeting (29 April 1963),
COPERS/LPSC/84, 7 May 1963. STWG, 9th meeting (30-31 May 1963), COPERS/GTST/98,
20 June 1963. Also COPERS/GTST/82, rev. 1, 14 June 1963.
422 In December 1963 and in January 1964, discussions took place in Washington and in Paris, respectively,
between ESA and NASA about eventual co-operation in scientific satellite projects, in particular about
the proposed payloads of ESRO I and II. The content and outcome of these discussions are presented in
COPERS/GTST/139, 11 February 196. See also Krige & Sebesta (1994).
423 LPSC, 8th meeting (7-8 February 1964), COPERS/LPSC/123, 3 March 1964.
424 Interim LPSC, 1st meeting (23 April 1964), ESRO/ST/14, 4 June 1964, p. 3. See also the meeting of the
Interim Scientific and Technical Working Group (25-26 May 1964), ESRO/ST/32, 11 June 1964, p. 4.
425 The decisions of the ad hoc working groups (with Rawer's objections) are in ESRO/ST/44, 20 July 1964
and ESRO/ST/45, 29 July 1964 for ESRO I and ESRO II respectively. Discussions and decisions were
taken at the second meeting of the Interim LPSC (30 July 1964), ESRO/ST/60, 31 August 1964, p. 4-6,
and at the first meeting of the STC (10-11 September 1964), ESRO/ST/MIN/1, 14 October 1964, p. 3-4.
The new payloads recommended for ESRO I and ESRO II are presented in ESRO/C/73,
13 November 1964 and were approved by the Council at its 5th session (25-26 November 1964),
ESRO/C/MIN/6, 11 January 1965, p. 3. Experiment S-70 was rather heavy (4 kg), with a high power
consumption and mechanically complicated.
426 STWG, 9th meeting (30-31 May 1963), COPERS/GTST/98, 20 June 1963, p. 5.
427 Massey and Robins (1986).
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The second consideration regards the scientific aims of the two satellites. These were small, non-
stabilised spacecraft, carrying very simple experiments designed to measure the radiation environment
around the spacecraft, either ionospheric particles or solar radiation or cosmic rays. This kind of
experiment represented a direct extrapolation to satellite projects of the experience matured with
sounding rocket experiments, and met the scientific interests of a substantial part of the young but
already well established European space science community. ESRO I, in particular, followed the well
established tradition of rocket-borne experiments to investigate auroral phenomena and the polar
ionosphere.
5.4.3 HEOS-A and the problem of ESRO's deep space telemetry network
Among the experiment proposals recommended by the ad hoc Working Groups in the spring of 1963,
six required highly eccentric orbit satellites (HEOS). Three of these had been proposed by the PLA
group for studies of the interplanetary medium, and three by the COS Group for the study of the
relation between the fluctuations in the geomagnetic field and the acceleration and dumping of Van
Allen particles. The latter group had also recommended a space probe (SP) to measure cosmic rays,
magnetic fields and interplanetary plasmas at considerable distance from the Earth's magnetic fields.
The LPSC invited the two groups to co-operate in order to find a good scientific mission for a
spacecraft journey very far away from the Earth and, at the same time, requested ESTEC to start
studying possible orbits and associated tracking and telemetry problems.428
A meeting was arranged between the chairman of the PLA group and representatives of the COS
Group, followed by a meeting of the COS Group which produced a proposal of an integrated payload
with a set of experiments for simultaneous measurements of plasma, magnetic field and cosmic ray
particles. The payload was eventually approved by the LPSC, with the further recommendation that a
second HEOS or SP should be launched a year later and that for this, "consideration should be given in
the first instance to the proposals from the PLA ad hoc working group".429 When the matter arrived at
the STC, however, the French Delegation expressed their anxiety about the costs of the space probes,
owing to the requirement of a deep space telemetry network. In fact, the network which ESRO was
building for low orbit satellites (ESTRACK) was not suitable for spacecraft in highly eccentric or
escape orbits. The problem regarded not only the first such spacecraft but the whole satellite
programme of ESRO, in particular if the cometary mission under study should be chosen as the second
large project after the LAS.430
A short technical digression may be useful at this point, with regards to four aspects of the difference
between a network for low orbit satellites and a deep space network.431 The first is the geographical
requirement. For low orbits, the satellite motion is predominant as compared with the Earth's rotation
and therefore, in order to observe all orbits at least once per revolution, about 8 to 10 stations are
required along great circles oriented broadly in the direction North-South. For a satellite on a highly
eccentric orbit or for a space probe, the situation is entirely different because it is the Earth's motion
which is predominant. In other words, when the spacecraft is far away from Earth, namely for most of
its revolution time, it can be considered to stay motionless while the Earth rotates below it. In this
case, a continuous observation can be achieved by a network consisting of three stations located
almost at the same latitude (preferably lower than 30 degrees) but evenly spaced from one another in
longitude.
428 Ad hoc group G [COS Group], 3rd meeting (19 March 1963), COPERS/LPSC/78, 24 April 1963, with
appendices 1 and 2. LPSC, 6th meeting (29 April 1963), COPERS/LPSC/84, 7 May 1963; 8th meeting (7-
8 February 1964), COPERS/LPSC/123, 3 March 1964. See also COPERS/LPSC/80, 26 April 1963 and
COPERS/GTST/82, rev. 1, 14 June 1963.
429 COS Group, 6th meeting (13 March 1964), ESRO/ST/10, 21 April 1964. Interim LPSC, 2nd meeting
(20 July 1964), ESRO/ST/60, 31 August 1964, p. 7-8. All relevant documents are grouped in ESRO/ST/6,
15 April 1964 and in ESRO/ST/33, 20 July 1964.
430 STC, 1st meeting (10-11 September 1964), ESRO/ST/MIN/1, 14 October 1964.
431 ESRO/ST/6, 15 April 1964, appendix 3. More technical aspects are presented in ESRO/ST/92,
12 January 1965.
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The second aspect regards the visibility time from a station. Low orbit satellites can be observed from
one station for a short time, usually less than 20 minutes, and it is therefore necessary to record at low
speed the instrument readings during most of the orbital period, and to play back the information
rapidly when the satellite passes over a station. For satellites on highly eccentric orbits, the time during
which it is visible from one station is of the order of hours (except if the station sees the satellite when
it is near the perigee, in which case the observation time is of the order of 3 minutes). The information
can be transmitted to Earth all along the orbit, either in real time, with a three-station network, or by
playing back stored data if only two stations are available.
The third aspect regards the telemetry frequency. The ESRO network being built for low altitude
satellites operated on 136/137 MHz, a frequency which is not very attractive for long distance space
communication, due to galactic noise. Both for this reason and to increase the bit rate, it is preferable
to use a higher frequency (400 or 1700 MHz) and then larger antenna dishes, with corresponding cost
increase.
Finally, the fourth aspect regards the tracking of satellites. For tracking purposes it is not necessary to
make position measurements evenly distributed over the orbit but it is imperative to make at least a
minimum number of relatively accurate measurements during each orbit. Here again, ESRO's low
orbit network drastically limited the possibility of making reliable measurements and it appeared
inevitable to consider the realisation of a system better suited for long distance tracking. This also had
important implications in so far as time-scale and budget were concerned.
Facing these problems and the French objections, the STC decided not to take a decision on the
recommended payload before having investigated better the implications of the project as regards the
setting-up of a deep space facility. In particular, it was also recognised that considerable differences in
costs and technical requirements occurred between a network suitable for highly eccentric orbit
satellites only and a network for deep space probes. The LPAC did not push the matter further for the
moment but it agreed that a highly eccentric orbit with apogee of 200,000 km ought to be sufficient for
the first highly eccentric orbit satellite (HEOS-A), as this would take the spacecraft outside the
magnetosphere.432 A study was then realised in ESTEC about a network suitable for such an orbit
where two alternatives were presented:
1. A three-station network based on stations almost identical with ESTRACK-type stations and
located in, say, Australia, southern Europe and Mexico (or southern USA).
2. A two-station network using higher frequency and larger antenna dishes (about 25 m diameter).433
The first option would be satisfactory for HEOS-A and could also be used for near Earth satellites in
conjunction with the other stations in the ESTRACK network. The bit rate obtainable at 200,000 km
was estimated 10 per sec. However, in order to convert it to a real deep space network, it would
require replacement of the antennae and change of the frequency of operation. The two-station
network would allow a bit rate about three times higher and could be converted to deep space use by
the relatively simple modification of changing the frequency of operation. On the other hand, the
absence of a third station would produce a gap of about 6 hours in operation every 24 hours. The cost
of the two networks was estimated as roughly the same, in the bracket of 40 to 50 million French
Francs (MFF). It was also estimated that both the addition of a third station to the two-station network
and the conversion of the three-station network to large dishes would require about 20 MFF.
On this basis the matter was discussed again by the STC, where the scientific value of the payload
recommended by the LPAC for HEOS-A was strongly advocated by the Italian, Swedish and German
delegations. It was finally agreed, with the abstentions of France and Belgium, to recommend to the
432 LPAC, 4th meeting (1 February 1965), ESRO/ST/106, 17 February 1965.
433 ESRO/ST/111, 4 March 1965. Other and more technical aspects are presented in ESRO/ST/92,
12 January 1965.
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Council the inclusion of this payload in the ESRO programme.434 The Council eventually approved the
payload, but, following the arguments of the French delegation, it did not endorse any extension of the
tracking and telemetry network in addition to the new ESTRACK station already planned in the
Falkland Islands, and requested a further study before coming to a decision.435 The study was
eventually performed and it showed that, besides the available ESTRACK and CNES stations, one
additional station was required in order to meet the minimum scientific requirements for HEOS-A.
This additional coverage could be provided by a station planned by ELDO for its programme in
Australia, at a cost of less than 1 MFF for additional equipment.436 The Council approved this solution
and, after a further recommendation of the COS Group to include experiment S-79 to measure cosmic
ray electrons, it approved the final payload of HEOS-A in the form given in Table 5-14.437
5.4.4 The TD programme and the definition of the TD-1 payload
Since the very beginning many experiment proposals had been recommended by the ad hoc Working
Groups for inclusion in the payload of a stabilised satellite and a design study for such a satellite was
being performed by the Royal Aircraft Establishment.438 The use of a stabilised platform made this
spacecraft suitable for astronomical observations and in fact, in April 1964, the LPSC recommended to
carry out two feasibility studies, one combining solar and stellar astronomy experiments and the other
with only non-solar astronomy experiments.439 Subsequently, at the very beginning of ESRO's official
life, it was decided to devote the first stabilised satellite to stellar astronomy and the second to solar
astronomy.440 Only the payload of the former was approved (Table 5-15a), however, pending the
revision of ESRO's 8-year programme. When the advantage was recognised of using the Thor Delta
(TD) rocket as a medium launching vehicle, the LPAC recommended a programme of six TD-type
standard spacecraft, the first two of which (TD-1 and TD-2) were to be the already agreed satellites for
stellar and solar astronomy, respectively. A third TD satellite was to be devoted to ionospheric studies,
with the assumption that the solar satellite TD-2 and the ionospheric satellite TD-3 would be launched
in time for the solar maximum in 1968-69, in order to study the correlation between solar activity and
ionospheric phenomena.441 Before any discussion about the payload composition of these two satellites
could take place, however, financial difficulties and the opposition of a few member state delegations
to the "streetcar" concept led to the abandonment of TD-3 and therefore it was decided to ask the ad
hoc scientific groups to submit fresh proposals for TD-2, now to be considered as "a solar, ionospheric
and geophysical satellite".442 This was but a compromise, based on the idea that it could be possible to
combine in a single spacecraft scientific objectives which pertained to very different scientific fields,
namely the study of the Sun, of the ionosphere of the solar-terrestrial relations. Hardly surprisingly, it
revealed itself a bad compromise which led to harsh competition and eventually to the abandonment of
TD-2.
434 STC, 4th meeting (10-11 March 1965), ESRO/ST/MIN/4, 3 May 1965.
435 Council, 6th session (24-25 March 1965), ESRO/C/MIN/6, 14 June 1965, p. 8. The French position is in
ESRO/C/114, 24 March 1965. The status and planning of ESTRACK by early 1965 is presented in
ESRO/ST/94, 8 January 1965.
436 ESRO/C/119, 18 May 1965.
437 Council, 7th session (27-28 July 1965), ESRO/C/MIN/7, 23 September 1965; 9th session (24-
26 November 1965), ESRO/C/MIN/9, 31 January 1966. See ESRO/C/149, 12 November 1965. An
electron detector in the payload of HEOS-A had been recommended by the COS Group at the beginning
but no proposal was available at that time. The choice of S-79 was made by the COS Group at its 10th
meeting (14 April 1965), COS/10, 17 May 1965.
438 ESRO/ST/5, 17 April 1964.
439 Interim LPSC, 1st meeting (23 April 1964), ESRO/ST/14, 4 June 1964. A third payload, also including
experiments devoted to solar and stellar astronomy but with more emphasis on the former was proposed
by the SUN group. The different options are discussed in ESRO/ST/39, 17 July 1964.
440 Interim LPSC, 2nd meeting (30 July 1964), ESRO/ST/60, 31 August 1964; STC, 1st meeting (10-
11 September 1964), ESRO/ST/MIN/1, 14 October 1964.
441 LPAC, 2nd meeting (24 November 1964), ESRO/ST/89.
442 LPAC, 5th meeting (19 March 1965), ESRO/ST/116, 2 April 1965, p. 6.
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The problem of the payload composition of the two TD satellites was discussed by the LPAC in July
1965, after new information on the performance of the augmented Thor Delta launcher had shown that
larger satellites of this series were possible and new payload space was thus available. Here the
competition between scientists interested in the various field of space research showed itself a difficult
issue to cope with. On the one hand, B. Hultqvist, on behalf of the ION group, strongly argued in
favour of experiment S-17, proposed by W. Dieminger, from the Max-Planck-Institut für Aeronomie
in Lindau/Harz, and aimed at studying the topside of the ionosphere by a special sounder (the so-
called "topside sounder"). This experiment had been originally suggested as the main experiment in
the "ionospheric satellite" TD-3; now the ION group gave it the highest priority and insisted that it
should be included in TD-2. On the other hand, C. de Jager, on behalf of the SUN group, argued that
the two satellites should include a solar spectrograph covering the range from Lyman-alpha (1216 Å)
up to 300 MeV and realised by the combination of 8 experiments.443 A long discussion followed, in
particular about the scientific merits of the topside sounder in comparison with other kinds of
measurement and in consideration of the vigorous programme of topside sounder satellites was
already being pursued in Canada (Alouette satellite programme). It was also realised that the inclusion
of the topside sounder would considerably affect the design of the satellite, making it significantly
different from TD-1 and thus jeopardising the streetcar concept. In the event, the LPAC confirmed that
TD-1 and TD-2 should be based on the same design, with the possibility of stabilisation of the order of
1 minute of arc. The topside sounder in its present design could therefore not be included in the TD-2
payload. The LPAC recommended the addition of three more experiments to TD-1 (Table 5-15b) and
composed a tentative payload for TD-2, with the proviso that a study should be made on the possible
modification of the topside experiment in such a way that it could also be included. This was again a
compromise, of course, and the conflict was to explode soon.
5.4.5 The TD-2 payload and the topside sounder controversy 444
The discussion on the TD-2 satellite was resumed, in an atmosphere of growing tension, at the
following meeting of the LPAC. Further studies had demonstrated in fact that, if one wanted a
common design for the two satellites, the inclusion of the topside sounder experiment, even after
reduction of weight, power and size, was scientifically and technologically incompatible with the
probe experiments already approved for inclusion in the payload.445 A choice had to be made which
could not be painless, considering that the LPAC had to confront "the opinions of the ION group and
of other scientists and of letters which the chairman had received on this subject". After long
discussions the LPAC concluded that:
At this stage the LPAC should concern itself solely with giving its unbiased scientific
judgement to the STC, taking into account, of course, the technical and financial
resources available. [...] Considering all these factors, the LPAC felt that a higher
scientific priority should be given to the probe experiments compared to the topside
sounder.446
The main reason for the LPAC's decision was certainly the willingness to keep the design of TD-2 as
much as possible similar to that of TD-1, both for financial reasons and because they wished to base
the core of ESRO's satellite programme on a highly stabilised spacecraft, suitable for astrophysical
investigation. The inclusion of the topside sounder would have required major changes in the design,
443 LPAC, 7th meeting (9 July 1965), ESRO/ST/134, 5 August 1965. On the augmented Thor Delta launcher
see SCI/WP/32, 3 May 1965 and SCI/WP/36, 6 July 1965. The weight of the scientific package could be
increased from 54 to 80 Kg. The recommendations of the three interested scientific ad hoc groups SUN,
ION and COS are presented in SUN/12, 30 June 1965; ION/18, 8 July 1965 and COS/12, 8 July 1965,
respectively.
444 A list of documents relevant for the story of the topside sounder proposal is in GEN/WP/74,
23 September 1966.
445 SCI/WP/40, 6 September 1965.
446 LPAC, 8th meeting (10 September 1965), ESRO/ST/136, 5 October 1965, p. 3-4. See also ESRO/ST/145,
24 September 1965 and ESRO/C/131, 13 July 1965.
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particularly in the stabilisation system, and would have significantly shifted the satellite's scientific
mission towards the field of ionospheric research. The latter was certainly respectable and it had been
the first to take full advantage of the advent of space technologies; it was also true, however, that a lot
of good work had been done already in this field and the future of space science seemed not being
there but rather in more complex satellite technologies, aimed at investigating distant celestial objects
or the Earth's space environment far beyond the atmosphere.
The reaction of the ION group could not have been harsher. The group approved two resolutions in
which the whole scientific policy of the LPAC was challenged and an alternative proposal for the TD-
2 payload recommended.447 In the first resolution, a strong case was made against the alleged unfair
distribution of the experiments allocated in the five approved satellites (excluding the LAS) between
the astronomical disciplines (covered by the SUN and STAR groups) and the disciplines covered by
the other groups. In this context, the penalisation of experiments of interest for the ION group was
particularly underlined: they represented 35 % of proposals but only 23 % of allocated experiments.
The document then claimed in crescendo:
The ad hoc Working Group for the Ionosphere and Auroral Phenomena represents a
larger number of groups actively interested in European space research than any of the
other ad hoc working groups. The international reputation of the European work in these
fields is very high. The total number of scientists engaged in ionospheric and auroral
studies represents an important fraction of all scientists involved in ESRO activity.448
Blaming the LPAC for not having adequately taken into consideration the opinions and the
expectations of the majority of scientists working in the ionospheric and auroral field, the ION group
went as far as to recommend that the LPAC should include a full member with special interest in the
ionosphere, in order "to remedy the present unsatisfactory situation [and] to ensure a more reasonable
distribution of ESRO's limited resources".449
With regards to the LPAC's decision on the TD-2 payload, the ION group's judgement was that "[it] is
scientifically not sound and that it presents a deep deception of the justified expectations of European
scientists engaged in geophysical research". They argued that the present design for TD-2, which
required a very expensive stabilisation, should be replaced by a new design for a geophysical satellite
with no or inexpensive stabilisation, carrying a payload based on the topside sounder (S-17) and a few
other experiments.450
Lüst could not accept this criticism of legitimacy to his LPAC and prepared a statement which he
submitted to the following Committee meeting. In this statement, the chairman reaffirmed that the
LPAC composed payloads only on the basis of the agreed scientific mission of a given spacecraft,
taking into account the scientific merits of the experiment proposals and their technical and financial
implications. As to the distribution of experiments among the various disciplines, Lüst insisted that
"the LPAC achieved this distribution surprisingly well since the percentage of the allocated
experiments seems to be balanced very well". In any case, he continued, "it must also be the task of
the LPAC to stimulate research in those fields where the activity is not yet high enough". Finally, Lüst
447 ION group, 13th meeting (14 September 1965), ION/24, 5 October 1965. The resolutions approved are
ION/22, 22 September 1965 (on the LPAC policy) and ION/23, 22 September 1965 (on the TD-2
payload). The latter was also sent to the STC with the code number ESRO/ST/141, 28 September 1965.
Recall the dissatisfaction of the ION group towards the LPAC's scientific policy expressed by Hultqvist a
few months earlier, when the STC discussed the revision of ESRO's 8-year programme.
448 ION/22, cit., appendix, p. 1. A table in this appendix presents the distribution of experiment proposals and
allocated experiments among the various ad hoc groups.
449 ION/22, cit., p. 1.
450 ION/23, cit., p. 1.
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felt obliged to remark that two of the four members of the LPAC were involved in ionospheric
research more or less directly and none of them was interested only in stellar astronomy.451
After a long discussion, on which, unfortunately, the minutes do not give us any information, the
meeting agreed to Lüst's statement and only accepted the ION group's request that in the future, if the
LPAC did not follow the recommendations of an ad hoc group, detailed explanations should be
reported to the group itself.
Then it was up to the STC to deal with the matter and to make a final recommendation to the Council.
Here again scientific and technical aspects intertwined with the still controversial question of the
opportunity of making the spacecraft for TD-1 and TD-2 as far as possible identical. During the
discussion, Lüst asked the vice-chairman B. Peters to take the chair in order to allow him greater
freedom to express his views in his capacity as chairman of the LPAC. In the event, the delegations
were called to vote: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Spain and Sweden voted for the inclusion
of the topside sounder in the payload of TD-2; Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom voted
against; the Swiss delegation was absent. Therefore, upsetting the recommendation of the LPAC, the
STC recommended that the probe experiments be replaced by the topside sounder.452 The Council
endorsed this decision and authorised the STC to make any changes that might prove necessary in
order to fit the topside sounder in the payload.453
Some information on the composition of the STC at this meeting may be useful to understand the
outcome of the discussion. Three influential scientists were delegates of the countries voting against
the topside sounder, namely G. Occhialini (I), H. van de Hulst (NL) and R. Boyd (UK), the latter
being also a member of the LPAC. Their vote was certainly determined by their scientific interests and
by their preference for the streetcar concept for the TD series. The Netherlands delegation, for
example, was explicit in the statement that "much of the information on the ionosphere is being
constantly collected by other topside sounder experiments and therefore the topside sounder was less
important than the other experiments". The United Kingdom delegation, for their part, said that "they
had always believed that TD-1 and TD-2 should be as similar as possible". Finally, ESRO's scientific
director B. Bolin recalled that the ION group's suggestion to design a spacecraft with a much simpler
stabilisation system would have excluded experiments aimed at direct solar observation, what was
hardly acceptable for a satellite aimed at studying solar-terrestrial phenomena related to the solar
maximum.
The most influential countries voting in favour of the topside sounder were Sweden, France and
Germany. Sweden was represented by B. Hultqvist, the chairman of the ION group and an obvious
advocate of the topside sounder. He reaffirmed that "the topside sounder was the most powerful
ionospheric equipment that existed", and that the ION group had proposed unanimously that it should
be the key experiment in TD-2. France was notoriously against the streetcar concept (recall the
opposition of the CNES's president, J. Coulomb), and the French delegation in the STC did not include
any scientist, but two top officials from the CNES (M. Bignier and A. Lebeau).454 Germany was also
critical of the streetcar concept and it was officially represented in the STC not by Lüst, the chairman
of both the STC and the LPAC, but by a ministerial top official (Regula) and by W. Priester, a scientist
involved in atmospheric research, while the proposer of the topside sounder, W. Dieminger, acted as
an adviser. We have no hints about the reasons for the vote of the other delegations except, perhaps,
the lukewarm attitude of Belgium towards the streetcar concept.
451 LPAC, 9th meeting (18 October 1965), ESRO/ST/154, 9 November 1965, p. 3. Only Lüst and Boyd of the
LPAC participated in the meeting. This was also attended by the President of the Council, A. Hocker, by
the chairmen of all ad hoc groups except for de Jager, and by a numerous group from the Executive,
including the Director General P. Auger and the Technical Director A.W. Lines.
452 STC, 6th meeting (5-6 October 1965), ESRO/ST/MIN/6, 26 October 1965. The discussion on the to side
sounder is on p. 4-6. The new payload composition is in ESRO/C/148, 12 November 1965.
453 Council, 9th session (24-26 November 1965), ESRO/C/MIN/9, 31 January 1966.
454 to the streetcar concept.
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After the STC meeting, ESTEC's engineers put themselves to work with the S-17 experimenters in
order to solve the technical difficulties connected with the inclusion of the topside sounder in the TD-2
payload. It was recognised that a modification of the antenna was possible so that it would not disturb
the stabilisation of the satellite but, on the other hand, a serious problem arose regarding the telemetry
requirements. In fact, 60,000 bits per second were required to telemeter the complete output and it was
not possible to store such an amount of information on the onboard tape recorder. Therefore, data
could only be transmitted in real time during each pass of the satellite over a telemetry station, what
required at least half of the time of contact with the station. This significantly limited the amount of
information available from the topside sounder and, at the same time, it implied that half of the total
telemetry capacity of the satellite had to be allocated to this experiment.455
According to W. Dieminger, the proposer of S-17, the topside sounder experiment remained
scientifically valuable even in the worst condition, but the LPAC wanted to reaffirm their reservations.
They could not upset the policy established by the STC, of course, but the message they sent to the
Committee was clear enough. In fact, the decision to confirm the topside sounder in the TD-2 payload
was agreed with the abstentions of two of the three members of the LPAC attending the meeting
(Blamont and de Jager) and of four of the six chairmen of ad hoc groups (Frith, de Jager, Occhialini
and Swings). The third LPAC member, chairman Lüst, who was also the chairman of the STC, could
not but vote in favour while the fourth member, Boyd, an opponent of the topside sounder, was absent.
The chairmen of ad hoc groups voting in favour were Hultqvist (of course) and L. Biermann, a
German theoretical astrophysicist interested in solar wind phenomena. The LPAC also agreed to
present the STC with the following statement:
The LPAC expresses concern about the technical difficulties which will probably be
encountered in the development of TD-2. The experimenters involved should be kept
informed on the status of the project and, particularly, on possible interference problems.
The development costs of TD-2 should be thoroughly assessed.456
In the event, a preliminary assessment of costs performed in ESTEC reopened the whole question. As
the engineers vividly put it, it was not possible to deal cheaply with the technical difficulty caused "by
attempting to put an experiment into a satellite with which it is not compatible".457 Taking together
both TD satellites the figures were: 80 MFF for two different scientific payloads integrated into a
standard spacecraft (streetcar concept); 100 to 125 MF for two different spacecraft but with common
components; 160 to 275 for TD-1 and TD-2 as now proposed. A wise alternative was then suggested,
i.e. to build two similar TD spacecraft, as originally suggested by the LPAC, and to carry out the
topside sounder experiment in a separate Scout-type satellite.
On the basis of the new information, the discussion on the topside sounder experiment was resumed in
the STC and a new vote was called. Only the Swedish delegation (i.e. Hultqvist) was now in favour.
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom voted against; France, Italy
and Spain abstained.458 Then the question came of to what should be done with the topside sounder.
The Danish delegation stressed that it had voted for its omission from TD-2 only on the understanding
that it would be flown somehow or other. France and Italy called for further information. The German
delegation pointed out that Dieminger's group had been working on this experiment for a long time.
The British urged proper consideration of the scientific aspects, as "there would be many launchings
of topside sounders on the other side of the Atlantic". In the event, it was agreed to request ESTEC to
455 SCI/WP/51, 9 December 1965.
456 LPAC, 10th meeting (13 December 1965), ESRO/ST/168, 4 January 1966, p. 6.
457 ESRO/ST/177, 27 January 1966, p. 3.
458 STC, 8th meeting (14-15 February 1966), ESRO/ST/MIN/8. The Swiss delegation was absent.
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study the technical and financial implications of the Scout-satellite option, while the scientific merits
of the project would be discussed by the ION group and by the LPAC.459
Not surprisingly the ION group expressed a strong recommendation to launch S-17 by Scout.460 They
again recalled the outstanding contribution of European scientists to ionospheric physics and stressed
that "the proposed experiment would involve an exceptional number of scientific groups". Five groups
had indicated their wish to receive and process data from the topside sounder and Dieminger offered to
waive the normal experimenters' priority for receiving his data and to enable other groups to
participate fully in the analysis of the results. It is fair to say that the whole scientific community
interested in ionospheric research was advocating that ESRO should launch the topside sounder
experiment in one of its satellites.
They did not succeed. The LPAC, in fact, "taking into account the estimate of cost of 30 MFF, in view
of the severe financial limitations of ESRO", decided not to recommend this expenditure which, in
their opinion, was not "entirely justified on scientific grounds". The LPAC recognised, however, that:
The sequence of events leading to this proposal, involving considerations other than
scientific, may be taken into account when the Council makes its final decision.461
The chairman of the LPAC explained to the STC that this last sentence, which opened the door to a
political decision in favour of the topside sounder, had been included in the approved statement
because his committee felt that ESRO had certain responsibilities towards the experimenter who had
been working on this experiment for some time. Furthermore, Lüst recalled that "several delegations
[in the STC] had agreed to the elimination of the topside sounder from the TD-2 payload on the
understanding that some other solution would be found for this experiment". The STC finally agreed
to endorse the LPAC decision not to recommend to the Council the approval of the topside sounder
experiment on a separate Scout vehicle and, by a majority vote, decided to delete the last sentence in
the LPAC resolution.462
When the matter came to the Council, the German delegation stressed that "the future of Prof.
Dieminger's group was at stake [as] it had been working on the topside sounder experiment for about a
year on the understanding that it would be flown by ESRO". In the event, the Council approved the
STC's recommendation which definitely ruled out the topside sounder experiment, but also asked the
STC's chairman to assist Dieminger's group in his search for collaboration with NASA.463
*   *   *
The approved payloads of both TD-1 and TD-2 underwent small changes in the following months. In
late 1966, experiments S-30 and S-96 were withdrawn from TD-1 and TD-2 respectively, and the ad
hoc groups were called to submit recommendations for replacement. The LPAC eventually agreed to
459 Ibidem, p. 5. The feasibility of a Scout-type satellite for launching the topside sounder is discussed in
ION/30, 4 March 1965. The STC also requested the Council for authorisation to take a final decision on
this matter but it did not obtain the necessary delegation of power: Council, 10th session (24-
25 March 1966), ESRO/C/MIN/10, 10 June 1966, p. 3-4. See ESRO/C/174, 9 March 1966.
460 ION group, 15th meeting (15 March 1966), ION/31, 17 March 1966. The arguments in favour of the
topside sounder are presented in detail in ION/32, 26 March 1966, from which the follwing quotation is
taken (p. 2).
461 LPAC, 12th meeting (5 April 1966), ESRO/ST/207, p. 4. The new chairman of the ION group, A.P.
Willmore, abstained. The resolution of the LPAC is also reported in ESRO/ST/195, 13 April 1966, with
attached ION/32 and ESTEC's report SCI/WP/59, 25 March 1966.
462 STC, 9th meeting (2-3 May 1966), ESRO/ST/MIN/9, 7 June 1966, p. 15. Italy, Netherlands, Spain,
Sweden and the United Kingdom voted in favour of the deletion; France and Germany against; Belgium,
Denmark and Switzerland abstained.
463 Council, 11th session (22-24 June 1966), ESRO/C/MIN/11, 15 July 1966, p. 6.
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recommend experiment S-125/S-133 for TD-1 and experiments S-118 and S-126 for TD-2.464 Finally,
in early 1970, experiment S-1 was withdrawn from TD-1. The final configuration of the two payloads
is reported in Tables 5-16 and 5-17.
One consideration is suggested by inspection of these tables, which touch the resulting hybrid
composition of the two TD payloads. TD-1 had originally been devoted to non-solar astronomy.
Subsequently, when the new capability of the Thor Delta launcher allowed an increase of the payload
weight, two experiments on solar physics had been added and one for cosmic ray studies. TD-2 was to
be devoted to solar astronomy but, when financial and institutional difficulties led to the abandonment
of TD-3, its mission was redefined in order to include other research fields. This resulted in very
complex payloads, including various uncorrelated experiments in both branches of astrophysics (solar
and stellar), in atmospheric and ionospheric physics, and in cosmic ray physics. Again this puts into
evidence the fluid condition of the European space science community in 1965, still unable (and also
unwilling, we should say) to use ESRO's limited resources to implement a satellite programme based
on a few well defined scientific missions, supported by technically sophisticated instrumentation. On
the contrary, in a context characterised by great uncertainty regarding the technical and financial
conditions of the satellite programme, any research group and any sector of the scientific community
could lobby for a share in ESRO's spacecraft. The lack of an authoritative scientific staff in ESRO and
the weakness of its management vis-à-vis member state delegations are the main reasons for this
unhealthy situation. In 1966 this was still compensated by the ongoing LAS project, but after the
abandonment of ESRO's most ambitious project and the drastic retrenchment of the financial resources
available to the Organisation, the need of establishing scientific guidelines and priorities became
inescapable.
5.4.6 The second highly eccentric orbit satellite and the ESLAB controversy
In 1967, within the framework of discussions about future satellite projects, the LPAC recommended
that the HEOS-A spacecraft should be used for a second highly eccentric orbit satellite (HEOS-A2).
The scientific mission of this satellite was to be defined by the chairman of the LPAC together with
the chairmen of the ION, PLA and COS Groups. The recommendation was endorsed by the STC who
invited scientific groups in Europe to submit experiment proposals that, in their words, "could include
either new experiments, repeats of experiments of HEOS-A1, or modified versions of these".465
Seventeen proposals were received by March 1968 and examined by the three interested Working
Groups. They agreed that HEOS-A2 should be injected into an orbit of high latitude apogee and its
mission should include "a study of propagation of cosmic rays in the solar system in correlation with
direct measurements of interplanetary fields and particles and of the properties of the boundary
between the magnetosphere and interplanetary space". On this basis, the chairmen of the groups
proposed a payload composition to the LPAC.466
The LPAC had no difficulty in approving the proposed payload, but for one experiment for which two
almost identical proposals existed: S-204, proposed by D.E. Page, from ESRO's scientific laboratory
(ESLAB), and S-217, proposed by J. Labeyrie, from the Centre d'Etudes Nucléaires in Saclay.467 Both
experiments aimed at measuring intermediate energy particles and, according to the COS Group,
"although S-204 was technically the better experiment, S-217 should have priority because of the
464 LPAC, 16th meeting (8-9 February 1967), ESRO/ST/245, 8 March 1967. The recommendation was
accepted by the STC at its 14th meeting (21 February 1967), ESRO/ST/MIN/14, 10 April 1967. Both S-
125 and S-133 aimed at measuring celestial gamma rays, the former being proposed by Lüst and the latter
by Occhialini and Labeyrie. The two groups decided to collaborate and the experiment was eventually
known as S-133. See also ESRO/ST/213, 9 September 1966 and SCI/WP/75, 30 January 1967.
465 LPAC, 17th meeting (11 April 1967), ESRO/ST/253, 30 April 1967; 18th meeting (28 September 1967),
ESRO/ST/271, 9 October 1967. STC, 16th meeting (9-10 October 1967), ESRO/ST/MIN/16,
29 November 1967, p. 5. See also SCI/WP/94, 22 September 1967.
466 ESRO/ST/290, 27 June 1968, p. 1.
467 LPAC, 22nd meeting (3 May 1968), LPAC/6, 17 June 1968.
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wider energy ranges covered".468 When reporting to the LPAC, however, the chairwoman of the COS
Group, C. Dilworth, said that both experiments had been modified since and now they resembled each
other more than before so that, in her opinion, the matter should be referred back to the COS Group
for further discussion.
As a matter of fact, the choice between these two experiments involved considerations other than of
purely scientific value. The real issue was that S-204 was the first experiment proposal coming from
within ESRO which was a serious candidate for inclusion in an satellite payload, and it was in direct
competition with a similar experiment proposed by a French group which usually enjoyed a large
share in ESRO spacecraft. The establishment of a research laboratory within ESRO had been one of
the main controversial issues in the COPERS period, when the institutional framework of the
Organisation was discussed, and ESLAB was the outcome of a compromise which implied that
ESRO's scientists were not to compete with research groups in Member States.469 This non-scientific
consideration, more than the wider energy range covered, had possibly influenced the COS Group's
original choice of Labeyrie's experiment, "although S-204 was technically the better experiment".
What had happened since exposed the real question, however, as the ESLAB group had shown that
they could extend their energy range by a simple modification of their experiment and the Saclay
group had taken over a part of the design of their competitor in order to improve the performance of
their own.470 After a long discussion, which touched several issues well beyond the problem of just
choosing one experiment for a small satellite, the LPAC agreed to seek a way out from the slippery
ground in which aspects "apart from scientific value" had to be taken into consideration. Both
proposals were referred back to the COS Group for further consideration "on scientific and technical
grounds", on the basis of the judgement of an external referee. If the group arrived at the opinion that
really no differences existed on these grounds between the two proposals, the question had to be
discussed again by the LPAC. The German cosmic ray physicist G. Pfotzer, assisted by COS Group's
members G. Pizzella and P. Rothwell, was invited to report on S-204 and S-217. In the event,
following their recommendation, the COS Group reversed their former judgement and approved S-
204.471 The payload composition of HEOS-A2 was thus submitted to the approval of the STC and
Council as in Table 5-18.
No problems arose in the former, which did not even convene to discuss on the HEOS-A2 payload and
the delegations voted ad referendum.472 But it was quite different in the Council, where the controversy
exploded openly when the French delegation "strongly protested against the manner in which the
payload composition had been decided". There was no question, they argued, about ESLAB's right to
submit proposals for experiments, but "they must be of an original nature and not compete with the
proposals submitted by national scientific groups". The delegation went as far as to add a statement
that sounded like a menace:
The decision taken had created a feeling of uneasiness within the French group whose
proposal has been set aside. [...] The situation that had thus arisen was extremely
unfortunate. [...] If the only French group of scientists concerned with the work of ESRO
were led to have a negative attitude, it would be difficult for the French Delegation to
defend the Organisation.473
468 COS Group, 18th meeting (25-26 March 1968), COS/37, 8 July 1968, p. 3.
469 See chapter 2.
470 C. Dilworth, private communication to the author. Among extra-scientific considerations one could add
the fact that Page and the ESLAB group were somewhat outsiders in the European "space science club"
while Labeyrie was a long-time friend and collaborator of Dilworth and Occhialini.
471 COS Group, 19th meeting (5 June 1968), COS/39, 18 October 1968. The report of the referees is
appended as annex I.
472 ESRO/ST/290, 27 June 1968. ESRO/ST/290, add. 1, 14 August 1968.
473 Council, 25th session (8-9 October 1968), ESRO/C/MIN/25, 6 November 1968, p. 13 and 14. The French
delegation also blamed the Director General because, when requesting the vote of the STC ad
referendum, he had not officially informed them of the change in the payload composition: ESRO/C/370,
8 October 1968.
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A rather nervous discussion followed, in which the chairman of the LPAC, rather desperately, stressed
that "the experiments were considered solely on the basis of their scientific value and the LPAC did
not take account of political aspects". This was particularly true for the case under discussion, he
added with plain naivety as the point raised by the French was in fact a matter of policy. The Director
General, on his own part, recalled that the ESLAB programme, which included the experiment under
discussion, had been approved more than a year and a half before: He could not accept that
experiments proposed by ESLAB should not be allowed to compete on an equal footing with national
groups:
ESLAB had an extremely important task to carry out and it would be impossible to retain
highly qualified scientists in ESLAB if they had the impression that there was no hope of
seeing a practical application of their work.474
In the event, science prevailed over politics, and the payload of HEOS-A2 was approved as proposed
by the LPAC, with the abstentions of the Belgian and French delegations and a generic
recommendation to the STC for an improvement in the selection procedure of experiments.
5.4.7 The TD-1/TD-2 crisis and the abandonment of TD-2
By early 1968 it appeared evident that the financial costs of the joint TD-1/TD-2 project had been
greatly underestimated by the industrial consortium with which a preliminary contract had been signed
one year earlier. A detailed revision resulted in a real cost escalation, from the original estimate of 109
MFF to twice this figure. By the time the TD programme was finished, the ESRO Directorate warned,
the actual sum spent might well be in the region of 320 MFF, including capital facilities and
launchings.475 The ESRO Council was thus confronted with a difficult choice. On the one hand, it
could decide to cancel the TD programme, the only important project left for the Organisation in the
first phase of its 8-year period. This implied devastating effects, such as the waste of the money,
capital investment and human resources already invested; a great blow to the prestige of European
industry; a traumatic effect on the experimenters and the definitive loss of confidence of the scientific
community in ESRO. Going on with the TD programme, on the other hand, would severely squeeze
and limit the funds available for the future scientific programme and would render more difficult the
task of balancing the geographical distribution of contracts.
The bad news about the TD programme dropped like a bomb-shell in the dramatic financial and
institutional crisis ESRO was living in early 1968. The Organisation, in fact, was feeling the
consequence of the Member States' failure to reach agreement on the ceiling for the second three-year
period (1967-1969), and therefore any budget decision required unanimous approval in the Council.
All problems and difficulties accumulating in the seven years since the start of the European joint
effort in space were showing up in all crudeness. In the words of the new Director General, Hermann
Bondi, "the future of ESRO looked bleak indeed".476
A dramatic discussion on the TD programme took place at the Council session of 28-29 March 1968
but it came to nothing. The Council, in fact, did express an indication in favour of the continuation of
the programme and authorised the extension of the preliminary contract for 4 months, but, on the other
hand, it could not find unanimous agreement to approve the inclusion in the 1968 budget of the
contract authority required by the Director General to sign the final contract. The main opposition
came from the Italian delegation, because of their deep dissatisfaction towards the geographical
474 Ibidem, p. 13.
475 ESRO/C/342, 14 March 1968, with add. 1 (21 March 1968) and add. 2 (27 March 1968).
476 Bondi (1984), p. 22. Bondi had taken over from Auger in November 1967.
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distribution of ESRO's industrial contracts which penalised Italy.477 An extraordinary Council session
was then called one week later, on the occasion of the official inauguration of ESTEC, in the hope that
a suitable solution could be found. This was not to be, however. The Italian delegation, in fact,
subjected its approval to the continuation of the programme to the condition that Italy's participation in
the programme be limited to 11.72 % of the original cost estimate (109 MFF for the construction of
the satellites and 40 MFF for launchings). This, of course, was hardly acceptable by other Member
States and ESRO's Legal Adviser warned that there was no possibility in the Convention of meeting
the Italian delegation's request. As a consequence, Italy's one vote against the inclusion in the 1968
budget of the contract authority necessary for the placing of the TD contract resulted in a veto that
blocked the project against the wishes of all other delegations. The Organisation, the Director General
stressed, found itself "virtually without a programme", while the German and French delegations, for
their part, cautioned that "the decision now made would have very serious consequences [...] as
regards the Member States' future attitude towards ESRO".478
Following the Council decision, ESRO found itself in the necessity to cancel the TD programme
outright. This meant the complete loss of 72 MFF already committed to the programme and the
wastage of the facilities of ESTEC and ESTRACK installed to cater for the two satellites and destined
to remain idle pending a new programme. Moreover, from the scientific point of view, European
scientists had lost the possibility of studying the solar maximum from space. In this situation, which
left the Organisation "at the mercy of a single delegation's veto", Bondi felt that a solution had to be
worked out anyway, in order to enable ESRO "to meet its obligation to the scientists who had
experiments on the TD satellites". He suggested cancelling only one of the TD satellites, while the
other could be continued as a special project under article VIII of the Convention, which allowed
ESRO to develop projects on behalf of a group of Member States, after approval by a two-thirds
majority in the Council. The cancelled satellite would be replaced by a new, small satellite carrying
only the experiments remaining scientifically valid.479
The STC endorsed Bondi's proposal with the proviso that first priority on future flight opportunities
should be given to experiments from the cancelled TD satellite, and the proposal was then approved
by the Council.480 It was now the LPAC's task to advise as to which of the TD satellites should be
cancelled and, eventually, on which of its experiments should be retained in the new satellite. A first
discussion on this question took place at the restricted LPAC meeting held during the COSPAR
477 Council, 22nd session (28-29 March 1968), ESRO/C/MIN/22, 22 April 1968, p. 15. The resolution was
approved by 6 votes in favour; Italy voted against, Switzerland and Denmark abstained, Belgium did note
take part in the vote. From ESRO's General Report for 1967 (p. 114) we learn that, by the end of that
year, Italy's financial contributions to ESRO was 11.41 per cent of total member state contributions while
the percentage value of contracts placed in the country was 7.50. The ratio of contract percentage to
contribution percentage was 0.657. This figure was significantly higher than for Denmark (0.358) and
Spain (0.249); significantly lower than for France (1.954), Belgium (1.602), Switzerland (1.325),
Netherlands (1.154), and Sweden (1.130); and comparable with that of Germany (0.612) and the United
Kingdom (0.713). The latter two countries, however, were by far the most important contributors to
ESRO (23.32 and 24.19ÿ%, respectively) and therefore the absolute value of contracts was high.
478 Council, 23th session (4 April 1968), ESRO/C/MIN/23, 3 May 1968, p. 7.
479 Bondi's proposal is presented in ESRO/C/349, 17 May 1968, from which the first of the previous
quotation is taken. Its legal and financial aspects are discussed in ESRO/C/350 and ESRO/C/351
respectively, both dated 17 May 1968. See also ESRO/C/356, 21 May 1968. The second quotation is from
Bondi's presentation at the 1st meeting of the STC (6 May 1968), ESRO/ST/MIN/18, 26 June 1968, p. 2.
480 STC, 19th meeting (29 May 1968), ESRO/ST/MIN/19, 28 June 1968. Council, 24th session
(30 May 1968), ESRO/C/MIN/24, 7 June 1968. At this session the Council approved to cancel one TD
satellite and to pursue the other either as an ESRO project or as a special project. In the event, as
unanimity was not reached, the TD-1 project was approved as a special project financed by all Member
States bar Italy: Council,
25th session (8-8 October 1968), ESRO/C/MIN/25, 6 November 1968. The complex legal and financial
aspects of the
TD special project are presented in ESRO/C/360 with several addenda and revisions.
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Symposium in Tokyo, on 14 May 1968, but no firm recommendation was issued in that occasion.481 In
the event, as it appeared that there was no clear priority on scientific grounds as to which of the TD
satellite projects should continue, the STC agreed to authorise the Director General, in consultation
with the Bureau, to take the decision, after carrying out a technical and financial assessment.482 This
showed that, in order to enable significant simplification of the project, the spacecraft design had to be
modified so that it could keep its stabilisation only if shone upon by the Sun but not during eclipses.
This implied that the satellite should be injected into an helio-synchronous orbit. Proper consideration
of the experiments included in the two payloads showed that the scientific mission of TD-1 could still
be fulfilled satisfactorily after this modification while that of TD-2 would be seriously jeopardised.
Therefore the former was kept in the programme as a "special project" funded by all Member States
bar Italy, while a "TD-2 rescue operation" was undertaken in order to save as many as possible of the
TD-2 experiments.483
5.4.8 The TD-2 rescue operation and the approval of ESRO IV
The problem of rescuing the still scientifically valid experiments of TD-2 was not easy, as it required
"a solution [...] that was fast, compatible with the industrial policy of the Organisation, and did not
consume so much of the available funds that it would prevent new projects being started".484 Of the 11
experiments included in the satellite payload (Table 5-17), 4 required solar pointing (S-39, S-106,
S-118, S-126), while the others could be flown in non-stabilised satellites. From the viewpoint of
research fields involved, three experiments regarded solar physics (S-39, S-106, S-126); three
regarded atmospheric physics (S-80, S-97 and S-118); three regarded ionospheric and auroral
phenomena (S-45, S-85, and S-94); and two regarded solar wind (S-99 and S-103). It was thus evident
that any solution of the rescue operation involved a complex decision on how to take into account
various scientific interests and technical constraints.
In September 1968, three options were presented to the LPAC and the STC by the ESRO Directorate
for Programmes and Planning. The first was to rescue some of the experiments not requiring solar
pointing by using an non-stabilised spacecraft like ESRO I or ESRO II. In particular, the ESRO I
spacecraft structure could be used to make a so-called ESRO III satellite carrying the ionospheric
experiments S-45, S-85 and S-94; otherwise, by using the ESRO II spacecraft with improved solar
cells, the so-called ESRO IV satellite could be realised, which would carry the atmospheric
experiment S-80 and the solar wind experiments S-99 and S-103 (the other non solar-pointing
atmospheric experiment S-97 had been withdrawn). The cost estimate of the spacecraft was 25 MFF
and 20 MFF respectively, with an additional 7.5 MFF for the Scout launcher. ESRO III would be
ready for flight in September 1971; ESRO IV by the end of 1971. The second option was to use a
NASA OSO (Orbiting Solar Observatory) spacecraft for flying three of the four solar pointing TD-2
experiments, namely S-39, S-106 and S-118. In this case ESRO would purchase a flight unit of a
standard OSO spacecraft from NASA at a cost of around 40 MFF and would place these experiments
in the pointing section of the satellite. The remaining payload capacity would be put at NASA disposal
for American experimenters in order to obtain in exchange the provision of a Thor Delta launcher
without charge (the cost of such a launcher was about 20 MFF). The launch of such a satellite was
possible before the end of 1972, still in time to cover the solar maximum.
481 LPAC, 23rd meeting (14 May 1968), LPAC/7, 26 June 1968. The meeting was attended by LPAC
members Lüst,
De Jager, Hultqvist and Occhialini (Blamont being unable to attend), by the director of ESLAB
(E.A. Trendelenburg) and by J. Ortner of ESRO's Directorate of Programmes and Planning.
482 STC, 19th meeting (29 May 1968), ESRO/ST/MIN/19, 28 June 1968.
483 ESRO, General Report 1968. The TD-1 special project is described in ESRO/C/362, 23 September 1968,
and add. 1, 27 September 1968. A general account of the TD-2 rescue operation is in ESRO/ST/303,
19 February 1969.
484 STC, 20th meeting, 7 October 1968, ESRO/ST/MIN/20, 18 November 1968, p. 7. Also LPAC, 24th
meeting
(first session, 23 September 1968), LPAC/15, 13 November 1968.
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Finally, the third option foresaw the development in Europe of a new spacecraft with good solar
stabilisation capability. In fact, the ESRO's Secretariat had received "an unofficial proposal from a
European firm to develop a stabilised satellite with a higher degree of stabilisation than the OSO, at a
lower cost, and with a faster delivery schedule and under more satisfactory contract conditions than
had hitherto been thought possible". This solution, however, could not be realised before the end of
1974 and was more expensive than the others. It actually envisaged the development of a real new
solar satellite project.485
The LPAC did not feel able to give preference to one of these different possibilities or to establish
priorities between them. Looking at the matter from a purely scientific point of view, the Committee
seemed less interested in rescuing the TD-2 experiments than in starting a vigorous programme in
solar physics in collaboration with NASA.486 The latter had suggested in fact a joint ESRO/NASA
project for building two improved OSO spacecraft, carrying experiments provided in equal number by
the two agencies, and the LPAC felt that ESRO should not miss this opportunity. The STC, on their
side, avoided taking a decision at this stage, limiting themselves to entrust the LPAC with the
responsibility of "examining and recommending whether the experiments were of sufficient value to
merit their being given priority over newer proposals".487 Thus the issue went back to the LPAC.  As a
matter of fact, the problem of the TD-2 replacement had important political and scientific implications
that made any decision difficult and painful. First of all, from the scientific point of view, it was
necessary to assess the scientific worthiness of the TD-2 experiments at the time when they could be
flown vis-à-vis new experiment proposals. As the Danish delegation in the STC put it: "There was a
risk of conflict between the moral obligation of the Organisation to fly the displaced TD-2
experiments and the interests of the future projects". Moreover, as it was evident that the rescue
operation could not save all TD-2 experiments, a selection had to be made and this involved a major
issue of scientific policy, namely the role of solar physics in ESRO's programme. Among the political
aspects, there was the need to place a certain number of sub-contracts to firms other than those that
had been responsible for the construction of ESRO I and II so as to comply with the requirements of
fair geographical distribution of contracts. Another important political issue, connected with the OSO
option, regarded the hostility of several Member States to any choice involving "buying American".
Three dramatic meetings of the LPAC were held between November 1968 and March 1969 to discuss
the whole matter. At the first, all TD-2 experimenters presented their work in progress and called
strongly on the moral obligation ESRO had towards them.488 This was particularly stressed by those
proposing solar pointing experiments. Speaking on behalf of the Leicester University group preparing
experiment S-39, K. Pounds said that they had already spent 70 % of the total contract sum for their
spectrograph, adding that "it would be essential that ESRO did not delay further a decision on whether
or not experiment S 39 would be flown before the end of 1972". The Munich group proposing S-118
claimed that this experiment represented a new technique for the study of the oxygen content of the
upper atmosphere and "no other experiment of its kind had been designed so far by any other group".
They had already invested 800,000 DM in the development of the instrument and Lüst added that
"[this] group would probably be disbanded were this experiment to be suppressed". De Jager, while
advocating the scientific merit of experiment S-126 ("the best existing for scanning the solar disk in
soft X-rays"), recognised that it could not be included in a standard OSO spacecraft and volunteered to
withdraw the experiment if ESRO decided to rescue the solar pointing experiments by using such a
satellite. He added, however, that:
It was his sincere hope that, in the event of the experiment being withdrawn for the
reasons stated, ESRO would take into consideration the efforts so far made in the
485 STC, 20th meeting (7 October 1968), ESRO/ST/MIN/20, 18 November 1968, p. 7.
486 LPAC, 24th meeting (first session, 23 September 1968), LPAC/15, 13 November 1968.
487 STC, 20th meeting (7 October 1968), ESRO/ST/MIN/20, 18 November 1968, p. 7-8.
488 LPAC, 25th meeting (19 November 1968), LPAC/19, 8 January 1969. Following quotations from p. 4-6.
Technical information on the various TD-2 experiments were presented in LPAC/14, 11 November 1968.
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realisation of the instrument and examine the possibility of flying an improved version
some time in the future on a solar satellite with highly improved scanning capabilities.
As a matter of fact, for most European space scientists as well as for the LPAC, the rescue of the solar
pointing experiments, and thus the involvement of ESRO in the rapidly evolving discipline of solar
physics, was certainly more appealing than the ESRO III or ESRO IV solution. The time factor was
essential in this case since significant results could be obtained by the proposed experiments only if
the satellite were launched not later than 1972, what excluded the possibility of building a new
satellite in Europe. In the event, the LPAC recommended the second option, namely to buy an OSO
spacecraft to fly the solar pointing experiments S-39, S-106 and S-118 in its pointing section, leaving
the non pointing section to American experiments in exchange for free launching by Thor Delta.
At the following meeting of the LPAC, in January 1969, the framework had radically changed.489
ESRO's Director for Programmes and Plans, J.-A. Dinkespiler, informed that NASA was not
interested in the proposed arrangement and consequently, if ESRO wanted to use an OSO spacecraft to
rescue its solar pointing experiments, it would have to pay for both the satellite and the launcher. In
this case, however, it would be possible to accommodate in the spacecraft also the non-pointing
experiments, thus rescuing most of the TD-2 experiments. But this solution implied paying some 65 to
105 MF to NASA and it seemed hardly feasible to persuade ESRO's Member States to spend their
money across the Atlantic. Only very strong scientific arguments could justify the effort. In Bondi's
words:
The Director General would only consider the OSO solution as a possibility if the LPAC
were to state categorically that this was the only possible solution. If any other possibility
existed and it was a question of preference on the part of the LPAC, he could not, for
political reasons, undertake to recommend this solution to the STC and Council.
Another possibility did exist, as a study made by ESRO showed that it was possible to design and
build in Europe a small solar-pointing, Scout-type satellite to fly the three experiments already
approved for the OSO solution (EUROSOL project).490 The main drawback laid in the time scale, as it
would not be possible to launch this satellite before the second half of 1973. In conclusion,
Dinkespiler listed the costs (including launchers) and schedules of the various solutions for the TD-2
rescue operation as they could be estimated at that stage:
European pointing satellite 100 MFF second half of 1973
OSO-a (without prototype) 65 MFF Spring 1972
OSO-b (with prototype) 105 MFF end 1972
ESRO III or IV 35 - 40 MFF end 1971
Facing this situation, the LPAC could only choose the line of least resistance, if only from the political
and not from the scientific and financial viewpoint:
The LPAC felt it desirable to have a European solar satellite developed and flown by
1973 on condition that all three experimenters concerned would agree to this solution,
particularly with regard to the time scale. [...] In the event of any one answer being
negative, ESRO would be left with the choice of pursuing the OSO solution or
abandoning the rescue operation for the pointing experiments.
In other words, the members of the LPAC and the chairmen of the ad hoc groups, who acted on behalf
of the European space science community, did not feel strong enough to advocate the purchase of an
American spacecraft on the basis of purely scientific arguments, i.e. the possibility of rescuing most of
489 LPAC, 26th meeting (8 January 1969), LPAC/25, 13 February 1969. Following quotations from p. 4-6 and
8.
490 This project is described in annex 1 to ESRO/ST/303, 19 February 1969.
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the TD-2 experiments at good price and according to the best timing. They rather hoped that the
experimenters could accept the postponement of one year so as to save a solar physics programme in
ESRO. At the same time, they did not express any interest in the ESRO III and ESRO IV options.
At this stage, following a question from the chairman of the COS Group, C. Dilworth, the Director for
Satellite and Sounding Rocket Programmes in ESTEC, P. Blassel, specified that the schedule
presented was correct only if ESRO accorded the highest priority to the solar satellite, i.e. in
preference to HEOS-A2. In fact, as the TD-1 project was already occupying almost the entire technical
staff, and because of the difficulty of recruiting competent staff at short notice, only one new project
could be started and a priority had to be established. This information radically changed the situation.
For the LPAC, in fact, any delay in the development and launch of HEOS-A2 was not acceptable, as
this "would amount to ESRO's disappointing the experimenters involved in this satellite". Therefore,
assuming the HEOS-A2 project to take first priority, starting in Spring 1969 as planned, the realistic
time scale had to be changed as follows:
European pointing satellite Spring 1974
OSO - a (without prototype) Autumn 1972
OSO - b (with prototype) mid 1973
ESRO III or IV mid 1972
The new time scale affected the position of the LPAC and led its members to assume a more resolute
line vis-à-vis the STC and the Council:
The LPAC as well as the solar experimenters themselves regard 1972 as the latest
possible launch date for the rescue of the TD-2 solar pointing experiments. This condition
cannot be achieved using a European solar satellite due to the time factor imposed.
Therefore, the LPAC recommends the rescue of the experiments on board an OSO
satellite without prototype, being the only possible solution within the required time
scale. If Council were not to support this recommendation, the rescue operation for the
solar pointing experiments could not be realised.
In other words, facing the prospects of a delay of almost 2 years compared to the most acceptable
launch date, the LPAC felt they had good enough scientific arguments to overcome political
opposition. They knew this would not be easy, however, and called the community to a lobbying
initiative:
The scientists themselves should brief their delegations so that they had a full
understanding of the implications for the European scientific community should they
reject the OSO proposal for political reasons.
They did not succeed, however. On the eve of the STC meeting called to issue its final
recommendation to the Council, the LPAC met again and it was clear at that moment that there was no
hope of getting the OSO solution approved. On the one hand, this solution was certainly attractive
from the financial point of view and by far the most interesting one from the scientific point of view.
On the other hand, it was of no technical interest to Europe and thus contrary to ESRO's industrial
policy. Unless this policy was modified for this purpose, the rescue of the TD-2 pointing experiments
had to be abandoned. In conclusion, while the OSO solution was still listed among possible options,
the LPAC agreed to recommend the launching of ESRO IV, for which the possibility of allocating in
its payload, after slight modification, five non-pointing experiments had been demonstrated
(Table 5-19).491
491 LPAC, 27th meeting (5 March 1969), LPAC/27, 26 March 1969. See ESRO/ST/302, 19 February 1969,
with add. 1, 5 March 1969, and ESRO/ST/303, 19 February 1969. For the ESRO IV payload see
LPAC/21, 23 December 1968.
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It is quite probable that, by that time, European solar physicists had decided to abandon the
controversial OSO solution for launching obsolete experiments and to set a more promising attack
front, i.e. lobbying to get ESRO to embark on an advanced solar satellite project at a later stage. In
fact, at the STC meeting on the following day, the main spokesman of this community in Europe, the
LPAC member and Dutch delegate C. De Jager declared that:
Although [the delegation] had no objections in principle against buying an OSO in the
United States, they did not think this was the desirable solution for the solar physicists:
their requirements went beyond launching simply one or two solar experiments on an
OSO and would be far better satisfied with a more advanced solar project later in the
programme.492
In the event, the STC endorsed (with the abstention of France and Belgium) the LPAC's
recommendation to develop the ESRO IV project and adopted a recommendation, put forward by
Lüst, by which ESRO was urged to initiate, as soon as possible a feasibility study for "a sophisticated
solar satellite, which should be included among the proposals for a major project from which a choice
would be made in 1970/1971".493 The solar physics community did not have its feasibility study, nor
did it have a chance to advocate its satellite against other project proposals. In fact, in 1969, after the
decision to build the two new satellites COS-B and GEOS, the LPAC was called to discuss ESRO's
long-term scientific policy, in order to enable the Organisation to make "a careful selection of new
feasibility studies to be initiated on future projects".494 The outcome was a policy definition which
definitely excluded stellar astronomy and high resolution solar astronomy from ESRO's future satellite
programme, confining these fields to rocket experiments. According to the LPAC's scientific policy on
ESRO satellite programme for the late 1970s, primary consideration had to be given to a very limited
number of research fields, including fundamental physics (like the investigation of the general theory
of gravitation), high energy astrophysics (X- and gamma-ray astronomy), cosmic ray studies, and
plasma physics investigations in the magnetosphere. As a consequence, the structure of ESRO's
scientific advisory groups was reorganised in 1971, the existing six ad hoc groups being replaced by
an Astrophysics Working Group, a Solar System Working Group, and a Fundamental Physics Panel.
By 1969 the first phase of ESRO's life came to an end. The Organisation's first generation of satellites
were in orbit (ESRO I and II, HEOS-1) or under development and scheduled for launch in 1972
(HEOS-2, TD-1 and ESRO IV): this was the actual outcome of the ambitious programme which the
ESRO pioneers had written in the Blue Book for COPERS in 1961. With the approval of two new
satellite projects (COS-B and GEOS) and the policy definition of early 1970 a new phase started: it
was definitely recognised that ESRO could not support all fields of space science in a viable way but it
had to select a few, well-phased major projects according to agreed scientific guidelines. Choices had
to be made in order to establish priorities and concentrate efforts in those fields where: (a) interesting
new scientific results could be expected; (b) technical complexity and financial needs fell within the
limits of ESRO's capabilities; and (c) a safe niche for original results existed between the programmes
of the two space superpowers.
At this turning point there were winners and losers, of course. Among the former we can easily
identify the cosmic ray physicists, who firmly occupied both the ground of magnetospheric
investigation and that of high energy astrophysics: both COS-B and GEOS were recommended and
strongly advocated by the COS Group, while the following X-ray mission of the EXOSAT satellite
was also an achievement of the same sector of the space science community. The most illustrious
losers were, needless to say, the astronomers. Those interested in stellar astronomy first lost the Large
492 STC, 21st meeting (6 March 1969), ESRO/ST/MIN/21, 24 March 1969, p. 4.
493 Ibidem. It appears from the minutes that only Sweden considered that "the policy of not buying
American" should be slackened in this case and the OSO solution adopted. ESRO IV was approved by the
Council, together with HEOS-A2, at its 27th session (25-26 March 1969), ESRO/C/MIN/27, 4 April 1969.
See also ESRO/C/397, 14 March 1969.
494 ESRO/ST/330, 10 October 1969, p. 1. The selection of COS-B and GEOS will be discussed in chapter 7.
The definition of ESRO's scientific policy will be dealt with in detail in chapter 8.
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Astronomical Satellite (LAS) and then did not succeed in getting the less ambitious UVAS (Ultra
Violet Astronomy Satellite) project approved against COS-B and GEOS. Solar astronomers, on their
side, lost TD-2 and did not even have a second chance.
At the beginning of the new decade ESRO was reaching maturity. Something of the muddled
enthusiasm of its early period had faded away and a new awareness of the role and limits of the
Organisation had emerged from the hard times of the crisis. Important changes in the organisational
structure gave more flexibility and autonomy to the Organisation and ESRO's Member States
reaffirmed their confidence in it by agreeing on its extension beyond the 8-year period covered by the
original Convention. The scientific programme could be planned on a more secure basis and,
moreover, Member States entrusted to ESRO the task of studying and eventually implementing a new
programme on application satellites. In the difficult and controversial situation of European
cooperation in space, ESRO represented the most solid element.
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Table 5-1a
Ad hoc Working Groups and their chairmen in 1962-63
A Atmospheric Structure G.V. Groves (UK) 495
B Ionosphere and Auroral Phenomena B. Hultqvist (S)
C Meteorology A. Nyberg (S)
D Solar Astronomy and General Astronomy J.-C. Pecker (F)
E Interplanetary Medium C. De Jager (NL)
F Lunar and Planetary Astronomy P. Swings (B)
G Cosmic Rays and Trapped Radiation G. Occhialini (I)
H Geodetics, Relativity and Gravitation W. Kertz (D) 496
Table 5-1b
New distribution of atmospheric and astronomical groups
A, C Atmospheric structure R. Frith (UK)
D Sun C. De Jager (NL)
E Moon, planets, comets and interplanetary space L.F. Biermann (D)
F Stars and stellar systems P. Swings (B)
Table 5-2
Satellite experiment proposal by early 1963
A - Atmospheric Structure 3
B - Ionosphere and Auroral Phenomena 20
C - Meteorology 2
D - Solar Astronomy and General Astronomy 20
E - Interplanetary Medium 7
F - Lunar and Planetary Astronomy --
G - Cosmic Rays and Trapped Radiation 18
H - Geodetics, Relativity and Gravitation 1
TOTAL 71
From: COPERS/LPSC/32, rev. 2, 7 May 1963.
495 M. Nicolet (B) had been initially proposed for the chairmanship of this group but he could not accept.
496 J. Bartels (D) had been initially proposed for the chairmanship of this group but he could not accept.
This group was eventually dissolved.
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Table 5-3
Membership of the Launching Programme Advisory Committee (LPAC)
1964-67 1968-69 1969-70
R. Lüst (chairman) R. Lüst (chairman) R. Lüst (chairman)
J. Blamont J. Blamont J. Geiss
R. Boyd B. Hultqvist B. Hultqvist
C. de Jager C. de Jager G. Occhialini
G. Occhialini B. Strömgren
Table 5-4
Chairmen of ad hoc Working Groups
1964-65 1966 1967-68
ATM Atmospheric structure R. Frith R. Frith F. Möller
ION Ionospheric and auroral
phenomena
B. Hultqvist A. Willmore A. Willmore
SUN Solar astronomy C. de Jager R. Michard R. Michard
PLA Moon, planets, comets and inter-
planetary medium
L. Biermann L. Biermann J. Geiss
STAR Stellar astronomy P. Swings P. Swings L. Gratton
COS Cosmic rays and trapped
radiation
G. Occhialini B. Peters C. Dilworth
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Table 5-5
ESRO sounding rockets launches











N.B: The 1966 figures include ESRO's participation in the solar-eclipse campaign on the island of
Karystos, Greece, in May 1966, when ESRO launched seven rockets within a 3-hour windows centred
on the time of the eclipse, plus two other rockets some days earlier.
Table 5-6
Rocket types used by ESRO










Launching programme proposed by the LPAC in February 1965




space probes Major projects
1967 S-1 S-2
1968
1969 TD-1 TD-2 SP-1
1970 TD-3 TD-4 SP-2
1971 TD-5 TD-6 SP-3 SP-4 A-1
1972 A-2
It was assumed that Thor Delta rockets would be used for all TD- and SP-type satellites. For major projects the
ELDO launcher was assumed.
From ESRO/ST/109, 3 March 1965. p. 6. Also ESRO/ST/114, 16 March 1965, p. 6.
Table 5-8

















































































800 225 650 650 0 or 90 ° 1970
1971
1972
From ESRO, General Report, 1964-65, fig. 2.9 and 2.10.
Only the names of the projects actually approved are indicated. Notice that two TD satellites and one HEOS
satellite are in brackets because their actual realisation seemed already jeopardised by lack of financial resources.
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Table 5-9
Satellite experiments proposals by the end of 1965
ATM Atmospheric Structure and Meteorology 8
ION Ionospheric and Auroral Phenomena 39
SUN Solar Astronomy 16
STAR Stellar Astronomy 7
PLA Study of the Moon, Planets and Interplanetary Medium 14
COS Cosmic Rays and Trapped Radiation 25
--- Space Biology 1
TOTAL 110
From ESRO General Report, 1964-65, p. 26-27.
Table 5-10
The payload of ESRO I approved in 1963
(polar ionosphere)
S-32 Auroral photometry D.R. Bates
Queen's University, Belfast
S-42 Helium lines He II (304 Å) and
He I (584 Å)
R. Boyd
University College London








S-70 Ionospheric sounding E. Vassy
Lab. Phys. de l'Atmosphère, Paris





Radio and Space Res. Station, Slough
B. Hultqvist
Kiruna Geophysical Observatory
From: COPERS/GTST/82, rev. 1, 14 June 1963, p. 2.
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Table 5-11
The payload of ESRO II approved in Spring 1963
(solar astronomy and cosmic rays)
S-25 Trapped radiation H. Elliot
Imperial College, London
S-27 Solar and Van Allen belt protons H. Elliot
Imperial College, London




S-29 High energy cosmic ray electrons J.G. Wilson
University of Leeds
S-31 Measurements of micrometeorites D.R. Bates
Queen's University, Belfast




S-42 Helium lines He II (304 Å) and
He I (584 Å)
R.L.F. Boyd
University College, London
S-48 Measurement of Lyman alpha R.L.F. Boyd
University College, London
From: COPERT/STWG/82, rev. 1, 14 June 1963.
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Table 5-12
The final configuration of the ESRO I payload
(polar ionosphere)
S-32 Auroral photometry D.R. BatesQueen's University, Belfast
A. Omholt, A. Egeland
Oslo University
S-44 Ionospheric electron temperature and
density
R. Boyd, A.P. Willmore
University College London
S-45 Ionospheric composition and ion
temperature
R. Boyd, A.P. Willmore
University College London
S-71A Flux and energy spectrum of
electrons, 40-400 keV
R. Daziel and D.E. Page
Radio and Space Res. Station, Slough
S-71B Electron and proton density B. Hultqvist, W. Riedler
Kiruna Geophysical Observatory








S-71E Energy spectrum of protons,
1-30 MeV, 40-400 keV
R. Daziel and D.E. Page
Radio and Space Res. Station, Slough
From: ESRO, General Report, 1964-1965.
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Table 5-13
The final configuration of the ESRO II payload
(solar astronomy and cosmic rays)
S-25 Trapped radiation H. Elliot, J.J. Quenby
Imperial College, London
S-27 Solar and Van Allen belt protons H. Elliot, J.J. Quenby
Imperial College, London
S-28 Protons and alpha particles in cosmic
rays
H. Elliot, J.J. Quenby
Imperial College, London
S-29 High energy cosmic ray electrons P.L. Marsden
University of Leeds




S-37 Solar X rays, 44-70 Å C. De Jager, W. De Graaf
Utrecht Observatory
S-72 Flux and energy spectrum of solar
protons, 35-1000 MeV
J. Labeyrie, L. Koch
Centre d'Etudes Nucléaires, Saclay
From: ESRO, General Report, 1964-1965.
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Table 5-14
The payload of HEOS-A approved in Autumn 1965
S-58/
S-73
Flux, energy spectrum and angular









S-24A Interplanetary magnetic field H. Elliot, P.C. Edgecock
Imperial College, London
S-24B High energy cosmic ray protons H. Elliot, A.R Engel
Imperial College, London
S-24C Solar protons, 1-20 MeV H. Elliot, R.J. Hynds
Imperial College, London
S-16 Interaction between interplanetary
plasma and magnetic fields
R. Lüst
Max-Planck-Institut, Garching
S-72 Solar and cosmic ray protons J. Labeyrie, L. Koch
Centre d'Etudes Nucléaires, Saclay
S-79 Cosmic ray electrons, 50-600 MeV C. Dilworth
University of Milan
J. Labeyrie
Centre d'Etudes Nucléaires, Saclay
N.B.: The complex experiment S-24 was made up of the original proposals S-24 and S-27, both presented by
Elliot.
N.B.: The collaboration S-58/S-73 was made up from experiment proposals originally presented by the Brussels
group (S-58) and by the Rome/Bari group (S-73).
From: ESRO/ST/109, 3 March 1965 and ESRO, General Report 1964-1965.
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Table 5-15a










S-30 Celestial gamma rays G.W. Hutchinson, D. Ramsden
University of Southampton
S-59 Stellar spectrography in the UV C. De Jager, A.B. Underhill
Utrecht Observatory
S-77 Celestial X rays, 3-30 keV J. Labeyrie, L. Koch
Centre d'Etudes Nucléaires, Saclay
N.B.: Experiment S-1 (IR scanning) and S-2 (UV scanning) were originally presented by Swings; experiment S-
68 (IR scanning) was originally presented by Swings and Butler.
Table 5-15b
Addition to the payload of TD-1 in 1965
S-67A Primary cosmic ray particles J. Labeyrie, L. Koch
Centre d'Etudes Nucléaires, Saclay
S-88 Solar gamma rays, 50-300 MeV J. Bland, G. Occhialini
University of Milan
S-100 Solar X rays, 40-300 keV C. De Jager, J.N. Van Gils
Utrecht Observatory
From: ESRO/ST/145, 24 September 1965 and ESRO General Report 1964-1965.
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Table 5-16
The final configuration of the TD-1 payload
S-2/
S-68
Scanning of the sky in the ultraviolet





S-59 Stellar spectrography in the UV C. De Jager, A.B. Underhill
Utrecht Observatory
S-67A Primary cosmic ray particles J. Labeyrie, L. Koch
Centre d'Etudes Nucléaires, Saclay
S-77 Celestial X rays, 3-30 keV J. Labeyrie, L. Koch
Centre d'Etudes Nucléaires, Saclay
S-30 Celestial gamma rays G.W. Hutchinson, D. Ramsden
University of Southampton
S-88 Solar gamma rays, 50-300 MeV J. Bland, G. Occhialini
University of Milan
S-100 Solar X rays, 40-300 keV C. De Jager, J.N. Van Gils
Utrecht Observatory
S-133 Celestial gamma rays, 70-300 MeV J. Labeyrie, Y. Koechlin
Centre d'Etudes Nucléaires, Saclay




From: ESRO, General Report, 1967.
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Table 5-17
The final configuration of the TD-2 payload
S-39 Solar X-ray spectrometry E.A. Stewardson, K.A.Pounds
University of Leicester
S-45 Ionospheric composition and ion
temperature probe
R.L.F. Boyd, A.P. Willmore
University College, London
S-80 Neutral particle composition of the
upper atmosphere
W. Priester, U. Von Zahn
University of Bonn
S-85 Low energy auroral electrons R. Dalziel, T. Briant
Radio and Space Research Station,
Slough
S-94 Auroral particles B. Hultqvist, W. Riedler
Kiruna Geophysical Observatory
S-97 Light emission from oxygen and
ionised nitrogen
J.E. Blamont
Service d'Aéronomie, CNES, Verrières
S-99 Solar protons, 13-160 MeV C. De Jager, H.F. van Beck Utrecht
Observatory
S-103 Solar protons, 0.6-28 MeV R. Lüst, D. Hovestadt
Max Plank Institut, Garching
S-106 Solar UV spectrography R.L.F. Boyd, M. Timothy
University College London








N.B.: Besides S-45, two more probe experiments had been originally included in the payload: S-11 (by K.
Rawer, from the Ionosphären Institut, Breisach) and S-93 (by J. Sayers, from the University of
Birmingham). Subsequently, for technical reason, only one could be kept and the ION group
recommended S-45 at its 14th meeting (19 November 1965), ION/27, 7 December 1965.
From: ESRO, General Report, 1966.
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Table 5-18
The final configuration of the HEOS-A2 payload
S-201 Magnetic field measurement H. Elliot
Imperial College, London
S-202 Plasma measurement G. Pizzella
University of Rome
S-203 ELF radiation in solar wind and
magnetosphere
B. Peters
Danish Space Res. Inst., Copenhagen
S-204 Intermediate energy particles D.E. Page
Space Science Department, ESTEC
S-209 High energy cosmic ray electrons C. Dilworth
University of Milan
J. Labeyrie
Centre d'Etudes Nucléaires, Saclay
S-210 Measurement of solar wind Rosenbauer
Max-Planck-Institut, Garching
S-215 Measurement of micrometeorites J. Zähringer
Max-Planck-Institut, Heidelberg
From: ESRO General Report, 1968.
Table 5-19
The final configuration of the ESRO IV payload
S-45 Density, temperature and composition
of positive ions
R.L.F. Boyd, A.P. Willmore
University College, London
S-80 Mass spectrometer of neutral gases W. Priester, U. Von Zahn
University of Bonn
S-94 Auroral particles B. Hultqvist, W. Riedler
Kiruna Geophysical Observatory
S-99 Galactic and solar particles, 2.5 -320
MeV
C. De Jager, H.F. Van Beck
Utrecht Observatory
S-103 Galactic and solar particles, 2.5 -360
MeV
R. Lüst, D. Hovestadt
Max-Planck-Institut, Garching
From: ESRO, General Report, 1969.
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Chapter 6: 
The Rise and Fall of ESRO's First Major Scientific Project:
the Large Astronomical Satellite (LAS)497
J. Krige
The Large Astronomical Satellite (LAS) was a planned orbiting observatory whose primary objective
was to gain basic knowledge about celestial objects using a high-resolution ultraviolet spectrometer.
For several reasons – scientific, technical, political – it seemed to be an ideal project for the fledgling
European Space Research Organisation (ESRO) which officially came into being in 1964. Yet it was
never flown. This chapter tells its story, the story of a technological device which was born in the late
1950s, which became increasingly controversial, and which finally passed away in 1968 for lack of
financial and political support.
For many years astronomers had speculated about the scientific advantages of placing an observatory
beyond the interfering influence of the Earth's atmosphere. For example, about 99 % of the radiation
emitted by celestial bodies in the far ultraviolet (102 - 103 Ångström) are already absorbed 100 km
above the Earth's surface. However, hopes of researching such regions of the electromagnetic
spectrum were doomed to remain in the realm of science fiction until sufficiently powerful rockets
were available. The success of the V2s, developed in Nazi Germany during World War II, "made it all
seem possible", to quote Lyman Spitzer, a longstanding champion of space telescopes.498 The bulk of
these rockets, along with the best German engineers, were captured and transferred to the United
States after the war.499 Encouraged by what they had achieved, as early as 1946 Spitzer described the
"Astronomical Advantages of an Extra-terrestrial Observatory". This early, classified report identified
the scientific interest of a satellite without a telescope, of a satellite with a small ten-inch telescope,
and finally of a satellite carrying a giant 200-600 inch telescope. This device, surmised Spitzer, would
break new ground, would "uncover new phenomena not yet imagined, and perhaps [...] modify
profoundly our basic concepts of space and time".500 The claims may have been exaggerated but the
underlying sentiments were genuine. After the war astronomers and astrophysicists were increasingly
determined to study the sky from space.
Apart from its scientific interest, the Large Astronomical Satellite was a technical challenge. The
observatory had to be stabilised in space, i.e. the tumbling motion acquired during its injection into
orbit had to be sensed and counteracted, after which it had to be locked into an inertial reference
frame. It then had to be slewed within this frame so as to point successively at stars and other celestial
bodies of varying degrees of brightness. Finally, the satellite had to be locked on to a star long enough
to collect useful data (fine guidance). This information then had to be relayed back to one or more
ground stations on Earth.501 All of these operations called for highly sophisticated engineering
solutions. The design of the spacecraft that would carry the LAS was just the kind of project that
would attract engineers to ESRO's new technical research centre in Noordwijk, Netherlands (ESTEC).
It would also provide a stimulus to European industries who were being called on to build up quickly
the in-house expertise needed for them to compete successfully in the space sector.
497 This chapter is essentially based on Krige ed. (1993). We wish to thank Harwood Academic Publishers
for the permission to use this paper here.
498 Quoted in Smith (1989), p. 29.
499 For a history of the V2 and the Nazi war effort, see Neufeld (1995). The rounding up of the German
rocket scientists and their material and their transfer to the US are described in Lasby (1971). For the
early exploitation of these resources in the US see DeVorkin (1992).
500 See Smith (1989), p. 30.
501 For a general technical description of the spacecraft needed for this kind of device, see Rogerson (1963),
especially section 3.
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Finally, the LAS was of great 'political' interest. One of the most important rationales for launching a
collaborative European space effort – indeed for joint international ventures in any field of big science
– was that several nations could achieve together what none of them could achieve alone. This was a
key argument for setting up CERN in the early 1950s, and it was used again by scientists, in fact by
some of the same scientists, for setting up ESRO in the late 1950s.502 In the words of Alexander
Hocker, ESRO's second Council Chairman, "[...] the real 'raison d'être' of the Organisation [was] to
carry out projects of a scale and technical complexity beyond what the European countries could
achieve within the framework of their individual national programmes". And, he went on immediately
to say, "this was the reason why, right at the outset, consideration was given to the project for a Large
Astronomical Satellite".503 From the point of view of many of those who set up ESRO in the early
1960s, the LAS was seen to justify the creation of ESRO as the construction of its big accelerators was
seen to justify the creation of CERN.
This chapter describes and analyses the evolution of this major technological project from its inception
in the late 1950s to its demise roughly a decade later. The treatment is essentially chronological, and is
divided into three main phases. During the first, which lasted until 1964, the broad scientific objectives
of Europe's first astronomical observatory were defined. This was a period when the space science
community was flush with optimism, and in which its members collaborated enthusiastically in
anticipation of the new opportunities and resources which 'their' envisaged space organisation would
bring. The second phase, lasting for the next two years, was the one in which the scientific aims had to
be translated into a technically feasible design. Three different groups made proposals at this stage,
one of them so radically different from the other two that no compromise between it and them was
possible. Its rejection sparked off a painful and sometimes angry conflict, which was exacerbated by
disagreements over how best to organise the LAS project. The concluding phase is that which covered
1967 and 1968. This was the phase in which the final design characteristics and costing of the LAS's
scientific payload and the spacecraft to carry it aloft were firmed up in consultation with industry.
Costs rose, and ESRO simultaneously entered a financial crisis which was coupled with a major re-
evaluation of its basic objectives. The LAS did not survive the shock.504
Methodologically speaking we describe the sequence of events whereby a technological artifact comes
into being – or fails to do so, as in this case. It shows how, in different stages of the evolution of a
technological project, decisions are taken about what device to build (or whether to build it all) which
involve a mix of various kinds of factors – scientific, technical, institutional, financial, political. The
weights attributed to these factors differ depending on what stage the decision making process has
reached and on the context. These decisions sometimes involve making choices, sometimes not.
Sophisticated 'technologies' are not 'chosen' like consumer goods off a supermarket shelf. They are the
result of a lengthy, messy process, the outcome of battles won and lost, and of compromises struck,
between interest groups with very different, and sometimes conflicting, priorities.505
502 For the launching of CERN see Hermann et al. (1987), especially Part II by D. Pestre. The role of some of
the 'founding fathers' of CERN (in particular E. Amaldi and P. Auger) in the setting up of ESRO is
discussed in chapter 1.
503 Foreword by A. Hocker to ESRO General Report 1966.
504 For an account of the LAS from a UK point of view, see Massey and Robins (1986), chapter 6.
505 The approach followed here resonates with that of the so-called 'social constructivists' and with closely-
allied critiques of the 'rational model of decisionmaking'. For the former see particularly Bijker et al
(1987) and Hughes (1983). For its application in the space sector see Mack (1990). The classic critique of
the rational model is Allison (1971). For a study on decisionmaking in science which exposes the
limitations of this model see Pestre in Hermann et al. (1990), chapter 12.
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6.1 Defining the scientific objectives of LAS (1960-64). The time of optimism and of
cohesion in the scientific community
6.1.1 The first set of specifications of the LAS
The seeds of ESRO's LAS project were sown at the very first meeting of the COPERS Interim
Scientific and Technical Working Group (STWG). Held in Stockholm on 4 and 5 April 1961, one of
its main tasks was to draft proposals for a European space science programme. The scientists present
broke the programme down into two broad categories, short term and long term projects. The latter
were dealt with first. Robert Boyd, who was a member of the UK's National Committee for Space
Research, proposed two: Earth-orbiting astronomical observatories and lunar satellites. He identified
ten possible objectives for the Earth-orbiting observatories, including ultraviolet stellar spectroscopy,
soft X-ray spectroscopy, the search for special UV and X-ray sources, and the study of the directional
intensity of cosmic rays. "The British proposal", the minutes of the meeting tell us, "was generally
considered a very suitable basis for the cooperative European Space Research". In fact it was taken
over almost unchanged in the final report (the so-called "Blue Book") prepared by the Group for the
third session of the COPERS held in Munich on 24 and 25 October 1961.506
The next steps towards defining the specifications of an orbiting observatory were taken in March
1963. A Working Group, chaired by R.E. Butler from the Royal Observatory in Edinburgh, was set up
and met for the first time on 22 April. Butler had prepared a paper for the meeting in which he
explained the possible research that could be done with a large astronomical satellite, and gave his
views on the most suitable instruments to be flown on ESRO's first LAS.507 The LAS Working Group
(LASWG) rapidly converged on the desirable characteristics of the satellite. Many options – notably
investigations of the moon, the Sun, and the planets – were discarded on the grounds that they were
being done already, or could best be done by other means. Similarly the making of sky scans in
wavelength regions not observable on the surface of the Earth, while being judged the "most urgent"
task, was discarded on the grounds that they would probably be done before LAS was ready by the
American 'Project Celescope' (see below) and by one of the first medium-sized ESRO satellites (later
labelled TD-1). Accordingly, the Working Group proposed "that the primary instrument for the first
large ESRO astronomical satellite should be designed to make spectrophotometric observations in the
spectral range extending from the Lyman limit (912 Å) to about 3500 Å". A resolution of 1 Å, "or
better if instrumentally possible", was to be aimed at. In order to observe faint stars, it was thought
"essential to be able to degrade this to 10 Å and even to 100 Å at will by ground control". The
instrument was to be flown on a spacecraft which could be pointed to a succession of positions in the
sky to an accuracy of "a few minutes of an arc". If directed at a star or star-like object, it was then to
'lock-on' to the body "to a greater accuracy and [to] remain locked on for a period of minutes or
hours". Finally the Group recommended that, alongside the primary instrument, there should be a
smaller instrument to make broad-band X-ray observations.508
The Chairman of the LAS Working Group was enthusiastic about the potential of this device. A large
satellite meeting the specifications, Butler wrote in July 1963, "[would] have exciting possibilities".
Scientists could obtain "high resolution ultra-violet spectra of very many early type stars, [...] medium
and low resolution spectra of many less bright stars of all types, of nebulae, and of other interesting
objects", as well as new information on the "chemical composition, age and surface gravity of stars, on
stellar coronae, on stellar and interstellar hydrogen". These data would not only be useful in their own
506 The minutes of the Stockholm meeting are in HAEC, Box 1688. Boyd's detailed proposal is Appendix 3
to the minutes. For a more detailed discussion of the Stockholm meeting and of the "Blue Book" see
chapter 2.
507 It was decided to set up the Working Group at a joint meeting of the ad hoc advisory groups on Solar and
General Astronomy and of Lunar and Planetary Astronomy in March 1963 (COPERS/LPSC/86, rev. 1,
3 July 1963). Butler's paper prepared for its first meeting, and dated 29 March 1963, is
COPERS/LPSC/71, 4 April 1963.
508 The material in this paragraph is from COPERS/LPSC/71, cit., from the Draft Recommendations of the
first LASWG meeting (Golay archive, file "Correspondance"), and from Butler's report to the LPSC,
COPERS/LPSC/86, rev. 1, 3 July 1963.
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right. They were also "likely to stimulate many different branches of astronomy particularly stellar
physics, star clusters, galactic structure and interstellar matter".509
The Working Group recognised "that the majority of astronomers concerned with the satellite,
although possessing considerable enthusiasm, were ignorant of many space research techniques and
limitations". Accordingly, at the end of 1963 the COPERS commissioned preliminary design studies
of the spacecraft with the Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE) in Britain, with the Centre National
d'Études Spatiales (CNES) in France, and with the Deutsche Versuchsanstalt für Luft- und Raumfahrt
(DVLR) in Germany. Their task was to assess, by April the following year, "the feasibility of carrying
out this project with the required degrees of precision and stability".510
Butler's leading role in drawing up the specifications of the LAS, and the Working Group's rapid
agreement on a "reasonable scientific outline" for the satellite, are not surprising. In fact some of its
basic features were already specified around 1958 by a Working Group (Chairman H.E. Butler) of the
newly-established British National Committee for Space Research (BNCSR). Discussing what the
most suitable astronomical payload would be for the UK's Blue Streak satellite launcher they
concluded that "the highest priority should be given to flying an ultra-violet spectrometer operating in
the wavelength range 3300 to 1200 Å with a spectral resolution as high as 1 Å". As for the spacecraft,
the RAE at Farnborough undertook "to work out the technical requirements and possibilities for an
astronomical satellite stabilised to a few minutes of an arc".511 There were certainly strong scientific
and technical arguments for building the LAS proposed in the Blue Book and refined by the LASWG.
But the envisaged satellite was also the 'Europeanisation' of a British project which was born in the
UK well before ESRO or even COPERS came into being. And it never lost its birthmark.
6.1.2 Tightening up the specifications: the determination to compete
From its inception the LAS Working Group wanted the final design of the satellite to take account, as
far as possible, of the "opinions of the majority of European astronomers". To this end they organised
a meeting in Paris in April 1964 which was attended by 18 European astronomers and several
American visitors. The delegates were presented with a 230–page report reviewing the kinds of studies
that could be done with the LAS. After the meeting, and having considered the findings of the three
commissioned technical studies, the Working Group tightened up its specifications for the satellite.512
These specifications were approved at the meeting of the Group held on 9 July 1964.513 They were
intended to serve as a basic point of reference for any proposed designs of the LAS.
The specifications arrived at differed in one important detail from those agreed on the year before: the
resolution of the ultraviolet spectrometer. In April 1963, it will be remembered, it was agreed that this
should be 1 Å (or better, if technically feasible), degradable to 10 Å or even 100 Å to observe faints
stars. The new specifications mentioned a few tenths of an Ångström as a "reasonable target",
degradable by factors of 2.5 or thereabouts. The pointing accuracy of the spacecraft was upgraded
correspondingly. In April 1963 it was assumed that this would be a "few minutes of an arc". The July
509 COPERS/LPSC/86, rev. 1, cit.
510 The first remark is by Butler and is from his "Review" cited in note 15 below. The centres were assisted,
respectively, by the British Aircraft Corporation, by Nord Aviation, and by Bolkow Entwicklungen – see
ESRO General Report 1964-65, p. 41, from which the final quotation is also taken. The invitations to
firms in the Member States to apply for this work is COPERS/249, 19 August 1963. The design study
made by the RAE is in Box P(Z)6, 003, that of the Guided Weapons Division of the BAC in Box P(Z)6,
004 HAEC.
511 Massey and Robins (1986), p. 152. Butler was the Chairman of the BNCSR's Solar and Stellar
Astronomy Working Group.
512 For this information see Butler's "Review of the Work and General Recommendations", chapter 1 of
ESRO, Scientific Report No 1: Report of the Working Group on the Large Astronomical Satellite, Review
of the Scientific Objectives, Paris: COPERS, March 1964 (quotation from p. 3), Golay archives. See also
ESRO General Report 1964-65, p. 41.
513 See Revised Preliminary Scientific Specification as Approved by the LAS Working Group at the Meeting
in Paris on 1st October, 1964, LAS/22, 2 October 1964.
177
1964 specifications called for an accuracy of the order of one minute of an arc.514 In short the 'new'
LAS was both scientifically more refined (in the restricted sense that it aimed at higher resolutions)
and technically more complex (in calling for an increased degree of stabilisation of the spacecraft)
than its predecessor.
This change in the specifications was not uncontested both inside the Working Group and in the wider
community at large. Some members of the Group considered the new target resolution of a few tenths
of an Ångström to be "too severe". Similarly, in a letter to the Group dated 14 June 1964, G. Courtès, a
senior French astronomer who was not a member of the LASWG, wanted it put on record that he
considered the spectral resolution now proposed to be "too stringent".515 Behind these objections were
fears, which were later to burst violently into the open, that the increased technical complexity of the
satellite would unduly limit its scientific scope, push European industry to, if not beyond its limits, and
send costs soaring. Against that, there seems to have been one crucial argument which carried the day
in 1964: that a LAS that did not meet the new specifications would be a LAS devoid of scientific
interest, a LAS rendered obsolete before it was flown by the parallel American Orbiting Astronomical
Observatory (OAO) project.
A comprehensive description of the OAO plans was written up by one of the main protagonists of the
programme, John B. Rogerson, in summer 1963. It was summarised in a review which was released
around spring 1964.516 The OAO project was to be a series of satellites equipped with a precisely
stabilised platform on which astronomical observing equipment could be mounted. These were to be
launched at yearly intervals beginning in 1965, the scientific package becoming successively more
sophisticated. The first OAO was to carry instruments for the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory
and for Wisconsin University. Labelled "Project Celescope", its primary aim was to measure the
brightness of every star that was above its equipment threshold in each of four wavelength regions.
This was to be followed by a satellite carrying an experiment provided by NASA's Goddard Space
Flight Center, designed to obtain absolute spectrophotometric measurements of selected stars, nebulae,
and galaxies. Finally, there was the most complex payload of all, Princeton University's Flying
Telescope Project. Devised by Spitzer and Rogerson, it was a "telescope-ultraviolet spectrometer
system which [would] permit the study of O and B spectral type stars as faint as sixth visual
magnitude with high spectral resolution in the range of 700 to 3200 Ångströms". 517
When the LASWG first met in April 1963, they realised that Project Celescope (later labelled OAO-1)
would probably provide a map of the sky before the LAS was launched. At the time this did not seem
to matter very much. Of course the European group did "not want completely to copy any US (or
possibly USSR) satellite". At the same time, Butler felt that "we should not give too much attention to
the remark '...but the Americans (or Russians) will have done that long before we do...'. Even if by
accident or otherwise two nearly identical satellites were in orbit", he went on, "in most cases there
514 The information is from the source just cited. It should be added that the specifications required that the
scientific instrumentation was not to occupy a space greater than one metre in diameter and 2.5 metres in
length, and its weight was to be around 200 kg. It was foreseen that the payload would be launched into a
polar orbit from the Woomera range in Australia using an ELDO A rocket. This, it was claimed, could
place 800 kg into a 600 km circular polar orbit, leaving 220 kg for scientific instrumentation. The stated
performance of the ELDO A launcher is in document entitled "Situation arising over the ELDO A
launcher", SCI/WP/30, 29 April 1965 (Golay archve, file "Groupe d'Études Spatiales - Correspondance").
515 Massey and Robins (1986) at p. 153. Courtès's letter (Institut d'Astronomie Spatiale, Marseille) is referred
to in the Minutes of the 8th Meeting of the LASWG, LAS/17, 11 August 1964 (Golay archive, file
"Groupe d'Etudes Spatiales - Correspondance").
516 Rogerson (1963). The review was Review of astronomical observations from outside the Earth's
atmosphere, and it was made by an International Astronomical Union Commission, President L.
Goldberg: see paper laid before the British National Committee for Space Research, document NCSP/20
(64), 1964 (Golay archive, file "Projet LAS Geneve").
517 Rogerson (1963), at p. 645. The rest of the paragraph is essentially based on Goldberg's Report cited in
the previous note. For more information on the OAOs see Smith (1989) pp. 37 et seq.
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[was] an adequate number of heavenly bodies to justify such duplication".518 By March 1964 Butler
seemed a little more anxious. "The U.S. programme [had] visibly clarified", he noted, and there were a
number of "superficial similarities between the ESRO design and that of the US Goddard Space Flight
Center component aboard OAO-2".519 At this stage, and before the April meeting with astronomers,
the original design specifications were still intact. Three months later, however, they had been
tightened up to bring the LAS more in line with the Flying Telescope Project (OAO-3), which had a
planned resolution of 0.1 Å and 0.4 Å. The performance of the LAS was upgraded so that it could
compete with the best the Americans could offer. It was a choice which was to have major influence
on the subsequent trajectory of the technology.
6.2 Choosing the scientific payload (1965-66). The collapse of consensus and the
ongoing debate over project management
6.2.1 The debate over project management: at home or in-house?
In parallel with the firming up of the specifications on the LAS there were lengthy discussions in 1964
on how best to manage the project. The point at issue was a longstanding and divisive one inside the
space science community. It concerned the degree of control which national groups should be given
over the scientific package, and the nature of their interface with ESTEC.
Early in 1964 the ESRO Executive opened the discussion on how best to manage the LAS project.520 It
was understood that ESRO, which was funding the LAS, had overall responsibility for the satellite.
ESTEC would build the spacecraft and it would place contracts with groups in the Member States for
the scientific payload. One possible management scenario was that one of these groups, reporting
periodically to ESRO's Scientific Director, would be responsible for the scientific planning,
programme and coordination. This group could then be joined by scientists from other Member States,
so preserving the international flavour of the project. The alternative favoured by the Executive was to
establish a permanent scientific group of about 20 people near ESTEC, perhaps in ESLAB, the small
associated scientific laboratory. This group "would be actively engaged on some of the scientific
work" associated with the LAS (i.e. experimental laboratory work and instrument design), and would
act "as a co-ordinator of the other work being undertaken on contract". The in-house knowledge built
up inside ESLAB would enable the Scientific Directorate to exercise the "scientific control of
contracts with external scientific groups" and to coordinate their designs with those of the spacecraft
engineers at ESTEC.
This scheme was received lukewarmly, particularly by the British and the French delegates to the
ESRO Council's Scientific and Technical Committee (STC), who did not like the idea of ESRO
exercising this degree of control over national scientific groups.521 In August 1964 the UK delegation
put forward a counterproposal. It suggested that "the overall responsibility for the design,
development, testing and data assimilation" of the LAS's scientific payload should be vested in an
appropriate institute in an ESRO Member State, under contract to ESRO. At the same time, to ensure
that the project was "broadly spread throughout the ESRO countries", the UK delegation proposed that
the LAS, like the American OAO project, "should not be conceived as a single project, but as a
continuing project with a series of launchings". Instead of having back-up launches for a single design,
as originally proposed, the money would be spent on flying "two, three, or even four" different
scientific payloads using a "basic standard satellite" designed by ESTEC. The British confirmed the
usefulness of having a group of project scientists near ESTEC. However, their main task would not be
to do scientific research, nor to exercise scientific control over the national groups, as the Executive
had proposed. It would be to coordinate "the scientific payload design done by national teams with the
518 COPERS/LPSC/71, cit (fn. 10).
519 Butler's "Review" cit. (fn. 15).
520 COPERS/GTST/144, 13 February 1964, COPERS/GTST/143, 10 March 1964, and ESRO/ST/21,
15 May 1964, from which the following quotations are taken.
521 ESRO/ST/32, 11 June 1964.
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work of ESTEC on the standard satellite". At some later date it may of course design its own payload
for the LAS, but that would only be after it had built up "the necessary capacity".522
The UK's proposal had several advantages. Firstly, the scientific groups to undertake the LAS would
be based on existing national teams and could draw on their strengths. Secondly, unlike the
Executive's proposal, this would also enable work on the LAS to get started quickly, and without
having first to build up a senior core of scientists at ESTEC, which might prove difficult anyway.
Thirdly, it represented something of a compromise between those who felt that ESLAB should have a
strong core of in-house scientists and those who felt that this would be dangerous, draining the best
personnel from national projects and creating a privileged elite who would rapidly seek to monopolise
the most interesting scientific work.523 The UK proposal straddled the fence, leaving the major
responsibility for the scientific payload with national groups, all the while holding out the possibility
that in some distant future ESLAB may have its own important scientific teams. Despite some minor
misgivings, the British recommendations were thus accepted almost intact by the ESRO Council and
its committees in the autumn of 1964. And national groups were invited to submit proposals for the
scientific package of the LAS by the end of the year.524
6.2.2 The scientific groups submit their designs: the first signs of tension
Three distinct scientific groups submitted definite proposals for the LAS's scientific payload. These
were:
• a Belgian-French-Swiss group, which had constituted itself as the Groupe d'Études Spatiales, and
which we shall label the BFS group. It was based at the Institut d'Astrophysique de Liège
(Director P. Swings), the Institut d'Astronomie Spatiale in Marseille (Director G. Courtès, who
was also the project leader) and the Observatoire de Genève (Director M. Golay);
• a German–Dutch group, called the Gernelas group, and based at the Max Planck Institut für
Extraterrestrische Physik in Garching (Director R. Lüst), the Max Planck Institut für Astrophysik
in Munich (Director L. Biermann), the Space Research Laboratory of the University of Utrecht
(Director C. de Jager) and the Kapteyn Observatory of the University of Groningen (Director J.
Borgman). The project leader was J.G. Emming (Utrecht);
• a British consortium made of groups based at the UK Atomic Energy Authority's Culham
Laboratory (led by R. Wilson, who was also the project leader), at its Atomic Weapons Research
Establishment at Aldermaston (L. Maddock), at University College London (R. Boyd), and at the
Royal Aircraft Establishment at Farnborough.
There was a fourth proposal from a Swedish group which was not, however, strong enough to
undertake the project on its own, and which was hoping to collaborate with the British team.525
The most striking feature about these proposals was that the BFS Group had decided to deviate from
the specifications drawn up by the LAS Working Group in October 1964. As we have seen, the
previous summer Courtès (BFS Project Leader) had strongly objected to the increase in the resolution
of the spectrometer from 1 Å to 0.1 Å. Consistent with this objection, and refusing to be bound by the
522 This paragraph is based on the British Note... (ESRO/ST/57, 27 August 1964) and on the subsequent
debate in the 1st STC meeting (10-11 September 1964), ESRO/ST/MIN/1, 14 October 1964.
523 For this important debate see see chapter 2.
524 ESRO/ST/MIN/1, cit.; ESRO/ST/76, 10 November 1964 (for the LPAC's view); ESRO/C/76,
13 November 1964 (for the recommendation submitted by the STC to the Council); and ESRO/C/MIN/5,
11 January 1965 (for the Council debate).
525 The details of the three groups are from paper ESRO/ST/193, 12 April 1966, and they may have changed
in membership between this date and January 1965. The willingness of the Swedes to join with the UK
group was stated at the 3rd STC meeting (10-11 June 1965), ESRO/ST/MIN/3, 13 August 1965.
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'agreed' specifications, the BFS Group proposed a LAS scientific payload which had a maximum
resolution of about 1 Å.
The STC met in January 1965 to discuss these proposals. It was obviously desirable that the groups try
to agree on a set of scientific objectives and payload specifications. But it was also obviously
impossible. A suggestion by the Belgian delegation that the three teams should meet to discuss the
scientific merits of their proposals before design studies were started was roundly rejected by the
British. The UK delegation "did not see the use of such a meeting", the STC minutes tell us, "the
differences of opinion between the various groups being very large". More specifically, the British,
supported by the Dutch, raised two objections to the BFS proposal. It deviated from the specifications
drawn up "after long and careful study by a group consisting of many of the most competent
astronomers in Europe". It also risked simply duplicating work that the Americans would already have
done with their early OAOs. Against them, the French delegation, supported by the Belgians, insisted
that the specifications of the LAS Working Group were to be regarded as a guide and not as an
obligation. They recognised that the proposal deviated from the recommendations of the LASWG, but
"felt very strongly that it was impossible at the present time to meet the very ambitious requirements
laid down by this group". Consequently they had preferred to submit "a more modest proposal, the
reliable functioning of which was much more certain and which", in their view, "could produce results
of great scientific interest". The STC, unwilling at this stage to make painful choice, agreed to place
design contracts with all three of the main groups. At the same time it recommended that
representatives of these groups meet with ESTEC staff as soon as possible to discuss the design of the
spacecraft. The Committee suggested that at this meeting "the possibility of combining the proposals
might be considered" adding, realistically, "in particular the question of combining the Swedish
proposal with one of the others".526
At one level, the STC's action was simply the classic approach of a decision maker faced with a
difficult and divisive choice: decide without choosing and hope that a 'choice' can be made at a later
date which, in the light of new circumstances, does not offend anyone.527 Perhaps it also reflected a
wish to hedge bets by keeping several options open for as long as possible so as to be in a better
position later to capitalise on new scientific, technological and political developments. Behind these
strategies though there were also the pressures to dilute LAS's international character which had been
building up around the project throughout 1964. The consensus over the LAS had been broken in the
summer of 1964 when the target resolution of its UV spectrometer had been increased tenfold. This
difference of opinion became institutionalised with the decision to give national teams a large measure
of control over the development of their preferred scientific payload. And it was clear that the
divisions would be exacerbated by giving contracts to all three teams. As the Dutch delegation pointed
out, once the designs of the different payloads were frozen, there would be even less hope of getting
the groups to collaborate. A bruising and damaging conflict within Europe's young space science
community was looming.
526 STC, 3rd meeting (20-21 January 1965), ESRO/ST/MIN/3, 17 February 1965. It should be pointed out
that the STC was following the recommendations of the LPAC which, meeting the day before, had
decided that all three main groups should be given design contracts: ESRO/ST/102, 17 February 1965.
527 Schilling (1961).
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6.2.3 LAS's scientific payload is chosen: incipient tension turns to open conflict
Design contracts for the three scientific groups were duly authorised. The contracts stipulated that the
final designs had to be submitted by 31 January 1966.528 To assess them, ESRO set up a board of
consultants comprising three astronomers, two spectroscopists, and one expert on electronics and data
handling. Their conclusions were then submitted to a panel of experts comprising L. Goldberg,
Director of Harvard University Laboratory, USA, L. Gratton, Director of the Laboratory of
Astrophysics in Frascati, Italy, and H.C. van de Hulst, Professor of Theoretical Astronomy at the
University of Leiden, Netherlands. This panel submitted its recommendations to the Director General
at a meeting held at ESTEC on 4 and 5 April 1966.529
To assess the design studies the board of consultants broke down the project into nine main categories
(e.g. design, telescope, electronics, management). These features were then further subdivided into a
total of 63 subheadings. Each subheading was marked on a scale from 3 (very good) to zero
(unacceptable). The points were then summed to give a final score for each proposal. The result was
145 points for the UK team, 132 points for the Gernelas group, and 120 points for the BFS group.
More concretely, the board found that the British team was ahead as far as overall management,
overall design, and technical facilities were concerned. The Gernelas proposal, they added, was
technically comparable but managerially weaker than that of the UK group. As for the BFS proposal,
wrote the board, it was "the weakest of all".530
The ESRO Directorate and the panel of three experts considered this report in the knowledge that there
would only be enough money in the first eight-year plan for just one major scientific payload on the
LAS. They made two main recommendations. Firstly, they proposed that only one high-resolution
instrument should be built, and that it should be based on the UK design. A back-up unit incorporating
any new technological developments would also be built in parallel to cover the risk of the first LAS
failing. Secondly, returning to the Executive's original proposal, and hoping to internationalise the
project, they recommended that a highly competent scientific project manager should be appointed at
ESLAB and given "full executive responsibility for the scientific payload".531
The Belgian-French-Swiss Group fought back immediately. The consultants and the expert panel, they
insisted, had treated them unjustly.532 They had concentrated on the technical aspects of the designs at
the expense of wider considerations. The BFS team, said the paper, were being "penalised" for having
"the courage to rethink the problem", and to come up with a design that was "realistic in its concept,
original in its mechanical and optical solutions, [and] logical in its scientific programme". In defence
528 The process of drawing up these contracts was complicated by sudden doubts over the suitability of the
ELDO A launcher. At its meeting in March 1965 the STC was informed that it now looked as though this
rocket could not place more than about 400 kg into a 600 km polar orbit, half the overall weight initially
announced. If this were confirmed it would mean that the British or Gernelas scientific packages would
be too heavy for the European rocket (document SCI/WP/30, 29 April 1965, Golay archive). The
possibility of using an American launcher was immediately explored (ESRO/ST/130, 4 June 1965). The
problem was resolved in the light of new information from ELDO (ESRO/ST/126, 28 May 1965). In May
ESRO was informed that it was "estimated" that ELDO A could put a payload of 800 kg into an
equatorial orbit of at least 700 km. Launching would take place from a range that France proposed to set
up in French Guyana, and which would be ready in 1968-69. This proposal was accepted by the STC in
June on condition that, if there was any substantial degradation in the announced performance of ELDO
A, or any important delays in its development which affected the LAS schedules, a US launcher would be
used "to avoid any substantial changes in the spacecraft design" (ESRO/ST/MIN/5, 13 August 1965).
529 The three volumes of the Gernelas study and one volume of the UK study are in box P(Z)6, 003; four of
the seven volumes of the BFS study are in box P(Z)6, 004, HAEC. For details on the panel of experts see
ESRO/ST/191, 15 April 1966 and ESRO/ST/193, 12 April 1966.
530 ESRO/ST/193, 12 April 1966.
531 ESRO/ST/191, 15 April 1966.
532 The BFS Group's paper is ESRO/ST/208, 29 April 1966.
182
of their position, the BFS group put forward three types of arguments: scientific, technical, and
financial. They were to echo down the later history of the LAS.533
On the scientific side, the group did not deny that the British and Gernelas instruments would produce
results of interest. They simply insisted that their device would also do so, and in fact would break
new ground. The advantage of a high-resolution spectrometer, they said, was that it could make a
detailed study of a few already comparatively well-known objects. The advantage of their payload, by
contrast, was "the satellite's power of exploration". It could be used to study galactic structure as a
whole, to explore highly unusual celestial objects or those having a violent evolution, and to observe
extra-galactic sources which radiated strongly in the low wavelength region. In sum, according to the
BFS group, whereas the British and Gernelas packages were well suited to refining what was already
known, their instrument had the possibility of making exciting new discoveries.534
A second important advantage of their device claimed by the BFS team was that it was technically
feasible and avoided unnecessary risks. Take for example the mirrors in the British and the BFS
designs. The former was to be of quartz and had to be of perfect optical quality. "The technical hazards
in construction (very small tolerances), in survival at launch (behaviour under vibration), and in
operation in space" were considerable. The BFS mirror, on the other hand, could be of beryllium or of
a synthetic substance with "very large" optical tolerances. Consider too the required pointing accuracy
of the spacecraft. The high-resolution spectrometer called for a satellite capable of fine pointing with a
precision better than 1 arc sec. The low-resolution instrument, required a primary stabilisation to the
nearest minute of an arc. In short, unlike the British proposal, the BFS design adopted "mechanical
and optical solutions which [were] elegant without being acrobatic or ruinous".
Finally, there was the question of costs. It was clear that the more sophisticated satellite and scientific
payload called for by the British group would be more expensive than those required for a low-
resolution instrument. Here the BFS remarked that "an analysis of project economy" showed that if
ESRO went ahead with the British design it would amount "to attempting to reach the performances of
NASA's OAO III, while spending much less and practically without any preliminary experience". A
paper prepared by the ESRO Executive in June 1965, after a visit to NASA headquarters, confirmed
this line of argument. Here it was reported that NASA's estimate of the OAO programme costs was
"about four times as great as the ESRO estimates" for the LAS. The Executive admitted that the
American programme was more ambitious and complex. But their paper insisted that all the same the
LAS could probably only be built within the budget "provided no attempt [was] made to introduce
very new developments or to push to extremes mechanical, electronic or control problems of the
spacecraft".535 In the eyes of the BFS team, the British proposal did just that. As they put it to the STC,
"it would seem rather odd that Europe should wish to adopt at the outset a stellar programme closely
similar to that in the United States, using one satellite – and one only! – weighing half as much and
built with much smaller funds [than] that in the United States".
The STC met early in May 1966 to discuss the experts' reports and the BFS Group's paper.536 As one
might imagine the ensuing debate was lengthy – Massey and Robins, who were the British delegates,
remember that it lasted more than five hours – and very divisive – unsurprising, since many of those
533 ESRO/ST/208, 29 April 1966, and ESRO/ST/204, 25 July 1966. The subsequent quotations are from this
document.
534 We are not able to assess the validity of this contrast. It should however be noted that in subsequent
discussions of the Star and Stellar Systems (STAR) Working Group of the LPAC, it was agreed that,
while both low and high resolution experiments were useful, they could be not be done using a single
instrument. Accordingly, in October 1966 the STAR group "strongly" recommended that "LAS design
should not be changed to aim at wide field ['low resolution'] spectrophotometry": STAR/23,
5 October 1966, STAR/25, 13 October 1966 and STAR/30, 14 November 1966 (Golay archive, file
"STAR").
535 ESRO/ST/129, 4 June 1965.
536 STC, 9th meeting (2-3 May 1966), ESRO/ST/MIN/9, 7 June 1966.
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who had proposed payloads were also national delegates.537 In the event, it was 'agreed' that the UK's
design be adopted. In a concession to the BFS group, it was added that, if it was technically and
financially possible, low resolution experiments would be combined with high resolution experiments
in the same payload. The question of management was not settled unambiguously. The French and
Belgian delegations insisted that "the management of the project should be confided to the British
group, whose capabilities had been proved. ESLAB", they went on, "did not have the facilities and
should not 'cut its teeth' on a project of such magnitude and importance". The Director General
(P. Auger), along with the Danish, Dutch and Swiss delegations, on the other hand, were not keen to
give a single national group overall responsibility for the project. To resolve the difficulty it was
decided to discuss the matter with the Project Manager of the British team, and to hold a special
meeting of the STC before the next Council session to try and reach agreement on the management
aspects. The debate ended on a tense note. The Belgian delegation asked that the minutes record its
reservation concerning all the decisions taken by the meeting on the LAS. The French delegation
added that, "for the Organisation's sake, it regretted the conclusions reached by the Committee".538
This debate calls for two comments. Firstly it was a debate between two sectors of the space science
community with very different disciplinary histories, very different professional backgrounds, and
very different ways of defining the aims of research. Loosely speaking it was a conflict between
physicists and stellar astronomers, the former recently attracted to space, the latter seeing their work as
part of a tradition of celestial studies going back for centuries. As Marcel Golay, one of the members
of the latter group and a team leader in the BFS consortium has put it, for the physicists "a star was a
laboratory, for us [i.e. the astronomers] a star was a member of a vast population itself part of a vast
structure".539 The former preferred to study a single phenomenon, to concentrate on a single event or
process. The latter, on the other hand, the stellar astronomers, preferred making surveys of collections
of objects. They were not interested in the properties of an object 'for itself', but for the light it threw
on how a population of such objects behaved. And they lost out. They lost out because their approach,
according to Golay, had a 19th Century flavour to it. They also lost out because, compared to the
'physicists', they were relatively indifferent to space research, particularly in the early 1960s - after all
they had a considerable amount of ground-based equipment that they could use.540 Finally, they were
defeated because stellar astronomers lacked the social weight and impressive organisational acumen of
a physics community that had become increasingly powerful since the war.
The second point to note is that the contrasting positions adopted by the British/Gernelas teams and
the BFS group are indicative of the dilemmas faced by a scientific community which was at least a
decade behind its American counterpart and which, at the same time, had to try to compete with it. In
this situation there were two opposed ways of situating oneself vis-à-vis the leader. One philosophy
took a medium- to long-term view. It held that one should try to approach parity gradually, first
building up the experience and know-how with scientifically interesting but technically and financially
'realistic' projects. This was the approach favoured by the BFS Group. They agreed, as one of their
members, P. Swings, put it as early as 1962, that "what we wish most is to have at our disposal the
expensive, heavy, stabilised orbiting satellites". However, Swings went on, before trying to build
something equivalent to the most sophisticated device planned in the USA, "much experience with
more modest instruments must be gained".541 Against that there was the view, insisted on by the British
537 In particular P. Swings (B), M. Golay (CH), R. Lüst (G), and C. de Jager (NL). H. Massey (UK) was
intimately involved with the British proposal - see Massey and Robins (1986), p. 155.
538 The amended version of the Belgian comment is to be found in ESRO/ST/MIN/10, 6 July 1966. It differs
from the briefer version in the draft minutes (ESRO/ST/MIN/9) by stressing that several delegations had
raised doubts about the scientific, technical and financial aspects of the UK project.
539 M. Golay, private communication, 30 September 1991, 1 October 1991.
540 Let us not forget that ESO, the European Southern Observatory, was established in 1962 to operate an
astronomical observatory in Chile and to promote and organise cooperation in astronomical research in
Europe. At present it has no less than fourteen optical telescopes in operation.
541 Swings, "Report on the Scientific Interest and Problems", in J. Ortner's Report on the COPERS
Colloquium concerning astronomical experiments to be accommodated in ESRO rockets and satellites,
COPERS/LPSC/14, 4 September 1962.
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from mid-1964 onwards, that one should try to catch up in one leap. If one did otherwise, if one took a
stepwise approach, one would always be behind, building devices which were obsolete, and lacking in
any kind of scientific or technical challenge. As one participant who assessed the proposals
remembered afterwards, "we had to choose between (A) something that might be by later
commentators called 'again the same thing, a student's exercise' or (B) an ambitious project that might
turn out to be difficult or too expensive for us".542 They decided to take the risk.
6.2.4 The BFS Group strikes back, in vain
Despite its setback in May 1966 the BFS Group was not beaten yet. A meeting to take stock of the
situation was held in Paris in July. It was attended by some members of the Group and a number of
senior Belgian, French and Swiss ESRO Council and STC delegates.543 They realised that the Council,
which was to meet a week later, would surely ratify the STC's recommendation to fly the UK's LAS.
At the same time, they thought it might just be possible for them to have a simplified version of their
package flown. There were certainly formidable obstacles to be overcome. But there was one glimmer
of light. The month before another attempt to work out a management scheme for the LAS had failed.
The Executive had again put forward a proposal which gave considerable scientific responsibility to a
project manager and his team at ESLAB, and the British had again insisted that the project be based at
Culham under the scientific control of their Project Leader.544 That granted, was it not possible that
"the Franco-Belgian-Swiss project might find an ally in the ESRO Directorate if it appeared as a way
of getting out of this impasse and if it provided a means by which ESLAB could be consolidated"?
Would a low-resolution experiment, by virtue of its dimensions and its relative simplicity, not enable
"ESLAB along with international help, to organise itself and to acquire experience which would be
extremely useful for controlling LAS"?545 Put differently, granted that the LAS was not a suitable
project on which the newly-born ESLAB could cut its teeth, why not have its scientists start on
something related but less complex, and which would be built first, moving later on to the LAS? In
short, the BFS hoped to exploit the resentment felt in some ESRO circles about the UK's
determination to control the LAS by having a version of their payload built in-house, and flown before
the Culham group's experiment.
With these considerations in mind the BFS submitted a new paper to the STC meeting held just before
the July 1966 Council session. It asked the committee to recommend to the Council that a ceiling of
50 MFF be imposed on the high-resolution experiment. It also requested that the 25 MFF set aside in
the ESRO budget for a second large project be used for a low-resolution experiment. And it suggested
that a top-level Astronomic Programmes Department with its own Director be set up inside ESRO for
the management of both projects, its task being "to ensure that these projects [were] of an international
character".546
542 H. van de Hulst, private communication, 5 September 1991. There was an analogous debate at CERN
over its bubble chambers as described by Krige & Pestre (1986), and by Krige in Hermann et al (1990),
chap. 9.3. On the difficulties of Europe catching up with the USA see particularly Pestre in Hermann et al
(1990),
chapter 13. See also Collette's paper later in this volume where he speaks of the need for Europe to
leapfrog the USA if it was to remain competitive in the commercial field of telecommmunications by
satellite.
543 Those present were Coulomb (ESRO Council and STC Chairman), General Aubinière (DG, CNES),
Bignier (Council, STC and CNES), Cruvelier (Marseille), de Boisgelin (Foreign Affairs and Council), for
France; Dubois (Council Adviser and STC), Monfils, and Housiaux (Liège University and STC) for
Belgium; and Chavaz (Swiss Embassy, Paris and Adviser. STC). See letter from Chavaz to Golay,
12 July 1966 (Golay archive, file "Groupe d'Etudes Spatiales, Correspondance").
544 For the debate over the management problem in June see the ESRO Executive's paper, ESRO/ST/209,
15 June 1966, the UK addendum, ESRO/ST/209, add. 1, 17 June 1966, and the minutes of the 10th STC
meeting (21 June 1966), ESRO/ST/MIN/10, 6 July 1966.
545 The quotations are from Chavez's letter cited in note 46. Our translation from the French.
546 ESRO/ST/204, 25 July 1966.
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This counterattack bore little fruit. The only residue it left in the decisions taken by the Council in
mid-July was that ceilings should be imposed on the costs of the spacecraft and its scientific payload
in November, when more data would be available.547 Apart from that, the Council, by six votes to four
(Belgium, France, Spain and Switzerland), confirmed that there should be only one basic design for
the LAS scientific package. It also agreed that it be based on the UK design, that there be one back-up
unit, and that a contract for the primary scientific package be negotiated with Culham laboratory. The
management structure of the project was fudged. The Council agreed that there should be an overall
LAS systems manager, and instructed the Director General "to make proposals as soon as possible
concerning the structure for the internal management of the project within the Organisation". At the
same session, the Council discussed ESROs next three-year budget. And it took a decision which
dramatically changed the terms of the debate about the LAS.
6.3 Settling the final design and operational needs (1967-68). Rising costs, shrinking
budgets and the withering away of LAS
6.3.1 The financial crisis of July 1966 and the dangers it posed to LAS
When the ESRO Convention was signed in 1962, the meeting of government representatives also
signed an associated protocol making financial provision for the Organisation. It stipulated an overall
eight-year ceiling of expenditure of 1509 MFF. It also set ceilings for the first and second three-year
periods. The Organisation was to spend no more than 384 MFF in 1964-66 and the limit for 1967-69
was set at 602 MFF. All of these figures were in 1962 prices. At its meeting in July 1966, the ESRO
Council's Administrative and Finance Committee (AFC) was presented with a draft budget for the next
three years which called for 808 MFF in 1965 prices.548 This figure was composed of three elements.
There was 602 MFF, the sum provided for under the financial protocol. Then there was an additional
84 MFF, being an adjustment of 13.9 % to update the 602 MFF to 1965 prices. Finally there was a
new item: 122 MFF. This was money which had not been used during the first three-year period and
which the ESRO Executive wished to carry forward to the second. There had been an underspending,
said the Executive, because the build up of the Organisation had gone ahead more slowly than
anticipated.
In the ensuing debate in the AFC it was provisionally decided to allow ESRO to carry forward about
half of the unspent monies, and the budget level for 1967-1969 was set at 750 MFF (602 + 84 +
61 MFF, rounded up) in 1965 prices.549 The Council, meeting a week later, was not prepared to do
even that. The Belgian and French delegations "criticised the Organisation's lack of financial
discipline, its too heavy investment and [its] staff plans" - including the decision to go ahead with the
LAS project, "which was the most difficult to carry out".550 The British delegation made it clear that it
would not support a budget of more than 686 MFF (602 + 84 MFF) for the next three years. The
Italian delegation went further, refused to accept the adjustment for inflation, and asked for a budget
level of 602 MFF in 1965 prices. In the event, the Council invited the Executive to prepare a budget
for the next three years for 686 MFF, rounded up to 690 MFF.551 The Executive's hope of carrying
forward the unspent funds from the first three-year period was dashed.
In the light of this situation, a new expenditure profile was prepared for consideration by the STC.552
New costing of the LAS indicated that the spacecraft plus two flight models would cost
547 Council, 12th meeting (24-25 July 1966) ESRO/C/MIN/12, 1 September 1966. The resolutions taken on
the LAS are ESRO/C/XII/Res. 5, 25 July 1966.
548 ESRO/AF/476, 20 June 1966.
549 The AFC recommendations are spelt out in ESRO/AF/549, 7 July 1966. The French and Italian
delegations did not support these figures at the meeting.
550 ESRO/C/MIN/12, cit. The comment about the LAS is in a French note: ESRO/C/218, 15 July 1966.
551 The resolution is in document ESRO/C/DP/12, 28 July 1966. It included the stipulation by the Italian
delegation that their government was not prepared to pay more than 602 MFF for 1967-69.
552 SCI/WP/66, 19 August 1966, attached to a summary of the LPAC recommendations for the STC,
ESRO/ST/215, 9 September 1966.
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210 – 250 MFF, while UK figures for the scientific package with its back-up indicated that these
would cost 50 MFF. On the basis of this data, and the need to cut 55 MFF from the satellite
programme, two alternative scenarios were proposed. Both allowed for minimal expenditure on the
LAS and its instruments in 1967, when a large slice of the anticipated ESRO budget would be needed
for commitments already entered into. Both put the launching of the spacecraft outside the initial
eight-year life of ESRO. On hypothesis A, the two envisaged TD satellites would be slightly
simplified, the take-off of LAS expenditure would be slowed down, and its anticipated launch would
be in 1973-74. On hypothesis B, one of the TD satellites would be dropped from the programme, and
the LAS programme would go ahead more rapidly, with an anticipated launch in 1972-73.
The Launching Programme Advisory Committee (LPAC) considered these recommendations at its
meeting on 27 August 1966.553 After a lengthy discussion, it adopted hypothesis A. The TD-1 and TD-
2 satellites, it said, should be "pursued with the highest priority". A ceiling of 300 MFF should be
imposed on the LAS for the spacecraft and the scientific package, and not more than 200 MFF of this
was to be spent by the end of the first eight-year period of ESRO's life, i.e. 1971.554 These
recommendations were accepted by the STC at its meeting on 22 and 23 September 1966, the Italian
delegation abstaining.555
What considerations informed the decision to give the two TD satellites top priority? One reason
seems to be purely practical. Tenders for the two satellites had already been called for, and the offers
opened the month before.556 It would be difficult to cancel one or either of these projects now, with
design work already so well advanced. Then it must also be remembered that these were multi-
experiment satellites. TD-1 carried seven experiments, TD-2 no less than ten at this time. These
instruments had been built by national groups in many Member States. The two satellites could thus
count on widespread scientific and political support. Finally, some of the experiments to be flown
would be useful for later ESRO projects. One of TD-1's main tasks was the study of stellar astronomy,
and in some eyes it could be seen as part of the overall LAS programme.
All the same this set of priorities, far from securing the future of the LAS, in fact tended to endanger
it. Firstly, the viability of the Culham group was threatened. It was not simply that there was little or
no money to fund them during 1967. There was also the problem of what they were to do. The UK had
said that they needed five years to develop their scientific package. Since the work on the spacecraft
and the package had to proceed in parallel, and the anticipated launch was seven years hence, it was
clear that Culham had to slow down its activities for one or two years. This would surely be at the cost
of the group's morale and its interest in the project.
Secondly, there was the danger that the project costs may escalate above the ceiling. The estimate for
the scientific payload seemed accurate enough. There was far more uncertainty surrounding the costs
of the spacecraft. "It should be recalled", wrote the Executive in October, "that the figures for the
spacecraft are based on an assumption that such development costs in Europe only would be about 2/3
of the corresponding ones in the US". If further studies showed that assumption to be unrealistic,
"some modifications of the scientific aims might become necessary in the course of working out the
final design during 1967 and 1968".557
Finally, there was the danger that the LAS fall victim to changes in ESRO's long-term policy, which
was due to be discussed at a Ministerial Conference in 1967. It was becoming clear that at this
553 LPAC, 13th meeting (27 August 1966), ESRO/ST/218, rev. 1, 28 September 1965. See also chapter 5.
554 The full programme implied by this decision "provided for the launching of ESRO I and II in 1967,
HEOS-A in 1968, TD-2 in 1969, and also geared towards the launching of TD-1 in 1970, LAS in 1973-74
and towards the starting of another project in 1968-69": ESRO/AF/561, 7 September 1966, and
ESRO/AF/561, corr. 1, 19 September 1966.
555 STC, 12th meeting (22-23 September 1966), ESRO/ST/MIN/12, 2 November 1966.
556 This information is from document SCI/WP/66, cit.. As the spacecraft were tendered for as a unit pair, it
would also have been difficult to cancel just one of them.
557 ESRO/ST/229, 28 October 1966.
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conference the Member States would be looking for a de-emphasis of the science programme. As the
Belgian delegate to the STC put it, "governments would have more confidence in ESRO if the
Organisation's research programme was coordinated with other European space activities, like the
development of a launcher and of telecommunications satellites. A coordinated programme of this
type", the Belgian delegate went on, "would enable Europe, if not to catch up with the United States,
then at least to ensure that it was not left even further behind".558 About one third of the LAS's costs, or
100 MFF, were to be borne outside the first eight-year period foreseen in the ESRO Convention. If the
future ESRO was to include a strong applications satellites programme, the prospects for an expensive
and prestigious scientific project like the LAS were bleak indeed.
6.3.2 The UK's attempts to save the Culham group
Alarmed by developments the UK Atomic Energy Authority and the Science Research Council made
two proposals intended to secure the viability of the LAS and of the Culham group. Firstly, they
offered to pay for the work at Culham during 1967, the money only being refunded by ESRO in 1968,
when there was more breathing space in the budget. Secondly, they proposed that the Culham Group
be authorised to develop a half-scale model of the LAS. This would be flown on a star-stabilised
rocket then being developed in the UK. The experiment, said the Culham Group Leader, in addition to
ensuring that his team would remain fully employed, "would increase the know-how available on the
technological aspects of the development and might well have an impact on the final design of the
payload".559
The British suggestion was rejected by the STC at its meeting on 8 and 9 November. The German and
Dutch delegations were strongly in favour of continuing the LAS, believing that large, advanced
projects had a fundamental place in a European space effort. Other delegations were less convinced,
fearing that it would unbalance the programme. And when the British offers of support for the Culham
group were put to the vote, to the bitter disappointment and anger of the Group Leader, they were
refused by five votes (Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy and Spain) to three (Germany, Netherlands,
and UK). Sweden and Switzerland abstained.560 In the light of this decision, the STC agreed, after
another painful vote, that work on the scientific package should be temporarily halted, and that tender
action be initiated for the spacecraft on the basis of the Culham group's design. The Ministerial
conference to be held the next year would examine the new cost estimates and decide on the future of
the LAS. These recommendations were endorsed by the Council a few weeks later with one important
change. On the insistence of ESRO's Technical Director it was agreed to provide minimal finance for
the nucleus of the Culham Group until the Ministerial Conference was held, hopefully in summer
1967. This was because the help of the group was said to be essential for the assessment of tenders.561
Two brief comments are apposite here. Firstly, the votes in the STC were indicative of the deep
divisions now created by the LAS inside the European space science community. On the one hand,
they reflected the ongoing animosity of the Belgian and French delegations to the high-resolution
instrument favoured by the German, Dutch and British teams, and their determination to try to kill the
project at every opportunity. The financial situation brought them additional allies: Italy and Spain,
who were becoming increasingly apprehensive about the costs of ESRO, and Denmark. The Danish
position was spelt out in a long statement made to the STC in November, and (what was most unusual)
reproduced verbatim in its minutes. The LAS, said the Danish delegation, was taking resources away
from projects of interest to the smaller Member States, like sounding rockets and the scholarship
558 This is from the minutes of the 13th STC meeting (8-9 November 1966), ESRO/ST/MIN/13,
27 December 1966. Our translation from the French version. On the 1967 European Space Conference
see chapter 9.
559 This paragraph is based on ESRO/ST/229, 28 October 1966, and the explanations by the head of the
Culham group in ESRO/ST/MIN/13, cit.
560 ESRO/ST/MIN/13, cit.
561 Council, 14th meeting (30/11-2/1266), ESRO/C/MIN/14, 20 January 1967. The contract with the Culham
Group was subsequently extended until the end of February 1967 and finally terminated on 31 July 1968
(see ESRO General Report 1967, p. 54, and 1968, p. 25).
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programme. It was also forcing cuts in the applied research programme which was essential if Europe
was to be less dependent on American material and know-how. The costs, they concluded, were not
worth the benefits, and the Large Astronomical Satellite should be given a very low priority in the
ESRO programme. The second point to note about this debate is the support for the British LAS by
ESRO's Technical Directorate. This had been guaranteed from the start. Indeed early in 1966 the
Technical Director had proposed calling for tenders for the LAS spacecraft using the UK design of the
payload as a guide even before the technical studies submitted by the three scientific groups had been
assessed by the ESRO consultants.562 At one level this reflected the longstanding relationship between
the Technical Director, Alfred (Freddy) Lines and the British team. Lines had been at the Royal
Aircraft Establishment before joining ESRO. Here he had directed a programme, in consultation with
British astronomers, aimed at working out the technical requirements and possibilities for an
astronomical satellite stabilised to a few minutes of an arc. In 1962 he had presented a paper to a
COPERS Colloquium describing his main findings.563 The RAE subsequently provided one of the first
early feasibility studies of the spacecraft for COPERS. Lines had thus been personally and emotionally
involved with the UK group and their project from the very beginning. In addition, at a more general
level, there was the interest of producing a spacecraft of the complexity demanded by the British (and
Gernelas) LASs. Here was a project worthy of the engineers at ESTEC, a project which would
stimulate them personally, challenge them professionally, and ensure that the centre in Noordwijk
would become a lynchpin in the development of ESRO and of Europe's space effort.
6.3.3 Enter new cost assessments, exit the LAS
A call for tenders for the LAS spacecraft was duly issued in January 1967. A consultant from NASA,
W.G. Stroud, was employed for six months to assist with the tender evaluation and to help establish
realistic cost estimates for the project. In doing this, Stroud and his teams from ESRO, ELDO and
Culham actually redefined the project - in fact he even proposed changing its name to the European
Space Observatory. The LAS was once again to be "a continuing programme comprising a series of
flights of the same spacecraft with different scientific packages". The basic specifications remained
unchanged, but the technology was upgraded (e.g. by the inclusion of an onboard computer) - and
costs soared. Stroud's estimates in June 1967 for the scientific payload were 55-60 MFF (compared to
50 MFF a few months before), those for the spacecraft were now 400-500 MFF (double the earlier
estimate). The NASA consultant also included for the first time estimates of the cost of ground support
facilities and equipment, including data acquisition and handling, which added another 180-230 MFF
on to the bill. On top of that there was the launcher to be paid for, at 120 MFF. In short the total cost
of the LAS was now about 900 MFF in 1967 prices - to be compared with a ceiling of 300 MFF for
spacecraft and payload agreed only a few months before.564
We shall end our story here. The Council, said Stroud sanguinely in presenting his report, ought "not
to be alarmed by the apparently high cost. [...] LAS was designed for an extremely advanced and
challenging task and no other project that existed or was planned was capable of carrying out such a
task".565 The Council, predictably, baulked at Stroud's cost figures, but agreed that the LAS could be
submitted to the Ministerial Conference, "as an example of the type of project that should be
562 The proposal to call for tenders is ESRO/ST/180, 2 February 1966. The criticism that Lines was 'jumping
the gun' was made particularly forcefully by the French and Belgian delegations at the 8th STC meeting
(14-15 February 1966), ESRO/ST/MIN/8, 4 April 1966.
563 For the information on Lines' past links in the UK see Massey and Robins (1986), 152. His paper at the
COPERS Colloquium is in the document compiled by J. Ortner and cited in note 44.
564 For information in this paragraph see ESRO General Report 1967, pp. 52-5 and ESRO/ST/254,
5 June 1967 (for the cost estimates).
565 ESRO/ST/253, 30 April 1967 (for Stroud's presentation to the LPAC), ESRO/ST/MIN/15,
5 September 1967 (for his presentation to the STC on 5 June), and ESRO/C/MIN/17, 6 July 1967, (for his
presentation to the Council, from which the quotation is taken). He backed up his intervention with a
paper giving "A Justification for the European Space Observatory (LAS)", ESRO/C/MIN/17, Annex II,
5 July 1967.
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undertaken by ESRO".566 The Ministerial Conference, meeting in Rome from 11-13 July 1967, decided
to set up an Advisory Committee on Programmes, chaired by J-P. Causse, whose task it was to
"elaborate proposals for a joint space policy and programmes".567 The Causse Report, published six
months later, found that the LAS "[could] be undertaken, but that it [was] at the limit of Europe's
present technical and financial resources".568
When was a decision taken to abandon the LAS? Apparently in mid-1968. The ESRO "Bureau"
discussed the future of the project at a meeting on 9 May 1968 and resolved "to discontinue the
contract [with Culham], unless the next Council meeting should wish otherwise".569 In the event, the
next Council meeting, held on 30 May 1968, was dominated by difficulties surrounding the TD
project. To judge from its minutes, it never even considered the LAS.570 And according to ESRO's
1968 General Report, "the contract with the Culham Group for the [LAS] experimental package was
terminated as of 31 July 1968, because of the high cost of the whole project".571 After eight or more
years of work, and thousands of pages of technical reports, ESRO's Large Astronomical Satellite had
quietly disappeared from its scientific programme.
A footnote. In 1968 the UK team started redesigning their scientific package and had carried out a
feasibility study for another high-resolution UV spectrometer with "somewhat relaxed" specifications.
Its wavelength range was restricted to 1000–2000Å. And the pointing accuracy of the spacecraft was
reduced to 2 arc sec, as compared to 0.1 arc sec for the LAS.572 This became the UVAS, which was
also unsuccessfully put forward as a candidate for an ESRO satellite. UVAS in turn evolved into the
International Ultraviolet Explorer (IUE), a joint ESA/NASA/UK Science Research Council satellite
and a close cousin of the LAS.573 The IUE was successfully launched into geostationary orbit on 26
January 1978 - twenty years after the first plans for the LAS were drawn up.
6.4 Post-mortem
Why was the LAS never realised as an ESRO project? The answer is apparently simple: it was too
expensive. And indeed the costs soared. In 1961 the Blue Book gave a figure of 84 MFF for the cost of
an astronomical satellite, using UK estimates of what industry would charge to build one. By end-
1966, when the specifications had been firmed up and the first serious designs and costing completed,
it looked as though the scientific payload would cost about 50 MFF and the satellite about 250 MFF.
A year later, Stroud and his team, after upgrading the scientific package and tendering for the
spacecraft, came up with figures of 55 - 60 MFF and 400 - 500 MFF, respectively. In fact the  Causse
Report estimated that the LAS programme and its launchers would cost about $180 million, equivalent
to the cost of about five or six medium-sized scientific or applications satellites.
We cannot leave matters at that, though. Indeed it is meaningless to speak of the LAS as too
expensive. From a technical point of view it was in fact cheaper, and allegedly better, than the
American OAO programme which, according to the  Causse Report, had already cost about
$250 million by December 1967. If the LAS was too expensive, it was too expensive given the amount
566 The Council minutes are ESRO/C/MIN/17, 6 July 1967.
567 The minutes of the European Space Conference are CSE/CM(July 1967)/PV/..., with various dates.
568 The Report of the Advisory Committee on Programmes, chaired by J-P. Causse, is document
CSE/CCP(67)5, December 1967. The quotation is from p. 15. The Causse Report is discussed in detail in
chapter 9.
569 H. van de Hulst (private communication), 5 September 1991.
570 The minutes are ESRO/C/MIN/24, 7 June 1968.
571 ESRO General Report 1968, p. 25.
572 See ESRO General Report 1968, at pp. 25 and 87 for this information.
573 On the decisions regarding UVAS and IUE see chapters 7 and 8 in this book. The IUE was designed to
give high-resolution (approx. 0.1 Å) spectra of bright objects and low-resolution (approx. 6 Å) spectra of
fainter objects. The spectral range covered was 1150 Å to 3200 Å. Fine guidance to an accuracy of
1 arc sec was provided. The total weight of the IUE spacecraft and scientific payload was 668 kg.
See Massey and Robins (1986), chapter 15, and Macchetto & Penston (1978).
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of money European governments were prepared to spend on ESRO and the scientists' insistence that
the organisation had to have a balanced programme.
From the very start it was clear that European governments were not prepared to pump anything like
the amount of money into ESRO that the USA was spending on its civilian space science programme
in NASA. One important reason for this so-called 'lack of political will' was that, granted the
commercial and military interest of space, some major European powers also wanted to build up an
independent launch capability and substantial national space programmes. They were prepared to
invest in joint scientific research in parallel, but only under tightly controlled financial conditions.
Even this was rapidly judged by some to be a luxury. The pressure in the mid-1960s to broaden
ESRO's brief to include application satellites, and a number of major funding crises in ELDO,
effectively meant that there could be no major upturn in the funding for scientific satellites, as the LAS
required.
The LAS also suffered from a growing loss of support in the space science community. It must be
remembered that space science is a fragmented discipline. The LPAC had no less than six different ad
hoc Working Groups proposing rocket and satellite experiments in diverse fields. To maintain some
'balance' between them it had to ensure that no one field was granted too large a share of the available
resources. This counted heavily against the LAS, which increasingly threatened to skew the whole
research programme in favour of stellar astronomy. The lack of widespread scientific support for the
LAS in 1965-6 was also undoubtedly due to the so-called 'management problem'. There may have
been all sorts of good reasons why the UK blocked every initiative by the ESRO Executive to build up
a strong in-house group of space scientists who would share in the work on the LAS's scientific
package. But this was a move which was particularly resented by some of the smaller countries. They
saw front-line research in an international centre like ESTEC as the only way in which their scientists
and engineers could build up the necessary know-how in the space sector. By consistently refusing to
take meaningful steps to 'internationalise' the work on the LAS - a project paid for by ESRO, after all -
British scientists undoubtedly lost the goodwill of important sections of the ESRO management and of
at least some of their professional colleagues in other countries.574
Another reason why the LAS was abandoned was that it was seen to be technically too ambitious for
ESRO. The  Causse Report made much of this. Many of the components called for in the designs
proposed by Stroud and his team had performance specifications which were more demanding than
those currently being achieved in the USA. It was not sure that European industries were yet in a
position to undertake a venture of this size and complexity, said the Report. Linked to the question of
technical risk was, of course, the fear of further cost escalation. It is thus not surprising that when the
LAS was abandoned, the Culham group designed a technologically simpler payload. In particular they
dramatically reduced the pointing accuracy of the spacecraft which was one of the main factors
pushing up its cost.
Surveying these arguments it is of course striking that the difficulties faced by the LAS were precisely
those predicted by the Belgian-French-Swiss group who proposed building a low-resolution
instrument in 1965. From the start they had objected to increasing the target resolution to 0.1 Å, and
they had warned against the implications of the corresponding increases called for in pointing
accuracy. They had also objected that the satellite demanded sophisticated technology (e.g. a finely-
polished and delicate quartz mirror) which would make it technically risky and highly costly. The
scientists in these groups cannot have been pleased at the demise of the LAS. But they must have felt a
certain grim satisfaction at seeing their early predictions, which had been swept so brusquely aside,
confirmed by later events.
574 According to one of the protagonists, R. Lüst, "the so-called 'management problem' was one of the major
reasons that the project lost wide-spread scientific support. In my opinion, this could be stated more
strongly as being the killer". As confirmation, Lüst remarks that projects like COS-B, EXOSAT and
particularly Hipparcos would never have been accepted if they had been arranged in line with the UK
management scheme. (Letter from R. Lüst to the author, 5 September 1991
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Does this mean that the BFS design should have been chosen at the start? That would be too hasty.
Everyone realised the scientific, technical and political importance of ESRO having large, expensive
and challenging projects in its programme. The LAS not only fulfilled these objectives. It also held out
the promise that European astronomers and astrophysicists could compete on an equal footing with
their American colleagues. This was why most European stellar astronomers consistently supported
the British design for the LAS. This was a dream which most space scientists felt the BFS payload
could never fulfil. It was a dream which was inevitably shattered. If you want to compete in a race you
need comparable resources, and these Europe did not have. Causse's committee drew the sobering
conclusions. It was essential for ESRO to have ambitious projects, but preferably "in a field where
competition [was] not too lively already" and in which the Organisation could "collaborat[e] with the
other great space Powers".575
575 Causse Report, cit., pp. 19-20.
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Chapter 7: 
The COS-B Satellite: A Case Study in ESRO's Selection Procedures576
A. Russo
COS-B is the name of a successful space mission aimed at studying celestial gamma rays. It was
carried out by a team of European scientists within the framework of the scientific programme of the
European Space Research Organisation (ESRO) first and of the European Space Agency (ESA) later.
First proposed in the mid-1960s, the project was approved by the ESRO Council in 1969 and the
satellite was launched in August 1975 (Figure 7-1). It provided a continuous flow of useful data until
April 1982, when the instruments on board were switched off because of the irreversible deterioration
of the main detector. Stored in several hundreds of magnetic tapes, these data are still available for
further processing by the scientific community at large.
The historical interest of the COS-B mission can be considered from at least three points of view.
Scientifically speaking, it made a fundamental contribution to the field of gamma-ray astronomy,
dramatically improving the available data base from about 8000 events to more than 200,000 in the
energy range from 50 to 5000 million electron-volts (50 MeV - 5 GeV). The mission produced the first
gamma-ray map of the sky in three different energy bands and the first catalogue of discrete sources at
energies higher than 100 MeV (Figure 7-2). The new information on celestial gamma rays provided by
COS-B added significantly to the scientific knowledge of the so-called "turbulent universe" which was
being explored simultaneously through the study of pulsars and by X-ray astronomy.577
COS-B is also historically interesting for the light it throws on the early development of ESRO. ESRO
was conceived in the early 1960s as an international scientific organisation to foster European
cooperation in space research. From the mid-1960s onwards it had to come to terms with the rapid
development of space activities in the field of applications. National policies differed sharply and a
variety of political options and organisational strategies were brought forward, causing considerable
stress in the institutional context where the COS-B project was discussed and eventually approved.
This was also ESRO's first observatory-like (single-experiment) satellite and the first major scientific
mission of the Organisation. Before COS-B, the discontinued LAS apart, ESRO's satellite programme
was based on spacecraft carrying several experiments provided by laboratories in its Member States.
Even if one or more of the experiments failed, the others could still collect good scientific data. The
scientific payload of COS-B, on the contrary, comprised one experiment only, i.e. a gamma-ray
telescope whose parts were provided by different laboratories. This meant that the decision-making
process leading to the approval of the project was particularly complex, that the scientists who built
the payload had to be sure that it worked reliably, and that a new management structure had to be
evolved.
Finally, from the sociological point of view, COS-B can be viewed as an example of the establishment
of "big science" in space research. Three aspects are relevant here. Firstly, there were the people. The
many scientists involved in the construction of the scientific payload of COS-B and in the analysis of
its data were widely distributed in space and time, spread as they were over six laboratories in four
countries and over three scientific generations. They had to deal with problems arising from their
different institutional settings and scientific cultures, as well as with tensions and conflicts about the
meaning and the aims of such a long "experiment". Secondly, there was the problem of management.
COS-B was a complex scientific and technological enterprise, whose success depended on a careful
division of labour and on the ability to integrate into a single project competence and expertise in
576 This chapter is essentially based on Russo (1993c). We wish to thank Harwood Academic Publishers for
the permission to use this paper here.
577 The experiment is described in Bignami et al. (1975). Among the many papers reporting on its results one
must cite Swanenburg et al. (1981), Mayer-Hasselwander et al. (1982), Clear et al. (1987).
See also, ESA Bulletin, 2 (COS-B Special), August 1975.
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Figure 7-1: The COS-B satellite
Figure 7-2: The gamma-ray map of the Milky Way as observed by COS-B
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several fields. The fact that the construction of the scientific payload and its integration in the
spacecraft were split among different laboratories, with different leaders who were funded from
different sources, pushed the art of management to the limits of what was possible. Finally, there was
the role of computer analysis in obtaining meaningful results from the huge flow of data coming from
the satellite. This is an obvious aspect in contemporary "big science" experiments, but was less
apparent when COS-B was first conceived. In fact, its development intertwined with the dramatic
growth of information science and of its influence on the design of space experiments. Indeed COS-B
served as a test-bed for new software (e.g. pattern recognition), and this too affected the actual
implementation of the project, both from the scientific and from the organisational point of view.
In this chapter we shall analyse the first phase of the history of COS-B, concentrating on the decision-
making process which transformed an ingenious scientific idea into a project undertaken by a big
multinational organisation. The aim is to present it as a case study of the many factors that played a
role in a major scientific and technological choice of this kind. Three levels, in particular, can be
identified in the chain of events that brought COS-B into ESRO's programme. The first is the scientific
context, where the Organisation's several advisory committees discussed the project's merit and its
feasibility in comparison with other competing projects. The second regards the institutional dynamics
of the bodies called on to take the decision. Finally, there is the set of political and financial factors
that affected the decision-making process itself.
Our narrative will extend over the three and a half years that were necessary for ESRO to arrive at a
definite decision about a scientific programme which included COS-B as its major component. Three
main phases can be identified in this story. The first, lasting from early 1966 to spring 1967, was the
period when ESRO's scientific advisory bodies discussed the satellite proposals put forward by the
scientific community. Among these, a project for a cosmic ray satellite devoted to gamma-ray
astronomy was taken into consideration and given some priority. The severe crisis inside ESRO in the
years 1967-68 characterised the second phase. No project could actually be taken beyond the stage of
a feasibility study. In addition, it was now suggested that an X-ray experiment be added to the gamma-
ray experiment considered before. The third phase, from late 1968 to June 1969, was the time when
decisions were taken. The idea of having a satellite solely devoted to gamma-ray astronomy (COS-B)
was again strongly advocated, and it eventually triumphed over a joint X- and gamma-ray satellite
(COS-A). Political and financial considerations, as well as scientific arguments, led to ESRO adopting
a programme in which top priority was given to the COS-B project and a geostationary satellite
(GEOS), against an alternative programme involving a satellite for astronomy in the ultraviolet.
7.1 Gamma-ray astronomy and the S-111 proposal
The first record in the files of what was to become the COS-B mission is a "proposal for experiment"
presented in November 1965 to ESRO under the title "A multipurpose detector for the study of
electromagnetic and nuclear events". It received the code number S-111, namely the 111th in the series
of proposals for an experiment to be flown on an ESRO satellite.578 The S-111 proposal was presented
by three scientists of great prestige in the European space research community, Giuseppe Occhialini,
Reimar Lüst, and Jacques Labeyrie, on behalf of the research groups which they directed respectively
at the Istituto di Scienze Fisiche of the University of Milan (Italy), the Max-Plank-Institut für
Extraterrestrische Physik in Munich (Germany) and the Centre d'Etudes Nucléaires in Saclay (France).
The main purpose of the proposed experiment was to measure the flux, energy spectrum and degree of
anisotropy of the diffuse gamma radiation having an energy greater than 100 MeV, and to search for
and study discrete gamma-ray sources. Moreover, different triggering conditions of the main detector
578 ESRO, Proposal for experiment S-111, 25 November 191965, COS-B papers, Palermo.
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allowed the measurement of the absolute flux, energy spectrum and negative-positive ratio of primary
cosmic electrons of energy greater than 1 GeV.579
To analyse the complex decision-making process by which this original proposal eventually became a
definite project approved by ESRO we must consider the scientific aims of the proposed experiment,
the characteristics of its protagonists, and the institutional setting in which it was proposed. By the
mid-1960s, gamma-ray astronomy was a very new field of research from which much was expected.
Measurements of celestial gamma rays, in fact, could provide direct information on physical processes
which played a crucial role throughout astronomy, both as a source of energy in stars and in
interactions of cosmic ray particles with the interstellar medium. As P. Morrison put it in 1958:
[This] is a form of radiation which is more directly related to high-energy and nuclear
processes than is optical or radio emission, and yet does not share with high-energy
charged particles the complete loss of information about the position of the source.580
Morrison's paper, often considered as the birth of gamma-ray astronomy, provided the stimulus for the
first surge of experimental work.581 In fact, after discussing several processes which could give rise to
cosmic gamma rays and the possibilities of experimental measurements, Morrison concluded:
All experience suggests that such speculative estimates of what is present in a novel field
of enquiry rarely prove reliable; but it suggests no less strongly that the extension of
observations to such a new domain will in the end repay considerable effort. This note is
intended mainly to attract to this problem the attention of those experimenters skilled in
the required arts.
The challenge was first accepted by a research group at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT) directed by W.L. Kraushaar, who designed an instrument to be flown on board the satellite
Explorer XI. The experiment was successful and, in 1962, the possible detection of "gamma rays of
non-terrestrial origin" was announced, thus giving birth to experimental gamma-ray astronomy.582 By
the time S-111 was proposed to ESRO, however, the scanty data available from this and a few other
experiments indicated the great difficulty of obtaining reliable and unambiguous results, due both to
the low fluxes observed and to the high background radiation created in and around the detectors.583
Concluding a long review on the subject in 1967, G.C. Fazio renewed the challenge:
Future experiments in gamma-ray astronomy are not going to be performed easily.
However, the knowledge of the universe to be gained by the detection of a flux of gamma
rays is so important that more sensitive experiments are essential.584
This ambitious and difficult task inspired S-111. Its proponents were physicists with longstanding
experience in fields such as cosmic rays, nuclear and particle physics and plasma physics, and had
been involved in space research from the earliest days of ESRO. Of the three, Occhialini was the
senior member and the scientific driving force. His involvement in cosmic-ray physics dated back to
the early 1930s and he had important results to his credit, such as the discovery of electron-positron
579 The original design also included a detector for measuring heavy cosmic-ray nuclei. The Danish physicist
B. Peters showed an interest in this part of the S-111 project and a possible collaboration between him
and a senior member of Labeyrie's group, L. Koch, was discussed. The heavy nuclei experiment was
eventually discarded.
580 Morrison (1958), p. 859. The following quotation is from p. 864. Being neutral, gamma rays are not
affected, like charged cosmic ray particles, by interstellar magnetic fields and propagate along straight
lines.
581 See for example Hillier (1984).
582 Kraushaar & Clark (1962). Also, Kraushaar et al. (1965).
583 Contemporary reviews are Ginzburg & Syrovatskii (1965); Greisen (1966); Fazio (1967).
Also Lüst (1966); Hutchinson (1966).
584 Fazio (1967), p. 524.
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showers (with P. Blackett) and the discovery of the π-meson (with C. Powell). By the mid-1960s, the
cosmic-ray group of the University of Milan, directed by "Beppo" Occhialini and by his wife
Constance (Connie) Dilworth, was heavily involved in space research, and building experiments for
ESRO rockets and satellites.585
The scientific collaboration between Milan and Saclay had originated a few years before, when the
two groups jointly realised several balloon-borne experiments to study primary cosmic ray electrons.586
At the large laboratory of the French Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique, Labeyrie directed the
Service d'Electronique Physique, where his group had developed a solid-state detector for high-energy
particles.587 Occhialini led him to cosmic rays and space research, and eventually a Section
d'astrophysique was established in Saclay in the early 1970's.588 Lüst’s main scientific interest was in
plasma physics and in the role of plasmas in space physics and astrophysics. After spending some time
at MIT, he had established at Garching b. Munich the Max-Plank-Institut für Extraterrestrische Physik
in the early 1960s. He had been one of the founding fathers of ESRO and his group was also among
the first users of ESRO rockets and satellites.589
The joint proposal S-111 derived from the three groups' common experience and scientific interests.
On the one hand, it was a natural follow up of the French-Italian collaboration; on the other, it drew
from the three laboratories' experience with the spark chamber technique. The rapid development of
this device in the early 1960s had made the spark chamber particularly suited for space research.590 A
visual spark chamber associated with plastic scintillation counters was the detector used in the Milan-
Saclay balloon experiments, while a wire spark chamber had been developed at the Max-Plank-Institut
by M. Sommer and Klaus Pinkau, the latter being a brilliant physicist who had just arrived in Garching
from the University of Kiel and who soon became Lüst's principal collaborator. A spark chamber was
the central element in the detecting system of S-111. The same groups, calling themselves the
MiMoSa (Milano-Monaco-Saclay) collaboration, also used a spark chamber built at Saclay for a small
gamma ray experiment proposed in 1967 for the TD-1 satellite (proposal S-133).591
The detecting system of S-111 included two spark chambers triggered by a telescope made of two
Cerenkov counters and a set of plastic scintillator counters. The upper spark chamber was for the
conversion of gamma rays and the identification of the direction of arrival. The lower chamber served
for energy measurement. Different triggering conditions could be remote-controlled for gamma rays
and electrons respectively. The total weight of the experiment was estimated at about 60 kg. The
satellite was required to have a circular, near polar orbit with altitude of 700 km and a minimum
lifetime of twelve months. It had to be pointed at different regions of the sky in order to detect and
study possible discrete sources of gamma rays. A significant feature of the proposed experiment was
that it would use most of the facilities available on the satellite for the scientific payload. S-111 was
thus essentially a proposal for a single-purpose space mission and was in fact intended for a second
generation ESRO satellite.
585 Two satellite experiments were being developed in Milan to be flown on board of ESRO spacecrafts
HEOS-A and TD-1 respectively: S-79, in collaboration with Labeyrie's group, to investigate cosmic ray
electrons, and S-88 to study solar gamma rays. ESRO, General Report 1964-65. On Occhialini
see Russo (1996).
586 Bland et al (1968).
587 Labeyrie (1963).
588 By 1965, Labeyrie and his co-workers were building four satellite experiments for ESRO. These were
S-79, with the Milan group; S-72, to measure solar protons, to be flown on both ESRO-II and HEOS-A;
S-67-A, to investigate the spectrometry of primary cosmic rays, to be flown on TD-1; and S-77, also for
TD-1, for X-ray spectrometry. ESRO, General Report 1964-65.
589 Two satellite experiments were in construction in Munich, to be included in the payloads of HEOS-A and
TD-2 respectively: S-16, to study the interaction of interplanetary plasma with magnetic fields, and
S-103/104, to investigate solar protons. ESRO, General Report 1964-1965.
590 Roberts (1964); Wenzel (1964).
591 Experiment S-133 derived from two different proposals, from Milan-Saclay and Munich respectively:
ESRO, General Report 1967.
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7.2 ESRO in the mid 1960s
The European Space Research Organisation (ESRO) was officially born on 20 March 1964, after four
year of laborious preparations. Its statutory purpose was "to provide for, and to promote, collaboration
among European States in space research and technology, exclusively for peaceful purposes".592 To
accomplish its tasks, the ESRO Council and the Director General were advised by two special
committees, the Scientific and Technical Committee (STC) and the Administrative and Financial
Committee (AFC). Both the Council and the STC and AFC were made of delegations from the
Member States. As for the definition of the Organisation's scientific programmes, the most important
body was the Launching Programme Advisory Committee (LPAC). The latter was composed of five
eminent scientists whose task it was to evaluate the experiment proposals coming from the scientific
community and to suggest integrated scientific payloads for rockets and satellites.593 The LPAC was
supported by six working groups of scientists expert in the different fields of space science, identified
by easily intelligible acronyms: ATM (atmospheric structure), COS (cosmic rays and trapped
radiation), ION (ionosphere and auroral phenomena), PLA (moon, planets, comets and interplanetary
medium), STAR (stars and stellar systems) and SUN (solar astronomy). Of the 110 satellite
experiments proposed to ESRO by the end of 1965, 70 had been recommended by the expert groups
and more than half of them had been arranged in the payloads of the Organisation's five planned
satellites. These were two small satellites, ESRO-I and ESRO-II, to be launched in 1967, a highly
eccentric orbit satellite (HEOS-A), scheduled for 1968, and two medium sized satellites, TD-1 and
TD-2, planned for 1969. Besides these, a project for a large astronomical satellite (LAS) for stellar
astronomy in the ultra-violet region was also studied.
When S-111 was presented, a new phase was opening in European space research. More and more
groups were entering the field and competing for space on satellite payloads, and there was a growing
awareness of the need for more ambitious scientific programmes. On this highly competitive terrain, a
choice among different projects was not simply based on scientific merit. It was necessarily the result
of a decision-making process in which various aspects had to be taken into consideration: scientific
value, of course, but also technical and financial feasibility, fair distribution among different sectors of
the scientific community and among different Member States, research programmes of other space
agencies, fair return in industrial contracts, and so on. In competing on this terrain, Occhialini, Lüst
and Labeyrie had the advantage of being at one and the same time proponents of a specific project and
involved at the highest level in the definition of the Organisation's scientific policy. Lüst was one of
the founding fathers of ESRO and, in the late 1960s, he was a German delegate in the Council (vice-
president from 1969), the vice-chairman of the STC and the chairman of the LPAC. Occhialini was an
Italian delegate in the STC, the scientific adviser to the Italian delegation in the Council and, from
May 1968, a member of the LPAC. Labeyrie was a member of the COS Group, of which C. Dilworth
became the chairman in 1967. Their game was to be played on different tables. As scientists, they had
to work out a well-defined scientific mission, good enough to compete successfully with many others
in the several fields of space science. As group leaders, they had to get a technically feasible design
ready for when ESRO would have been in the position to decide about its new scientific programme.
As ESRO policy-makers, they had to do their best to ensure that their project was chosen.
7.2.1 Two competing projects for ESRO's second generation of satellites
Early in 1966, the LPAC started to discuss ESRO's future satellite programme. By that time, the type
of mission and the payload composition of the first generation of spacecraft had been established, and
it was possible to arrive at "quiet and thorough deliberations on what satellites ESRO might launch in
the years 1970 to 1972".594 Three aspects were to be considered, i.e. the desires and intentions of the
scientists, the technical feasibility of the proposed projects and the economic resources of the
Organisation. Moreover, there was the possibility of co-operating with NASA for realising very large
592 Convention for the Establishment of a European Space Research Organisation (signed on 14 June 1962
and entered into force on 20 March 1964).
593 The membership of the LPAC in this period is reported in table 3 of chapter 5.
594 LPAC, 11th meeting (17 January 1966), ESRO/ST/173, 14 February 1966, p. 3.
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projects. The LPAC decided to ask the ad hoc working groups to discuss the matter and to inform
them about the suggestions coming from the scientific community at large.
When the LPAC met again, in April, it was evident that another large project comparable to the LAS
could not be completed with the funds available for the eight-year period covered by the ESRO
Convention. Any such satellite could thus only be undertaken, if at all, in co-operation with NASA.
Attention was thus focussed on the desirable scientific objectives of ESRO's own programme of
medium-sized satellites. In tackling this problem, the ad hoc working groups generally did not attempt
to compose payloads on the basis of proposals for satellite experiments already available in the ESRO
files. Instead they put forward their suggestions about the kind of scientific missions from which the
most interesting results could be obtained. The result was some 16 mission projects covering topics as
different as the study of ionospheric irregularities, the study of solar flares, the study of interplanetary
plasma, and the investigation of cosmic gamma rays and electrons. The latter project, requiring a
satellite in a circular, low orbit, was among those recommended by the COS Group, who also
presented proposal S-111 as an example of the payload for such a satellite.595
After discussing the findings of the groups, the LPAC concluded that it was too early to submit
specific recommendations to the STC, and recommended to start studies on a few satellite projects,
looking for compatibility with other spacecraft already under development and considering the
possibility of combining different proposals. While these studies were under way in ESTEC, a severe
financial crisis arose in ESRO, which jeopardised the whole of the operational programme and
rendered any future planning almost impossible. The rapid escalation of costs, the difficulties
connected with the fair distribution and management of industrial contracts, the different political
views on the role and tasks of ESRO in the general context of European space activities, these and
other factors made it impossible to reach unanimous agreement in the Council (as demanded by the
Convention) on the level of resources to be granted to ESRO for its second three-year period
(1967-69). For two years, as Director General Herman Bondi later recalled, the Organisation had to
live "from hand to mouth, and 'extra-legally'".596
An immediate consequence of the crisis was the uncertainty surrounding the future of the Large
Astronomical Satellite (LAS), by far the most expensive and most demanding ESRO project. A
decision about LAS was to be taken at a Ministerial Conference planned in mid-1967 and, in fact, the
whole of the Organisation's future satellite programme hinged to a great extent on the outcome. In this
difficult situation, the LPAC could only underline that:
It is of the greatest importance to the viability of ESRO as a reputable scientific
organisation that no reduction be made in the operational programme. [...] ESRO should
undertake medium satellites and space probe projects at such a level as to ensure that
two launchings take place on the average every year. This is considered as a minimum
programme.597
Even a minimum programme, however, implied that difficult choices already had to be taken in this
early, and somewhat uncertain phase of the decision-making process. Thus, a large fraction of the
595 The proposals of the scientific working groups, including the large projects involving ESRO/NASA co-
operation, are in document SCI/WP/55, 25 March 1966. The ION group was the most prolific, proposing
6 projects plus one involving four satellites. For the recommendations of the COS Group, see the report
of its 13th meeting (17 March 1966), COS/24, 6 April 1966. All projects were discussed at the 12th
meeting of the LPAC (5 April 1966), ESRO/ST/207, 3 May 1966, and the conclusions were presented in
documents ESRO/ST/199, 21 April 1966 (medium-sized spacecraft) and ESRO/ST/200, 21 April 1966
(large projects and ESRO/NASA co-operation). See also SCI/WP/61 and SCI/WP/62, 30 March 1966.
596 Bondi (1984), p. 22. The ESRO crisis in 1966, which eventually led to the abandonment of the LAS, is
discussed in the previous chapter.
597 LPAC, 13th meeting (27 August 1966), ESRO/ST/218, rev. 1, 28 September 1966, pp. 5, 6. Also in
ESRO/ST/215, 9 September 1966. Different options for a revision of the satellite programme in the new
financial situation are presented in SCI/WP/66, 19 August 1966.
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LPAC's meeting in December 1966 was devoted to a discussion of ESRO's future satellite programme
and to a critical consideration of the several projects on the table. All the main elements of the
scientific and political equation to be solved were exposed and extensively reviewed. In particular:
whether to concentrate on one specific field of space research or to offer an equal share of the total
spacecraft programme to each scientific group; whether to aim at having as many scientists as possible
participating in the programme or to favour projects which promised to yield the most important
scientific results; whether to favour outstanding original research or rather to stimulate space research
in many laboratories; whether to advocate a rapid implementation of the LAS project and then to
accept a limited number of medium-sized satellites or to propose that the LAS be abandoned in order
to release more resources for a larger number of less ambitious projects. Some boundary conditions
were also discussed: what to expect from the eventual co-operation with NASA; how to arrive at
definite cost evaluations of the various projects; how to get a clear assessment on performance,
reliability, availability and likely future developments of the different American and European
launchers.598
After further discussions, both in the scientific groups and in the LPAC, the latter recommended, early
in 1967, that two alternative programmes should be studied in more detail, each of them including
several options.599 The first was a joint ION/COS/PLA project consisting of three satellites operating
simultaneously in different orbits and providing correlated data. This project included a highly
eccentric orbit satellite to study the solar wind plasma (HEOS-B proposed by the PLA group), an
intermediate orbit satellite to measure high-energy particles in the magnetosphere (COS Group), and a
low orbit satellite to make measurements of several atmospheric and ionospheric parameters (ION
group).600 The alternative programme which interested the LPAC foresaw the launching of a number of
independent satellites to be chosen from those proposed by the various groups. These were:
1. a cosmic ray satellite whose scientific mission was to be decided by the COS Group (and for
which S-111 was considered as the most interesting proposal);
2. a satellite with orbit adjustable from 400 to 1000 km altitude to study small-scale ionospheric
irregularities (ION group);
3. a solar satellite for high resolution studies of the Sun in the ultraviolet (SUN group);
4. a geostationary satellite for studies of the magnetosphere (strongly recommended by the COS
Group).601
The LPAC requested feasibility studies on all these projects and, although it did not explicitly indicate
preferences at this stage, it did hint at some priority scale:
The Joint [ION/COS/PLA] Project would offer an opportunity to many scientists to carry
out experiments. On the other hand, the [LPAC] was aware of the originality of some of
the cosmic ray experiments proposed by the COS Group.602
At this stage of the decision-making process, Occhialini, Lüst and Labeyrie's gamma-ray project
thus had to compete at several levels. Firstly, at the core of ESRO's scientific activity, there was
the competition between the  LAS project and the rest of the  ESRO programme - a conflict in which a
598 LPAC, 15th meeting (13-14 December 1966), ESRO/ST/237, 6 January 1967.
599 LPAC, 16th meeting (8-9 February 1967), ESRO/ST/245, 8 March 1967. The groups' opinions are
reviewed in SCI/WP/76, 30 January 1967.
600 The joint satellite project is described in SCI/WP/71, 21 October 1966.
601 The geostationary satellite was supposed to use the spacecraft being studied by ESRO for the
experimental communication satellite requested by the European Conference on Satellite
Communications (CETS, from French initials). See chapter 11 in this book.
602 LPAC, 15th meeting (13-14 December 1966), ESRO/ST/237, 6 January 1967, p. 8.
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well-defined sector of the space science community (the astronomers) and one of the Organisation's
most influential Member States (the UK), were opposed by another sector of the community (the
physicists) and by another influential Member State (France, supported by Belgium and
Switzerland).603 The second decision level involved the choice between the joint three-satellite project
and the alternative programme of independent satellites. The former involved a large fraction of the
physics community interested in space research and would provide a coordinated set of data on the
Earth's space environment. It was supported by an influential member of COS Group, the English
scientist H. Elliot who had elaborated the scientific mission of one of the three satellites. Thirdly, the
cosmic ray satellite had to compete with the others in the alternative programme, proposed by groups
interested in other fields of space research. ESRO's resources did not allow for more than one or two
projects to be started in the near future and even if the joint project were dropped, a choice had to
made among the equally interesting scientific objectives of the alternative programme. Finally, within
the COS Group itself, besides Elliot's interest in the joint project, Occhialini, Lüst and Labeyrie's
gamma-ray experiment S-111 was not the only candidate for the cosmic ray satellite. In fact, when
calls were made for defining its scientific mission, two other experiments were also proposed (Be10
isotope abundance in the primary cosmic radiation and solar neutrons). These posed no real danger to
S-111 though, and the COS Group soon recommended that the feasibility study of the cosmic ray
satellite should be made "taking proposal S-111 as an example".604 More important was the fact that a
new scientific objective was soon to emerge in the cosmic ray field: to defeat it would require all the
resources that the S-111 collaboration could master.
7.2.2  The LPAC makes its choice - to the satisfaction of the COS Group
The feasibility study of the cosmic ray satellite was realised in ESTEC in collaboration with M.
Sommer from Lüst's laboratory and with L. Scarsi, a former student of Occhialini's.605 It presented two
possible alternatives. The first was essentially the same as S-111: a heavy (700 kg) low orbit satellite
with command pointing capability, carrying a 160 kg scientific payload consisting of two spark
chambers with associated scintillation and Cerenkov counters. The second was a highly eccentric orbit
satellite, which had the advantage that it avoided interference from the Earth's shadow, from celestial
radiation rediffused by the Earth (the albedo), and from trapped (van Allen) radiation. In the latter
case, however, due to restrictions on weight and telemetry, one had to exclude the second spark
chamber for energy measurements. The COS Group eventually recommended the first project.606
In May 1967 this feasibility study was presented to the LPAC, together with the others requested by
the Committee.607 The Chairman of the COS Group, B. Peters, informed the LPAC that "the majority
of the COS Group had concluded that the proposed three-satellite project was not acceptable and
would, therefore, not be endorsed by the Group".608 The feasibility study, in fact, had shown that the
project could not fulfil its main scientific objective, since it failed to allow for the desired distinction
between temporal and spatial variations. The LPAC accordingly agreed to drop the joint three-satellite
programme as a unitary complex, but to retain one component, the highly eccentric orbit satellite
(HEOS-B). This was to satisfy the request of the PLA group for independent studies of the
interplanetary medium. This choice made, the LPAC drew up a tentative launching table which gave
priority to the cosmic ray satellite and the geostationary satellite, both to be flown in 1972. HEOS-B
603 See previous chapter.
604 COS Group, 15th meeting (23-24 January 1967), COS/30, 6 February 1967, p. 10. Also LPAC, 16th
meeting (8-9 February 1967), ESRO/ST/245, 8 March 1967, p. 6.
605 L. Scarsi, M. Sommer, H. Martin, R. Pacault, J. van Boeckel, J. Ortner, Feasibility study of a cosmic ray
satellite, ESRO SP-23, August 1967.
606 COS Group, 16th meeting (24 April 1967), COS/32, 8 May 1967. The study also presented the "economy
solution" of a smaller experiment, using a TD-type spacecraft without command pointing, which was not
studied in detail and was rapidly discarded by the COS-Group.
607 All these feasibility studies are reviewed in ESRO/ST/251, 23 May 1967.
608 LPAC, 17th meeting (11 May 191967), ESRO/ST/253, p. 3 (emphasis in the original). Elliot had dissented
from this conclusion. See also the report of the 16th meeting of the COS Group (24 April 1967), COS/32,
8 May 1967.
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and the ionospheric satellite were scheduled for 1973 and the solar satellite for 1974. This programme
was eventually approved by the STC.609 Another step forward had been taken for S-111, whose
position was further strengthened by the decision of the LPAC, following Peters' suggestion, to
nominate C. Dilworth, as the chairperson of the COS Group. Everything was still uncertain, however,
pending a final decision on the LAS and on the role of ESRO in the context of a European space
policy.
7.3 The growing importance of X-ray astronomy
The European Space Conference held in Rome on 11-13 July 1967 did not reach any definite
conclusion on the many controversial issues concerning European cooperation in space. Instead it
decided to create an Advisory Committee on Programmes, chaired by J.-P. Causse, to elaborate a
coherent space policy covering science, application and launchers. The Conference did express
confidence in ESRO's activity but left the Organisation in a state of uncertainty as regards funding,
and the extent of its involvement in application satellites. No decision was taken on the LAS. In this
situation, the LPAC decided to continue work on the feasibility studies of the cosmic ray satellite and
of the geostationary satellite, which were the first on its preferred launch schedule. At the same time,
there were signs that a new confrontation was brewing in the STC, as we read in the minutes of its
October 1967 meeting:
The United Kingdom Delegation [M.O. Robins, W.D.B. Greening and A.P. Willmore]
wondered whether the cosmic ray satellite, estimated to cost MF 130 [million French
francs], represented a good investment since only a few scientific experiments would be
in the satellite. The Chairman of the LPAC [Lüst] said his committee attached great
importance to this project which was of great scientific interest, and pointed out that
certain vital studies could only be carried with large experiments. The Italian Delegation
[Occhialini and E. Cigerza] said that the successful execution of this project would be a
major advance for European space science.610
The British delegation was concerned for two main reasons. Firstly, the increasing possibility that the
LAS would be cancelled disturbed the astronomers, who feared that stellar astronomy would
ultimately not be included in ESRO's scientific programme. In this perspective, the STAR group had
already prepared a proposal for a wide-field ultra-violet astronomy satellite, and the UK group who
had designed the LAS had worked out a simplified version of the same payload to be proposed in the
event that the LAS was dropped.611 Secondly, a new field of space research, X-ray astronomy, was
seeking recognition among the community of cosmic-ray physicists. The LPAC and the STC, in fact,
requested that the feasibility study of the cosmic-ray satellite be revised in order to consider the
inclusion of an X-ray experiment in the scientific payload.612 This point deserves a short digression.
The interest in X-ray astronomy within the space science community grew rapidly after the epochal,
first rocket observation of a celestial (non solar) X-ray source in 1962 (Scorpio X-1). A significant
609 STC, 15th meeting (5 June 1967), ESRO/ST/MIN/15, 5 September 1967. Also: ESRO/ST/249,
19 May 1967, and add. 1, 25 May 1967; ESRO/ST/262, 26 September 1967.
610 STC, 16th meeting (9-10 October 1967), ESRO/ST/MIN/16, 29 November 1967, p. 6.
611 For the wide field astronomy satellite (eventually called WIFAS) see the reports of the 9th (31 May 1967),
the 10th (27 September 1967) and the 11th (14 December 1967) meetings of the STAR group: STAR/42,
25 July 1967; STAR/46, 23 November 1967; STAR/49, 12 January 1968. The study is in STAR/52,
20 June 1968. See also STAR/47, 27 November 1967. The study for the simplified LAS (eventually
called UVAS) is STAR/54, 18 June 1968.
612 It is interesting to remark that, against the LPAC's decision, C. Dilworth reported that "the association of
X-ray studies had been discussed in the COS Group, although agreement between members had not been
reached". LPAC, 18th meeting (28 September 1967), corrigendum, ESRO/ST/271, corr. 1,
13 October 1967.
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migration of scientists from other fields ensued.613 By 1967 more than a dozen groups, most of them in
the USA, were working in X-ray astronomy and a large mass of data had been collected by balloon
and rocket experiments. Moreover, rapidly varying X-ray stars had been reported, posing puzzling
problems for experimenters and theoreticians. In this context, it became clear that satellite
experiments, which could observe X-ray sources over an extended period of time, were essential if
further important progress was to be made.614
Two groups in Europe were active in X-astronomy, both of them in the United Kingdom. The first was
at University College London, under the direction of R.L.F. Boyd and A.P. Willmore, who had
extended their earlier involvement in solar X-ray studies into the new field. The second had been
established in 1960 at the University of Leicester by K. Pounds, a former student of Boyd's. The two
groups had jointly designed an X-ray telescope to be flown in NASA's OAO-3 satellite. A similar
design had been used for the X-ray telescope which had been included as a subsidiary instrument in
the UK project for the LAS payload alongside the primary UV telescope.615 With the LAS looking less
and less likely and with X-ray astronomy in full expansion, British scientists naturally thought of
proposing an X-ray experiment for the coming cosmic ray satellite. They could count on the influence
of Boyd in all important boards of ESRO (Boyd was in the LPAC up to April 1968, in the Council and
the STC in 1969). Accordingly, as soon as the LPAC called for a new feasibility study of the cosmic
ray satellite, including an X-ray instrument, Pounds presented a design based on the combination of a
high-resolution telescope (employing a grazing incidence parabolic mirror and operating in the 0.4 to
2 keV energy range), and a conventional geometrically collimated proportional counter (operating in
the 2 to 20 keV energy range).The new feasibility study for the cosmic-ray satellite, completed in
January 1968, included Pounds' design for an X-ray instrument. It clearly reflected a compromise
between the two scientific interests. On the one hand, it was stressed that:
The primary scientific mission of the cosmic ray satellite should remain the study of the
gamma ray flux and energy spectrum, both from diffuse and discrete sources. [...] The X-
ray experiment [...] is given as an example of an additional experiment which could fly
along with the main gamma-ray telescope.616
On the other hand, the study was made more general and not immediately connected with the former
S-111 proposal. The breakdown by weight of the 170 kg experimental payload was 130 kg for the
gamma-ray experiment (including 40 kg was for the energy measuring device) and 40 kg for the X-ray
experiment. The report was discussed by the LPAC in January 1968. Behind the usually impersonal
language of the minutes of the meeting, one can grasp a rather nervous debate:
Professor Boyd thought that the outcome of the feasibility study looked to be fairly
satisfactory. He felt that, when the letters inviting the submission of experiments were
sent out, it should be made clear that there was a certain flexibility in the scientific
proposals made and that the experiments described in the feasibility study should be
regarded as examples. It was then for the LPAC to assess the value of the proposals
made. Professor Occhialini-Dilworth considered that the ESRO scientific working
groups, as consultants to the LPAC on scientific matters, should be asked their opinion
on the proposals received for experiments.617
Both Boyd and Dilworth probably felt that the inclusion of two such different experiments in the
satellite was not scientifically sound and a decision about which scientific objective should be
613 Hirsch (1983). The pioneer work had been made by a scientific team using a rocket developed by the
private company American Science & Engineering: Giacconi et al., (1962).
614 Morrison (1967); Friedman (1969).
615 Massey and Robins (1986), p. 366-387.
616 M. Sommer, K.A. Pounds, J. van Boeckel, H. Marin, R. Pacault, Revised Feasibility Study Cosmic Ray
Satellite, ESLAB/27, 17 January 191968, p. 3 and 14 (emphasis in the text).
617 LPAC, 19th meeting (23 January 1968), ESRO/ST/280, 21 February 1968, p. 3.
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privileged in the final design was still pending. Boyd, an obvious supporter of X-ray astronomy and of
Pounds' proposal, wanted to disassociate the cosmic ray mission from the S-111 option as much as
possible and to shift the major responsibility for the choice to the LPAC. Dilworth, on the other hand,
wanted to stress the role of the COS Group, of which she was chairperson and where she knew that a
strong interest existed in the gamma-ray option.
The main difficulty raised at the meeting, however, was the lack of a clear and definite assessment of
the cost of the satellite, in particular after the incorporation of the X-ray experiment. As a result,
following a suggestion made by Lüst, it was decided to prepare a cost estimate of the whole operation,
including a comparison with previous ESRO projects and covering both the option of a single gamma-
ray experiment and the option of two experiments.
7.4 The Caravane Collaboration
The decision to postpone the decision on the cosmic-ray satellite was received with some relief by the
proponents of the gamma-ray experiment. As Dilworth wrote, "this means we have at least one month
more breathing time, to solve the numerous technical problems involved in the project".618 The main
issues were the kind of spark chamber to be used and the technique for energy measurement. By this
time, the three groups had adopted the evocative term Caravane Collaboration, suggested by
Occhialini since they always seemed to meet in airport lounges, on the move. An important question
for them was the possible extension of the collaboration to other groups. This was both a scientific
requirement, namely to take advantage of a larger technical expertise, and a financial one, in order to
share the cost on a wider basis. It was also a political move, intended to strengthen the Caravane's
position in ESRO and to facilitate the passage of the gamma-ray proposal through the Organisation's
decision-making structure. We must recall that, in March 1968, Occhialini had been elected by the
STC in the membership of the LPAC, together with B. Hultqvist. The other candidates were Elliot and
Peters. At the same time, Boyd had retired from the membership of the Committee.619
Two steps were taken in this respect by the leaders of Caravane. The first was to accept the proposal
made by the British physicist and COS Group member G. Hutchinson that there be an international
collaboration aimed at the realisation of the cosmic-ray satellite project. Hutchinson and his group at
the University of Southampton had developed a gamma-ray experiment for the payload of the NASA
OGO-5 spacecraft and wanted to increase their involvement in the field.620 Having examined the first
feasibility study for a pure gamma-ray satellite, Hutchinson invited a number of European laboratories
to discuss the formulation of a joint proposal in which his group would provide a spark chamber based
on the acoustic system of spark location which they had developed some years before.621 The
Southampton group was easily added to the Caravane.
Lengthier negotiations were required for the next important addition to the Collaboration, namely the
cosmic-ray group at the Kamerlingh Onnes Laboratorium in Leiden. This group was directed by
Hendrik (Henk) van de Hulst, an eminent radioastronomer and astrophysicist who had secured his
place in the history of astronomy thanks to his suggestion that the spectral line of interstellar neutral
hydrogen at a wavelength of 21 cm be used for studying the large scale structure of our Galaxy.622 One
of the founding fathers of ESRO, van de Hulst was a Dutch delegate in the Council (chairman in
618 Dilworth, letter to L. Scarsi (and others), 1 February 1968, COS-B papers, Palermo.
619 LPAC, 20th meeting (15 February 1968), LPAC/1, 14 March 1968, and STC, 17th meeting
(27 March 1968), ESRO/ST/MIN/17, 4 April 1968.
620 Hutchinson et al. (1970). This experiment was unsucessful due to high background triggering rate.
621 G. Hutchinson, letter to L. Scarsi (and others), undated, with annexed "Outline proposal for a combined
cosmic ray satellite project", November 1967, COS-B papers, Palermo.
622 Van de Hulst's prediction that the 21 cm line might be detectable astronomically was made in 1944; the
line was actually detected in 1951 by H.I. Ewen and A.M. Purcell at Harvard College observatory and
promtly confirmed by Van de Hulst, L.Muller and J.H. Oort.
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1968-70) and in the STC (chairman in 1967). The Leiden group had also entered the field of gamma-
ray astronomy through building a detector for the payload of OGO-5.623
At a meeting of the Caravane held in Paris in January 1968, a solid group from Southampton attended,
including Hutchinson. The meeting was also attended by an observer from Leiden, A. Scheepmaker.
Pinkau introduced Caravane to him in these terms:
We collaborate on equal terms, there are no more or less important contributions from
the various groups. All scientific data are available to any member of the collaboration.
All publications should be seen and be given permission to publish by the editorial
board.624
Important decisions about the final configuration of the experiment were taken at this meeting. The
first concerned the technique of spark detection in the spark chamber. Three options were up for
discussion: Saclay's vidicon, Southampton's acoustic spark chamber and Munich’s wire spark
chamber. After lengthy discussions and a careful comparison of the three techniques, it was decided
that "the experiment should be done with the wire spark chamber of wire spacing about 0.7 mm on the
assurance of the Munich group that such a wire spacing can be achieved." A letter from Pinkau three
weeks later confirmed that the "007 chamber" worked satisfactorily.625 As to the energy measuring
device, it was decided to use a calorimeter based on plastic scintillators. It was then decided that
Munich should build the spark chamber, Southampton the scintillation and Cerenkov counters for the
triggering telescope and that Saclay, Milan and possibly Leiden should share the construction of the
other parts of the payload.626 Each group was to take technical and financial responsibility for its own
part.
The design was discussed and specified further at a meeting held at the end of March. This was the
first Caravane meeting attended by Van de Hulst who, on behalf of the Leiden group, accepted to
participate in the study phase of the project but reserved a final decision regarding collaboration for
another two weeks.627
While these negotiations were going on inside the Caravane, bad news arrived from ESRO. The cost
of the cosmic-ray satellite had risen to some 200 MFF. Considering this figure, "the LPAC did not feel
that it could make a recommendation to the STC regarding this project at the present time".628 In fact,
in the spring 1968, the financial situation at ESRO was critical and, as Bondi recalled later, "the future
of ESRO looked bleak indeed".629 The glaring failure to estimate costs correctly and the ongoing
controversies among Member States over basic issues of policy had brought the Organisation to a
deadlock, and it was clear that its ambitious initial programme could not be realised. The LAS project
had to be abandoned and the medium-sized (so-called TD) satellite programme had to be drastically
reduced. In this difficult situation, ESRO could not decide to undertake a new major project without a
radical redefinition of its role and its programmes.
623 Bleeker et al. (1970).
624 Minutes of the meeting of the Caravane collaboration, Paris, 16-18 January 1968, COS-B papers,
Palermo. The Caravane's editorial board was never created; its role was eventually taken by the COS-B
Steering Committee, made of the heads of the laboratories involved in the experiment.
625 K. Pinkau, letter to members of the Caravane, 12 March 1968, COS-B papers, Palermo.
626 Eventually, Saclay took charge of the anticoincidence counter, Milan of the experiment electronics and
Leiden of the energy calorimeter.
627 Minutes of the Meeting of the Caravane Collaboration, Paris, 26-27 March 1968, COS-B papers,
Palermo.
628 STC 18th meeting (6 May 1968), ESRO/ST/MIN/18, 26 June 1968, p. 6. LPAC, 21st meeting
(3 April 1968), LPAC/4, 10 May 1968. About the new criteria on cost estimation, which also affected the
LAS project, see the previous chapter. After the cosmic-ray satellite, the STC decided to re-evaluate the
costs of the other projects under study as well.
629 Bondi (1984), p. 22.
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Faced with this situation, the leaders of the Caravane decided to try elsewhere. NASA had called for
proposals for satellite payloads, including experiments in the field of gamma-ray astronomy. Seizing
the opportunity, the Caravane rushed a proposal to NASA to beat the deadline of April 15.630 This
initiative came to nought. NASA Headquarters also received a proposal to fly a gamma-ray
experiment from a group at its Goddard Space Flight Center. It was obviously difficult for a European
team to beat a competitor that was a part of NASA itself.631 More worrying for the Caravane
Collaboration was the fact that Goddard's project was essentially the same as their own. The NASA
team had already used the wire spark chamber technique in balloon-borne experiments and was now
implementing this technique for larger payloads to be used both in balloons and in satellites.632
Goddard's project was eventually adopted by NASA and included in the payload of the satellite
SAS-2, scheduled for launch in late 1972.633 If the Caravane experiment was ultimately going to be
accepted by ESRO, it was essential that the collaboration improve their instrument to ensure that it
was not scientifically obsolete if, or when, it was flown.
7.5 COS-A and COS-B
By the end of 1968 ESRO was recovering from its crisis. Three satellites (ESRO I, ESRO II and
HEOS-A) had been successfully put into orbit and were functioning very well. A special arrangement
had been reached regarding the TD satellite programme, by which TD-1 was retained in the
programme as a special project while TD-2 was abandoned, some of its experiments being
incorporated in the payload of a smaller satellite (ESRO-IV).634 Finally, the European Space
Conference held in Bad Godesberg in November had found a tentative way out of the aged and
controversial question of the role of Europe in the three domains of space, i.e. scientific satellites,
applications satellites and launchers. ESRO Member States participating in the Conference agreed to
an expenditure of 860 MFF for the scientific programme in the three-year period 1969-71 and, what is
more important, they authorised the necessary commitments for individual scientific projects that
would extend beyond the eight-year period covered by the 1964 Convention. ESRO had returned to
legality and its future seemed assured.635
ESRO's Committees could start to make plans again. The LPAC resumed the projects under study in
ESTEC, deciding as well "to retain in the long term programme provision for at least one stellar
astronomy project and one other major project (as, for example, the cosmic ray satellite)".636 In fact, as
mentioned above, even before the LAS programme was definitely jeopardised, there was pressure
building up within the astronomy community to have a new, less ambitious project approved by
ESRO. Two candidates were on the table. The first was a satellite for high-resolution (0.1 Å)
ultra violet spectroscopy of single stars (UVAS). Its scientific aims were essentially those of the LAS,
but with somewhat relaxed specifications, and it was proposed by the former LAS group at the UK
Atomic Energy Authority's Culham laboratory. The second project was a wide-field astronomy
satellite (WIFAS) aimed at obtaining a sky map of stars in the UV region using low resolution
spectroscopy (1 Å). WIFAS was supported by that part of the astronomy community that had always
630 Minutes of the Meeting of the Caravane Collaboration, Paris, 26-27 March 1968, COS-B papers,
Palermo. The Caravane Collaboration proposal to NASA is Investigation of extraterrestrial gamma
radiation in the energy range 25-500 Mev (April 1968), COS-B papers, Palermo. At this stage the
collaboration included Southampton but not yet Leiden.
631 Pinkau to Scarsi (and others), 7 May 1968, with annexed letter of intent by Goddard's C.E. Fichtel, D.A.
Kniffen, H. Ogelman; COS-B papers, Palermo.
632 Fichtel et al. (1970).
633 Tucker & Tucker (1986), p. 106-123. SAS-2 had a successful but short flight, from November 1972 until
June 1973, when a capacitor failed.
634 See chapter 5 in this volume.
635 ESRO, General Report 1968. A detailed discussion of these events is in Chapter 11.
636 LPAC, 24th meeting (first session, 23 September 1968), LPAC/15, 13 November 1968, p. 3. See also
STC, 20th meeting (7 October 1968), ESRO/ST/MIN/20, 18 November 1968. Relevant documents are:
LPAC/10, 18 September 1968 and ESRO/ST/295, 26 September 1968.
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considered low-resolution, wide-field investigations a more interesting scientific mission than that
adopted for the LAS.637
As for the reassessment of the cosmic-ray project, the main problem was to accommodate the design
to the new weight constraints imposed by the use of an American Delta launcher instead of the ELDO
launcher previously considered. While the latter could place a scientific payload of 170 kg into orbit,
the maximum allowed by the American vehicle was 130 kg. A study group was convened and it was
decided to reduce the weight of the gamma-ray experiment from 130 kg to 90 kg by eliminating the
energy measuring device. The remaining 40 kg would be for the X-ray experiment. Sommer and
Pounds were asked to revise the gamma- and X-ray instruments, respectively, while the French firm
Sud-Aviation was charged with preparing a detailed feasibility study for the whole satellite.638
Needless to say the Caravane's leaders did not like the envisaged solution. Pounds' new design of the
X-ray detector, based on a modulation collimator with moveable shutters, was very large and heavy.
Moreover, they felt that the need to compete with Goddard's SAS-2 meant that the energy-measuring
device had to be kept in the European gamma-ray experiment. Pinkau hurried to Milan to discuss the
situation with Occhialini and Dilworth. They decided not to change their original design and to use all
their influence in ESRO's committees to get the feasibility study to 'match' their own project. At a
meeting of the study group held in late February 1969 at ESRO Headquarters in Paris, which Pinkau
attended as a representative of the chairman of the COS Group, he stressed that the mass breakdown
90-40 kg should not be considered as final, and that a decision about the inclusion of the energy
measuring device was up to the COS Group. Sud-Aviation was invited to study the implications of
having a scientific payload composed of a pure gamma ray experiment weighing 130 kg.639
The full offensive was taken at the meeting of the COS Group held in Milan on 18 March.640 After
Sommer's and Pounds' presentations of the gamma- and X-ray experiments respectively, Pinkau
presented an alternative proposal which, as he said, had been "cooked up in two days" by the Caravane
collaboration just before the meeting.641 They stressed that, following SAS-2 (mainly devoted to a
survey of gamma ray sources), the main purpose of the ESRO satellite should be the measurement of
the energy spectrum of identified sources with the highest possible resolution, in order to understand
physical processes occurring in them. Referring to Sommer's proposal they argued:
What is left optional there (namely the additional calorimeter counters) is considered a
necessity. In our view, the gamma-experiment should be the primary aim of the mission
and should define the boundary conditions for the satellite.
Starting from the design elaborated in their NASA proposal of April 1968, the Caravane then
presented the modifications that could be envisaged in order to remain within the weight limit of 130
kg. They also proposed, as a possible alternative, a satellite having a moderately eccentric orbit. Since
the observation time was increased by a factor two on such a satellite, the sensitive area and so the
weight of the experiment could be reduced. This alternative had been originally suggested and
advocated by C. Dilworth and, in fact, now appeared to the Caravane as the most promising design.
637 The STAR group had recommended to start feasibility studies and cost evaluation of both projects at its
12th meeting (5 July 1968), STAR/58, 2 October 1968. For the debates about the specifications of the
envisaged ESRO astronomical satellite see chapter 6.
638 "Minutes of the meeting held at ESRO headquarters on 4 February 1969", ESRO MS/16,
17 February 1969.
M. Sommer, letter to C. Dilworth (chairman of the COS-Group) and to R. Lüst (chairman of the LPAC),
13 February 1969; Sommer papers. M. Sommer, The gamma-ray experiment for the COS-A satellite,
ESRO MS/25, 28 March 1969; K. Pounds, The X-ray experiment for the COS-A satellite, ESRO MS/26,
28 March 1969; Vvan de Hulst papers.
639 "Minutes of meeting held on 27 February 1969", ESRO MS/22; Sommer papers.
640 COS Group, 21st meeting (18 March 1969), ESRO COS/42, 27 March 1969.
641 A. Dean, Y. Koechlin, K. Pinkau, L. Scarsi, R.D. Wills, undated, untitled handwritten draft; Van de
Hulst's personal notes on the meeting; Van de Hulst papers.
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A lively discussion followed Pinkau's presentation, and chairperson Dilworth finally presented a
systematic analysis of the four possible options discussed. The first was Sommer's and Pounds' design
for a joint X- and gamma-ray mission in a circular orbit satellite. The second was a sort of
compromise, with 50 % of the energy calorimeter and a reduced weight of the X-ray experiment. The
third and the fourth were the two alternatives (circular orbit and eccentric orbit satellite) presented by
Pinkau on behalf of the Caravane collaboration for a purely gamma-ray mission. In the event, it was
unanimously decided that the pure gamma ray, eccentric orbit satellite deserved a feasibility study
which was also entrusted to Sud-Aviation. This project was called COS-B which, as matters now
stood, was in competition with the Pounds-Sommer project labelled COS-A.642
On 5 and 6 May, 1969, a special symposium was convened by ESRO to prepare for the selection of
projects to be included in ESRO's future scientific programme. This was the occasion for European
space scientists to learn about and discuss the results of the feasibility studies on possible satellite
missions made in the previous months. These included COS-A and COS-B, a satellite for ionosphere
research, a geostationary satellite for magnetospheric studies (GEOS), an atmospheric research
satellite (EARS), a Mercury fly-by mission, and the two ultraviolet astronomy projects UVAS and
WIFAS.643 Following the symposium, the ad hoc working groups met in order to recommend
priorities. The COS Group met in Frascati on 12 May and settled its own priorities:
[The COS Group] came reluctantly to the conclusion that, whereas the gamma and X-ray
experiments proposed (both of high scientific interest) are scientifically compatible, they
are technically only compatible on the same satellite at increased cost and considerable
concession in the scientific aims. The COS Group concluded that the maximum scientific
value could be obtained by separate missions. It therefore recommends the COS-B
version. At the same time the COS Group strongly urges ESRO to include in its
programme as soon as possible a satellite suited to high precision X-ray investigations.644
The Caravane Collaboration had succeeded in the first and most direct confrontation, i.e. within their
own sector of the space science community. They had 'persuaded' the COS Group to prefer a more
ambitious, single mission rather than a hybrid experiment whose results would not have been
competitive with other projects under development. However, it must be stressed that, had there been
at the time a strong interest in, and influential supporters of, X-ray astronomy in the COS Group, a
parallel study of a pure X-ray satellite (COS-C?) could have been requested. This was not the case,
and the COS-B mission remained the only, well-studied project in the field of high-energy
astrophysics. The Caravane Collaboration now had to win first in the LPAC against the proposals
supported by the other groups and then in the higher (political) levels of ESRO's decision-making
structure.
7.5.1 The LPAC makes its choice - to the satisfaction of the Caravane
In anticipation of the LPAC meeting, the five leaders of the Caravane Collaboration sent a letter of
intent to Director General H. Bondi, informing him of their "intention to submit a detailed proposal on
642 Cosmic Ray Satellite B, ESRO FS/6, 29 April 1969; Cosmic Ray Satellite A, ESRO FS/5, 29 April 1969;
HAEC, folder 646.
643 "Preparations for ESRO's future scientific programme", ESRO/ELDO Bulletin, 5, May 1969, 14-18.
These projects are presented in a series of reports, coded FS/1 to FS/8 that can be found, with the
exception of FS/7 and FS/8 (UVAS and WIFAS), in folder 646, HAEC. The programme of the
symposium is in LPAC/28 (rev. 1), 2 May 1969. It is interesting to remark that in this programme, the
presentation of the two cosmic-ray satellites includes an introductory lecture by Pinkau (who is also
presenting COS-B) on "Scientific mission of gamma-ray experiments" which is not present in an earlier
version of the same programme: LPAC/28, 14 April 1969.
644 COS Group, 22nd meeting (12 May 1969), COS/44, 20 October 1969, p. 4-5. This resolution was adopted
with the dissention of the British scientist J.J. Quenby. Quenby was not directly interested in X-ray
astronomy
(his research field was the magnetosphere).
209
a gamma ray astronomy experiment [....] if ESRO should decide to go ahead with a satellite project
suitable for such an experiment". The proposal, they added, "is similar to the gamma ray experiment
now studied in connection with the COS-B project".645 The circle was thus closed. Caravane's
experiment proposal perfectly fitted ESRO's COS-B project - hardly surprising since the people who
acted as ESRO's principal scientific advisers for the definition of its programme were the same
scientists who submitted a proposal correspondingly perfectly to one of the projects considered for
inclusion in the programme itself. Moreover, as there were no other proposals besides the Caravane's
for a gamma-ray mission, the COS-B project, if approved, could go ahead without the delay caused by
a call for experiment proposals and selection. This was certainly an aspect which the LPAC and the
STC could not avoid considering when making their choice.
Together with COS-B, four other projects had passed the expert groups' examination and were
submitted to the LPAC. These were the atmospheric satellite (EARS) recommended by the ATM
group, the Mercury fly-by mission recommended by the PLA group, the geostationary satellite
(GEOS) recommended by the ION and the COS Groups, and the ultraviolet project UVAS, that the
STAR group had preferred to WIFAS.646 All the chairmen of the working groups (barring the SUN
Group), the president of the STC, P.A Sheppard, and a large group of ESRO staff and officials
(including the Director General Bondi, the Director of ESTEC W. Kleen and the Director for
Programmes and Planning J.A. Dinkespiler) attended the crucial 28th meeting of the LPAC held in
June 1969. Here the scientific, technical and financial aspects of the projects presented were widely
discussed in order to define a sound launching programme.647
The atmospheric research satellite was rapidly discarded, pending further definition of the scientific
objectives of the mission in the light of ESRO's envisaged involvement in a meteorological satellite
programme. The Mercury mission was eliminated as too expensive, "in spite of the desirability of
Europe entering the increasingly important field of planetary exploration". It would absorb too much
of ESRO's limited budget. Three projects remained and the choice between them was left to a
restricted meeting of the four members of LPAC who were present, namely Lüst, Occhialini,
J.A. Blamont, and B. Hultqvist (the fifth, the Dutch astrophysicist C. de Jager was unable to attend),
assisted by Bondi and Dinkespiler.
The three projects under discussion, namely COS-B, GEOS and UVAS, were very different in their
characteristics and scientific objectives, and served the needs of the three most important sectors of the
space science community: physicists interested in high energy cosmic phenomena, scientists studying
the magnetosphere, and astronomers. COS-B involved a single, well defined experiment, to be realised
by an international group of laboratories. According to the LPAC, "it had an essentially new
exploratory character in which there were possibilities of far-reaching discoveries but some risk also
of disappointment". The geostationary satellite, on the contrary, was a multi-experiment mission,
which could only be flown after the scientific community had chosen among different experiment
proposals. The LPAC's judgement on GEOS was that "[it] was unlikely to yield far-reaching
discoveries in terrestrial plasma but it could have very important possibilities in regard to future
extraterrestrial and cosmic plasma physics". Finally, UVAS was a very ambitious project, "of great
scientific significance in the long run, [which] would provide an assured return in scientific
information with the possibility also of a scientific break-through". Observation time would be shared
by European astronomy groups, sixteen of which had expressed an interest. The major point against
UVAS was that its cost was on the borderline of ESRO's budget for satellite projects.
645 Van de Hulst, Occhialini, Lüst, Labeyrie, Hutchinson, letter to Bondi, 16 May 1969. This letter was in
response to a letter of Bondi (25 April 1969) to the scientific community at large, aimed at getting
information about possible proposals in view of the discussions in the LPAC and the STC on ESRO's
future programme. Both letters are reported in ESRO/ST/316, 6 June 1969.
646 The recommendations of the ad hoc working groups groups are in LPAC/38, 14 May 1969.
647 LPAC, the 28th meeting (22-23 May 1969), LPAC/39, 26 June 1969. Following quotations are from p. 6
and 11.
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This latter point needs elaboration. The estimated costs to ESRO of the three projects were 223 MFF
for UVAS, 141 MFF for COS-B and 129 MFF for GEOS. In the case of UVAS being selected, it was
intended that ESRO pay for both the satellite (estimated cost at 160 MFF) and for the scientific
payload (estimated cost at 73 MFF).648 This was the policy that had been followed for the LAS, in
which the Organisation was expected to bear the entire cost of the project. In the case of COS-B and of
GEOS, on the contrary, ESRO would only bear the cost of the satellite. The experiments were to be
funded by the scientific groups building them (as for all previous ESRO satellites). Behind the
financial arguments there was again the question of choosing between different scientific policies and
different research fields. The decision to be taken by the LPAC was whether to recommend that all of
ESRO's resources be invested in one big astronomical project or to give priority to less ambitious
projects in a wider range of disciplines, with the implication that "this somewhat handicaps the
astronomers and planetarians, for whom any worthwhile project is likely to be a more costly one".649
The LPAC opted for the latter policy. It recommended a priority list for the projects to be included in
ESRO's programme which put both COS-B and GEOS at the top of the list, COS-B alone in second
place and UVAS in third.650
7.6 The final choice
The Caravane collaboration had succeeded in the second important step. It was not the last, however.
It was now up to the STC to make a recommendation on the programme from the general scientific
and policy point of view, and then for the Council to give its approval. In both bodies the Caravane
had to face stiff opposition to COS-B, notably from the representatives of the British scientists
interested in X-ray astronomy and stellar astronomy, led by H. Massey and R. Boyd. Already annoyed
by the preference accorded to COS-B over COS-A, they could hardly accept the rejection of UVAS, a
project in which the British scientific community, as well as the British industry, had invested much
and from which much was expected. It was no compensation to them that Hutchinson's group from
Southampton was likely to participate in COS-B, Hutchinson being isolated and somewhat at odds
with the UK scientific establishment. Nor was it enough that a group from Imperial College, London,
including the physicist J.J. Quenby, was interested in magnetospheric research and then in GEOS. As
far as Massey and Boyd were concerned, an entire and an extremely influential sector of the British
space science community risked being excluded from ESRO's future programme. And this, in their
view, was intolerable.
The discussion at the STC meeting on the LPAC recommendation was impassioned and dramatic,
according to the recollections of some protagonists. Scientific and financial considerations became
intertwined with personal feelings, rivalries and expectations.651 The main argument put forward by the
British delegation (Boyd and Greening) was that "the decision in favour of COS-B had been taken by
the LPAC, not on the ground of strictly scientific interest, but mainly for financial reasons". But, they
went on, this argument was no longer valid since several groups had recently expressed a willingness
to form a consortium for the construction of the UVAS payload and to fund it. The new situation, they
concluded, called for a re-examination of the LPAC's resolution. In the British delegation's view, "not
only would the UVAS experiment satisfy more scientific groups than would the COS-B, but the
development of the spacecraft would be technologically more exciting". The STC did not accept the
UK's argument, however. It agreed by 7 votes in favour, 2 against (UK and Belgium) and 1 abstention
648 This figure for the scientific package of UVAS was given by the Director General at the 28th Council
session.
649 "ESRO's future satellite programme", ESRO/ELDO Bulletin, 6 (July 1969), 16-17, on p. 17. This article
presented a review of ESRO's general financial position by mid-1969.
650 The LPAC's recommendation is also reported in ESRO/ST/310, 2 June 1969 and ESRO/ST/314,
6 June 1969.
The possibility of funding both COS-B and GEOS derived from the fact that the two projects could be
conveniently phased.
651 STC, 22nd meeting (19-20 June 1969), ESRO/ST/MIN/22, 29 July 1969. The following quotations are
from p. 3-4.
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(Germany) that the new information on the financial aspect should not bear on the discussion at that
meeting. The reason given was that the setting up of such a consortium would certainly take a long
time and that a choice could not be postponed any longer. In conclusion, with only Belgium
abstaining, the STC confirmed the recommendation of the LPAC to adopt COS-B and GEOS in
ESRO's programme. It also reaffirmed its interest in stellar astronomy, however, and expressed its
hope to "receiv[e] for consideration in 1970 a fully worked out proposal for an ultra-violet
astronomical satellite with an experiment jointly financed and executed by an international European
team of scientific groups". The question of the financial aspect of the three projects was raised again
by the UK Delegation, with added vigour, a few days later at the Council session:
The experiments to be flown in COS-B and GEOS [...] were to be financed by the
scientific groups, but these groups were subsidised by the governments and it must be
borne in mind that each government agency had a certain total envelope with which the
space effort in its country was financed. Therefore some Member States might have
difficulties in financing the participation of their scientific groups for both satellites. [...]
As twenty-two groups had shown great interest in [the UVAS project], it should not take
too long to form a Consortium for the financing of its scientific package, thus allowing it
to be considered on an equal footing with the other two projects.652
According to the British delegates, a negative decision on UVAS "would close the doors on ultra-
violet astronomy for a long time" so that it was wiser "to keep the option open for all three satellites
until the November session [of the Council]".
The British position was sympathetically received by some delegations. The Belgians, in particular,
felt that any firm commitment to extend the scientific programme beyond 1971 should be postponed,
pending the conclusions of the Causse Committee and the decisions of the European Space
Conference. The Dutch, for their part, felt that "the United Kingdom Delegation's suggestion to put the
three projects on an equal footing should be studied". The French and the Swedish delegations, on the
contrary, believed that, even without a firm long-term commitment, a clear-cut decision had to be
taken. Some delegations stressed that the Bad Godesberg Conference in November 1968 had
authorised the Council to approve projects that would extend beyond 1971 and thought, as the German
delegation put it, that "the Council should now avail itself of this authorisation and by adopting these
two projects in ESRO's programme give a clear indication [...] of what was judged to be scientifically
valuable and feasible at this time". The Director General, for his part, stressed that ESRO had certain
'moral obligations' vis-à-vis the scientists:
This decision must be taken in order to convince the scientific community that ESRO had
the firm intention to carry out these projects. It was evident that this commitment could
only be good if decisions were taken at a higher level, to continue a space programme in
Europe and to make the necessary resources available to this end.
The Council ultimately approved the adoption of the COS-B and GEOS satellites in the ESRO's
programme. It added the proviso that before any contractual obligations were undertaken for the
development phases, the Council had to confirm that this programme were compatible with decisions
on European space policy taken within the framework of the European Space Conference. The
Council also authorised the STC to approve the composition and scheme of management of the
international team of scientific groups which were to provide the scientific payload for COS-B. Three
and a half years after the S-111 proposal had first been put forward, the Caravane was on the way to
achieving its main objective: new data on cosmic gamma rays, and that using a satellite exclusively
dedicated to their experiment. They could not afford to fail.




It is up to the historian to add a final comment. Scientific and technical considerations played certainly
the major role in the process that led COS-B to the last stage of decisions. The final choice was not
just a matter of scientific rationality, however. In fact, from the scientific and technical point of view,
UVAS was certainly as good as COS-B, or even better. The project had been worked out and was to
be implemented by the experienced laboratory that had worked on the LAS since long time. It was an
observatory-type satellite whose scientific mission was of great interest for a large fraction of the
astronomical community and promised an assured scientific return. From the institutional point of
view, it represented, as the heir of LAS, the kind of large space project from which ESRO had mainly
derived its raison d'être. The COS-B project, on the contrary, while aiming at investigating a certainly
interesting new cosmic phenomenon, had an exploratory character with all the risks associated with
this kind of mission. Its scientific payload was to be realised by an international collaboration whose
managerial capability had never been tested before. Finally, as regards COS-B and GEOS, ESRO
placed itself again in the position of an organisation called to provide technical and managerial
services for scientific projects whose responsibility was outside. UVAS was certainly much expensive.
However, from the financial point of view, as it presented itself in spring 1969, UVAS was not so
much more challenging than COS-B and GEOS. As a matter of fact, the possibility of having the
scientific payload of UVAS funded by groups outside ESRO was discarded without, at the same time,
having firm assurance that COS-B would have been. We shall see in a moment how this risked to
jeopardise the project after its approval.
In a wider perspective, one can look at the success of COS-B and GEOS against UVAS (and, before
this, the abandonment of LAS) as a consequence of the weakness and disunity of European
astronomers with regard to space research as compared to physicists.653 In general, it was in the interest
of the former that ESRO produced a few stabilised high-performance satellites (LAS and UVAS were
examples of this kind) while the latter, spread among many disciplines, preferred a programme based
on a large number of medium-sized satellites. But it is worth to recall that astronomers were not
unanimous in preferring UVAS to the wide-field satellite (WIFAS). In fact, of the 16 groups
expressing interest in UV stellar astronomy, 7 were in favour of UVAS, 5 preferred WIFAS and 4
would have been satisfied of any of them.654 On the contrary, a programme including both COS-B and
GEOS represented an optimum for the physicists involved in space research as it involved several
groups of two influent sectors of this community. Finally, if we look more closely at the internal
dynamics of ESRO's committees and advisory groups, one cannot avoid considering the role played by
the prestige, far-sightedness and scientific skill of people like Occhialini, Lüst and Dilworth. They
were able to play with great passion and intellectual integrity their role of scientists interested in a
specific research field as well as that of scientific advisors concerned with the future of European co-
operation in space.
To conclude, at the question "Why was COS-B eventually chosen as an ESRO project?" answers can
be given at several levels and involve many different factors - scientific, technical, institutional,
financial, political, personal. These factors weighted differently at different times in the sequence of
events which led to the decision to include COS-B in ESRO's scientific programme: the result looks
not so much as a "wholly rational" choice among clearly defined alternatives but rather as the outcome
of battles and compromises between interest groups. In this case, the result was a very considerable
scientific and technical success, such as an official history can refer to it as "a reward for the courage
of its proposers who met some opposition from those who felt the mission was too risky".655 On
balance, one must recognise that an outstanding success was also IUE, the UV space astronomy
mission that the NASA and the UK Science Research Council jointly derived from the LAS and
UVAS,  and which  was eventually  realised  with  the contribution of the European Space Agency. Of
653 Golay (1984).
654 ESRO/ST/316, 6 June 1969. STAR Group, 14th meeting (12-13 May 1969), STAR/61, 2 June 1969.
655 Twenty years of European cooperation in space, 1964-1984, ESA Report, Noordwijk, 1984, p. 45.
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course, no one would dare to say that it is a blame for ESRO's advisory bodies not to have
recommended UVAS in 1969!
7.7 Epilogue
The Council resolution of July 1969 ended the long decision-making process, thus establishing the
second phase of ESRO's scientific programme, under discussion since 1966. This was an essentially
political decision and it had political consequences. Two of them must be mentioned here. The first
regarded the participation of Hutchinson's group in the COS-B programme. The UK's Space Policy
and Grants Committee, following a recommendation of its Astrophysics Working Group (chairman
Boyd), did not recommend that the British Science Research Council support the Southampton
group.656 Informing ESRO's Director General of the decision not to provide financial support to
Hutchinson, J.F. Hosie, on behalf of the United Kingdom Delegation, went even further:
The specific issue under our consideration was, of course, that of support for UK
participation in the payload. However, it followed that doubts as to scientific timeliness
and promise in relation to cost applied equally to the whole project. It was therefore
agreed that we should express the hope that there will be a re-examination in ESRO of
the desirability of devoting so large a share of ESRO's limited resources to this particular
project.657
An informal meeting was held at ESRO's headquarters in response to this threat to re-open the debate
on the scientific programme adopted by the Council. It was attended by Bondi and Dinkespiler, by the
chairmen of the Council (van de Hulst) and of the STC (P.A. Sheppard), by Lüst, in his capacity of
chairman of the COS-B Steering Committee, and by the Director of ESTEC's Space Science
Department (SSD, formerly ESLAB), E.A. Trendelenburg.658 Two important decisions were taken
here. The first was to organise as soon as possible a colloquium to discuss the scientific mission of
COS-B within the general framework of gamma-ray astronomy, in order to assess and possibly
remove the existing doubts of British scientists. The second was to suggest that SSD took over
Southampton's part of the project, both technically and financially. The Caravane accepted this
suggestion after a careful examination of other possibilities, and recommended that ESTEC recruit
Southampton scientist R. Wills in order to take advantage of the large amount of research that had
already been done in Hutchinson's laboratory.659
This new scheme was not uncontroversial, as it meant that ESRO would have to pay for a share in a
project that one of the leading Member States had refused to support. Moreover, several delegations
(the French in particular) worried that the large scale of the participation of SSD in the COS-B project
would strengthen the position of ESTEC's scientific laboratory as a competitor with national groups.
The future of COS-B (and indirectly of ESRO's scientific programme) thus depended on the result of
the planned colloquium. This was eventually held in ESTEC on 1-2 June, 1970. Both European and
American scientists were present, and H. Massey, certainly not sympathetic to the Caravane's project,
was invited to take the chair. After a day and a half of scientific reports and informal discussions, the
members of the Caravane apparently succeeded in convincing the British scientists of the scientific
656 Report of the second meeting of the Steering Committee of the COS-B Collaboration, 2 February 1970,
Annex "Report of discussion of financial matters", Van de Hulst papers. See also Massey and Robins
(1986),
p. 389.
657 J.F. Hosie, letter to Bondi, 10 March 1970, ESRO/C/449. Bondi's reply (18 March 1970) is ibidem.
658 Report on COS-B meeting held in Paris on Thursday, March 26, 1970, Van de Hulst papers.
659 Minutes of the third meeting of the Steering Committee of the COS-B collaboration, 14 April 1970, with
attached letter from van de Hulst to Bondi, Vvan de Hulst papers. Also ESRO/ST/347, 20 May 1970. For
an account of SSD's activities in that period see Trendelenburg et al. (1970).
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value of COS-B.660 Following further recommendations by the STC and by the Administrative and
Finance Committee, the Council finally approved the full participation of the SSD in the project with
the other partners of the Caravane (Figure 7-3 and Table 8-1, p. 246).661
The second implication of the COS-B decision regarded the functioning of ESRO's planning
procedures and its overall scientific policy. The protracted and complex process which ultimately led
to the choice of ESRO's second generation satellites had revealed that new procedures were needed for
defining the Organisation's long-term scientific policy. The time when any scientific group interested
in space science could expect to get an experiment on one of ESRO's satellites was definitely over.
The Organisation had to develop mechanisms for selecting a few, well-phased major projects
according to previously defined scientific guidelines. On the one hand, it was evident that ESRO's
budgetary limitations would not permit it to support all fields of space science in a viable way. On the
other hand, the definition of future projects required a large amount of coordination with national
policies. No less important was the consideration that, as the French delegation to the STC had put it,
"the difficulties were aggravated by the fact that the Committee charged with making the selection
from among the various proposals was composed of scientists who might be personally involved in the
preparation of the proposals".662 We shall discuss in the following chapter the initiatives undertaken by
the LPAC in order to outline a well defined scientific policy for the new phase of ESRO's life.
To conclude, one cannot but give a short account of what happened with COS-B. Following 5 years of
laborious implementation of the project, the satellite was successfully launched by a NASA Delta
2913 rocket from Western Test Range, California, on 9 August 1975. It was the first satellite bearing
the flag of the newly created European Space Agency (ESA) which had taken over from ESRO and
ELDO earlier that year. Three days later, a telex from ESOC, ESA's satellite operation centre in
Darmstadt, Germany, informed the COS-B people that everything was operating correctly. Soon
thereafter the first gamma ray event, "awaited with bated breath", showed up on the quick-look display
screen (Figure 7-4). It was definitive evidence that the instrument that so many scientists and
engineers had conceived, designed and built had performed well in the space environment and that it
could fulfil its aims.663
It is difficult to overestimate the importance of COS-B in the historical evolution, first of ESRO and
later of ESA. The management of such a complex undertaking involved the planning, coordination and
integration of dozens of scientists, engineers and technicians at scientific laboratories and industrial
plants spread in several countries. The direct involvement of ESTEC's Space Science Department in
the construction of the experiment and in the data analysis contributed significantly to make ESA's
scientific laboratory a highly qualified research centre, The great scientific value of the results
obtained by a well designed space mission in a leading field of space science added considerably to
the Agency's self-confidence and prestige. COS-B is probably less well known than the Ariane rocket,
and its digitised data are certainly less spectacular than Giotto's pictures. Nevertheless the project
remains one of the single most important steps in the process that finally brought European space
science to the level that ESRO's founding fathers had envisaged.
660 ESRO, Gamma-Ray Astrophysics Colloquium, ESRO SP-58, November 1970. The good impact on the
British scientists of the "excellent presentations and discussions at the Colloquium", was reported by
V. Manno, letter to Pinkau et al., 12 June 1970, Van de Hulst papers. See also STC, 25th meeting
(8 June 1970), ESRO/ST/MIN/25, 29 June 1970.
661 ESRO/ST/MIN/25, cit., AFC, 63rd meeting (9-10 June 1970), ESRO/AF/MIN/63, 25 June 1970; Council,
32nd session (30/6-1 July 1979), ESRO/C/MIN/32, 10 July 1970.
662 STC, 22nd meeting (19-20 June 1969), ESRO/ST/MIN/22, 29 July 1969, p. 4.
663 Taylor (1975), p.44.
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Figure 7-3: Sectional view of the experimental package
Figure 7-4: The first gamma ray detected by COS-B
216
How is a large project chosen in a big science organisation? From the case study we have discussed in
this paper a few aspects of general interest can be drawn.664 The first regards the main role played by
the financial constraints, both with respect of the total amount of resources and for the expenditure
planning over several years. This is a boundary condition where scientific considerations are very
poorly represented, it depends rather on general political factors, economic conditions at national and
international level, industrial interests and so on. In the case of COS-B, this aspect affected
significantly the length of the decision making process and was the most stringent argument against
UVAS and the Mercury fly-by mission.
A second aspect regards politics. Both at national and at international levels, a proper compromise
between different and conflicting interest groups must be searched for, according to political
guidelines whose dimension goes well beyond the scientific ground. LAS, UVAS, COS-B, had not
only scientific and financial significance but they also represented political objects which provided
ESRO with different characterisations. While scientists were discussing in the LPAC and in the expert
groups, government officials, diplomats and ministers confronted themselves in the STC, in the
Council, at the European Space Conferences. The issues were whether European satellites were to be
launched by European or American rockets; whether science or application should represent the future
main engagement of ESRO; whether the balance of space activities in Europe had to be shifted more
towards national programmes or towards international cooperation; whether space activities were
more a scientific luxury, a commercial interest or a technological need for advanced industrial
societies. Behind all this, there were governments discussing of benefits and drawbacks of European
economic and political integration.
Finally, one must not forget the role of personalities. Choosing a big scientific project is also a matter
of confrontation among scientists involved in the decision making process: members of advisory
committees or national delegations, government advisers, policymakers at various levels. At each
stage of this process, the traditional ties of cooperation, fellowship and solidarity that characterise the
scientific community are strained by the emergence of national interests, disciplinary competitions,
personal ambitions, career expectations, personal relationships and so on. When only one or two big
projects can be started every three or four years, the stake is high and scientific objectivity is often a
luxury. When making a choice entails some kind of painful discrimination, personal prestige,
diplomatic talent, personal or professional links can play a decisive role.
We will not forget mentioning the scientific merits of competing proposals, of course. We do
maintain, however, that this is not the main factor in choosing big science projects. It is peculiar of big
science, in fact, that any proposal arriving at the very decision making level has already passed
through a sifting which vouch for its scientific worthiness. The choice is always between projects that
are all excellent and scientifically valid and then it is always a matter of hard politics, not of scientific
rationality.
664 It must be underlined, however, that big differences exist between the case of space research and the
classical "big science" example of particle physics. The former is multi-disciplinary and each satellite
represents a unique piece of experimentation; the latter is a well defined scientific discipline organised
around big equipments in large laboratories (accelerators, detectors). It must also be recalled that the case
of ESRO/ESA is different from that of NASA, the latter having in-house large research laboratories
which the former has not. Finally, it is important to recall the multi-national structure of ESRO/ESA,
which is also the case for CERN but not for NASA or Fermilab. For particle physics at CERN see
Hermann et al. (1990); for NASA, see Newell (1980).
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Chapter 8: 
ESRO's Satellite Programme in 1969-1973:
The Definition of a Scientific Policy and the "First Package Deal"
A. Russo
The year 1968, the fifth of ESRO's official life, was very important: "The most momentous in the
Organisation's five years of existence", ESRO's General Report heralded, while the chairman of its
Scientific and Technical Committee (STC) declared that 1968 was "ESRO's first glorious year [...]
against the background of the growing pains of ESRO's formative years".665 Three main reasons can be
given for these optimistic claims. Firstly, ESRO could finally boast the successful launchings of its
first three satellites: ESRO II in May, renamed Iris after launch; ESRO I in October, renamed
Aurorae; HEOS-A in December, renamed HEOS-1. All were performing well and scientists were
drawing good scientific results from their data. Secondly, ESRO's organisational structure had been
significantly changed, following the recommendations of the group of experts chaired by J.H. Bannier,
who had analysed in detail the Organisation's structure, procedures and internal working methods.666
Finally, the third meeting of the European Space Conference, held in Bad Godesberg in November,
put an end to a long institutional and financial crisis by drafting a tentative space policy for Europe
which included ESRO's eventual involvement in application satellite projects. At the same conference,
ESRO Member States agreed to a level of resources for the scientific programme in the period
1969-1971 for the amount requested (860 MFF = 172 MAU) and authorised necessary commitments
for individual projects that would extend beyond 1971, namely beyond the 8-year period covered by
the original ESRO Convention.667
For the ESRO management this represented the way out a long period of uncertainty, and planning the
future of the Organisation became again "a rational and fruitful exercise". By the end of 1968, in fact,
only one project had already been approved, namely the TD-1 satellite, scheduled for launch in 1972,
and it appeared absolutely urgent to limit the large fluctuation in workload resulting from the
protracted absence of decisions. The time was ripe for ESRO to choose new projects and to define
more efficient long-term planning instruments: "Only with a real and challenging programme", they
concluded, "can we keep and recruit staff of the necessary calibre and make proper use of our
facilities".668 And in fact several new projects were approved in 1969.
A first set of decisions was taken in March, when the ESRO Council approved three small satellite
projects: ESRO IB (Boreas), a follow-up of ESRO I carrying the same payload, eventually launched in
October 1969; HEOS-A2 (HEOS-2), launched at the end of January 1972; and ESRO IV, the result of
the TD-2 rescue operation, launched in November 1972. By these decisions, an acceptable continuity
in the short term programme was achieved and the first phase of ESRO's satellite programme was
concluded. Subsequently, as discussed in the previous chapter, in July ESRO was able to bring to
conclusion the long decision-making process leading to the approval of two satellite projects for the
second phase. These were the COS-B satellite, to investigate celestial gamma rays, and the
geostationary satellite GEOS for studies of the magnetosphere.
In this chapter, we will analyse the development of ESRO's scientific satellite programme in the period
1969-1973, namely between the decision on COS-B and GEOS and the selection of the next satellite
projects: the ISEE-2 spacecraft in an ESRO/NASA three-satellite project devoted to magnetospheric
and solar wind studies, and the X-ray astronomy observatory Exosat. These four years were the most
665 ESRO, General Report 1968, p. 7; P.A. Sheppard's "Foreword" to ESRO/ELDO Bulletin,
Supplement, August 1969 (HEOS-1 Special), p. 4.
666 See chapter 2.
667 MFF stands for Million French Francs and MAU stands for Million Accounting Units, ESRO's
conventional monetary unit defined on the basis of the set of Member States' national currencies.
668 ESRO/ST/302, 19 February 1969, p. 1.
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important in the history of European cooperation in space. They marked the end of the illusion that
ESRO's sister organisation ELDO could ever build an all European satellite launcher and the
transformation of ESRO itself from an organisation solely devoted to scientific research to one mainly
engaged in the domain of application satellites. Facing the growing political and economic importance
of space activities, European governments were involved in long and painful discussions about the
possible definition of a coherent space policy for the Old Continent, trying to find a compromise
between conflicting national interests. In 1973 this compromise was finally agreed on, starting a
process which led in 1975 to the birth of the European Space Agency (ESA), out of the ashes of
ELDO and the wealth of ESRO.
In this context it was hardly possible for ESRO to approve new satellite projects in this period, in spite
of the several mission definition and feasibility studies which were performed after suggestions from
the European space science community. The time was not wasted, however, and we can consider these
four years a period of maturation of ESRO's scientific programme. Three elements contributed to this
maturation process. Firstly, with the successful launching of three satellites and the development of six
new spacecraft, four of which launched within the period we are considering, ESRO acquired
invaluable experience and proved to be a reliable organisation. This was not of minor importance in
the positive outcome of discussions on European space policy. The second element regards the place
of the scientific programme within ESRO's new engagement in the application field. While the budget
for the scientific programme was dramatically reduced in the period we are considering, this
programme was made mandatory in the new institutional setting and the money finally started to flow
from Member States continuously and predictably. Long-term planning became "a rational exercise"
as it had never been before. Finally, the third element of the maturation process, the one that will
constitute the main thread of this paper, regards the definition of a scientific policy. ESRO's policy-
makers definitely abandoned the illusion that the Organisation could actually pursue the "book of
dreams" that the European space scientists had written in the Blue Book, and made an important effort
to discuss guidelines and priorities, on the basis of the financial and technical resources available, and
taking into account the parallel development of national space programmes in Europe and the United
States.669
Following this thread, the chapter is organised in three main parts. In the first we will review the main
features of the two satellite projects approved by the ESRO Council in July 1969, namely COS-B and
GEOS. These were the last to be approved in the institutional framework established by ESRO's
founding fathers and represented a cornerstone for the following evolution of the Organisation's
scientific programme. In the second part, we will analyse the discussions within the European space
science community which led to the important policy statement issued by ESRO's Launching
Programme Advisory Committee (LPAC) in early 1970. The relevant aspect of this policy definition
was the recognition that only a limited number of scientific fields could be included in ESRO's
scientific programme and a choice had to be made: magnetospheric physics and high energy
astrophysics were included in this number with high priority, while UV stellar astronomy, solar
physics, and planetary science were definitely ruled out. As a consequence of this decision, the X-ray
satellite project HELOS was recommended in 1971 by the LPAC but, pending the outcome of the
political discussions among ESRO's Member States, its eventual inclusion in the Organisation's
programme was not even discussed by the Organisation's governing bodies. The latter, however, did
approve LPAC's other recommendation that ESRO should cooperate in the NASA/UK project
International Ultraviolet Explorer (IUE). In the third part we will report on the important "Package
Deal" agreed on by the ESRO Council in December 1971, which formally established application
satellite programmes, and then we will discuss the choice of ISEE-2 and Exosat, the coherent
conclusion of four years of scientific discussions and feasibility studies.670
669 The so-called "Blue Book" is the original programme of ESRO as approved by the European Preparatory
Commission for Space Research (COPERS) in October 1961: see chapter 2.
670 The 1971 package deal will be discussed here from the point of view of ESRO's scientific programme.
Other viewpoints on this important event in ESRO's life are in chapter 10 and 13.
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8.1 COS-B and GEOS
In the previous chapter, we have discussed in detail the decision-making process leading to the
adoption of COS-B and GEOS in ESRO's satellite programme.671 It must be recalled here that this
choice implied the rejection of the UVAS project, a space observatory for ultraviolet astronomy
strongly advocated by the same groups which had been involved in the ill-fated Large Astronomical
Satellite (LAS). This decision, therefore, represented a new blow to the expectations of European
astronomers interested in space research and, at the same time, it set the stage for the eventual
emergence of magnetospheric science and high energy astrophysics as the leading fields in ESRO's
scientific satellite programme.
COS-B was an observatory-type satellite whose mission was the study of the extraterrestrial gamma
radiation with energy above about 30 MeV. The scientific payload was provided by a group of
laboratories, calling themselves the Caravane Collaboration, who built the different parts of the
instrument (Table 8-1). The heads of the groups providing the payload constituted the Steering
Committee responsible for the scientific direction of the project and for the publication of its results.
An important aspect of this project is that ESTEC's Space Science Department (SSD, formerly
ESLAB) was a member of the collaboration and had the responsibility for integration and
management. This was the first time that ESRO's in-house research laboratory was significantly
involved in a major satellite project; this affected the further evolution of the laboratory, making it a
recognised scientific institution. The satellite was successfully launched in August 1975 and it
provided a continuous flow of useful data until April 1982, when the instruments on board were
switched off because of the definitive deterioration of the main detector.
GEOS was a geostationary satellite whose scientific mission was the study of physical phenomena in
the magnetosphere by integrated measurements of particles, fields and plasma. Unlike COS-B, GEOS
was a multi-experiment satellite: its scientific payload was made up of 7 different instruments
provided by 10 European laboratories. Because of its unique orbit and the sophistication of its
payload, GEOS was selected as the reference spacecraft in the world-wide "International
Magnetospheric Study" (IMS). The satellite was launched in April 1977 but, as a result of a launcher
malfunction, the planned geostationary orbit could not be attained. The launch of the refurbished
qualification model was then approved in December 1977 and successfully executed in July 1978. The
satellite's operations were terminated in June 1982.
COS-B and GEOS were ESRO's second generation satellites, after the greatly curtailed ESRO, HEOS
and TD programmes, and they were quite different from each other, both in their scientific mission
and in their overall conception. COS-B was the first ESRO/ESA single-experiment, observatory-type
satellite and this implied that the success of the mission depended on a close coordination between the
different people and institutions responsible for the development of the spacecraft and the payload.
While in multi-experiment satellites the failure of one experiment did not jeopardise the success of the
mission, in the case of COS-B a good performance of all the different parts of the satellite and its
payload was the sine qua non condition for the fulfilment of the scientific aims. The actual
implementation of the project, however, was based on ESRO's standard practice that the scientific
payload should be provided by external laboratories which depended on separate funding, expressed
different scientific cultures and worked in different institutional contexts. The Caravane Collaboration
kept scientific responsibility for the mission and the property of the data, which represented the
standard for an "experiment" rather than for an "observatory". While not a particularly sophisticated
spacecraft from the technical point of view, COS-B was, for all these reasons, very challenging from
the point of view of the management. This was complicated by the fact that ESTEC's SSD was at one
and the same time responsible for building a part of the instrument and for the integration of the whole
payload. Thus the problem of how to share responsibility for the scientific supervision over the
experiment between the collaboration as a whole and SSD's scientists became a matter of continuous
671 The scientific aims and technical specifications of the two satellites by the time of their launch are
described in ESA Bulletin, 2 (August 1975) and 9 (May 1977), respectively.
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negotiation. The organisation and management of COS-B in the different phases of development of
the project was a matter of experimenting and testing by itself, the results of which significantly
affected the further evolution of scientific satellite management in ESA. In the words of Roy Gibson,
ESA's Director General when COS-B was launched:
[It was not] always easy to develop a management scheme for the payload which had to
be established by mutual and voluntary agreement between ESRO and the members of the
payload collaboration, particularly as ESRO was not financing the payload. [...] The
Organisation has also drawn certain conclusions from this experience, such as that for
observatory satellites ESA hardware financing is a must. This philosophy has been
adopted for the EXOSAT payload.672
GEOS, on the contrary, was conceived like ESRO's first generation satellites, namely as a broad
scientific mission to be accomplished by a set of experiments chosen among proposals coming from
the scientific community and integrated into the payload. In this case, however, owing to the
peculiarity of the satellite's scientific mission, the problem of close cooperation among the different
experimenters, as well as between them and the scientific community at large, presented itself in more
urgent terms than previously. While the experiments in previous ESRO satellites were relatively
independent from one another and each group dealt with its own data autonomously, the GEOS
experimenters from the very beginning discussed ways to achieve the maximum scientific value from
the satellite and defined common modes of payload operation and data handling. They also established
contacts with other scientists through a Committee for Co-ordination of Observers associated with
GEOS (CCOG), created in 1972 on the initiative of a number of eminent European scientists.673
8.1.1 The choice of the payload composition for GEOS
In order to organise in the best possible way the scientific programme of the newly approved
geostationary satellite, ESRO organised a 3-day colloquium in Lyngby, near Copenhagen, in mid-
October 1969. Here it was stressed the opportunity of achieving an integrated scientific programme,
with related experiments being carried out by ground-based, balloon-borne or rocket-borne
instruments. Immediately following the colloquium, the three interested Working Groups ION, COS
and PLA held a joint meeting in order to define the mission objectives and to draft a letter of invitation
for experiment proposals.674
This was a very delicate passage. After the long and controversial decision-making process regarding
COS-B and GEOS itself, it was clear that the time when any scientific group interested in space
research could hope to get a share in one of ESRO's scientific satellites was over and GEOS appeared
to many as the last chance. At the same time, the peculiarity of the orbit made GEOS a spacecraft of
great scientific interest for many research fields, and much attention had to be devoted to obtain the
best results from it. In fact, the study of the magnetosphere and its phenomena was typically a
scientific domain created by the advent of space technologies, and it spread over several sectors of the
space science community. By probing this "little backyard universe", as the magnetosphere came to be
called, geophysicists wanted to pursue further their investigation of the structure of the Earth's
magnetic field; for ionosphere physicists it was of great interest to study how particles and waves
travelling along the magnetic lines determined ionospheric phenomena; cosmic ray physics was also
672 R. Gibson's Introduction to COS-B Special, ESA Bulletin, 2 (August 1975), p. 4.
673 ESRO, General Reports 1972 and 1973, and Annual Report 1974.
674 The report on the meeting (17 October 1969) is in LPAC/55, 10 November 1969, and the conclusions are
presented in LPAC/57, 28 October 1969. The meeting followed separate meetings of the three groups
held earlier on the same day, whose reports are ION/80, 19 December 1969; COS/46, 20 February 1970;
and PLA/62, 4 December 1969 respectively. The three groups were responsible for advising the LPAC on
ionospheric research (ION), cosmic rays (COS) and planetary science (PLA). Three other groups existed,
responsible for atmospheric research (ATM), stellar astronomy (STAR) and solar astronomy (SUN). The
structure and functions of the LPAC and its scientific advisory groups are discussed in chapter 5.
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involved, as the shape and structure of the magnetosphere is strongly affected by energetic particles
from the Sun; finally, the magnetosphere was a sort of natural laboratory for plasma physics studies.675
After long discussions, the purpose of this mission was carefully defined as follows:
To make integrated scientific studies of the distribution of thermal plasma, energetic
particles, fields and waves, by means of a satellite in a geosynchronous or geostationary
orbit. All types of experiment, however, for which this type of orbit is appropriate will be
considered for inclusion in the spacecraft.676
Through careful wording the LPAC then specified that magnetospheric and interplanetary studies
would be considered on the same basis; that priority should be given to experiments for which a
geostationary orbit was advantageous, but other types of experiment would be considered for inclusion
in the payload, "if they are of exceptional value or significance"; that the study of energetic particles
was included in the mission but with the exclusion of galactic cosmic rays; that the orbit should be
defined as "geostationary" but that "experimenters who would prefer a geosynchronous orbit would
have to justify their requirements, taking into account the penalties which might result".677
Two important points were stressed by the LPAC, that represented a novelty with respect to previous
ESRO's practice. Firstly, the experimenters were advised that they would be actively engaged in
managing and funding data processing, and that each experimenter would be required to communicate
his processed data to the others. GEOS, in fact, would provide an enormous potential output of data,
about 200 times as much as current ESRO satellites, and it was desirable to reduce the Organisation's
workload in this field.678 Secondly, the LPAC endorsed a solicitation from the Danish physicist
B. Peters, aimed at fostering cooperation among groups participating in the project.679 A two-stage
procedure was then defined for the submission of experiment proposals. In the first stage, groups
wishing to participate either in the hardware or in the data analysis for a specific experiment were to
write a letter of intent, to be circulated in order to enable other groups to become acquainted with the
existing possibilities and to stimulate the start of cooperative programmes. After this preliminary step,
definite experiment proposals had to be submitted.
By mid-January 1970, 28 letters of intent had been received, including 35 experiment proposals.
Moreover, several groups expressed an interest in participating in the scientific programme of GEOS
by rocket, balloon and ground-based experiments. Further negotiations among all interested groups led
to the submission, by the end of March, of 31 experiment proposals that were classified into 10 fields:
low-, medium-, and high-energy particles, ion composition, plasma experiments, DC electric fields,
DC magnetic fields, electric and magnetic wave fields, Lyman-α emission, beacon experiment. Two
675 For an overview on the discovery and early studies of the magnetosphere, see Newell (1980),
pp. 172-186. The definition "little backyard universe" is in Knott (1977), p. 12.
676 LPAC/57, 28 October 1969, p. 1.
677 LPAC, 29th meeting (13 November 1969), LPAC/63, 12 January 1970, pp. 7 and 11. Possible orbits are
discussed
in MS/64, rev. 1, 11 November 1969.
678 It is interesting to remark that the Director General H. Bondi stressed the fact that "European
experimental groups, to date, did not have sufficient experience to handle the flood of data that would be
derived from this satellite". LPAC, 32nd meeting (15-16 June 1970), LPAC/88, 24 August 1970, p. 4.
679 Peters, on behalf of the Danish delegation, had submitted a written statement on this subject to the STC at
its 23rd meeting (22 October 1969), ESRO/ST/MIN/23, 22 January 1969. The matter had been widely
discussed by the COS Group at its 23rd meeting (17 October 1969), COS/46, 20 February 1970.
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experts for each field were appointed as referees and their reports were then discussed by a panel of
experts, chaired by the British physicist H. Elliot, that finally submitted its conclusions to the LPAC.680
It required a long discussion in the LPAC in order to analyse the panel's recommendations as well as
the referees' reports when any inconsistency was present. As a result, the recommendations of the
panel were generally accepted and an integrated payload was defined, including 9 experiments in 7
fields of study (Table 8-2). The LPAC, in particular, endorsed the panel's suggestion to exclude the
beacon experiment and the study of high-energy particles and Lyman-α emission. It decided, on the
contrary, to include experiment S-303 to measure ion composition, a field that the panel had not
recommended for the GEOS mission.681 This payload composition was eventually endorsed by the
STC even though, regarding experiment S-328, the French delegation wanted to reaffirm its
opposition to development of payloads by ESLAB.682
8.2 Working out a scientific policy
Just after the decision on COS-B and GEOS, the LPAC's membership was partially renewed by the
STC. Jacques Blamont and Cornelis (Kees) de Jager were replaced by the Swiss physicist Johannes
Geiss and the Danish astrophysicist B. Strömgren, who joined Bengt Hultqvist, Reimar Lüst and
Giuseppe (Beppo) Occhialini in the Committee (Table 8-3).683 The new LPAC was asked by the
Director General Hermann Bondi "to consider the problem of ESRO's long-term scientific policy in
order to enable ESRO to make a careful selection of new feasibility studies to be initiated on future
projects".684
As a matter of fact, the complex affair of the selection of the satellite projects for the second phase of
the programme had shown that the problem of the ESRO's long-term scientific policy deserved fresh
consideration. Several factors had to be considered before undertaking any feasibility study on projects
to be realised in the second half of the 1970s. Firstly, it was obvious that budgetary limitations would
not allow ESRO to carry out satellite projects in all fields of space science: the Organisation had to
make choices about the research fields in which it wanted to concentrate its efforts. Secondly, ESRO's
satellite programme had to be based on a few, well-phased projects with a well-defined scientific
mission and an integrated payload. This implied the definition for each project of a clear scientific
leadership to deal with the building of the payload, the observation programme and the data handling.
Thirdly, the definition of ESRO's scientific programme required a large amount of coordination with
the Member States' national space programmes and with NASA, both in the light of eventual
collaboration and to avoid wasteful overlapping. Fourthly, as ESRO was going to be involved in
application satellite programmes, some kind of coordination had to be defined, from the technological
and managerial viewpoint, between this new field of activity and the scientific programme. The case
of GEOS was an example of a scientific satellite whose technological implications (platform,
telemetry, tracking stations, and so on) were relevant for the telecommunication satellite programme,
also based on the realisation of a geostationary satellite. Finally, no less important was the problem of
680 The procedure for the selection of the GEOS payload was agreed at the 31st meeting of the LPAC
(27-28 February 1970), LPAC/73, 3 April 1970. The initial 35 proposals were presented in LPAC/66,
26 January 1970, and add. 1, 28 January 1970. The following 31 proposals were presented in GEOS/4,
27 May 1970. Reports of the referees are in the series of documents GEOS/7-38. The panel of experts
consisted of H. Elliot (chairman), R. Gendrin, G. Haerendel, N. Herlofson, J.W. King, G. Pfotzer, J.J.
Quenby, J. Sayers. The panel held two meetings, on 20 April and 30 April - 2 May 1970, whose reports
are GEOS/1, 14 May 1970, and GEOS/2, part I-III, 27 May 1970 - 5 June 1970. The panel's final report is
GEOS/3, 28 May 1970. Both the conclusions of the Panel and those of the referees are summarised in
LPAC/83, 11 June 1970.
681 LPAC, 32nd meeting (15-16 June 1970), LPAC/88, 24 August 1970. LPAC's recommendations are in
LPAC/86, 17 June 1970.
682 STC, 26th meeting (14-15 October 1970), ESRO/ST/MIN/26, rev. 1, 23 November 1970, p. 4.
683 STC, 22nd meeting (19-20 June 1969), ESRO/ST/MIN/22, 29 July 1969, p. 6. The list of candidates
presented by ESRO's Director General also included H. Elliot and B. Gregory.
684 ESRO/ST/330, 10 October 1969, p. 1.
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defining selection procedures which avoided what the French delegation at the STC called "an
unhealthy situation", namely that "the Committee charged with making the selection from amongst the
various proposals was composed of scientists who might be personally involved in preparation of the
proposals".685
Following the Director General's request, the LPAC set up two panels: a Geophysics Panel, chaired by
A.P. Willmore, and an Astrophysics Panel, under the chairmanship of C. Dilworth (Tables 8-4a and
8-4b). The former was to cover research in geophysics and planetary science, including studies of the
neutral atmosphere, the ionosphere, the magnetosphere and the solar wind, as well as studies of the
planets and interplanetary matter. The latter was to cover research in solar and stellar astronomy,
cosmic rays and cosmology. These two panels held several meetings between August and December
1969, with the participation of several invited experts, and their reports were presented to the LPAC in
January 1970. We will discuss them separately.686
8.2.1 The Geophysics Panel
The first point made clear by the Geophysics Panel was that ESRO should exclude planetary missions
and missions aimed at studying the solar wind and the interplanetary medium at great distance from
the Earth:
They are necessarily expensive missions partly because of the large launcher cost and
partly because of stringent demands on the spacecraft which result from the long mission
duration, large transmission distance and variations in the solar constant of the
spacecraft.687
It was impossible for ESRO, the Panel argued, to sustain a healthy scientific programme in these fields
with the limited financial and technical resources available. Moreover, as American activity was rather
strong and was expected to undergo substantial expansion in the future, "ESRO would experience
strong competition with unequal resources". The Panel, however, did not exclude planetary studies if
these could be pursued by a small Earth-orbiting optical telescope specially devoted to the observation
of planets. If the regions far away from the Earth were excluded for financial reasons, those nearest the
Earth's surface were excluded for lack of real scientific interest. The Panel recognised that studies of
the neutral atmosphere and of the ionosphere at mid-latitudes should be omitted from the ESRO
programme: the former could be pursued by national sounding rocket programmes or in the
framework of the forthcoming ESRO's meteorological satellite programme, the latter could not receive
significant improvement by additional future satellites.
There remained the wide domain of magnetospheric studies, for which ESRO's resources were
sufficient to establish a viable programme and whose scientific interest was worth such an effort. Even
though it was recognised that the exploratory content of this field of study was not so great, given the
results obtained over the previous decade in the US and the Soviet Union on the structure and
properties of the magnetosphere, it was nevertheless possible to carry out studies in plasma physics
under extreme conditions, a branch of physical research of great interest and wide applicability both
on the Earth and in the skies. In the words of the Panel's scientists:
685 STC, 22nd meeting (19-20 June 1969), ESRO/ST/MIN/22, 29 July 1969, p. 4. The comment was on the
choice of COS-B and GEOS.
686 The terms of reference of the two panels are in the annex to ESRO/ST/330, 10 October 1969, and also in
LPAC/41, 8 September 1969. The membership is ibidem. The Geophysics Panel met three times, their
summary reports being LPAC/42, 22 August 1969; LPAC/44, 4 November 1969; and LPAC/53,
2 December 1969. The Astrophysics Panel met 4 times, their summary reports being LPAC/46,
22 October 1969; LPAC/52, 9 January 1970; LPAC/54, undated; and LPAC/64, 13 January 1970. The
two panels' final reports to the LPAC are LPAC/68, 27 January 1970, and LPAC/69, 9 January 1970,
respectively.
687 LPAC/68, cit., p. 5.
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In addition to being interesting, in itself, as an unusually rich branch of physics, the
physics of collisionless plasma has the added attraction of being a key subject in thermo-
nuclear research. This circumstance has, in recent years, led to remarkable progress in
plasma technology, that has greatly improved the basis for laboratory simulation of
cosmic phenomena. Far from making space plasma experiments unnecessary, such
improvements (which can be expected to continue) will make it increasingly fruitful to
combine laboratory experiments and space observations in the effort toward better
understanding of the physics of collisionless plasma.688
In conclusion, as regards the fields included in its terms of reference, the Geophysics Panel
recommended that ESRO should concentrate its scientific satellite programme on plasma physics
studies in the magnetosphere and on astronomical observations of the planets. Studies of the polar
ionosphere and nearby interplanetary space by small satellites could be undertaken only if in support
of the magnetospheric programme. It was agreed not to explicitly award priority to either of the two
recommended research fields, but a wide majority in the Panel thought that higher priority should be
given to magnetospheric studies.
8.2.2 The Astrophysics Panel
The Astrophysics Panel had a more difficult task. The difficulty arose from at least two factors.
Firstly, the research fields in the Panel's terms of reference included three broad research fields:
cosmic rays (including also celestial X- and gamma-rays but excluding solar radiation), stellar
astronomy (including visible, infrared and ultraviolet radiation), and solar physics (including all
corpuscular and electromagnetic radiation from the Sun). A survey among the European scientific
community had shown that there was roughly an equal number of groups interested in each of these
fields, and important results were expected from the use of satellite instrumentation of ever increasing
sophistication. Moreover, the very possibility of definite discipline classification was made difficult in
a phase which saw the emergence of a new discipline, high energy space astrophysics, based on the
use of physical techniques to investigate astronomical objects. In this situation, the possibility of
excluding some research field, as had been done by the Geophysics Panel, or even to establish
priorities, was definitely out of the question.689
The second difficulty derived from the consideration of NASA's post-Apollo programmes of manned
space stations (expected to be in orbit by the end of the 1970s), for which Europe's collaboration was
urged by the American space agency. These stations would provide splendid opportunities for
scientific research in the fields covered by the Panel and therefore the various scientific objectives had
to be assessed and scheduled in the light of the facilities eventually available on the space stations. In
this context, a new question arose, i.e. ESRO's role and responsibility in the building and management
of instrumentation to be placed in NASA's spacecraft and space stations in the framework of
ESRO/NASA cooperation.
In the event, the Astrophysics Panel decided to follow a different path from that of the other panel: it
agreed not to make selections or to establish priorities, but rather to discuss the scientific interest of the
various research fields, stressing that it was up to the scientific community, through ESRO's advisory
Working Groups, to give advice about the choice of future projects.
688 Ibidem, p. 11. It should be recalled that one of the member of the Panel, the Chairman of the ATM Group
U. von Zahn, protested against the priority given to magnetospheric studies, arguing that "while the main
emphasis should be placed in ESRO on the exploration of space, a choice was being made of a field or
research of non exploratory character". LPAC/53, 2 December 1969, p. 4.
689 Updated statistics of European groups interested in ESRO's programmes were presented at the 2nd
meeting of the Astrophysics Panel (20-21 October 1969), LPAC/52, 9 January 1970. Slightly different
figures had been presented earlier at the second meeting of the Geophysics panel (1-2 September 1969),
LPAC/44, 4 November 1969. Besides the three fields cited above two others were considered by the
Astrophysics panel: radio astronomy and fundamental physics. About the growing role of physicists in
the traditional domain of astronomers,see Hirsch (1983), in particular chapter 6.
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Underlying the discussions in the Astrophysics Panel there was the ongoing competition between
astronomers and cosmic ray physicists, the former advocating large and sophisticated space telescopes
for high resolution studies of the Sun and other stars in the UV region, the latter being more and more
interested in developing satellites devoted to high energy astrophysics (i.e. X- and gamma-ray
astronomy).690 In this competition, astronomers had the advantage of being in the position to claim
their turn in using ESRO resources, after the misgivings felt by the astronomical community in
relation to the abandonment of the LAS, UVAS and TD-2 projects. On the other hand, they suffered a
weakness deriving from three factors. Firstly, their projects were on the borderline of ESRO's financial
resources, often requiring collaboration with NASA or even the use of NASA's spacecraft. Secondly,
their scientific objectives were in an area well covered by the American OAO (Orbiting Astronomical
Observatory) and OSO (Orbiting Solar Observatories) programmes, which were to be followed up by
more powerful missions, including manned stations. Finally, such projects were in competition with
the interests and expectations of astronomers relying on ground based telescopes, who also advocated
ever more powerful instruments.691
As to the high energy astrophysics community, they certainly had the advantage that their projects
could fit well into ESRO's medium-satellite programme, but suffered from one serious drawback.
They had already obtained the gamma-ray satellite COS-B while, in the X-ray astronomy field, they
lacked a project that could successfully compete with the vigorous American programme: NASA's
first Small Astronomy Satellite (SAS-A), scheduled for launch in late 1970, was entirely devoted to X-
ray astronomy, and an ambitious programme of large High Energy Astronomy Observatories (HEAO)
was soon to be approved.692
Concluding its discussions, the Panel suggested a programme for the 1970s articulated in three phases.
In the first half of the decade, when no new satellite launches would be available, the programme was
to consist of stabilised sounding rockets, essentially devoted to ultra-violet and X-ray astronomy. After
1975, a small- and medium-size satellite programme was to be defined whose scientific objectives did
not require the facilities of the space stations. The third component of the programme was the
preparation of experiments to be carried out from the space stations, for which "ESRO should offer to
European experimenters not only coordination and management, but also basic facilities".
With respect to the various research fields, the Panel's report pointed out that, after the negative
outcome of the UVAS and the TD-2 affairs, a large expectation existed among the European
astronomical community for satellite projects devoted to stellar astronomy and solar physics. "The
need for ultraviolet observations has been stressed by European stellar optical astronomers for many
years", the Panel remarked, "particularly in the design studies carried out for the LAS and the UVAS".
It then continued:
If it appears that such a facility is outside of ESRO's financial possibilities, it might be
quite appropriate to make use, on a cooperative basis, of the OAO vehicle developed by
NASA. Scientific aims and basic instrumentation may remain identical to what has been
proposed for the UVAS, thus making use of the feasibility study work already carried out
by ESRO on the subject.693
The Panel also recommended that ESRO should propose to NASA a joint project for a space
astronomical observatory filling the gap between the OAO series and the facilities aboard the manned
space stations. When more information on the latter would be available, ESRO was to provide
690 This point has been discussed by Dilworth (1992).
691 In this period, the European astronomical community was involved in plans and discussions on the
envisaged European Southern Observatory (ESO), a large facility to be built in Chile. See Golay (1992).
692 SAS-A was renamed Uhuru after launch and provided the first catalogue of celestial X-ray sources:
Hirsch (1983).
693 LPAC/69, cit., p. 5-6.
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facilities to enable European astronomers "to put auxiliary equipment at the focus of large, stabilised,
light collecting devices".
As regards solar research, two types of projects were presented, which seemed of particular interest for
European scientists. The first was a satellite to study high energy plasma phenomena (flares) in the
solar atmosphere by simultaneous measurements in a wide spectral range, from extreme ultraviolet to
sub-millimetre, with good angular, spectral and temporal resolution. This kind of project, in the Panel's
opinion, seemed to be "within the reach of European technology and the European scientific interest
and capacity". The second project, on the contrary, envisaged cooperation with NASA to build a solar
space observatory to study the solar atmosphere with angular resolution better than 0.2".694
Against these major astronomical projects, cosmic rays and high energy astrophysics (the physicists'
domain) appeared with a low profile in the Panel's report. About cosmic ray studies, it was recalled
that much could be done by balloons, "satellites being necessary for particular experiments requiring
either long and continuous observation times, or complete freedom from the Earth's magnetic field".
Two such lines of investigation were indicated: the search for anti-nuclei and a detailed investigation
of the chemical and isotopic composition of the cosmic radiation. As to X-ray astronomy, the report
limited itself to surveying the projects under development and then concluded:
However, it is certain that X-ray studies will, in the future, require instrumentation of
ever increasing power and complexity and the Panel felt that European experimenters
might profitably concentrate on developing, over the next few years, sophisticated X-ray
detection systems so that they are available to take advantage of the facilities provided by
the manned space stations.695
No less generic was the presentation of gamma-ray astronomy: in the field of high energies (above
30 MeV) ESRO was developing the COS-B satellite while, in the low-energy range (0.3 to 10 MeV),
much more sophisticated experimental techniques were required.
Besides these "classical" research fields, others were discussed as eventual new terrains for space
experiments. A field "adopted enthusiastically by the Panel" was that of fundamental physics, namely
the application of space technology to the study of phenomena involving fundamental laws and
principles of physics. Two examples were put forward in particular, both aiming at testing gravitation
theories. One was an experiment on the space-time metric, involving the timing of the passage of a
laser signal to the Earth from a satellite in orbit beyond the Sun. The other concerned the detection of
gravitational waves in the quiet conditions afforded by satellites.696 Other research fields were put in a
more distant future, such as infrared astronomy (for which a programme of technological research was
recommended); optical astronomy (for which a long focal telescope on a manned space station was
suggested, with the aim of measuring accurately the orbit of a large number of binary stars and then
obtaining a much better knowledge of stellar masses); and radio astronomy (for which the possibility
was envisaged of a long wavelength radio telescope on the moon, or an extension to long-baseline
interferometry using a geostationary satellite).
8.2.3 The LPAC's policy statement of February 1970
The reports of the Geophysics Panel and the Astrophysics Panel were submitted to the LPAC in
January 1970, but the Committee agreed that, before arriving at a definite statement on ESRO's future
scientific policy, the two reports should be further discussed by the six ad hoc Working Groups.697 The
outcome of these discussions did not make the LPAC's task easier, however. Commenting on the
Geophysics Panel's report, the ION group objected to the principle of establishing a negative priority
694 Ibidem, p. 8.
695 Ibidem, p. 5.
696 Ibidem, p. 9. A preliminary mission definition study for a space experiment on the geometry of space-
time had already been performed, following a proposal of J. Blamont: LPAC/48, 15 October 1969.
697 LPAC, 30th meeting (14 January 1970), LPAC/70, 3 February 1970.
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list and argued that the Panel's guidelines should be used only for the major projects and should not
cover areas in which important missions could be carried out by the use of small satellites. The PLA
group stressed that new information from the United States showed that inexpensive planetary
missions were indeed possible and suggested studying the feasibility of a Venus orbiter. The STAR
group expressed its concern for the fact that so much emphasis was placed on the space stations,
whose availability in the near future was still uncertain, and recommended a satellite flying
instrumentation similar to the UVAS type to carry high resolution studies. The COS Group stressed
the importance of high energy astrophysics and of studies on the isotopic and chemical composition of
cosmic rays. This group also gave top priority to the study of neutrons and charged particles from the
Sun, a research area not included in the Astrophysics Panel's report, and placed the study of the
magnetosphere rather low in its list of priorities, contrary to the recommendations of the Geophysics
Panel. Finally, the COS Group recommended overriding priority to the field of fundamental physics,
should a mission in this domain prove feasible. The SUN group stressed the importance of having an
ESRO solar satellite to bridge the gap between the end of NASA's OSO programme and the space
station projects. The ATM group strongly complained against the elimination of atmospheric
research.698
In the event, the LPAC finally arrived at a definite statement about ESRO's future scientific policy
after two days of lively discussions. The chairman of the Council, H. van de Hulst, also attended the
meeting, together with an important delegation of ESRO's directorate (the Director General H. Bondi,
the Director of Programmes and Planning J.A. Dinkespiler, and the Director of ESTEC's Space
Science Department E.A. Trendelenburg), and with C. Dilworth and J.W. Dungey representing the
Astrophysics Panel and the Geophysics Panel respectively. The main issue was again UV stellar
astronomy and the pressure from the astronomical community to have a serious involvement of ESRO
in the field. B. Strömgren informed the LPAC of a letter he had received from the chairman of the
STAR group about "the concern felt by astronomers at the scarcity of optical astronomy in ESRO's
programme". The group advocated better communication between the LPAC and the astronomical
community and urged that investigations should be started, "for the use of an orbital observatory to
take advantage of the work already undertaken [for UVAS]". Strömgren himself, however,
acknowledged that "this was an area in which competition was involved", and that the opportunity of a
UVAS-type project should be assessed taking into consideration the American programme. According
to the LPAC chairman Lüst the problem presented itself in the following terms:
The LPAC should demonstrate: a) whether it felt ESRO should have, besides a sounding
rocket programme, satellite activity in the UV wavelength range, which would mean that
a substantial percentage of the budget should be allocated for this purpose in the future;
and b) whether such activity would involve ESRO's starting a medium-sized satellite like
UVAS with later modifications. On the other hand, consideration should be given as to
whether it would be better to link this type of programme to the space station on the lines
that ESRO might build certain equipment, e.g. a telescope, for use on the station.699
That was a matter of scientific policy, of course, which had to confront the financial reality. The latter
was presented by Dinkespiler, who provided the meeting with a tentative launching programme of
scientific satellites for the second half of the 1970s, on the basis of an envisaged budget of
30-33 MAU per year (Table 8-5). Dinkespiler's table was obviously ecumenical: it showed how it was
698 The the two Panels' reports were discussed at the following meetings of the ad hoc Working Groups:
ION, 28th meeting (26-27 January 1970), ION/84, 17 February 1970; PLA, 16th meeting
(6 February 1970), PLA/65, rev. 1, 23 March 1970; STAR, 15th meeting (11 February 1970), STAR/65,
25 February 1970; COS, 24th meeting (19 February 1970), COS/50 [missing in the files]; SUN, 14th
meeting (4 February 1970), SUN/40, 23 February 1970; ATM, 16th meeting (12 February 1970),
ATM/49, 8 April 1970. The comments of the various groups are reported in ION/83, 23 February 1970;
PLA/64, 19 February 1970; STAR/64, 23 February 1970; COS/48, 23 February 1970; SUN/38,
16 February 1970; ATM/48, 19 February 1970.
699 LPAC, 31st meeting (27-28 February 1970), LPAC/73, 3 April 1970, pp. 10 and 11.
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possible to include in ESRO's satellite programme all technical options, namely one large satellite
project (50 MAU in 5 years), 2 medium sized projects (32 MAU in 4 years), 3 small near-Earth
orbiting satellites (9 MAU in 3 years), and 1 highly eccentric orbit satellite (16 MAU in 3 years).
The LPAC's decision went into another direction. Concluding the discussion, in fact, the Committee
definitely excluded large satellite projects from the ESRO programme and stated that, "with the
presently foreseen budget for scientific spacecraft [...], it would be possible to perform in the five-year
period 1975-80 three medium-sized satellite projects and three to five small satellite projects". As
regards the contents of the programme, four research fields were to be given primary consideration
according to the LPAC, namely:
a. fundamental physics, with some priority given to experiments to test gravitational theories;
b. plasma physics investigations in the magnetosphere and coordinated studies in the surrounding
interplanetary medium and in the polar ionosphere by means of GEOS-type, HEOS-type and small
near-Earth satellites;
c. high energy astrophysics projects in the X-ray and low energy gamma-ray regions;
d. special cosmic ray studies such as the determination of elemental and isotopic abundance and the
measurement of solar neutrons and charged particles.
The LPAC's policy statement, as we see, was consistent with the recommendations of the Geophysics
Panel while, regarding the other Panel's controversial issues, it definitely endorsed the arguments of
the advocates of high energy astrophysics and cosmic rays. In fact, the most important element in the
LPAC's policy statement was that it explicitly excluded stellar UV astronomy and solar high
resolution astronomy from ESRO's satellite programme, confining these fields to rocket experiments.
In the opinion of the LPAC, "it would be inopportune to launch unmanned satellites at dates so close
to those when the [space] station begins to work". Preparation for eventual participation in the NASA
manned space station programme was recommended, but the LPAC made it clear that "the funds for a
major European participation in the development of the manned space station programme will be
provided in addition to the currently foreseen ESRO space science budget". Finally, as regards
planetary missions, the LPAC agreed with the Geophysics Panel that ESRO could not compete in this
field with the programmes pursued in the USA and USSR. Even in this case, it specified that any
eventual participation in a cooperative programme with NASA would require additional resources.700
The LPAC decided that its report should not be submitted to the approval of the STC and the Council.
It was agreed, however, that the policy statement contained in it should provide, on the one hand, the
LPAC with definite guidelines for future discussions and recommendations and, on the other hand,
ESRO's Directorate of Programmes and Planning with a general framework for future feasibility
studies. These same guidelines, the LPAC stressed, "could be of help to European experimenters in
defining the direction of their space activities and might assist in the definition of scientific policies in
national space programmes and in particular in the orientation of the work of institutes".701
Ten years after the Blue Book, this was the first time that the representatives of the scientific
community involved in ESRO programmes had tried to define a clear scientific policy, based on a set
of priorities and on the exclusion of some scientific areas and technical options. Even though not
700 LPAC/80, 22 May 1970, pp. 2 and 4. This is the first draft of the LPAC's Report on future policy for the
scientific space programme of ESRO. The first two chapters of this document report on the activity of the
Geophysics Panel and the Astrophysics Panel and on the final recommendations of the LPAC. The
various research fields are then reviewed in the following chapters. The draft was slightly amended at the
32nd LPAC meeting (15-16 June 1970), LPAC/88, 24 August 1970, and the final report was eventually
circulated in June in the form of a booklet.
701 Ibidem, p. 3.
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formally endorsed by ESRO's governing bodies, this policy did aim at shaping the further
development of the scientific programme of the Organisation, with the ambition of establishing
guidelines for the whole of European space science. In this respect it is important to remark that in the
new organisational framework established after the Bannier Report, the LPAC became an advisory
body of the Director General, who eventually reported to the STC. In fact, the LPAC's policy
definition made explicit reference to the activity of ESRO's new Directorate for Programmes and
Planning (DPP), created in 1968 after the recommendations of the Bannier Report, whose task it was
that of "elaborating a long term-policy, and initiating its execution, on the basis of thorough analysis
of the past and a sound and wide-ranging knowledge of space activities, programmes and capabilities
in Europe and throughout the world". In this capacity, the DPP was the office responsible for the
execution of mission definition and feasibility studies and for providing the European space science
community with all information about the status and perspectives of the space programmes in the
world. It represented the LPAC's immediate interlocutor within ESRO's top management.702
Reaching maturity, ESRO could no longer remain a service organisation for any kind of project
emerging from competing interests within the scientific community. Thirteen years after the beginning
of the space era, the general framework of world-wide space research appeared clearly defined; the
European space science community had definitely got over its infancy; and ESRO could now rely on a
more predictable, though limited, set of financial, technical and human resources. It was possible and
necessary for the Organisation to plan its long-term programme on a more secure base, and the LPAC
felt it had to play its part.
If we look at the LPAC's policy statement of February 1970 a few considerations are called for about
its most important aspect, i.e. the exclusion of solar and stellar astronomy from the ESRO satellite
programme. This was not an obvious or a painless choice. In fact, it mortified one of the most
important sectors of the space science community and excluded research fields in which the use of
space technology had stimulated a dramatic breakthrough in scientific knowledge. The decision to
limit solar and stellar astronomy in the ultraviolet to the sounding rocket programme was actually a
political as well as a scientific choice, whose rationality derived from at least three main factors. The
first was the consideration of the American effort in these fields. In spite of their great scientific
importance, the LPAC felt that a major effort of ESRO in any of them could not be justified since the
knowledge obtained would probably not be unique.703 Rather than committing a substantial fraction of
ESRO's limited resources to such fields, the LPAC felt that it was better to foster collaboration with
NASA in the space station programme.
The second factor regards the weakness of the astronomical community vis à vis the space
programmes, what prevented them from working out good projects and lobbying efficiently through
ESRO's policymakers. Even considering NASA's activities, in fact, European astronomers could still
claim their past experience in designing the LAS and UVAS projects and could certainly advocate the
expediency of a European undertaking in stellar astronomy or solar physics. The NASA's space station
programme was far from being established on a firm financial and institutional frame and the field was
wide enough to allow a niche where important original results could be obtained by a European
satellite. ESRO's financial resources did not in fact exclude this possibility while still leaving enough
money for other projects, as Dinkespiler's table showed. Most stellar astronomers and solar physicists,
however, were mainly interested in the development of ground based facilities and they lacked the
scientific culture and technical expertise required for developing important space projects. The few
groups  interested  in space  research  which had  contributed to  the first ESRO satellite payloads were
702 The quotation is from ESRO, General Report 1967, p. 5. Among the terms of reference of the Director
for Programmes and Planning, there was that of providing the secretaries of the STC and the LPAC.
703 This point was made clear in the LPAC's report LPAC/80, 22 May 1970, pp. 17-18.
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also engaged in national or multinational projects outside ESRO's programmes and could not viably
support a new major undertaking.704
Finally, if we are to understand the reasons for a political defeat, we must also look at the winners.
These were the two main physicists' communities involved in space research: those interested in the
Earth's space environment and those interested in high energy astrophysics, i.e. those who had
advocated and benefited from the choice of GEOS and COS-B. The former looked at the
magnetosphere as the new frontier of geophysical research, with a large variety of experimental
possibilities; the latter were colonising a new and promising field, where experimental techniques
borrowed from physical research could be successfully implemented for studies of high energy
phenomena in astronomical objects. The COS-B project had provided them with an instrument
devoted to high energy gamma rays. Now, just at the time when the LPAC was discussing its policy
statement, they worked out a valid suggestion for an X-ray satellite project. It was too late for
discussing it in the Astrophysics Panel and the COS Group meetings but still in time to affect the
LPAC's decisions. In fact, reporting to the LPAC on the results obtained by the X-ray Mission
Definition Group set up in ESRO a few months earlier, the Executive informed the Committee that it
seemed possible to carry out localisation of X-ray sources in the arc second range by using the lunar
occultation method with an HEOS-A2 type satellite, to be compared with the arc minute accuracy
attainable with SAS-A. There was finally a project that could compete on equal footing with the
American important programme. Indeed, as soon as she heard this statement, C. Dilworth was ready to
underline that "the Astrophysics Panel and COS Group reports would be modified by this
information". It is quite evident that the information did affect the LPAC policy statement, as the field
of X-ray astronomy was given high priority in spite of the low profile it appeared in the Astrophysics
Panel's report. The competition was starting again and the various scientific interests were ready to
take sides.705
8.3 LPAC's first recommendation on future missions: HELOS and SAS-D (IUE)
In June 1970 the LPAC started to discuss the choice of ESRO's future satellite projects, to follow
COS-B and GEOS in the second half of the 1970s. Three mission definition studies had been
completed, all fitting within the LPAC's policy statement and devoted respectively to: (a) a space
experiment on gravitation theories; (b) an X-ray astronomy satellite; and (c) a series of small standard
magnetospheric satellites.706
The X-ray astronomy satellite appeared the most promising project. A Mission Definition Group
(K. Pounds from Leicester University, R. Rocchia from Saclay, P. Sanford from Imperial College, and
J. Collet and R. Pacault from ESRO) had studied the matter, considering only projects not involving
very advanced technology such as highly accurate stabilisation, and remaining within the general
range of small- or medium-sized projects. After considering the X-ray experiments already envisaged
on four other satellites to be launched in the near future (the American SAS-A, the European TD-1,
the British UK-5, and the Japanese COSRA), the group concluded that the main aim of a future ESRO
mission should be the precise determination of the position and geometric shape of X-ray sources,
with an accuracy of a few arc sec. This could be achieved by a lunar occultation method with a
spacecraft in a highly eccentric orbit. They envisaged a detector sensitive to photons within the energy
704 This point has been discussed by Golay (1992) with regards to stellar astronomy and by de Jager (1992)
with regards to solar physics.
705 LPAC, 31st meeting (27-28 February 1970), LPAC/73, 3 April 1970, p. 9. This was the first reference to
what was to become first the HELOS (High Energy Lunar Occultation Project) project and later on
Exosat. See also Dilworth (1992).
706 LPAC, 32nd meeting (15-16 June 1970), LPAC/88, 24 August 1970. These studies were presented in
LPAC/75, 8 April 1970; LPAC/76, rev. 1, 23 July 1970; and LPAC/77, 25 May 1970; respectively. At the
meeting, a study on the possible launching of a second GEOS was also discussed. This option was
discarded at the following LPAC meeting, where the three main projects were discussed in detail: LPAC,
33rd meeting (1-2 October 1970), LPAC/92, 23 November 1970.
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range 0.3 to 20 keV as the main component of the scientific payload of this satellite, whose orbit
would allow the scanning of approximately 30 % of the sky, covering about 40 % of X-ray sources
presumably known at the time of launch.
The COS Group had endorsed this project, C. Dilworth reported, and the LPAC also showed
considerable interest in it, recommending that a feasibility study should be carried out "with all
possible speed". The LPAC also urged that a note on this project should appear in Nature and that a
survey should be made in order to identify the scientific groups in Europe potentially interested in it.
Finally, two other members were recommended in the membership of the Mission Definition Group:
J. Bleeker from Leiden University and J. Trumper from the Max-Planck-Institut in Garching. The
group could also take advantage of the advice of C. Dilworth.707 A well-defined and properly timed
project, a widespread interest among an influent sector of the scientific community, and a dedicated
group of scientists were thus established for the X-ray satellite project, which eventually came to be
called HELOS, an acronym for Highly Eccentric Lunar Occultation Satellite. The COS Group, and its
chairperson C. Dilworth in particular, felt a sort of moral obligation for supporting the X-ray satellite,
after their recommendation of the pure gamma-ray satellite COS-B against the alternative project
COS-A, which included both a gamma-ray and an X-ray experiment.708 As regards the two other
studies, the space experiment on gravitation theories and the small magnetospheric satellites, the
former was certainly the more interesting from the scientific point of view (it aimed at testing a
fundamental physical law) and the more challenging from the technical point of view (it required the
development of a heliocentric probe, with an extremely accurate clock and a very sensitive
accelerometer on board). It was clear, however, that the realisation of such a mission required a good
deal of advanced scientific and technical studies, and the LPAC recommended keeping on this
studying and looking into NASA's possible interest in collaborating on such a project.
Finally, as could be expected, the launching of small standardised satellites for magnetospheric studies
was advocated by the ION Group, which stressed the widespread interest in this project among
European scientific groups, as well as the possibility of relating the small satellite programme to the
GEOS mission.709 Two types of mission were considered, one based on the use of highly eccentric
orbit satellites and the other on satellites in circular orbits in the altitude region between 300 and
3000 km. In the first case, three groups of scientific objectives were suggested: studies of the polar
region at high altitude, studies of magnetospheric dynamics, and studies of plasma physics. In the
second case, two satellites should operate at the same time, with experiments aiming at high latitude
studies of the coupling between the magnetosphere and the ionosphere.
In the event, the LPAC was called to discuss one more project, namely the offer by NASA to have
ESRO's collaboration in the development of SAS-D, a space telescope for UV astronomy scheduled
for launching in 1974/75. This was an adaptation of the UVAS package to an Explorer-type satellite
injected into a geosynchronous orbit. The project, in fact, was to be realised by a collaboration
between NASA and the UK group which had designed both the LAS and UVAS. Possible
participation of ESRO was envisaged in the provision of a ground station to monitor the satellite on
this side of the Atlantic and/or in the development of some sub-system of the satellite. For a total cost
of no more than 2 to 4 MAU, the European astronomical community would have been offered
observational time of the order of one third of the total observational time. This possibility, LPAC
member B. Strömgren reported, generated "enthusiasm (...) among scientists who are worried about
the future of UV astronomy in Europe". In their opinion, Strömgren added, "the proposed astronomical
rocket  experiments  would not be  sufficient if  one  wanted to  prepare  for the  phase when European
707 Collet et al. (1970). COS Group, 25th meeting (5 June 1970), COS/53 [missing in the files].
708 See chapter 7. When recommending COS-B against COS-A, in March 1969, the COS Group had urged
that a satellite project devoted solely to X-ray astronomy should be studied by ESRO.
709 ION Group, 28th meeting, (26/27/70), ION/84, 17 February 1970; 29th meeting (5 June 1970), ION/90,
26 October 1970. The interest of the scientific community was documented in ION/81, 9 January 1970
and add. 1, 13 January 1970.
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experimenters would have access to the post-Apollo Programme", and the participation in the SAS-D
programme would satisfy just such a need. The LPAC accepted the plea: it expressed its great interest
in the project and urged ESRO to further investigate the possibility of cooperating with NASA in the
SAS-D project. The Committee was aware, of course, that this could appear to be in contradiction with
its own policy statement; therefore it stressed that this policy did not exclude but rather hoped for a
financially feasible involvement in UV astronomy in preparation for eventual participation in the
manned space station programme.710
The time of decision came at the end of April 1971, when the feasibility studies for the various
projects were available to the LAPC. The main question regarded the choice between the
magnetospheric project and the X-ray astronomy project HELOS. Whatever the choice made between
them, it was possible in addition to undertake a smaller project to be selected between participation in
the SAS-D project and the establishment of a study and laboratory programme to prepare a space
experiment on gravitation theories.711
Three different options had been studied for the magnetospheric project: a highly eccentric
magnetospheric satellite (HEMS), to be launched by the ELDO Europa II rocket or the NASA Thor
Delta vehicle, and two near Earth magnetospheric satellites (NEMS), to be launched by the French
Diamant-C and the British Black Arrow respectively. Reporting on the recommendations of the ION
group, its chairman J.W. King explained that a series of satellites would not be necessary to achieve
the scientific aims and emphasise rather the need to have correlated measurements from another
satellite at the time of GEOS as part of the International Magnetospheric Study. According to the ION
Group, first priority had to be given to the HEMS project while the NEMS projects should be
considered as second choice.712
The ION group's support to the magnetospheric project was not coupled with that of the COS Group.
On the contrary, the latter criticised the lack of clear scientific aims in the proposed magnetospheric
missions. Not surprisingly, the group strongly recommended the X-ray mission, which they considered
"an important and advanced tool in X-ray astronomy, with possible future application in the low
energy gamma ray field".713
The strength of HELOS derived from two main factors, one scientific and one institutional. From the
scientific point of view, the project had the advantage of the lunar occultation method, which allowed
the precise determination of the position of X-ray sources and the measurement of their fine structure
and angular dimensions with high accuracy. This was a very important characteristic, since the
launching of the satellite was planned after that of SAS-A, which was to produce the first large scale
survey of the X-ray sky, and before the launching of the first High Energy Astrophysics Observatory
(HEAO), a family of second generation satellites for X-ray astronomy whose pointing accuracy,
however, was expected to be one order of magnitude lower than that of HELOS.
710 LPAC, 33rd meeting (1-2 October 1970), LPAC/92, 23 November 1970, p. 10. Information on the
possible ESRO participation in the SAS-D programme was presented in ESRO/C/480,
23 November 1970.
711 LPAC, 36th meeting (28-29 April 1971), LPAC/110, 30 August 1971. This document is divided into two
parts with different page numbering., The first reports on the open meeting, attended by the chairmen of
the working groups; the second reports on the restricted meeting, with only LPAC members, the chairman
of the STC (Lüst) and a limited ESRO staff. The result of feasibility studies were presented in LPAC/103,
16 April 1971 (near Earth magnetospheric satellites), LPAC/104, 16 April 1971 (highly eccentric
magnetospheric satellites), LPAC/105, 2 April 1971 (HELOS), LPAC/108, 26 April 1971 (SAS-D), and
LPAC/109, 21 April 1971 (gravitation theories).
712 ION Group, 31st meeting (29 March 1971), ION/103, 6 April 1971. In addition to these three projects, a
feasiblity study had also been carried out on a smaller near Earth satellite to be launched by the less
powerful Diamant B launcher. The ION group, however, considered that this option would not be able to
fulfil the envisaged scientific objectives.
713 COS Group, 28th meeting (26-27 April 1971), COS/60, 11 June 1971, p. 13.
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As regards the institutional aspects, HELOS was an observatory-type satellite like COS-B but with
one significant difference with respect to the latter, i.e. that ESRO would be responsible for funding
both the spacecraft and the scientific package. HELOS was thus to be the first ESRO project for which
the Organisation would bear the financial cost of the experiment. The satellite would become a real
observatory-like facility, which meant that the whole European scientific community working in X-ray
astronomy would be interested in its performance, would be involved in its scientific management, and
would have access to its data. If HELOS was approved, ESRO's J. Ortner pointed out, "it was intended
to expand the Mission Definition Group to include representatives of all institutes actively engaged in
X-ray astronomy, in order to define the scientific payload in the best possible way".714 In conclusion,
while the magnetospheric project still placed itself in the early tradition of ESRO's satellites - a loose
scientific mission in a well-established research field, to be fulfilled by a collection of experiments
provided by different laboratories - HELOS was definitely in the new tradition inaugurated by COS-B
- a space observatory in a new and dynamic exploratory field, requiring the unitary effort of an
important sector of the space science community.
Last but not least, it must be recalled that behind HELOS there was the support of the same coalition
which had determined the success of COS-B (Occhialini's Milan group with Dilworth, Lüst's Munich
group with Trumper, van de Hulst's Leiden group with Bleeker), with two important additions:
ESTEC's Space Science Department, where the involvement in COS-B had produced the
establishment of a lively research programme in high energy astrophysics, and the British X-ray group
at Leicester University (K. Pounds), which had lost the possibility of flying its X-ray instrument in
COS-A and now wanted to seize the new opportunity.
If the alternative between the magnetospheric project and the HELOS project required the most
important choice, another decision had to be taken by the LPAC, i.e. whether to recommend ESRO's
cooperation in the NASA/UK SAS-D project or to recommend a laboratory research programme to
prepare a space experiment on gravitation theories. Regarding the former, the suggested form of
cooperation was the development by ESRO of a ground station in Europe, including a set of antennae
and a dedicated computer, at an estimated cost of around 3 MAU. This solution would give European
astronomers full scientific control of the observational time allocated to them, namely some
40 per cent of the total equally shared between ESRO and the UK. As regards the space experiment on
gravitation theories, studies carried out in industry and scientific institutes had confirmed "the real
gain one could expect from a complex space experiment entirely and exclusively devoted to tests of
gravitation theories".715 The proposed mission foresaw the use of a spacecraft in heliocentric orbit to
measure the coefficients of the space-time tensor with the highest accuracy possible. Owing to the
great technical complexity of the project, a vigorous programme of laboratory research was required in
order to demonstrate its feasibility and to permit assessment of its cost.
ESRO's involvement in the SAS-D project was strongly recommended by the STAR group,
represented at the LPAC meeting by its chairman, L. Houziaux, who was also ESRO's representative
in the SAS-D Working Group. According to the STAR Group, ESRO's participation in the SAS-D
project represented "a unique opportunity to satisfy the European UV community at a very attractive
cost". The group's resolution then concluded on a note of victimisation:
Rejection of the offer by NASA would deprive the European astronomical community of
the immeasurable benefits from the large capabilities offered by SAS-D. With the TD-1
instruments being the only sources of astrophysical information from satellites, the
European community would be placed at a major disadvantage with regard to its
714 LPAC/110, cit., p. 7. This aspect of the HELOS mission was emphasised at the COS Group meeting
which recommended it. The LPAC had discussed at length the financing of scientific experiments for
ESRO satellites at its 33rd meeting (1-2 October 1970), LPAC/92, 23 November 1970, and it had agreed
that, for large projects, consisting of one or two large experiments, there would be a great advantage if
ESRO funded the scientific payload.
715 LPAC/109, cit., 21 April 1971, p. 3.
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American counterpart. [...] It is felt that the expenditure required for participation in the
SAS-D project is not excessive in respect of what has been requested for, and given to,
astronomy.716
It was eventually the task of the restricted meeting of the LPAC to issue a final recommendation about
the selection of ESRO's next scientific satellite projects. Not surprisingly these were HELOS and
SAS-D. Even though the minutes of the meeting do not report any explicit reason for the choice of
HELOS, these can be easily inferred from what has been said before. We can just recall four main
aspects: (a) it was a well designed project, with a clear scientific objective and with strong support
from an influential sector of the scientific community involved in ESRO's programmes; (b) it allowed
European scientists to play a significant role in the promising field of X-ray astronomy even in the
face of NASA's important effort; (c) following COS-B, it gave coherence to ESRO's scientific
programme in the field of high energy astrophysics; (d) it would be the first truly ESRO satellite.
The choice of HELOS excluded, for financial reasons, the possibility of adopting the magnetospheric
project recommended by the ION group, but it did allow ESRO's participation in the SAS-D
programme. The LPAC recognised the great rewards in observation time for European astronomers
that would be obtained by this participation and strongly recommended it. No decision, on the
contrary, was taken on the laboratory programme for the space experiment on the gravitation theories,
pending the views to be expressed by the newly established Fundamental Physics Panel.
8.3.1 IUE adopted in the ESRO programme
In the event, owing to the political difficulties described in the following section, only the possible
participation in the SAS-D project was put forward to the STC. It was easily approved and the STC
also recommended that, besides providing a ground station at a cost of about 3 MAU, ESRO should
also contribute to the spacecraft hardware up to a maximum of 1 MAU.717 In July 1971 the Council
finally approved this recommendation and the project was then called International Ultraviolet
Explorer (IUE). We can notice a sort of irony in the circumstance that the first new ESRO project
approved after the LPAC's policy statement was in fact in a field that had been excluded in that very
statement.718 The IUE satellite was launched in January 1978 into a geosynchronous orbit and, after
commissioning, it was operated for 8 hours each day from ESA's Villafranca station, near Madrid,
from which European astronomers could carry out their observations just as in the case of a ground
observatory.
8.4 The 1971 crisis and the "first package deal"
Notwithstanding the LPAC's discussions and recommendations there was no question for ESRO
deciding on the start of a new major satellite project in the spring of 1971. In November 1970, in fact,
the latent crisis which afflicted European cooperation in space had erupted dramatically at the fourth
session of the European Space Conference (ESC). On that occasion, ESRO's General Report informs
us, "the disunity between the countries favouring a 'coherent policy' including an independent
European launcher effort and the others reached such a magnitude that the meeting broke up".719 As
a consequence,  all plans  for a  unified  European space organisation that for two years had dominated
716 LPAC/110, cit., p. 10. STAR, 27th meeting (27 April 1971), STAR/72 [missing in the files].
717 STC, 28th meeting (18 May 1971), ESRO/ST/MIN/28, 30 June 1971. See also ESRO/ST(71)9,
12 May 1971 and ESRO/ST(71)10, 7 May 1971. The STC's endorsement was taken with the sole
abstention of Spain, who pressed to have the ESRO tracking station for GEOS and SAS-D in her
territory. Eventually, the ground station was built at Villafranca, near Madrid, and ESA also contributed
the deployable solar-cell array of the spacecraft.
718 Council, 43rd session (13-14 July 1971), ESRO/C/MIN/43, 14 December 1972. Information to the
Council was provided in ESRO/C(71)34, 2 July 1971. The IUE project is described in ESRO/ELDO
Bulletin, 18 (May 1972), pp. 13-17.
719 ESRO, General Report 1970, p. 9. More on the ESC crisis in chapter 10.
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discussions receded dramatically and the very future of Europe collaboration in space appeared rather
grim. Denmark and France went as far as to denounce the ESRO Convention in order not to incur
financial obligations extending beyond the first eight-year period. Given this situation, it was
impossible for the Organisation to embark on a new programme and even the projects under
development had to be delayed.
Facing the failure of the ESC meeting, ESRO Member States agreed that their delegations to the
Council should negotiate further among themselves, leaving aside the problems which had led the
ESC to deadlock. In spite of some difficulties and setbacks, ESRO had proved to be sufficiently
reliable and successful in its work; it had acquired maturity and competence in managing industrial
contracts; and it had established a firm basis for the development of application satellites, which
increasingly appeared to be the true political and economic rationale for European co-operation in
space.720 The new Chairman of the ESRO Council, the Italian physicist Giampiero Puppi, former
Chairman of the ESC's Committee of Senior Officials, was given the task of negotiating a proper
compromise in order to drive the Organisation, as smoothly as possible, to its new role in the
application field and, at the same time, to offer European space policymakers a new ground for
negotiations. After one full year of intense negotiations, the compromise was worked out and it
became known as the "First Package Deal".721 The main aspect of the 1971 package deal is that ESRO
definitely abandoned its role as an Organisation solely devoted to scientific research and undertook
application satellite programmes on telecommunications, aeronautical communications, and
meteorology. The dramatic rise of importance of these application programmes can be appreciated if
one considers that for the years 1972, 1973 and 1974 they were to be provided for at an overall cost of
22.8 MAU, 48.5 MAU and 63.4 MAU respectively, eventually reaching an annual level of resources
of not less than 70 MAU in the period 1975-1980. In comparison, the budget for the scientific satellite
programme for 1972, 1973 and 1974 was fixed at 41.7 MAU, 36.0 MAU, and 31.7 MAU respectively,
eventually reaching a minimum level of 27 MAU in the years 1975-1977 (Figure 8-1).722 As a
consequence of this re-orientation, the Council decided to eliminate the sounding rocket programme
and to terminate the scientific activities in ESRIN by 1973. The Kiruna launching range (ESRANGE)
was taken over by Sweden under an appropriate protocol while, in order to smooth Italian protests, it
was eventually decided that ESRIN should become the new seat of the Documentation Service.723
Further economies were effected in the scientific programme by postponing the start of the
development contracts for the COS-B and GEOS projects, by deferring new projects, and by limiting
future scientific satellites launchings to one about every two years.
The 1971 package deal marked "the beginning of a new period in the life of ESRO".724 The
Organisation was definitely transformed into a space agency mainly devoted to application satellites
with only a minor fraction of its jobs and funds devoted to science. During the laborious negotiations
which led to the compromise, "the whole scientific programme was put in some doubt", the chairman
of the STC reported.725 In the first draft of Puppi's package deal, in fact, it was suggested that the
scientific programme should be made optional from 1974, a position strongly supported by France,
and only with a drastic reduction of funds had it been finally agreed to keep it mandatory. The sum of
27 MAU,  however,  fell  quite  short of  scientists'  expectations. In fact, in the hottest phase
of negotiations,  both the STC  and the LPAC had approved a statement in which, on the basis of some
720 "Statement by the Director General" at the 35th session of Council (22 December 1970), ESRO/C/483,
18 December 1970.
721 Council, 44th session (20 December 1971), ESRO/C/MIN/44, 6 January 1972. The Council resolution
with the agreed on "package deal" is reported in ESRO General Report 1971, p. 129-132, and in
ESRO/ELDO Bulletin, 17, (February 1972), p. 6-11.
722 The figures are taken from G. Puppi's and A. Hocker's comments to the Council resolution of
December 1971, ESRO/ELDO Bulletin, 17 (February 1972), pp. 11-14 and 14-19. The institutional
aspects of the first package deal will be discussed in detail in Chapter 11.
723 ESRIN, the ESRO Space Research Institute, was located in Frascati, near Rome (see chapter 2).
724 ESRO General Report 1971, p. 9.
725 STC, 28th meeting (18 May 1971), ESRO/ST/MIN/28, 30 June 1971, p. 2.
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Figure 8-1: Distribution of Financial Resources between Science, Applications and Basic
Activities agreed by the ESRO Council in December 1972
(ESRO/ELDO Bulletin, No 17, February 1972, p. 15)
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statistics on the number of scientific groups active in space research in Europe, they argued that ESRO
should launch one medium-sized satellite per year. The statement concluded that "the minimum level
of funding required for a truly viable scientific satellite programme lies between 43 and 47 MAU".726
It is against this background that we shall consider the further evolution of discussions and decisions
about ESRO's scientific satellite programme.
8.5 Choosing ESRO's new satellite projects
8.5.1 The new structure of the expert Working Groups
Following the policy statement of February 1970, the LPAC considered whether the structure of the
existing ad hoc Working Groups should not streamlined towards the research fields recommended for
the future ESRO satellite programme.727 Three aspects had to be considered. The first regarded the
evolution of the scientific fields involved in space research. The existing ION group, for example, was
no longer interested only in "ionospheric and auroral phenomena" but had in fact taken over
responsibility for a much wider domain, covering the whole of solar-terrestrial phenomena
(magnetosphere, solar wind and interplanetary medium). Similarly, the COS Group, whose original
terms of reference included "cosmic rays and trapped radiation", no longer had members representing
radiation belt physics and its main interest was now not in cosmic rays but in high energy astrophysics.
The second aspect regarded the evolution of ESRO's scientific policy, after the LPAC's policy
statement. It appeared, for example, that the work load of the PLA and ATM groups would not be very
large in the future, while some merging of the SUN and STAR groups seemed advisable to cover the
field of astronomy and low energy astrophysics. At the same time, because of the emphasis laid on the
importance of fundamental physics studies, a new Working Group on this subject was recommended.
The third aspect regarded the delicate issue of the relationship between ESRO and its customers, i.e.
the European space scientists. A reduction in the number of scientific groups implied in fact that fewer
scientists would be involved in discussions about ESRO's scientific programme, thus reducing
goodwill and support for ESRO in the Member States. In other words, the role of the Working Groups
was to be viewed from two different angles: (a) obtaining the best advice on scientific matters within
the framework of ESRO's overall policy; (b) keeping the European space science community together.
The LPAC eventually decided to postpone a decision on the change in the structure of the existing
Working Groups, pending the conclusion of Puppi's negotiations on the first package deal. The
Committee, however, did agree to set up a Fundamental Physics Panel (FFP) under the chairmanship
of H. Bondi.728 The issue was taken over again by the LPAC in September 1971, following a
solicitation by the STC.729 By that time fresh information was available about the proposed reduction
in the budget of the scientific satellite programme and the elimination of the sounding rocket
programme. As a consequence, the Committee agreed that the FFP should remain as an advisory body
of the LPAC and that two new Working Groups should replace the existing six: a Solar System
Working Group (SSWG) to cover solar physics, geophysics, solar-terrestrial relations and planetary
science; and an Astrophysics Working Groups (AWG) to cover stellar astronomy, X- and gamma-ray
astronomy and cosmic rays. Each Working Group would have approximately 15 members, to be
elected by the LPAC with a gradual build-up and serving for a period of 3 years. All fields of space
research were thus formally maintained in the working group structure; this however was made much
more coarse-grained and the number of scientists involved was reduced by roughly 50 %. It is
important to remark that solar physics was included in the terms of reference of the Solar System
726 LPAC, 36th meeting (28-29 April 1971), LPAC/110, cit., p. 2-3 of the restricted session; STC, 28th
meeting (18 May 1971), ESRO/ST/MIN/28, 30 June 1971, Annex 1; also in ESRO/ST(71)10,
7 May 1971, p. 2-3.
727 LPAC, 33rd meeting (1-2 October 1970), LPAC/92, 23 November 1970. Relevant documents on this issue
are LPAC/95, 25 November 1970, and ESRO/ST(72)8, 11 January 1972.
728 LPAC, 34th meeting (10-11 December 1970), LPAC/96, 15 January 1971; 36th meeting (28-
29 April 1971), LPAC/110, 30 August 1971.
729 LPAC, 37th meeting (28-29 September 1971), LPAC/119, 15 November 1971; STC, 28th meeting
(18 May 1971), ESRO/ST/MIN/28, 30 June 1971.
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Working Group, thus stressing its relevance to solar wind phenomena in the interplanetary space and
to solar-terrestrial relations rather than to astrophysics.
The chairmen and vice-chairmen of the groups were to be approved by the STC after nomination by
the LPAC. Eventually, G. Haerendel, from the Max-Plank-Institut für Extraterrestrische Physik in
Garching, was nominated Chairman of the SSWG, and C. de Jager, from the Utrecht Observatory, was
nominated Chairman of the AWG. A. Dollfus (Paris-Meudon Observatory) and L. Scarsi (University
of Palermo) were their respective deputies. The new structure came into effect on 1 February 1972, at
which time the existing Working Groups were disbanded (Table 8-6).730
8.5.2 The selection of ISEE-2 and Exosat
The agreement reached in the ESRO Council at the time of the first package deal foresaw that the
development contract for the next scientific satellite project should start not later than January 1975,
which implied that a decision had to be taken in 1973. In the course of 1972, three projects were
studied in detail by the Directorate of Programmes and Planning. The first was the HELOS project,
under study since two years and already recommended by the LPAC. Further studies demonstrated
that the spacecraft's pointing system, designed to achieve good lunar occultation of sources, also
assured the possibility of making observations in any celestial direction. Moreover, the satellite's
design made it possible to study temporal variations in the intensity of X-ray emissions from discrete
sources in a range between a few tens of microseconds and a few tens of hours. The conception and
objectives of the HELOS mission were discussed in a colloquium organised at ESRIN in May 1972
and by the end of the year the scientific objectives and model payload of the satellite had been fully
defined.731
The two other projects involved cooperation with NASA, more and more a necessity for ESRO after
the reduction of the scientific programme budget. The first project envisaged the launch of two
satellites into adjacent orbits for the study of small scale spatial and temporal variation in
magnetospheric plasma and solar wind. This project, originally called IMP-K/K' and then renamed
IMP-M/D (Ionospheric and Magnetospheric Physics - Mother/Daughter), had been discussed for the
first time during a joint ESRO/NASA programme review meeting held in Washington in early
February 1971.732 Subsequently, following further discussions between ESRO and NASA and a
preliminary study of an ESRO Mission Definition Group, the COS and the ION groups jointly agreed
to recommend that ESRO should undertake the project with NASA by supplying the "daughter"
satellite, and the LPAC requested a feasibility study.733 The two space organisations eventually defined
a selection procedure for the payloads of both satellites, which foresaw the possibility that American
experiments might be included in the European satellite and vice versa. This was an important
innovation for ESRO, whose satellite payloads had been reserved till then to European scientists.
Another important aspect of the agreement was that, following the usual NASA procedure but
contrary to ESRO's standard procedure, an announcement of flight opportunity, based on the mission
definition, would be sent out and experiment proposals discussed before the mission was actually
approved.734 The IMP-M/D project was then discussed in May 1972 at a colloquium in ESRIN and, by
730 LPAC, 38th meeting (9 November 1971), LPAC/122, 20 December 1971; STC, 30th meeting
(25 January 1972), ESRO/ST/MIN/30, 17 February 1972.
731 ESRO General Report 1972, pp. 106-107. The proceedings of the symposium are in ESRO (1972).
732 The report of this meeting (1-2 February 1971) is LPAC/107, 17 March 1971.
733 LPAC, 37th meeting (28-29 September 1971), LPAC/119, 15 November 1971. The report of the joint
COS/ION meeting (14 September 1971) is ION/108, 2 November 1971 and the resolution passed at the
meeting is in ION/106-COS/62, 15 September 1971. In this resolution, it was made clear that the
inclusion of the project in the ESRO programme was recommended with the provision that " the missions
already approved by the LPAC are not jeopardised". This reflected the COS Group's concern that the
IMP-M/D project might compete with HELOS: COS Group, 29th meeting (14 September 1971), COS/63,
3 November 1971. Document MS/282, 15 September 1971, is a presentation of the project at this stage.
734 LPAC, 38th meeting (9 November 1971), LPAC/122, 20 December 1971; STC, 30th meeting
(25 January 1972), ESRO/ST/MIN/30, 17 February 1972. The terms of the agreement are described in
LPAC/120, 2 November 1971 and in ESRO/ST(25), 29 November 1971.
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the end of the year, the selection procedure had been completed and the payloads of both satellites
definitely approved.735
The last project was a spacecraft to be injected into an orbit around the planet Venus. Preliminary
studies on a possible low-cost mission to Venus had already been made by ESRO in 1971, compatibly
with the LPAC policy statement which excluded planetary exploration for budgetary reasons, but did
allow for re-consideration of this issue should a significant cost reduction prove possible.736 The
envisaged solution was a Venus orbiter based on a spacecraft whose size and cost would be of the
order of that of GEOS. Subsequently, following a joint ESRO/NASA meeting on future co-operation
in space science, held in Washington on 18 April 1972, it was decided to link this project to NASA's
Pioneer Venus programme. The project foresaw that NASA should provide the basic spacecraft (the
so-called "space bus"); ESRO would then transform it into an orbiter by the addition of a suitable
motor and would be responsible for the integration of the scientific payload and the testing of the
satellite; finally, the spacecraft would be delivered to NASA for launching on a Thor Delta vehicle. A
joint ESRO/NASA committee eventually worked out the scientific objectives of the mission and
defined a model payload.737
When the LPAC was finally called to issue its recommendation on the choice of ESRO's new satellite
projects, the scientific importance of the event could not be underestimated. It came as much as four
years after the choice of COS-B and GEOS, and from that time onwards the aims and scopes of the
Organisation in the wider context of European space activities had undergone significant changes, of
which the dramatic reduction of the scientific budget was certainly not the least important. It was clear
that the new decision would have a major impact on the overall development of space research in
Europe, on the relationship between ESRO and NASA, and on the public image of ESRO's
undertakings. In fact, the event was given all the official prominence it deserved. The three projects
were first discussed in a two-day symposium, held at ESRIN on 26-27 February 1973, attended by
about a hundred scientists from all over Europe. The symposium was then followed, on 28 February,
by meetings of the Astrophysics and Solar System Working Groups and of the Fundamental Physics
Panel, whose conclusions were reported to the LPAC. Finally, on 28 February and 1-2 March, the
LPAC itself held its meeting and, in a restricted session, issued its final recommendation to the
Scientific Programme Board (SPB), the body that had replaced the STC in the new organisational
structure of ESRO which took into account its involvement in application satellite programmes.738
As usual in the case of major LPAC's decisions, the choice involved scientific, financial and political
aspects. Each of the three projects under discussion was recognised as being "fully worthy of adoption
735 The agreed payload composition of both satellites was presented in LPAC/147 + addendum,
13 December 1972, and it was approved by the LPAC at its 44th meeting (15 December 1972),
LPAC(73)2, 23 January 1973. Besides the two IMP-M/D satellites, a third ("heliocentric") NASA-built
spacecraft was contemplated, with correlated experiments on the solar wind undisturbed by the presence
of the Earth. Some of the instruments of this spacecraft were also to be provided by European scientific
groups.
736 A mission definition study for a low cost Venus orbiter was requested by the PLA group after the LPAC's
policy statement: PLA, 18th meeting (2 July 1970), PLA/69, 18 August 1970; 19th meeting
(25 September 1970), PLA/71, 20 November 1970.
737 The report on the ESRO/NASA meeting, prepared by LPAC's chairman J. Geiss, is in LPAC/127,
9 May 1972. The project was then discussed at the second meeting of the Solar System Working Group
(15 May 1972), SOL/4, 21 August 1972, and a feasibility study was requested by the LPAC at its 40th
meeting (16 May 1972), LPAC/128, 23 June 1972.
738 LPAC, 46th meeting (28/2-2 March 1973), LPAC(73)11, 21 March 1973. The three projects were
described in ESRO/PB-S(73)2, 13 March 1973 (Venus Orbiter); ESRO/PB-S(73)3, 9 March 1973
(HELOS); and ESRO/PB-S(73)4, 9 March 1973 (IMP-M/D). The programme of the Frascati symposium
is in LPAC(73)8, 24 January 1973, and its attendance is in MS(73)10, 14 March 1973. The conclusions of
the AWG, SSWG and FPP are attached to the minutes of the LPAC meeting, together with the LPAC's
recommendation to the SPB. The latter was eventually presented to the SPB in ESRO/PB-S(73)1,
8 March 1973. It must be remarked that the minutes of the LPAC meeting do not report at all on the
discussion which led to the conclusion presented in this document.
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by ESRO". Financial limitations, however, made it impossible to recommend simultaneous adoption
of all three because this would have unduly delayed the date of the next decision for another four
years. By appropriate phasing, however, it was possible for ESRO to realise two projects, the first to
be started in 1974 and the second in a later year. Therefore, the first problem the LPAC had to
confront was whether to recommend simultaneous adoption of both or to choose one now and delay
the decision on the second project to some later time. The issue was debated at length and eventually it
was agreed that two projects ought to be adopted contextually, the main reason being that ESRO
should remove all uncertainty about its future plans and "leave no doubt in the minds of national
authorities and of the scientific community of its determination to carry out a good scientific
programme". Moreover, by adopting two projects the interest of potential experimenters in the second
project would be fully retained, giving them ample preparation time to optimise the scientific package.
In the opinion of the LPAC, all these aspects compensated the disadvantage deriving from the
frustration of many other scientists who would be "painfully aware that three years will elapse before
they get another chance on a European space vehicle".739
Then came the problem of which two projects out of the three on the table should be recommended for
adoption, a choice that involved at least three different considerations. The first regarded of course a
comparison between the three projects from the viewpoint of their scientific interest and the degree of
support they received from the scientific community. From this point of view HELOS was certainly
the best placed. This was in fact a satellite based on an original concept proposed by European teams,
whose scientific mission pertained to a new and dynamic research field, and that had been under study
since a long time. The project had been already recommended by the LPAC two years earlier and had
been strongly recommended now by the Astrophysics Working Group. The Fundamental Physics
Panel had also given it top priority, on the motivation that "it will help to answer questions of
fundamental significance in gravitation and cosmology as well as many problems of astrophysical
importance".740
The other two projects pertained to the interests of the Solar System Working Group. This had
concluded that they were both scientifically valuable and that "a grouping together of the two projects
would constitute a balanced programme and serve a wide section of the scientific community".741 The
Group carefully avoided to award priority to either of them. This was in fact a very delicate issue. On
the one hand, participation in the IMP-M/D project was consistent with the LPAC's policy statement
and would usefully complement the GEOS mission, thus meeting the interests of a sector of the
European space science community that had a leading role in the development of ESRO's scientific
programme. On the other hand, the Venus Orbiter would provide ESRO and European scientists with
a unique opportunity to enter the fascinating field of planetary exploration at low cost. According to
the Working Group, the number of scientific groups eventually involved in the project was estimated
to be no less than 25 and the Venus mission would foster new lines of research by bringing diverse
disciplines together.
The second consideration regarded ESRO's relationship with NASA, a complex relationship that
involved both partnership in joint projects and "friendly competition".742 While HELOS was a pure
ESRO project, both the Venus Orbiter and the IMP-M/D mission were cooperative projects and, in
fact, this was the first time the two agencies were due to be involved in such an important
collaboration. The status of the two projects on the other side of the Atlantic was different, however.
The IMP-M/D mission had already been approved by the top NASA management and by the
President's Office for Management and Budget, and it was on the way to obtaining congressional
approval for starting in 1975. Moreover, payloads for both satellites and for the associated NASA's
739 ESRO/PB-S(73)1, cit., pp. 2-3. This document (as well as the minutes of the LPAC meeting) inform us
that this was a "majority opinion" in the LPAC but it is silent about the actual position of individual
LPAC members.
740 LPAC(73)11, cit., Annex V.
741 LPAC(73)11, cit., p. 4.
742 ESRO/PB-S(73)1, cit., p. 5.
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heliocentric spacecraft had already been decided by a joint ESRO/NASA screening procedure.
Therefore, if ESRO approved its part of the project (i.e. the "daughter" satellite), there was very little
risk that it might be cancelled by U.S. authorities at a later date. The situation was different for the
Venus Probe. ESRO, in fact, had received word from NASA that, because of its tight budget situation,
this project could not start in 1974 and it was still uncertain whether it could be included as a new start
in 1975. A positive decision by ESRO could affect the eventual course of action in the US, but the risk
was not negligible that the project might be cancelled in the future, as a consequence of negative
decisions in the United States.
Finally, the third consideration involved the question of timing, as ESRO was due to start its new
satellite project in 1974. The Venus Orbiter, even if adopted, could not start so soon, pending NASA's
final decision, and therefore the first project had to be either HELOS or the daughter satellite in the
IMP-M/D project. If the former was adopted, its cost development would prevent the start of a second
project before 1976 and, as a consequence, ESRO participation in the IMP-M/D project would become
incompatible with NASA's timetable. If, on the contrary, the latter was adopted, it would still be
possible to undertake the second project (HELOS or the Venus Orbiter) one year later.
In this situation, the LPAC decided to recommend the programme which appeared less risky from the
point of view of its actual feasibility and the more consistent with its three-year-old policy statement.
It agreed to recommend that ESRO should adopt the IMP-daughter spacecraft and HELOS, the former
starting in 1974 and scheduled for launch in 1977, the latter starting in 1975 and scheduled for launch
in 1979. The LPAC's recommendation, endorsed by ESRO's Director General, was approved by the
SPB and finally, in April, the Council approved the adoption of the two projects in the ESRO
programme.743 They were eventually renamed ISEE-2 and Exosat.744
Two considerations are called for regarding this conclusion. The first concerns the LPAC's decision to
recommend the contextual adoption of two projects, although only one could actually start in the near
future. Considering what we have said about the timing and the status of ESRO/NASA collaboration,
this decision was not innocent as regards the choice of which projects had to be selected. If, in fact,
only one project had been adopted, this could have been either HELOS or the IMP-daughter satellite,
and in both case the Venus Orbiter would have been in a more favourable condition at the time of
decision on the second project. We can venture to say that the wish of the majority of the European
space science community to realise both its pet projects played an important role in a decision which
took advantage of the weakness of the Venus Orbiter in early 1973 and bound the long-term ESRO
programme. This circumstance emerged when the LPAC's recommendation was submitted to the SPB
for approval. Here the French delegation, supported by the Belgian, expressed reservations on HELOS
and strongly advocated the Venus Orbiter. They insisted that there was no need to take an immediate
decision on HELOS and proposed instead that, after the adoption of the IMP-daughter satellite, tender
actions should be carried out among the scientific community, in order to assess the real degree of
interest in HELOS and the Venus Orbiter in Europe before the choice of the second project. A
vote was then taken on the French proposal to postpone a decision on HELOS and it was rejected by 5
743 SPB, 3rd meeting (27 March 1973), ESRO/PB-S/MIN/3, 11 April 1973; Council, 56th session (11-
12 April 1973), ESRO/C/MIN/56, 3 May 1973. The financial implications of this decision were presented
in ESRO/PB-S(73)7, 14 March 1973. According to the revised ESRO Convention, the SPB would have
the power to take final decisions on the scientific programme. As the new Convention was not yet in
force, however, the decision taken by the Board was eventually submitted to Council for confirmation:
ESRO/C(73)18, 29 March 1973. At the Council meeting, the funding by ESRO of the HELOS payload
was a matter of some controversy. Eventually, on this specific aspect, Belgium and Spain voted against
and France abstained.
744 The acronym ISEE stands for International Sun-Earth Explorer. ISEE-1 and ISEE-2 (the former IMP
"mother" and "daughter" satellites) were launched in tandem in October 1977; ISEE-3 (the IMP
"heliocentric" satellite) was launched in August 1978. The launch of Exosat had to be delayed until as late
as June 1983. A description of the ISEE mission at the time of its launch is in Durney (1978) and
Eaton (1978). For Exosat, see Altmann et al. (1982) and Taylor et al. (1982).
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votes against (Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Switzerland, United Kingdom) and four votes in favour
(Belgium, France, Spain, Sweden), with the abstention of Denmark. In the final vote on the LPAC's
recommendation, Sweden joined the majority. We can only offer a suggestion about the positions
expressed by SPB delegations, as no clear reasons emerge from the minutes of the meeting. On the
one hand, no important research group was active in France in X-ray astronomy while French
planetologists did certainly have an interest in the Venus Orbiter; Exosat, on the other hand, enjoyed
full support from the influential scientific circles interested in X-ray astronomy in the UK, Netherlands
and Italy, besides being supported by the ESRO scientific and technical staff.
The second consideration is of a more general character. It regards the development of ESRO's
scientific planning since 1969. In the context of the difficult times European cooperation in space was
suffering in those years, the LPAC and the Directorate of Programmes and Planning made every effort
to define a long-term scientific policy based on clear priority choices, accurate mission definition and
feasibility studies, and intelligent cooperation with NASA. The choice of IMP-M/D and HELOS after
COS-B and GEOS was in fact the logical outcome of this effort. With the painful decision to close the
rocket programme and the recognition that ESRO could not sustain a viable satellite programme in all
research fields nor undertake alone large and technically sophisticated projects, the forthcoming
European Space Agency had to find its own ground for scientific activity by selecting a limited
number of original projects in well-selected research fields, and by fostering participation in
cooperative projects with NASA.
8.6 Epilogue
In July 1973, a few months after the adoption of ESRO's new scientific satellite projects, an important
session of the European Space Conference marked the decisive turning point in the history of ESRO
and, more generally, of Europe in space. A new "package deal" negotiated within the framework of the
European Space Conference gave ESRO the overall responsibility for the new Ariane launcher
programme, whose management was entrusted to the French Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales. This,
in the words of the new Council chairman Maurice Lévy, "transform[ed] ESRO for the first time in
effect into a space organisation with a complete and balanced programme".745 The same agreement,
continued Lévy, foresaw for the European space organisation "the start of a great adventure", namely
co-operation with NASA in the Space Shuttle programme by the construction of a space laboratory
(Spacelab) to be integrated in the Shuttle. Finally, a new application programme, a satellite
programme for the control of maritime navigation (MAROTS), was also decided on and entrusted to
ESRO.
From the institutional point of view, the implementation of the new "à la carte" method of programme
financing and the fact that each of the three new programmes was sponsored by one of the main
Member States - Ariane by France, Spacelab by Germany and MAROTS by the UK - gave strength
and stability to ESRO's activity. Quoting again from Lévy:
It can therefore be said that the Organisation now has an almost completely charted
programme until 1980, and that this programme is particularly rich and diversified. The
ESRO budget, which was practically doubled after the first package deal in 1971, has
again been doubled following the new package deal of July 1973.
As a matter of fact, with the final liquidation of ELDO, it was evident that the forthcoming European
Space Agency would actually be based on ESRO's structure and on-going programme.
Space science was no longer the only component of this programme, nor the most important. It was
however the one which was already providing useful results as well as the one upon which the very
existence of a joint European effort in space could be based. By mid 1973 four ESRO satellites were
745 Lévy's foreword to the ESRO General Report 1973, p. 7. For the second package deal see chapter 11.
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orbiting around the Earth (HEOS-1 and 2, ESRO IV and TD-1), one was scheduled for launch in 1975
(COS-B) and two were under development for launching in 1977 (GEOS and ISEE-2). Moreover,
ESRO was actively involved in the co-operative IUE project which promised an important scientific
return to European scientists. At the same time, what was most important, the Organisation had finally
succeeded in defining a scientific policy which gave coherence to the selection procedure of future
programmes. And the procedure in fact went into motion again in the second half of 1973. In
September that year the Director General asked the LPAC to discuss ESRO scientific policy for the
period following ISEE-2 and Exosat in the early 1980s. The Astrophysics and the Solar System
working groups were called to produce reports on this matter, according to their respective areas of
interests, and new "Guidelines for ESRO scientific mission studies" were issued by the LPAC in
January 1974. Within these guidelines, eleven missions were recommended for immediate studies in
view of the selection of the new project(s) foreseen in 1976.746 The European participation in the Space
Telescope programme and the Out-of-Ecliptic (later Ulysses) mission were the outcome of the new
selection process.
The most significant aspect of the maturation process which we have analysed in the previous pages
can be recognised in the growing awareness among ESRO's scientific policymakers of the limits
imposed on the Organisation by its specific charter: that of a multinational organisation whose aims
and programmes had to be continuously negotiated by its Member States on the basis of different, and
sometimes conflicting, political and economic interests. In this negotiation, science, i.e. scientists'
thirst for new knowledge about celestial phenomena, was not an independent variable, but rather a
component of a complex network dominated by more mundane affairs. ESRO's overall policy
certainly kept science in its very foundation but its actual definition and development largely derived
from forces other than scientific dreams. The Blue Book had envisaged the launching of a large
scientific satellite each year, plus a good number of smaller satellites; now European space scientists
had accepted that ESRO could launch no more than one scientific mission every two or three years
and they had learned how to make the best choice out of their best ideas. The eventual development of
ESRO's scientific programme in the following years maybe disappointed the hopes and expectations
of a few European scientific groups but one can safely say that it was also a matter of pride for the
European space community as a whole.
746 The LPAC's report is coded LPAC(74)4, January 1974. The two working groups' reports are
ASTRO(73)15, 18 January 1974 and SOL(73)16, December 1973.
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Table 8-1
The Caravane Collaboration for the COS-B satellite
Laboratory Group leader Hardware
Centre d'Etudes Nucléaires, Saclay,
France




R. Lüst Spark chamber
Space Science Department,
ESTEC, Noordwijk, Netherlands
E. Trendelenburg Triggering telescope
Huygens Laboratory, University of
Leiden, Netherlands
H. van de Hulst Energy calorimeter
Istituto di Fisica, Università di
Milano, Italy
G. Occhialini Experiment electronics
Istituto di Fisica, Università di
Palermo, Italy
L. Scarsi Pulsar synchroniser
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Table 8-2
The GEOS payload recommended by the LPAC in June 1970
S-301 Study of thermal plasma Centre National d'Etudes des Télécomm.,
Issy-les-Moulineaux (F)
S-302b Study of thermal plasma Mullard Space Science Laboratory
Dorking (UK)
S-303 Composition, energy spectra and
angular distribution of ions
Universität Bern, Switzerland
Max-Planck-Institut, Garching (D)
S-310 Pitch-angle distribution of electrons
and protons (0.2 - 20 keV)
Kiruna Geophysical Observatory (S)
S-321 Pitch-angle distribution of electrons
(30 - 200 keV) and protons (40 keV -
1.4 MeV)
Max-Planck-Institut, Lindau (D)
S-325 Electromagnetic wave fields in the
magnetosphere ( 0.1 - 10,000 Hz)
Centre National d'Etudes des Télécomm.,
Issy-les-Moulineaux (F)
Danish Space Research Institute Lyngby
(DK)
S-328 DC, ELF and VLF electric fields in
the magnetosphere
ESTEC, Noordwijk (NL)
S-329 DC electric field Max-Planck-Institut, Garching (D)
S-331 DC and ULF magnetic fields Laboratorio di Ricerche Spaziali, Frascati
(I)
Experiment S-331 was chosen against the similar experiment S-332, from the Technisches Universität,
Braunschweig (D), on the basis of consideration to fair geographical distribution.
It was agreed that, in the event of weight problems arising during the project definition phase,
experiment S-302b should be excluded.
Subsequently, experiments S-301, S-325 and S-328 were combined in one experiment, coded as
S-300.
Source: LPAC/86, 17 June 1970.
Table 8-3
Membership of the Launching Programme Advisory Committee (LPAC)
1969-70 1970-1971 1971-1972 1973
R. Lüst (chair) J. Geiss (chair) J. Geiss (chair) H.C. van de Hulst (chair)
J. Geiss H. Elliot H. Elliot H. Elliot
B. Hultqvist B. Hultqvist B. Hultqvist G. Haerendel
G. Occhialini G. Occhialini H.C. van de Hulst G. Pizzella





A.P. Willmore (chair) University College London
J. Blamont Service d'Aéronomie, Verrières-l.-B.
A. Dollfus Observatoire de Paris, Meudon
J.W. Dungey Imperial College, London
C.-G. Fälthammar Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm
G. Haerendel Max-Planck-Institut, Garching
J.A. Ratcliffe Radio and Space Research Station, Slough
P. Rothwell University of Southampton
U. von Zahn Universität Bonn
Table 8-4b
The Astrophysics Panel
C. Dilworth (chair) Università di Milano
G. Cocconi CERN, Geneva
H. Elliot Imperial College, London
A. Hewish Cambridge University
L. Houziaux Université de Liège
K.O. Kiepenheuer Fraunhofer Institut, Fribourg
E. Schatzmann Institut d'Astrophysique, Paris
Source: LPAC/41, 8 September 1969.
Table 8-5
Tentative satellite programme presented by J.A. Dinkespiler at the 31st LPAC meeting (27-28 February 1970)
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
ESRO IV 3 3 3
TD-1 10 10 10
COS-B 3 9 9 9
GEOS 1 6 8 8 7
Small satell. * 3 3 3
Large satell. * 10 10 10 10 10
Small satell. * 33 3
Medium satell. * 8 8 8 8
HEO satell. * 5 5 6
Medium satell. * 8 8 8 8
Small satell. * 3 3 3
An asterisk indicates the time the project is approved.
Figures in the table are in MAU (Million Accounting Units).











H. Bondi (chairman) G. Haerendel (chairman) C. de Jager (chairman)
I. Roxburgh (deputy) A. Dollfus (deputy) L. Scarsi (deputy)
J. Blamont M. Ackerman M. Golay
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The Beginning of the Telecommunications
Satellite Programme in ESRO
A. Russo
The European Space Research Organisation (ESRO) was created in the early 1960s as an organisation
solely devoted to space science. Its Convention, in fact, made no reference to the possibility of
carrying out work on application satellites such as for telecommunications, meteorology, navigation,
etc. At the end of 1966, however, after a request from the European Conference on Satellite
Communications (known by its French initials CETS), the ESRO Council accepted to undertake "a
six-month study to evaluate the technical and financial implications involved in the development and
launching of a few experimental communications satellites and to indicate other developments of
interest in the field of application satellites".747 This event marked the beginning of ESRO's
involvement in the field of application satellites, in particular in what appeared as the most promising
sector from the commercial point of view, namely telecommunications satellites. Today the
telecommunications programme demands about 9.1 per cent of the budget of the European Space
Agency (ESA), the Organisation which succeeded ESRO and ELDO (the European Launcher
Development Organisation) in 1975. The percentage rises to 27.8 per cent with the inclusion of the
other main application programme, Earth observation, to be compared to the 12.8 per cent devoted to
the scientific satellite programme.748 The major satellites developed within these two application
programmes, the communications satellite Olympus, launched in 1989, and the Earth Resources
Satellite ERS-1, launched in 1991, are by far the most expensive in the ESA satellite family. Their cost
is over 700 MAU, i.e. twice the cost of Hipparcos, ESA's space telescope for astrometric
measurements, and 4.5 times the cost of ESA's scientific space probes Giotto and Ulysses.749
At the time when ESRO undertook its studies on behalf of the CETS, the first experimental phase of
satellite telecommunications was at its end. The American satellites Telstar (1962) and Early Bird
(1965) had well demonstrated the technical feasibility and economic profitability of space links for
long distance telephony; and the first television transmissions across the oceans and continents had
dramatically shown the social relevance of live TV on a planetary scale. Plans were under
development to build a satellite system for global coverage of the Earth. It took several years,
however, for the European space organisation to go from those preliminary studies to the start of the
first development programme. It was only at the end of 1971 that the ESRO Member States definitely
approved that the organisation be formally engaged in a telecommunications satellite programme and
provided the necessary funding. The analysis of this difficult beginning of ESRO's
telecommunications programme is the subject of this chapter. In the following, we will discuss the
actual implementation of this programme up to 1978, when the first experimental satellite (OTS-2)
was successfully launched.750
The transformation of ESRO from an organisation solely devoted to scientific research into one
mainly involved in application programmes was not the main reason for this long delay. On the
contrary, the ESRO staff was much interested in the new undertaking and was soon ready to integrate
747 ESRO, General Report 1966, p. 12.
748 ESA, Annual Report 1997. Other high highest percentages of the ESA budget are demanded by the space
transportation programme (28.3 %) and the manned space flight programme (13 %).
749 The acronym MAU stands for Million Accounting Unit, ESA's conventional monetary unit based on a
gold standard. In the period covered by this chapter, its value was about 1 US dollar. Giotto is the name
of the well-known space mission to Halley's comet in 1986 and Ulysses is the name of the spacecraft
launched in 1990 into an orbit extending outside the ecliptic plane to observe the solar poles.
750 The first OTS satellite was lost in September 1977 due to the failure of the Thor-Delta rocket. ESRO's
first application satellite successfully in orbit was thus the meteorological satellite Meteosat, launched in
November 1977.
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the new tasks into the managerial and technical framework of the Organisation. Nor were the national
delegations in the ESRO Council worried about this sort of "genetic change": by the mid-1960s it was
evident that pure research alone was not the only good reason for launching satellites (leaving apart
military interests), but important economic and commercial aspects were also involved. And it made
no sense to create a new organisation to cover these aspects when one existed already that had proved
its capability and reliability. Space scientists did express concern and even opposition, fearing that
work on applications would jeopardise the scientific programme, but they could hardly resist the drift.
The reason why it took five years to start a telecommunications programme in ESRO lies rather in the
political and institutional framework in which such a programme had to be defined and agreed on,
namely the need for a coherent space policy for Western European countries. Defining a strategy in
satellite telecommunications implied important choices regarding international relations, industrial
policy, defence of economic and commercial interests, control of areas of cultural influence. Does
Europe need a space policy defined at continental level? How is coherency defined at this level? What
is the place of telecommunications in this frame? Answers to these questions were different in
different countries, both because governments had different visions of Europe's role in a USA-USSR
dominated world and because various interest groups held conflicting views about the importance and
mutual relationship of the various sectors of space activities - science, telecommunications and other
application fields, and launchers.
The long and controversial process which led to the adoption of the telecommunications programme in
ESRO, the story we are telling in this chapter, is but one aspect of the emergence of such a European
space policy out of the experience of ESRO and ELDO. The compromise reached at the end of 1971,
which we discuss in the last section, cleared the situation regarding ESRO and finally gave a start to
the telecommunications programme. It did not resolve the main controversial issue, however, namely
whether Europe should develop and use its own rockets to launch its application satellites or rely on
American launchers. To answer this question required two more years of difficult negotiations whose
outcome marked the origin of the European Space Agency.
9.1 The beginning of the space telecommunications era
9.1.1 The prophet
In the ideal portrait gallery of satellite telecommunications, the first place would be occupied by one
of the world's best-known and best-selling popular science writers: Arthur C. Clarke, the author of
2001: A Space Odyssey. A prophet of the space age and an amateur communications scientist, Clarke
suggested for the first time, in an article published in 1945, the idea of geo-synchronous
communications satellites. In that article, Clarke noted that a satellite in an orbit with a radius of
42,000 km (i.e. 36,000 km above the Earth's surface) has a period of exactly 24 hours:
A body in such an orbit, if its plane coincided with that of the Earth's equator, would
revolve with the Earth and would thus be stationary above the same spot on the planet. It
would remain fixed in the sky of a whole hemisphere and unlike all other heavenly bodies
would neither rise not set.751
If a space station were built in this orbit, continued Clarke, and were equipped with suitable receiving
and transmitting equipment, it could act as a repeater to relay transmissions between any two points in
the hemisphere beneath. Moreover, a transmission originating from any point on the hemisphere could
be broadcast to the whole of the hemisphere itself, "and thus the requirements of all possible services
would be met". Three satellite stations would ensure complete coverage of the globe (Figure 9-1).
Clarke wrote his article twelve years before the first artificial satellite of any kind was actually
launched,  and space stations  appeared to most  people not far from  science fiction.  At  that time, the
751 Clarke (1945), as reprinted in Pierce (1968), p. 38
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Figure 9-1: A.C. Clarke's original figures (1945) of
geostationary telecommunications satellites
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only way to provide long distance telephone communications was by high-frequency radio waves.
Long submarine cables, established since 1858 for telegraphic communications across the Atlantic,
could transmit the dot and dashes of telegraph messages but were unsuitable to handle the high-
frequency signals required to transmit the fine modulations of the human voice.752 Fortunately, radio
waves are reflected by the ionospheric layers of the upper atmosphere and by the Earth's surface, thus
allowing the transmission of signals along the curved surface of our planet by a series of successive
reflections. The transmission, however, suffered from the irregular behaviour of the ionosphere and its
quality depended on such phenomena as weather conditions, solar flares and magnetic storms.
Establishing a voice circuit always required the great skill of operators, and often was much disturbed.
Unsatisfactory though long-distance telephony was in 1945, the position of the new-born television
was far worse, as Clarke stressed in his article. In order to transmit images, in fact, much higher
frequencies are required than to transmit sound, and the corresponding waves are not reflected by the
ionosphere. A complex network of VHF repeaters in sight of one another was thus required to provide
television coverage over a large area, while coverage of a whole continent appeared prohibitively
expensive and transoceanic links impossible.
In the second half of the 1950s, the situation of long-distance telephony changed significantly, thanks
to the great technical advances in electronics stimulated by World War II. The first transatlantic
telephone cable (TAT-1) went into service in 1956, and it was soon followed by a succession of
transoceanic cables of ever-increasing capacity. Then, in the following two decades, transistors
replaced the vacuum tubes and it became possible to handle several thousand voice circuits in a single
telephone cable.753 Cable television came later but it is still limited to limited land regions.
The laying of the first transoceanic telephone cables happened just when the launch of the first
satellites made Clarke's vision appear to be a real possibility. In fact, the competition between these
two communication systems started from the very beginning. Satellites have three obvious advantages
over cables. Firstly, they allow multiple access from several ground stations (fixed or, eventually,
mobile) while cables can only provide point-to-point circuits; secondly, the cost of satellite circuits is
independent of the distance of the earth stations while the cost of cable circuits increases with their
length; finally, satellite transmissions can leap over physical and political barriers that can hardly be
passed by cables. On the other hand, the advocates of cables argued that the technology of satellite
telecommunications was still in its infancy while cables had a century-old history behind them. Live
world-wide television, direct calling service to and from any place on Earth, and the need to transmit
huge amounts of data in real time were still in an uncertain future, while the high costs, technical
difficulties and not rare failures of satellites and launchers were in the actual present. Any forecast
about the future demand of long-distance telephone circuits and TV channels was unreliable and no
guarantee existed that the enormous investment required to realise an operational system could be
profitable from the commercial point of view.754 And if satellite telecommunications could overpass
geographical and political barriers, their massive use implied nevertheless a strong dependence on
those very few countries which had the technical and financial means to build such satellites and,
principally, to launch them into the suitable orbit. Finally, one must not forget that big investments had
752 For a popular account of the wiring of the Oceans for communications purposes see Clarke (1992).
753 The TAT-1 cable had an initial capacity of 36 voice circuits and it was thought that this would be enough
to carry all the transatlantic telephone traffic for some years ahead. In fact, the demand for calls grew very
rapidly and the cable was fully loaded almost from the day it went into service. By the time of the launch
of Early Bird (1965), the new, high-performance TAT-4 cable had a capacity of 408 voice circuits. In
1982 the individual submarine cable capacity was 4000 circuits. These data are respectively from
Dalgleish (1989), p. 6; Smith (1976), p. 152; and Astrain (1984), p. 3.
754 As an example of the difficulty of foreseeing future trends, we can note that, according to Galloway
(1972), there were only 550 overseas telephone circuits in 1961 and the projected global need for 1980
was about 8000 circuits. As a matter of fact, a single Intelsat V satellite, the first of which was just
launched in 1980, had a traffic capacity of 12,000 circuits plus two TV channels. And in 1982, the total
world transoceanic telephony service amounted to 40,000 circuits: Astrain (1984), p. 3.
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been made in the communications business and therefore the competition between cables and satellites
also involved important economic and commercial interests.755
9.1.2 The first experimental communications satellites: Echo, Telstar, Syncom
The importance of satellites for military communications was recognised from the very beginning of
the space age. The first programmes were started by the US Department of Defense as early as 1958
and in December that year an Atlas rocket launched the first communications satellite, SCORE (Signal
Communications by Orbiting Relay Equipment). It recorded a transmission at a frequency of 150 MHz
while passing over one earth station and then played it back at 132 MHz when requested by another
station. The maximum message length was 4 minutes, and the spacecraft capacity was either one voice
channel or seven teletype channels. The satellite was used to broadcast a tape recording of a Christmas
message from the US President D. Eisenhower and this first "voice from space" dramatically
demonstrated the potential of communication satellites.756
SCORE was followed in 1960 by another military satellite, Courier, an improved version of the
delayed repeater SCORE-type satellite. NASA, for its part, developed a satellite telecommunication
programme based on a passive satellite called Echo, an orbiting balloon 30 m in diameter, made of
plastic coated with aluminium and used as a passive reflector of telephone and television signals at a
height of about 1500 km. The first Echo satellite was launched in August 1960 and a second one,
somewhat larger and more rigid, followed in January 1964. Echo I provided the first real-time satellite
transmission of a transatlantic signal between America and Western Europe; Echo II performed
communications experiments between the United States and the Soviet Union.757
For the general public, the era of space communications was actually opened on 10 July 1962, when a
Thor-Delta rocket launched Telstar I, the first real-time transponder, designed and built for NASA by
the American Telephone and Telegraph Company (ATT). Two weeks after launch this satellite
provided the first live broadcast of television images across the Atlantic, and less than one year later,
in May 1963, Telstar II established an analogous connection over the Pacific between the USA and
Japan.758 The Telstar satellite weighed 80 kg and presented itself as a sphere with a diameter of about 1
m. It was launched into a low elliptical orbit inclined at approximately 45° to the equator, with perigee
at about 1000 km and apogee at about 6000 km. The period of the orbit was 158 minutes. The
communications equipment was based on frequency modulation (FM) of the radio-frequency (RF)
carrier: a frequency of 6.39 GHz was used for ground-satellite (uplink) transmissions and 4.17 GHz
for satellite-ground (downlink) transmissions. This choice of frequencies, which set the precedent of
the 6/4 GHz operation, derived from the fact that they were widely used by terrestrial microwave
755 Kinsley (1976) has analysed how interest groups linked to the common carriers in the United States have
endeavoured to control innovation in the field of satellite telecommunications in order to protect
investments in traditional cable facilities. See also Galloway (1972), p. 148.
756 Smith (1976), pp. 49-50.
757 On NASA's passive satellite experimentation see Smith (1976), pp. 51-55.
758 NASA was also involved in another active communications satellite project, Relay, in collaboration with
the Radio Corporation of America (RCA). The first satellite of this project, Relay I, was launched in
December 1962, followed in January 1964 by Relay II. Although overshadowed by publicity surrounding
the Telstar satellite, Relay was NASA's most advanced communications satellite before adoption of the
entirely new Syncom design. Smith (1976), pp. 80-83.
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systems (microwave radio communications, radar) and therefore much of the technical hardware
required was already well developed.759
NASA's Telstar and Relay projects were research and development projects whose aim it was to
demonstrate the technical feasibility of satellite telecommunications and to provide information for the
eventual design of operational systems. All these satellites were placed in near-Earth orbits and each
of them was therefore visible simultaneously to widely-separated earth stations for only a few
relatively short periods each day. As a consequence, a large number of such satellites were needed in
order to have at least one in the sky at any given time and thus to provide full-time service. Moreover,
earth stations had to be equipped with two separate steerable antennas, in order to receive signals from
one satellite and to relay them to another. On the contrary, a single geostationary satellite like that
envisaged by Clarke could be seen 24 hours a day from about 40 % of the Earth's surface, and this
made it possible to provide direct and continuous communications between a large number of widely
separated stations, each equipped with one fixed antenna. Two main problems presented themselves,
however, to those who advocated a telecommunications system based on geostationary satellites. The
first was the availability of powerful enough rockets to lift heavy payloads to the required altitude of
36,000 km. The second was the foreseeable difficulty in telephone conversations caused by the time
delay (about half a second) in the transmission of signals from an earth station to another and back
again via such a distant satellite. To these technical problems one should add the then complete
ignorance about the environment of the geostationary orbit and the concern that the satellite could not
survive long enough to be useful.
The launch by NASA of Syncom II, on 26 July 1963, proved that the first problem had a solution even
with the then existing rockets. The solution in fact came from two young engineers of Hughes Aircraft
Company, H. Rosen and D. Williams, and consisted in launching the satellite into a low-altitude
circular orbit in preparation for two major boosts in velocity. The first was provided by the last stage
of the rocket and injected the spacecraft into an elliptical "transfer orbit," with the apogee at the
geostationary altitude of 36,000 km. From the transfer orbit apogee the satellite could then be injected
into a circular orbit at the requested distance from the Earth by firing a solid rocket motor ("apogee
motor") on board the spacecraft. Small liquid mono-propellant rockets were used to adjust the position
and orientation of the spacecraft in the orbit, and a controlled spin system kept the satellite antennas
pointed at the Earth at all times.760
Syncom II was the first experimental geosynchronous communications satellite (actually the first
geosynchronous satellite of any kind) but its orbit had an inclination of 32°, which caused a daily
north-south excursion of the satellite. Its mass was only 39 kg, which was the maximum capacity of
the Thor Delta rocket at that time, and it was able to relay several voice circuits or one television
channel between earth stations provided with large antennas. This satellite had the tragic distinction of
carrying across the Atlantic, on 22 November 1963, the television images of the assassination of
President J. Kennedy. The next satellite in this series, Syncom III, was launched in July 1964 and the
759 An RF carrier is an electromagnetic wave used to transmit some kind of information (voice, video
pictures, or data) through free space. The information is recorded by modulating either the amplitude of
the carrier wave (AM) or its frequency (FM). In the latter case, that used for satellite communications, the
frequency modulation is operated within a bandwidth centred at the carrier frequency and lying within the
particular frequency band assigned to the transmission. Frequency bands are allocated for various
purposes by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), a United Nations Agency located in
Geneva, Switzerland. The 6/4 GHz uplink/downlink operation is within the so-called C band, a band that
has the great advantage of having the minimum combination of natural and man-made noice sources.
Useful textbooks on satellite communication technology are Pratt & Bostian (1984), Elbert (1987),
Dalgleish (1989) and Maral & Bousquest (1998). An historical account of the technical development of
communications satellites is in Fordyce (1986).
760 Podraczky (1979), p. 39; Smith (1976), p. 58-60 and 83-87; Fordyce (1986), pp. 202-203. The Syncom
project was a joint project of NASA and the Department of Defence; the technical design and the
construction of the satellite were realised by Hughes Aircraft Company. The first Syncom satellite was
launched on 14 February 1963 but it was unsuccessful.
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orbit inclination was now reduced to zero, so that the satellite was in the Earth's equatorial plane and
was truly geostationary. The satellite was used to transmit television pictures from the Tokyo Olympic
Games in August that year.
The Syncom project demonstrated the feasibility of placing satellites into geostationary orbits and
maintaining precise station-keeping and attitude control. These two simple, lightweight, spin-stabilised
satellites dramatically added new evidence of the political and social importance of world-wide
telecommunications, and showed the great economic value of satellite technology for telephony and
television. By the end of 1964, the first demonstration phase of satellite telecommunications was
coming to an end and the time was ripe for starting commercial ventures.
9.1.3 Comsat, Intelsat and the beginning of commercial satellite telecommunications
While the engineers were experimenting, the future of satellite telecommunications was also discussed
at the political level in the United States. In 1962, after a long period of difficult negotiations
involving NASA, industrial lobbies, the Congress and the White House, Congress passed the
Communications Satellite Act. By this act, the realisation and exploitation of commercial systems for
international satellite telecommunications was entrusted exclusively to the newly created
Communications Satellite Corporation (Comsat), whose ownership was shared in equal parts between
the main American communications companies (ATT, ITT, RCA, etc.) and private investors (among
which the aerospace industries). While formally a private corporation, Comsat had been created in
pursuance of the US national policy in the field of satellite telecommunications and this was reflected
in its statute: three members of the Board of Directors were nominated by the US president, and
controls and regulatory powers were entrusted to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and
the State Department.761
The task of Comsat was twofold. Firstly, it had to determine the feasibility of a commercially valuable
communications satellite system, and eventually to develop such a system. Secondly, as the system
could only be international, it was mandatory for Comsat to involve as many countries as possible in
the project and to work out a suitable institutional framework. In order to fulfil the first task, Comsat
placed an order with Hughes, the builder of the Syncom satellites, for a geostationary satellite to be
used as a demonstration system of such a technology from the commercial point of view. As to its
second task, Comsat undertook an important effort to encourage international participation in the new
venture.762 The result of this effort was the formal signing, on 20 August 1964, of the Interim
Agreements that established the International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium (Intelsat),
whose task it was "to design, develop, construct, establish, maintain, and operate the space segment of
a single global commercial communications satellite system".763
The Intelsat agreements were signed by 13 nations plus the Vatican City, but the membership grew
rapidly, reaching 48 by the end of 1965, 63 in 1968, and 83 in 1972.764 The agreements consisted in
fact of two different documents: an intergovernmental treaty covering organisational principles and
arrangements for an international communications satellite system; and a Special Agreement signed by
national entities responsible for telecommunications, dealing with the operating aspects of the new
761 The political process leading to the approval of the Communications Satellite Act and the creation of
Comsat is discussed by Galloway (1972), pp. 47-73, and Smith (1976), pp. 93-120.
See also Kinsley (1976), pp. 1-25.
762 International cooperation in satellite telecommunications had already been established by NASA and
ATT in the framework of the Echo, Relay and Telstar projects, in order to build and operate ground
stations in a few western European countries.
763 Colino (1984), p. 61. The negotiations leading to the Intelsat agreements are extensively discussed in
Galloway (1972), pp. 75-104, and Smith (1976), pp. 121-141. The term "space segment" refers to the
satellites, their launching, and their tracking and operation in orbit. The parallel term "ground segment"
refers to the earth station network used to access to the satellite communications system in order to assure
the requested services (telephony and telegraphy, television, data transmission, etc.).
764 The list is given in Galloway (1972), appendix B, pp. 193-198.
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organisation. Intelsat's ownership shares were assigned to these entities according to the proportional
use of the system, on the basis of ITU's projections for the year 1968. This gave Comsat, which
represented the US, 61 per cent of quotas, while the British Post Office (BPO) was a weak second with
about 8 per cent of the share. The combined European share was 30.5 per cent and the total Canadian,
Japanese and Australian was 8.5 per cent. It was assumed that new members would acquire their
quotas from the shares of existing members on a pro rata basis, with the proviso that Comsat's share
would not be reduced under 50.6 per cent.765
The governing body of Intelsat was an Interim Communications Satellite Committee (ICSC), whose
members were drawn from the signatories of the Special Agreement and represented countries or
group of countries with at least 1.5 per cent of the projected 1968 Intelsat traffic level. The voting
procedure was based on a complex decision-making formula which gave non-American members
some degree of control on the most important decisions. Comsat, however, was by far the dominant
member in the new organisation, with more than 50 per cent of the voting power, while several
smaller countries had to share a single vote (the USSR, had it joined Intelsat as Western countries
hoped, would have less than a fraction of vote). Moreover, Comsat's position was strengthened by the
fact that the American company was appointed as the operating manager of Intelsat.
The Intelsat agreements of 1964 reflected the dominant position of the United States in the technology
of satellites and launchers. The other signatories obtained, however, that these agreements should be
temporary and that a new accord should be re-negotiated after five years, in order to arrive at a
definitive institutional structure more respectful of the interests of other Intelsat members. An
international conference was to be called in 1969 to discuss proposals for the new arrangement. By
that time, it was expected that much more information would be available about the technical,
financial and commercial aspects of satellite telecommunications, and that other countries would
possess the level of technology required to enter the field competitively.
9.1.4 Early Bird and beyond
In the capacity of Intelsat's operating manager, Comsat had responsibility for the design, development
and operation of the space segment of the system, while the ground segment was to be provided by the
appropriate bodies in the countries in which they were situated. Comsat's satellite under development
at Hughes, then known as HS 303, was thus designated as the first operational satellite for use by
Intelsat. Renamed Early Bird and then Intelsat I, it was launched on 6 April 1965. On 28 June, twenty
years after Clarke's forecast, it successfully inaugurated a commercial communications service
between Europe and the United States. What was more important, Early Bird definitely demonstrated
the acceptability and good quality of telephone communications by geostationary satellites: it was
proved in fact that the communication delays associated with such satellites were acceptable as long as
any echoes along the communication path were adequately controlled, which could be achieved by the
use of suitable electronic devices.
Early Bird (Figure 9-2) was very small and involved crude technology. It was a spin stabilised
cylindrical spacecraft, 72 cm in diameter and 60 cm long, weighing 38.5 kg. The communications
payload included two transponders which received transmissions in the 6 GHz band and re-transmitted
in the 4 GHz band. One transponder relayed signals from Europe to North America and the other
operated in the backward path. The power capability was 240 telephone circuits or one TV channel
and multiple access was not possible: this meant, firstly, that when television was transmitted,
telephone traffic had to be switched to cables; secondly, that only point-to-point communications were
765 In 1966, Comsat held 55 per cent of Intelsat quotas while 17 European countries held 27.5 per cent
(Britain 7.4 per cent and France 5.5 per cent). By the end of 1970, Comsat's share was 52.6 per cent and
European countries' 26.6 per cent (Britain 7.2 per cent, France and Germany 5.3 per cent): Voge (1966),
p. 33; Galloway (1972), appendix B, pp. 193-198.
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Figure 9-2: Early Bird
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allowed and each earth station on both sides of the Atlantic had to take it in turns to work with the
satellite.766
Even though designed "almost as it were a submarine cable in the sky", Early Bird dramatically
demonstrated the potential of communications satellites from the commercial point of view. Its
capacity of 240 voice circuits was comparable with the capacity of ATT's brand new, high
performance TAT-4 cable, which held 408 telephone channels, and above all it allowed live television
transmission, whose impact on the general public was revolutionising the world system of information
and entertainment. Unfortunately for Early Bird, however, the simultaneous going into service of
TAT-4 made it impossible to demonstrate the economic competitiveness of satellites over submarine
cables for transoceanic telephony. In fact, as Nature informed its readers, "communications companies
on both sides of the Atlantic wanted to recoup some of their investment first, and the satellite rates
were in any case set far too high".767 This situation would change before the end of the decade.
The success of Early Bird led the ICSC to decide, in February 1966, that the Intelsat commercial
system should be based on the use of geostationary satellites. Hughes was contracted for a new
generation of such spacecraft and in 1967 Intelsat I was joined in orbit by three Intelsat II satellites.
The first provided service to the Pacific Ocean region, the second provided additional trans-Atlantic
service, between Europe and South America, and the third became a spare in orbit for the Pacific
Ocean satellite. These satellites took advantage of the increased capabilities of the Thor-Delta rocket
and each of them weighed about 87 kg. The telephone capacity was the same as Intelsat I but the
communications payload was now designed to allow multiple access, i.e. to carry signals from several
earth stations simultaneously. Twenty-five countries in two ocean regions were thus connected by the
Intelsat system and this determined both a substantial increase in international telephone traffic and a
significant lowering of rates charged by cable carriers. Even though the possibility of launch failures
made the economics of satellites still uncertain, it became clear, as Nature put it, that "new cables can
only add to existing capacity, while satellites can almost multiply it". And in fact, in the last quarter of
1967, Intelsat realised its first net operating profit.768
Finally, in May 1969, the third generation of Intelsat satellites, Intelsat III, established the global
coverage and world-wide service that Arthur Clarke had envisaged, with one satellite over each of the
Earth's oceans and many earth stations spread all over the world. It was estimated that 500 million
people saw the television pictures, relayed by the Intelsat III satellites, of the first landing on the moon
in July 1969. Eight Intelsat III were launched between September 1968 and July 1970, but three failed
to reach the geostationary orbit. And the number of hours for television transmission and reception
increased from 1372 in 1968 to 6792 in 1972.769
The Intelsat III satellites, built by TRW and weighing 152 kg, had significant advantages compared to
their predecessors. Their two transponders allowed 1200 telephone circuits or up to four television
channels, or 700 telephone circuits and one TV channel handled simultaneously. Like the previous
Intelsat satellites, it received transmissions at about 6 GHz and converted them to about 4 GHz for
transmission down to Earth. An important improvement was the new type of communications antenna,
766 Description of Early Bird and its operation can be found in Podraczky & Pelton (1984), pp. 95-100. This
paper describes all generations of Intelsat satellites up to the early 1980s. In the initial period, four
stations operated in Europe, at Pleumeur-Bodou (F), Goonhilly Downs (UK), Raisting (G), and
Fucino (I); and one in the United States, at Andover, Me. Subsequently a new station was added at Mill
Village, Canada. The European traffic was rotated from station to station on a weekly basis, with the
smaller station at Fucino carrying traffic on weekends.
767 "World wide satellites", Nature, 212, 554-555 (5 November 1966), on p. 554.
768 "Double or nothing", Nature, 216, 4-5 (7 October 1967), on p. 4; Smith (1976), p. 152.
See also Astrain (1984), p. 4. The Intelsat II satellites were realised by Comsat for use by NASA for the
Apollo missions to the moon, but about half of channels remained free for commercial use. The first
satellite, launched in October 1966, failed to reach synchronous orbit because of a malfunction of its
apogee motor. This was followed by three successful launches in January, March and September 1967.
769 Smith (1976), p. 153.
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provided with a despun motor which kept it fixed in the direction of the Earth while the spacecraft was
spinning. In this way, all the power was radiated towards the Earth while in previous satellites, whose
antenna rotated with the satellite, most of the power was radiated into space.770
The enormous increase in demand for communications satellite service called for new generations of
satellites, with much higher capacity and improved performance. Thus, even during the construction
phase of the Intelsat III satellites, a new series of Intelsat IV satellites was contracted with Hughes, to
take advantage of a larger launch vehicle, the Atlas-Centaur, capable of placing some 700 kg into
geostationary orbit. The first Intelsat IV went into service in early 1971 over the Atlantic region, and
six others followed between 1971 and 1975. These satellites had a mass of about 730 kg and they were
provided both with a global-beam antenna oriented towards the Earth, like their predecessors, and with
two high-gain "spot-beam" antennas, steerable in orbit under ground command towards a restricted
area on the Earth's surface. The satellite's twelve transponders allowed a capacity of about 4000
telephone circuits plus two TV channels.771
New generation of Intelsat satellites followed in the 1970s and 1980s (Intelsat IV-A, V and VI),
together with several experimental and commercial communications satellites developed and launched
by other national and international organisations. We are not going to pursue this historical account
further, as it would go beyond the time span covered in this chapter. It is fair to recall, however, that in
the same period 1965-1975, the USSR also developed her communications satellite system, based on
the Molniya satellites, the first of which was launched in 1965. In November 1971 the Intersputnik
organisation was created, on the initiative of the Soviet Union and other countries under USSR
influence.772
9.2 The first steps in satellite telecommunications in Europe (1964-1966)
Europe was a latecomer in the communications satellite field. While development work was actively
pursued in the US, the European space effort was in fact insignificant: ESRO and ELDO existed only
in embryo, the very few national programmes were still in their early stages and no plan existed
specifically directed towards communications satellites. Early involvement of European countries in
the field was limited to the realisation of two ground stations to participate in the experimental
programme of Telstar and Relay, the first built by the British Post Office at Goonhilly Downs and the
second by the French PTT at Pleumeur-Bodou. Subsequently, a large station was built at Raisting in
Germany and a smaller one at Fucino in Italy, both used to receive signals from Early Bird.
First plans for independent European activity in the space sector started only in 1963, when the results
obtained in the U.S. had already shown the technical feasibility and economic interest of
communications satellites, and when Comsat started its actions to promote an international
arrangement for a world-wide system. The growing disparity between the USA and Europe, in fact,
gave rise to considerable concern since it would have caused a substantial weakness of Europe both in
the control of whatever arrangements might be made and in the industrial competition for the
construction of the necessary hardware.
In March, the British Minister of Aviation announced a joint UK-Commonwealth programme for a
civilian-military satellite communications system based on geostationary satellites. One month later
the consortium of European aerospace industries Eurospace presented a comprehensive space
programme which gave high priority to the development of an all-European communications satellite
system, based on a set of satellites in equatorial orbit. Finally, a European Conference for Satellite
Communications (ECSC, better known as CETS from its French initials) was established in May, with
770 Podraczky & Pelton (1984), pp. 103-109; Dalgleish (1989), pp. 9-12.
771 Podraczky & Pelton (1984), pp. 109-113; Dalgleish (1989), pp. 12-15.
772 For the USA-USSR relations concerning satellite telecommunications and the creation of Intersputnik see
Galloway (1972), pp. 121-136. We will not deal with this development as it has little or no importance for
the history of ESRO in this period.
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the twofold aim of co-ordinating the positions of European countries in the forthcoming negotiations
for the Intelsat agreements, and to promote the development of a European programme in satellite
telecommunications.
The CETS had been called after the conclusions of a meeting of the Conference of European Postal
and Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT, from its French initials), held in Cologne in
December 1962. Participants in this meeting had discussed the American proposal of establishing a
single global system and had agreed that Europe would take a regional approach to this initiative
rather than negotiate a series of bilateral arrangements, as proposed by Comsat. The CETS was thus
intended to be the instrument for Europe to speak with one voice in the negotiations.773 The first
institutional organisation of Intelsat defined in the 1964 Interim Agreements could only reflect the
position of strength of the United States and of Comsat. The problem for Europe was now to develop
its own telecommunication satellite programme in order to arrive in a better position at the re-
negotiations for the definitive arrangement. This was the CETS's second aim.
Two main reasons pushed CETS Member States to get actively involved in the space sector of satellite
telecommunications. The first was the economic interest of European industries in participating in the
Intelsat development and procurement contracts at a level consistent with Europe's financial
contribution to the consortium. By 1966, in fact, it was evident that European companies were unable
to compete successfully with their American counterparts, and Comsat was thus awarding most of the
Intelsat money to American firms. In 1967, for example, the British Parliament's Estimates Committee
lamented that "the US share of contracts was overwhelmingly high", and stressed that in the contracts
allotted for six Intelsat III satellites worth 32 million dollars, the value of contracts allotted in the UK
was only 500,000 dollars, i.e. less than 1.6 per cent, well below Britain's 7.41 per cent share of Intelsat
quotas.774 One year later, Nature recalled that the share of contracts placed by Intelsat in Europe was
only 4 per cent, and commented:
It is precisely in the field of satellite construction, satellite sub-systems, onboard power
supplies and such things that European tenders have done badly, in part, of course,
because they lack the experience of their American competitors. It is a cogent argument
of CETS advisers that the inequality will not be rectified without more direct European
participation in the launching and designing of satellites.775
The second reason in favour of an autonomous European involvement in communications satellites
was political. By the mid-1960s, when the cold war had overcome its hottest phase, a good deal of
international competition took place on the ground of scientific and technical achievements,
commercial success, and cultural influence. This kind of competition existed not only between the two
sides of the iron curtain but also on the western side of it. With the Americans heading to the moon
and the Soviets lifting heavier and heavier payload beyond the atmosphere, space no longer appeared
as merely a new frontier for esoteric scientific investigation. It was definitely a key element for
technological innovation, for industrial development and for national prestige. And with Japan, China
and Canada already on their way to space, Europe could not remain sitting on its very limited
programmes in space research and launcher development. Satellite communications rather than basic
science appeared more and more as the privileged area of application of space technology, with a
potential market as large as the world and with a political interest as important as free communications
in the so-called "global village". As Le Monde would eventually comment: "The transmission of radio
773 Bignier (1966); Galloway (1972), pp. 93-94; Smith (1976), pp. 135-136. The CETS met for the first time
in May 1963 in Paris and following meetings were held in July 1963 (London), October 1963, March and
June 1964 (Rome), and October 1964 (Bonn).
774 Estimates Committee (1967), p. xi. See also ibidem, p. 64.
775 "More negotiation for Intelsat", Nature, 218, 714 (25 May 1968).
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and television programmes is one of the most supple and diversified means to assure a presence and
influence abroad".776
Three main difficulties presented themselves regarding the achievement of an independent European
capability in space communication. The first derived from the fact that two multinational space
organisations already existed in Europe, one to develop launchers and another to build scientific
satellites, but none had been created for building and operating applications satellites. While the
creation of a third organisation appeared unwise, any eventual involvement of those existing in the
new field implied changing their charter and operational programme. This problem was made more
difficult by the fact that, both at national level and in international negotiations, the different aspects of
space activities were dealt with by bodies as different as Ministries of Industry, Ministries of Aviation,
Ministries of Science and Technology, Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Research Councils, Space
Committees, PTT administrations and so on. The CETS itself did not have an official statute as an
independent organisation but was rather a series of meetings of governmental and PTT representatives,
with a small secretariat serving ad interim. This rendered the task of defining a coherent space policy a
hard task not only at European level but very often at the level of individual countries.777
The second difficulty lay in the situation created by the Intelsat agreements. As this international
consortium was to provide for a global space communications network, its members were committed
not to build systems that could compete with such a network on the commercial ground. This left them
two possible policies in space telecommunications: to compete in the international market for
supplying satellites and/or important technical hardware to Intelsat, or to develop communications
satellites for national use. But European space industries were not in a position to tender successfully
against American ones, and European countries were not large enough to require the use of satellites
for domestic telecommunications. A third way did exist, in fact, for Europe to foster an industrial
policy in the communications satellite field, but its political implications were rather delicate. This was
the development of a space communication system at regional level, namely covering a large part of
the European continent and the Mediterranean area, whose geographical extent would be comparable
with that included within the national borders of the United States or Canada. The limitation of such a
policy was twofold. Firstly, this regional system could take over some of the Intelsat traffic and thus
undermine the commercial interests of this organisation. Secondly, it had to win approval and support
from its potential users, i.e. the national PTT administrations, whose attitude, in fact, was very
cautious. On the one hand, these considered that satellite links within the European continent would
not be economical compared with the ground network, in which they had invested so much and which
was rapidly expanding. On the other hand, they were reluctant to get involved in matters where
political negotiations between foreign offices were more important than the usual technical agreements
between telecommunications administrations.778
The third difficulty was the lack of a European launcher capable of putting a satellite into the
geostationary orbit. The Europa rocket (or ELDO A), under development in ELDO, was not qualified
for this, therefore any independent European programme in space telecommunications by
geostationary satellites implied either the use of American rockets or an important change in ELDO's
programme. The availability of launching facilities for scientific satellites had been assured by the
American authorities but it was not evident that this would be granted even when commercial interests
776 Le Monde, 29 January 1967, quoted in Hochmuth (1974), p. 158. ESRO's deputy Director General
stressed that the first decade of the space age had been "the era of scientific satellites"; now a new phase
was opening, "the era of application satellites", and telecommunications represented the most important
sector of application satellites: Bertrand (1966), p. 26. See also Giarini (1968), pp. 95-107.
777 As an example, in the UK the different bodies responsible for space were the Ministry of Defence
(military satellites), the Ministry of Aviation (space technologies and launchers), the Department of
Education and Science through the Science Research Council (scientific satellites), the General Post
Office (telecommunications): Estimates Committee (1967), p. 1.
778 This last aspect was noted by the US representative during the early negotiations with the CEPT in 1964:
Galloway (1972), p. 93.
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were at stake. As to ELDO, we have seen in the previous chapters how this organisation was suffering
from serious financial and technical difficulties.
The definition of a suitable institutional framework, the emergence of an important and reliable
customer, and the building of a European launcher with geostationary capability were thus the
necessary preconditions for the success of a communications satellite programme in the Old
Continent.
9.2.1 The first definition of the CETS programme
In July 1963, at its second meeting, the CETS decided to create two subordinate bodies, a Committee
on Organisation (CO), to cover juridical, administrative and financial matters, and a Space Technology
Committee (STC), with the aim of defining a programme capable of qualifying the European industry
to participate in the Intelsat procurement contracts. The STC worked out a five-year plan which
foresaw two phases: a three-year phase of research and development starting in January 1965,
financed on a national basis and co-ordinated by the STC itself; and a phase with multinational
funding starting by the end of 1966. The plan was discussed at the CETS meeting held in Bonn in
October 1964, the first after the signature of the Intelsat agreements. Here it was agreed to recommend
to the Member States the start of the first phase, and to undertake a detailed study on the scientific,
technical, economical and financial aspects of the proposed second phase. The Conference also set up
a Technical Planning Staff (TPS), composed of experts from industry and governmental bodies under
the direction of N. Simmons, from the British Ministry of Aviation, whose task it was to review the
work on space technology in Europe and to propose a joint development programme for a European
experimental communications satellite capable of meeting the requirements of the Intelsat global
system.779
The TPS report was issued in December 1965. After surveying the current and potential European
capability in space and communications technologies, the TPS summarised its views:
Europe has the potential capability necessary for development of communication
satellites, but to realise this potential will require the purposeful execution of a well-
planned co-operative programme.780
The proposed programme was to be developed in five years at a cost of 370 million French francs
(MFF). It consisted of three stages:
1. The use of the ELDO A test launchings F9 (planned in October 1968) and F10 (planned in mid-
1969) for testing telecommunication components;
2. The realisation of an all-European experimental communications satellite;
3. The study of other application satellites such as for television broadcasting, navigation, and
meteorology.
Three or four experimental satellites were foreseen, to be launched into a low inclination orbit at an
altitude of 14,000 km (8-hour period) by the use of an improved ELDO launcher (ELDO A/S) or an
American launcher. The realisation of such satellites, together with the development of a more
advanced launching vehicle (ELDO B), was considered by the TPS a necessary step in order to put
779 Bignier (1966); Blassel & Collette (1968). The terms of reference, the composition and the organisation
of work of the TPS are reported in the notes on the first TPS meeting (12-14 January 1965), SCL/TPS/6E,
15 January 1965; HAEC, folder 1240.
780 TPS Report on European Potential and Recommended Development Plan, SCL/TPS/116E,
15 December 1965,
p. 20; HAEC, folder 401.
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Europe "in a position to participate fully in any competition to supply equipment for the global system,
or any sub-system required, from 1970 onwards".781
The TPS objectives were more ambitious, however, than securing European industry a share of
Intelsat procurement business. They recommended that, besides long-distance telephony, other
important applications, such as satellites for direct television broadcast, navigation assistance to ship
and aircraft, and meteorology. The TPS went as far as to consider that developing one of these
alternative application satellites should be the real primary objective of the recommended
telecommunications programme. The reason:
Since these other functions are ones which in general have a specifically regional
interest, as opposed to the world-wide application of long-distance telephony, and since
they are not at present the subject of international agreements giving a single
organisation a monopoly of their exploitation, they may be particularly appropriate for
European development effort.782
9.2.2 CETS, ESRO and ELDO
While the TPS was working out its plan for a joint European communications satellite programme, a
CO/STC working group discussed the institutional and financial aspects of such a programme, and in
particular the possible use of the existing space organisations for its implementation.783 In fact, both
ESRO and ELDO had been invited to the various CETS meetings and had participated in the work of
the STC. In September 1964, the chairman and vice-chairman of the STC, W. Stephens and
M. Bignier, had visited ESTEC to discuss with ESRO's Technical Director A. Lines the prospects for
possible collaboration.784 The definition of a formal arrangement was not an easy task, however, for
three main reasons. The first regarded the institutional aims of the two organisations. The ELDO
Convention defined as the sole objective of the Organisation: "the development and construction of
space vehicle launchers and their equipment suitable for practical applications and for supply to
eventual users". In the view of the CO, this excluded the possibility of ELDO developing a
communications satellite programme, unless important changes were made in its statute and
organisation. No difficulty existed, of course, for ELDO to provide the vehicles for launching the
satellites themselves.
A somewhat better situation presented itself in the case of ESRO. Article II of its Convention
stipulated in fact that "the purpose of the Organisation shall be to provide for, and to promote,
collaboration among European States in space research and technology [our emphasis]". This
formulation could be interpreted as allowing the realisation of an experimental communications
satellite. This, however, required a special approval from the Council and the proper integration of
such an undertaking in the organisational, financial and technical framework of the Organisation. In
any case, the ESRO Convention definitely excluded the eventual continuation of the programme
towards commercialisation.
The second difficulty derived from the different membership of the various organisations involved.
Only six European countries, plus Australia, were members of ELDO; ten were in ESRO; nineteen
participated more or less regularly in the CETS meetings; and twenty-three belonged to the CEPT, five
of which, however, had not signed the Intelsat agreements (Table 9-1). It was still unclear whether all
781 TPS Report, cit., p. 22. The ELDO A/S project consisted in the addition of a fourth stage (apogee) motor
to the ELDO A launcher under development, in order to achieve orbits at higher altitudes. ELDO B was a
project for a completely new rocket with geostationary capability.
782 TPS Report, cir., p. 31.
783 Reports on two meetings (1 April 1965 and 6-7 September 1965) of this working group are available:
SCL/JWG/3F, undated, and SCL/JWG/10E, 20 September 1965. A CO working group charged to study
the conventions of ESRO and ELDO was also set up and met on 20-21 May 1965, SCL/CO.13/3F,
undated. All these documents are in folder 1240 of HAEC.
784 ESRO/36, 14 October 1964, p. 2.
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ESRO Member States would be willing to participate in the communications satellite programme
while, at the same time, some non-ESRO countries would certainly do so. This circumstance implied
difficult problems regarding the legal arrangement of the collaboration, the management and financing
of the programme, and the definition of the industrial policy.
Finally, there was the problem of the financing of the programme, i.e. whether only governments
should contribute or whether private investments should also be considered, in particular for the
operational phase of the programme, when profits might be produced by commercial activities. In this
case, the CO/STC working group argued, one could envisage the formation of a Comsat-like European
company, capable of challenging the American exclusive role in the management of the global system.
This implied, however, the loss of governmental control over the telecommunications system, a
prospect not as easily acceptable in Europe as it was in the US. Moreover, doubts were expressed as to
"whether such financing would be practicable since such operation would require considerable
investments and could derive only long-term profits, and perhaps, in the early stage, funds invested
might be lost".785
Concluding this phase of its work, the working group recommended that governments and industries
should be requested to give their views on the method of financing the European communications
satellite programme and on the kind of institutional framework to be established for the experimental
and the operational phase of such a programme. It was also agreed that the ESRO and ELDO Councils
should be formally approached in order to know their opinions on the TPS report, now near
completion, and on how the programme described there could be carried out.786
The answer of ESRO was immediate and positive: two weeks after the CETS's letter the Executive had
already elaborated plans for the technical and financial management of the CETS programme. Ten
days later the Council agreed that "an encouraging reply should be sent to the CETS, declaring the
Organisation's interest in close co-operation".787 As a consequence, at the following meeting of the
CO/STC working group, held in February 1966 with the participation of delegations from ESRO and
ELDO, a large majority emerged in favour of appointing ESRO in the role of manager of the
telecommunications programme.788 Four reasons were explicitly given for this choice: (a) the
requirements for a communications satellite would determine the design and the requirement of the
launching vehicle and not the opposite; (b) the facilities available to ESRO were more apt to deal with
telecommunication problems; (c) the membership of ESRO included all countries likely to be
interested in participating in the execution of the programme; (d) it appeared easier to have the
cooperation of the other organisation as sub-contractor than if ELDO were chosen.789
ELDO, however, was the main problem in the path towards an autonomous European communications
satellite programme. In fact, in spite of the conclusions of the TPS report, no telecommunication
programme could start before bringing to solution the crisis that ESRO's sister organisation was living
in 1965-66.
785 SCL/JWG2/10E, cit., p. 3.
786 ESRO/C/145, 8 November 1965, with attached copy of a letter, dated 28 October 1965, sent by the
chairmen of the CETS Committees on Organisation and on Space Technology to the chairman of the
ESRO Council and to the President of the ELDO Council.
787 ESRO Council, 9th session (24-26 November 1965), ESRO/C/MIN/9, 31 January 1966, p. 25. The
document of the Executive is ESRO/C/150, 13 November 1965.
788 Three reports on this meeting (10-11 February 1966) are available: the "Conclusions of the Chairman",
SCL/JWG4/1E, 14 February 1966; a "Summary report" dated 25 February 1966; and the ELDO
document ELDO/C(66)14, 21 February 1966. The first two documents are in folder 1240, HAEC. See
also Bignier's report at the 21st AFC meeting (8-11 March 1966), ESRO/AF/MIN/21, 16 May 1966, pp.
9-10. It must be noted that the possible use of the ELDO launchings F9 and F10 for telecommunications
experiments was to be negotiated directly by ELDO and CETS.
789 With respect to the last point, ESRO Director General P. Auger had made it clear to CETS that ESRO
would not accept a position of sub-contractor of ELDO.
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9.2.3 The ELDO crisis of 1965-1966 and the start of the ELDO-PAS project 790
The problem of the European launcher was hotly debated in 1965-1966, both in the ELDO Council
and in the wider political circles involved in discussions on the European space policy. ELDO's initial
programme called for the development of a three-stage rocket, called Europa (or ELDO A), with the
capability of launching a large satellite into a near-Earth circular orbit (e.g. 800 kg payload at 550 km).
The construction of this rocket was entrusted to the Organisation's Member States: the first stage was
based on the British former military rocket Blue Streak, the second stage (Coralie) was to be built in
France, and the third stage (Astris) in Germany. Italy was given the task of building a series of test
satellites, Belgium was to provide down-range ground guidance stations, and the Netherlands the long-
range telemetry links. In addition to these European countries, Australia had also joined ELDO,
making its launching base of Woomera available to the Organisation.
By the beginning of 1965, however, it was recognised that much of ELDO's initial programme needed
to be revised. Firstly, the cost of completing the programme had risen up to more than twice the
original estimate (£ 143 million as compared to £ 70 million). Secondly, the objective of the initial
programme appeared obsolete vis-à-vis the recent development of space activities: the Europa rocket,
in fact, was not powerful enough to launch into a geostationary orbit the payload necessary for a
telecommunications mission. The crisis burst in January 1965, when the French delegation in the
ELDO Council called for the abandonment of the initial programme and the start of a new programme
for a more powerful rocket (ELDO B), aimed at providing Western Europe with launching capability
into the geostationary orbit.
A Working Group was set up with the task of formulating proposals for a reorientation of ELDO
activities, and in the course of 1965 plans for the realisation of the ELDO B vehicle were elaborated at
technical level. The political aspects were far from being resolved, however, and negotiations lasted a
year and a half. France, on the one hand, strongly advocated an independent European launcher
capability, following President de Gaulle's policy of national independence in strategically important
areas of science and technology. Britain, on the other hand, felt that its heavy investment in ELDO
was not worth the results to be expected and cast doubt both on the validity of the initial programme
and on the possibility of successfully developing any future programme like ELDO B. In June 1966,
the new (Labour) British government went as far as to anticipate the withdrawal of the United
Kingdom from ELDO.
A compromise was eventually reached at a Ministerial Conference of ELDO Member States held in
July. Here, in return for a dramatic reduction of Britain's financial contribution to the budget of ELDO
(from 38.8 to 27 per cent), it was agreed to undertake a new launcher project, called ELDO-PAS or
Europa II, designed to launch a 150 kg satellite into geostationary orbit when fired eastwards from the
equatorial base of Kourou, in French Guyana. Europa II was not a really new rocket, as ELDO B was
intended to be, but rather a modification of the Europa launcher (now called Europa I) in order to
make it capable of injecting a satellite into geostationary orbit. Its design in fact consisted of the
addition of the so-called "perigee-apogee stages" (PAS) to Europa I, namely a fourth stage (perigee
motor) capable of injecting the satellite into a transfer orbit, and an apogee motor in the satellite itself
to fire it into geostationary orbit (Figure 9-3). The ELDO-PAS programme thus allowed ELDO to take
advantage of the work already done on the initial Europa programme, whose continuation up to
790 We synthesise in this section the contents of chapters 3 and 4 in order to make this chapter self-consistent.
See also Pfaltzgraff & Deghand (1968); Hochmuth (1974), 59-98; and Schwarz (1979).
270
Figure 9-3: The ELDO-PAS concept
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completion was also approved. A new management scheme was also defined, in order to solve some
of the problems which had beset the Organisation since its beginning.791
9.2.4 ESRO's first studies of communications satellites: CETS A and B
The compromise worked out for ELDO promised to provide Europe by 1970 with a launcher capable
of putting a communications satellite into geostationary orbit. This element, as well as the most recent
developments of Intelsat, changed the framework of the TPS plan. The TPS therefore prepared a
supplementary report in which the new possibilities were assessed in the light of the success of Early
Bird and the growing political and social importance of real time television distribution.792
The first important aspect put into evidence was the decision of Intelsat to base its system on
geostationary satellites. Plans for the new generation of Intelsat III satellites were already under
development, noted the TPS, with a view to establishing a world-wide service of satellite
communications by the end of the decade. The European share in the procurement contracts for such a
system would be only 4.5 per cent of the total cost. In this perspective the place of Europe could only
be very limited:
The yield to Europe in communication satellite technology from Intelsat III procurement
is limited in both quality and quantity, e.g. it involves mainly repetitive work and little of
the creative element. It falls short by an order of magnitude of the minimum programme
recommended in [the original report] and cannot, by itself, generate the required
capability, nor the envisaged European potential.793
At the same time, the TPS concluded, it was difficult to forecast the specification for an eventual
successor to Intelsat III and it could not confidently be predicted that the payload capability of the
ELDO-PAS launcher would be adequate for this purpose.
Against this background, a re-definition of the CETS objectives was called for, leaving aside the field
of transoceanic telephonic communications, where so little room existed to compete successfully, and
taking into account the specific needs and interests of Europe. After discussing the most recent
developments and trends in the various fields of application satellites (aeronautical and maritime
communications, television distribution and broadcasting, navigation, meteorology, regional
telephonic communications), the TPS experts indicated television distribution and broadcasting as the
most promising field of activity for Europe and urged the CETS to start an experimental programme in
this field.
At the 6th meeting of the CETS, on 22-24 November 1966 in The Hague, the TPS proposal was finally
accepted by the Conference as the basis of a joint European programme in communications satellites.
A tentative institutional framework was also agreed for the implementation of this programme, which
791 ELDO, Report to the Council of Europe for 1966. A technical description of the ELDO-PAS system is in
Blanc (1966) and Nouaille (1968). The launch eastwards from an equatorial base made it possible to take
advantage of the rotation of the Earth. The ELDO-PAS project was approved by ELDO Member States as
a "supplementary programme", in addition to the "initial programme" described in the ELDO Convention.
The project also included the installation of an inertial guidance system in the third stage of the Europa
rocket, the establishment of an operational firing range in Kourou suitable for equatorial launchings and
the development of a suitable ground network. The reduction of the British financial contribution was
balanced by the other Member States: France (from 23.9 to 25 %), Germany (from 22 to 27 %), Italy
(from 9.8 to 12 %), Belgium and the Netherlands (from 2.85 and 2.64 % respectively to 9 % jointly).
792 This supplementary report (SCL/TPS/116/Supplement, 6 September 1966) is attached as Appendix 3 to
ESRO/C/225, 14 September 1966.
793 TPS/116/Supplement, cit., p. 4, emphasis in the original.
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foresaw that ESRO be entrusted with its management in close co-operation with ELDO.794 The
Conference then decided to commission ESRO to undertake a feasibility study of the programme
described in the TPS reports and, on this basis, a formal agreement between the two organisations was
defined and duly approved by the ESRO Council.795
The agreement with the CETS foresaw that ESRO should prepare a feasibility study of a European
communications satellite programme aiming at the development of an experimental satellite for
telephony and television distribution, comparable to the Intelsat III satellite then under development.
Three satellites were to be built and launched into geostationary orbit by Europa 2, the first launching
being scheduled for 1971. The study was also to include development plans, financial estimates and
proposals for the organisation of work. Finally, the study was to provide indications about further
developments on second generation telecommunications systems and other application fields. The
total cost of the programme was not to exceed 435 MFF, i.e. 280 MFF for the experimental satellites
(including 135 MFF for the provision of the launchers), 55 MFF for the associated programmes of
research and development, and 100 MFF for studies of other applications. The sum of 1.5 MFF was
made available to ESRO by CETS Member States for the realisation of the feasibility study, and a
report was expected by the end of May 1967.
Thanks to the work of a team of about 30 engineers under the direction of P. Blassel, the study was
completed in due time and the final report was sent to the CETS delegations.796 Two types of
experimental satellites meeting the mission specification defined by the TPS were presented. The first
satellite (CETS-A) could be developed in four years, taking advantage of the industrial capabilities
existing in Europe. The second (CETS-B) involved more advanced technological developments and
thus belonged to a later stage in the series of future objectives.797
9.3 Technical optimism and political setbacks (1967)
ESTEC's study was discussed in the various CETS committees and arrived on the tables of the second
meeting of the European Space Conference (ESC), convened in Rome on 11-13 July 1967 to discuss
the prospects of a coherent space policy for Europe.798 As a matter of fact, the prospects for such a
policy could hardly be considered with optimism at that time. ESRO was virtually without a
programme and was living a dramatic institutional and financial crisis. Its Member States, in fact,
could not agree unanimously (as demanded by the Convention) on the level of resources for the
second three-year period (1967-69) and the Organisation was thus prevented from making any long-
term plan. Its most important and ambitious project, the Large Astronomical Satellite (LAS) seemed
definitely jeopardised and a drastic reduction of its initial programme was inevitable.
794 CETS, 6th Plenary Meeting (22-24 November 1966): "Summary of conference decisions", SCH(66)21E,
(Revised), 28 November 1966; "Provisional summary record", SCH(66)23E, 30 November 1966; folder
1240, HAEC. It must be noted that the meeting decided to enlarge the terms of reference of the CETS, in
order to include other application fields besides conventional telecommunications. The meeting was
attended by representatives of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Monaco,
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Vatican City. Observers attended
from Greece, Australia, ELDO (the deputy Secretary General W. Stephens), ESRO (the Director General
P. Auger) and the CEPT.
795 ESRO Council, 14th session (30/11-2 December 1966), ESRO/C/MIN/14, 20 January 1967, p. 45-46. The
development of ESRO/CETS negotiations, including correspondence, draft agreements, technical
specifications and the CETS' November resolution, are reported in ESRO/C/221, 27 July 1966 (with add.
1, 16 September 1966; add. 2, 13 September 1966; add. 1, rev.1, 21 September 1966); ESRO/C/225,
14 September 1966 (with 3 appendixes); ESRO/C/245, 29 November 1966 (with 3 appendixes). On
ELDO side, see ELDO/C(66)57, 6 October 1966, and ELDO/C(66)62, 29 November 1966. For
ESRO/ELDO negotiations, see ELDO/C(67)24, 31 March 1967, ESRO/C/279, 24 April 1967, and the
correspondence in folder 402 (HAEC).
796 Letter, P. Auger to A. Hartog (President of the CETS), 30 May 1967: HAEC, folder 401.
797 Blassel & Collette (1968), Collette (1993).
798 The setting up of the European Space Conference is discussed in chapter 9.
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With regards to ELDO, the approval of the Europa II programme had not removed the reasons for
conflicts between the various national interests. While giving Europe an adequate degree of
independence in the capability of launching application satellites, the ELDO-PAS system could not be
considered the last word in the path towards real European autonomy. Foreseeable developments in
space communications technology and other application fields called for much heavier satellites and
more powerful rockets. And here the disagreement sharpened between the countries sceptical about
the prospects of a launcher development programme and those firmly committed to achieving
European autonomy in this field. Britain and France, as expected, led the opposite camps. For the
British Estimates Committee, the ELDO programmes had no future: the only firm prospective buyer
of Europa II was the French Government (two launchers), while Intelsat would hardly have used a
rocket costing about two and half times an equivalent American launcher. As to Europa I, the likely
abandonment of the LAS by ESRO implied the loss of the only foreseeable client for this launcher. In
conclusion, the Committee recommended that Britain should oppose any proposal to further develop
the ELDO-PAS programme, let alone undertake more advanced projects, and should rather invest
mostly on the all-British light satellite launcher Black Arrow.799 France, on the contrary, insisted that
Europe could not sustain a credible space policy in commercially interesting application fields without
the availability of its own launchers.
This disagreement over launchers paralleled that regarding the prospects of the joint European
communications satellite programme. While agreeing on the financing of ESRO's feasibility study,
CETS Member States were far from being equally convinced of the opportunity of undertaking the
programme itself, due to the great uncertainty about the economic aspects.
According to the TPS, which had been requested by the CETS meeting in The Hague to make a study
of the economic aspects of application satellites, the investment required for the development of the
experimental communications satellites would not be amortised in the period 1970-75. They stressed,
however, that in the long-term period (i.e. in 10-15 years) the whole foreseeable field of satellite
applications would cover important economic sectors and would lead ultimately to benefits many
times the investment involved. Besides the eventual direct economic benefits, the TPS also underlined
that it was important for Europe to control the technological development of application satellites
instead of relying exclusively on U.S. technology.800
Against the TPS's optimistic vision, however, an economic study made by the CEPT concluded that a
European communications satellite system would be more expensive than the conventional ground
links and, moreover, would not be competitive in comparison with the cost of using the Intelsat
system. In contrast, the Eurospace consortium found that an operational system for telephony and
television transmission would be profitable vis-à-vis conventional systems already in the second half
of the 1970s.801
The doubtful arguments about the economic and financial aspects, as well as the lack of a unifying
political and institutional framework, made the CETS incapable of establishing clear guidelines. And
the distance between its principal members was becoming wider and wider. In the United Kingdom,
the Post Office was adamantly against any direct involvement in communications satellites,
considering that the best way the country could secure its interests in the future of space
799 Estimates Committee (1967), pp. xxvi-xxvii. The Black Arrow project for a three-stage satellite launcher
had been started in 1964 but the decision to proceed with this programme was taken by the British
government only in 1966. The programme was to be completed within three or four years. The
programme, in fact, was cancelled even before the first and last operational launch of the rocket in
October 1971: "Britain will cancel Black Arrow space programme", The Times, 30 July 1971; "Choosing
Britain's place in the space race", ibidem, 29 October 1971.
800 TPS, Economic Potential for Europe of Application Satellites, SCL/TPS/217E, 30 May 1967: HAEC,
folder 401 bis.
801 The CEPT study had also been requested by the CETS at its The Hague meeting. Both this study and that
of Eurospace are referred to in the TPS study. A comparative analysis of the three studies is in the
Causse Report (fn. 65). See also Müller (1991), pp. 110-112.
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telecommunications was by building and commercialising ground stations within the Intelsat system.
For the Estimates Committee, the CETS was "not an organisation but a continuing conference [whose]
continued existence in its present form would appear unlikely to achieve any useful purpose". The
Committee then recommended that Britain should not take part in the CETS programme for a
television distribution satellite but should rather undertake a project to build an all-British satellite in
the framework of the Anglo-American military space communications system Skynet.802
France and Germany, on the contrary, were the most active among the advocates of European
autonomy in space. Both countries in fact managed to come down to business without waiting for the
outcome of pan-European ventures. France announced at The Hague conference the decision of its
government to undertake a national programme for a 3-axis stabilised communications satellite, called
Saros II, designed for launching by ELDO-PAS. The mission of this satellite was very similar to that
of the CETS project, i.e. to provide telephone circuits and television distribution over an area covering
Europe and North Africa, and this caused a great deal of worry to some delegations which feared that
the French project would jeopardise the joint European project. 803 Germany, for its part, started a
national project for a spin-stabilised satellite, called Olympia, designed to relay television pictures of
the Munich Olympic Games in 1972. Eventually, the two countries combined their efforts and reached
agreement on a bilateral project which they called Symphonie. Italy too decided in 1968 to develop its
own national programme in satellite telecommunications, project Sirio, based on the work made on the
experimental satellite originally designed for ELDO-PAS.804
The discussions about launchers and communications satellites naturally involved important political
aspects of the relationship with the United States and the role of European countries in the Intelsat
framework. Facing the strong American position in satellite telecommunications and heavy satellite
launchers, France was determined to prevent a US monopoly of communications satellites and to
develop regional systems covering the area of French (and European) cultural influence. They pressed
for the development of a vigorous European programme in satellite telecommunications, which could
not leave out the development of suitable launching vehicles. This insistence on European
independence in space was consistent with President de Gaulle's policy of political, economic, military
and technological independence from the superpower beyond the Atlantic, and the French government
was able to co-ordinate the actions of all its bodies within the framework of this policy.805
Britain, instead, moved within the Anglo-American "special relationship," reinforced by de Gaulle's
veto against Britain's membership in the European Community in May 1967. They thought that very
few possibilities existed for an autonomous European action in the space sector of space
communications, both because of the strength of the American presence and because of the
foreseeable small commercial demand for the kinds of communications satellites that Europe could
build and launch. Europe, according to the British, should concentrate all effort on obtaining more
favourable conditions for its industrial interests in the Intelsat framework.
802 Estimates Committee (1967), pp. xix and xxvi-xxvii. The definition of the CETS as a "continuing
conference" was suggested to the Committee by the Head of the Foreign Office's Scientific Relations
Department, E.G. Willan, on p. 103. The BPO's position is presented in a memorandum, pp. 48-51, and in
the witness of two top officials, pp. 52-74. The Skynet programme started in 1965 and a satellite was
launched in 1969 over the Indian Ocean, mainly for maintaining communications with British forces east
of Suez. The satellite had been manufactured in the United States while Britain provided the ground
stations. The programme contemplated the launch of two satellites of an improved type in 1973: Select
Committee (1971), pp. xxv-xxvi and 164-165.
803 SCH(66)23E, 30 November 1966, c5t., pp. 21-23. Such worries were expressed with particular vigour by
Belgium and were repeated at the STC meeting on 12-13 January 1967. A report on this meeting was
prepared by A. Dattner for Auger, 17 January 1967, HAEC, folder 1240.




In conclusion, looking at the main European countries, France regarded space as a key element in its
political strategy; Germany as an important element for the country's technical development,
especially in key fields where its industry was highly competent, like communications electronics;
Britain as a business to be pursued as long as it produced an economic return.806 As H. Bondi plainly
put it, for the benefit of the British Select Committee on Science and Technology:
As usual, the two opposite poles were France and the U.K. The French motivation was
very strongly a European presence in space, a European independence of America, never
mind what the cost benefit analysis shows, and the British attitude was if you could not
show - if I may exaggerate a little - that it was the sort of project that the bank would be
happy to finance, then it should not be done anyway.807
At the Rome ESC meeting, the ESRO study of the CETS satellites found itself in the framework of
this complete lack of agreement about European space policy and, moreover, it had to confront the
challenge of Symphonie.808 The German delegation stressed that this project was "not an alternative,
but a complement to the CETS project, aiming towards the advanced satellite which is the objective of
the European nations".809 The French, for their part, stressed the importance of solidarity amongst the
European states engaged in space activities and insisted that they should give priority to the
development of technologically advanced communications satellites. The other delegations' opinions
regarding the Franco-German project were much variegated: open hostility was expressed by Belgium,
which advocated a European joint project and feared that Symphonie would undermine the CETS
undertaking; the Italian argued that further development of the PAS satellite that they were preparing
for ELDO might be proposed as an element of the European communications satellite programme; the
British insisted that any such programme should be assessed from the economic and commercial point
of view.810
In the event, as is usual the case when big controversial issues are on the table, the Conference decided
not to decide. It agreed instead to create an Advisory Committee on Programmes, with the task of
elaborating a coherent space policy in Europe and proposing programmes in the framework of such a
policy. The head of the French CNES centre at Brétigny, J-P. Causse, was appointed as the chairman
of the Committee, whose work produced a report by the end of the year.811 Before discussing it,
however, we must report on an important development which happened just after the closing of the
Rome conference.
9.3.1 The European Broadcasting Union (EBU) and the Eurafrica project.
While Symphonie was being developed and ESRO was studying its communications satellite projects
for Europe, the need arose of finding a client, i.e. a user able to transform an experimental device into
an operational system and a commercial article. Most PTTs, as we have seen, had a more than
lukewarm attitude towards satellite telecommunications for Europe. But a "frustrated customer of the
PTTs" offered ESRO a possible alternative.812 This was the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), the
association of television companies which operated the Eurovision system. The transmission of
Eurovision programmes was realised by the EBU through a network of wide-band cables provided by
the PTT administrations on a commercial basis. The establishment of such a network, however,
required several hours, the cost of the service was considered too high, and the distribution was limited
to the countries connected to the existing network. The use of a satellite relay system could provide the
EBU with its own distribution network, which could be operated in real time at short notice, and
806 Schwarz (1979).
807 Select Committee (1971), p. 186.
808 ESC, Rome meeting (11-13 July 1967), CSE/CM/(July 67)PV/1-6, 11-13 July 1967.
809 CSE/CM/(July 67)PV/2, p. 2.
810 CSE/CM/(July 67)PV/2, pp. 2, 6-7, and Annex I; CSE/CM/(July 67)PV/3, pp. 2-5.
811 Report of the Advisory on Programmes (hereafter  Causse Report), CSE/CCP(67)5, December 1967.
812 Collette (1993), p. 89. Also Blassel & Collette (1968).
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capable of reaching all countries from which the satellite was visible, in particular African Near East
countries in the European cultural area.
As early as January 1967, when ESRO was starting its study of the CETS programme, the President of
the EBU, J.B. Broeksz, had expressed to Auger the great interest of his organisation for this work and
specified the requirements of a possible satellite for the Eurovision system.813 Then, at the CETS
meeting held immediately after the Rome conference, the EBU Director General officially confirmed
the interest in ESRO's work and requested that it should be pursued with consideration of the EBU
requirements. As a consequence, the CETS agreed to grant ESRO 1 MFF to continue the studies
already executed, and to design an experimental communications satellite programme, distinct from
Symphonie and meeting the needs of the Eurovision system. The cost of such a programme had to be
limited to 450 MFF.814
The opportunity offered by the EBU presented several advantages to the European organisations
involved in space. Firstly, it allowed ESRO to keep its technical team united and working on the
communications satellite project instead of dispersing it pending the decision on its actual
development.815 Secondly, it offered the CETS a way out the embarrassing situation of having a
"European" project too similar to that developed by two of the most important European countries.
Finally, it provided ESC delegations with the example of a communications satellite more oriented
towards operational activity than towards experimentation.
The CETS request was duly approved by the ESRO Council and work was resumed in ESTEC by
Blassel's team.816 Two projects were studied in particular. The first was a system satisfying the
requirements of the EBU (satellite CETS-C or Eurafrica), namely the replacement of ground circuits
with space links to provide simultaneous distribution of two Eurovision-type television programmes
within Europe and North Africa. The second was an experimental system for semi-direct television
broadcast (satellite CETS-D or Geovision). Both projects required development time scales of about
five years, but only the first satellite fell within the financial limits of 450 MFF fixed by the CETS and
was within the launching capability of the Europa launcher.817
In December 1967 the ESTEC study was sent to the CETS delegations and to the  Causse Committee.
The latter, in its report, strongly recommended the Eurafrica project as the application satellite project
to be initiated in the immediate future. In the words of the report:
The problem set by the EBU has, in fact, considerable attraction. It sets a target for
technological studies that is sufficiently ambitious while at the same time being almost
capable of attainment; it makes it immediately possible to acquire very valuable
operational experience in both the space sector and the ground sector; it can lead
rapidly, if desired, to operational activity on what appears to be a good economic basis;
and in any event it will provide useful data for the study of the future economic aspects of
television satellites.818
813 Broeksz to Auger, 20 January 1967, HAEC, folder 1240. Auger's reply, 6 February 1967, is also ibidem.
814 Letter from the CETS President A. Hartogh, to ESRO Director General P. Auger, 19 July 1967, HAEC,
folder 402. Also in ESRO/C/302, 26 July 1967, Annex 1.
815 The worry about "breaking brutally" the work of the technical team was expressed in a letter from Auger
to Hartogh, 21 March 1967, HAEC, folder 1240.
816 ESRO Council, 18th session (27 July 1967), ESRO/C/MIN/18, 14 August 1967, p. 8. Auger to Hartogh,
28 July 1967, HAEC, folder 402.
817 Letter from ESRO's new Director General, H. Bondi to Hartogh, 30 November 1967, HAEC, folder 402.
A satellite for television distribution has the same role as a normal TV repeater, namely its signals are
collected in the normal TV network and re-transmitted by standard UHF waves. A satellite for semi-direct
television broadcast sends signals that can be collected by an antenna and redistributed by cables within a
small community. Direct television broadcast by satellite means that signals from the spacecraft can be
collected by individual users by means of a small antenna.
818  Causse Report, p. 24.
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As to the commercial point of view, the  Causse Committee had performed a comparative analysis of
the three studies prepared respectively by the TPS, the CEPT and Eurospace, with the conclusion that
"the proposal for a television relay satellite system comes closest, among the European space projects
under discussion, to having a prospect of financial viability in the foreseeable future". As to the other
projects, they concluded that a European satellite used exclusively for telephony, telegraphy and data
transmission did not appear financially justified in the short term but could become viable in the
period 1975 to 1980. No definite conclusion could be arrived at on the economic validity of semi-
direct and direct TV broadcast, and on other application fields.819
From the technical point of view, the Eurafrica satellite (Figure 9-4) represented an important step
forward in relation to previous American satellites as well as to Symphonie. The former, in fact, were
based on spinning technology to assure the stabilisation of the spacecraft. As to Symphonie, its design
did foresee the more sophisticated three-axis stabilisation to keep the satellite firmly oriented towards
the Earth, but its solar cell array was not designed to track the Sun. The Eurafrica design, on the
contrary, adopted "four-axis" stabilisation, namely three-axis stabilisation of the body of the satellite
and Sun-pointing solar array.820 Other characteristics, like a longer operational life (5 years), a higher
power output, and a less expensive earth station, made Eurafrica a kind of prototype of an operational
satellite designed to meet the requirements of a well defined client, while the Franco-German project
still belonged to the experimental stage. The EBU in fact reaffirmed its interest in the project and, in
July 1968, its General Assembly officially approved the use of an operational satellite system for
Eurovision based on Eurafrica. The EBU specified that they were ready to bear the cost of the
operational satellites following the experimental one, provided that it should not bear any development
costs of the latter and that the annual average expenditure of the operational system did not exceed that
of terrestrial circuits or other means of television distribution that might be available at the time of
launching.821
9.3.2 The  Causse Report and its "wholehearted" reception in ESRO
The immediate start of the Eurafrica project was an important aspect of the "balanced programme"
suggested in the  Causse Report, which included the development of scientific and applications
satellites and a European launcher to follow Europa 2.822 The programme was articulated in four
phases, each requiring definite decisions to be taken at different times of its development. The first
phase, whose start was to be decided as soon as possible, foresaw the continuation of the Europa 1 and
Europa 2 programmes, the start of the Eurovision satellite programme and the development of a
scientific programme according to one of three possible options. The first foresaw the continuation of
the LAS project which, however, was "at the limit of Europe's present technical and financial
resources".823 The second option considered the abandonment of the LAS and the realisation of some
two scientific satellites per year, which was considered a "minimal programme". The third option
foresaw the start of an experimental meteorological satellite programme, with a corresponding
reduction of the scientific programme.
819 Ibidem, p. 75. The comparative analysis of the three studies is presented in Annex 6.
820 A description of the Eurafrica satellite and its mission is in Blassel & Collette (1968). See also Collette
(1993). Two industrial offers had been presented for Simphonie, one from the Aérospatiale-MBB
consortium, the other from Matra. The latter did foresee sun pointing of the solar array but it was the
former, which did not, that won the contract. It must be noted that three-axis stabilisation was a rather
advanced technology, under development at that time in the framework of NASA's ATS (Applications
Technology Satellite) programme. The launching of ATS-6, the first three-axis stabilised satellite, was in
1974, only months before the launching of Symphonie: Giget (1993).
821 Broeksz to Hartogh, 1 December 1967, reported in Annex 3 to the  Causse Report. See Davidson (1970),
p. 11.
822 For a more detailed discussion of the  Causse Report see chapter 9. Here we limit ourselves to those
aspects which are relevant to our presentation of ESRO's early activity in communications satellites.
823  Causse Report, p. 15.
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Figure 9-4: The Eurafrica satellite
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The second phase was to start with the decision, to be taken by 1969, to embark on a launcher project
with greater capability than Europa II, together with a programme for a second generation
communications satellite. The Europa III rocket, as it was called, was to become operational in 1975-
76 and would have the capability of putting into geostationary orbit a 500-kg satellite for semi-direct
TV broadcasting. The following phases three and four were only roughly described, featuring the
development of a vehicle for launching a 2-ton payload into geostationary orbit and the start of "a
project of major importance in science or a field of application, that would not be a mere repetition of
projects already carried out in the US or the USSR".824
All decisions about the actual implementation of the programme described in the  Causse Report were
deferred to the forthcoming meeting of the European Space Conference, planned in Bonn in spring
1968. No major technical or political impediment seemed to exist, however, for the eventual
realisation of the television relay satellite project. The ESRO staff, in fact, welcomed
"enthusiastically" the Causse Report and its suggestion that ESRO should be entrusted with a
development programme of application satellites. With the likely abandonment of the LAS and the
growing difficulties in obtaining from Member States important resources to develop pure science, the
involvement in application programmes appeared as the new rationale for ESRO continuing its very
existence and the only way to provide ESTEC engineers with challenging enough projects. In the
words of the Executive:
A decision to this effect would enable better advantage to be taken of past and future
investments in installations, technical research, and the training of specialist staff.825
The message that ESRO's founding father and first Director General P. Auger wrote at the moment he
left the Organisation echoed the general optimism:
Les programmes opérationnels devront être partagés de façon judicieuse entre les
missions à caractère purement scientifique et les missions ayant pour but des
applications, telles que télécommunications, météorologie ou navigation. Ce partage
tiendra compte des besoins des groupes scientifiques dans les Etats Membres comme des
besoins technologiques résultant des applications projetées, mais aussi des influences
réciproques de ces deux types d'entreprises. Les efforts dans les domaines de la science
pure et des applications, loin de se contrarier, devront être harmonisés entre eux, et
conduire ainsi à une plus grande efficacité.826
Auger's successor, the British scientist Hermann Bondi, expressed his confidence that the Organisation
would carry out the communications satellite programme "with the full and enthusiastic support of the
whole organisation from the management down"827 The new Director General saw several advantages
in the development of a large balanced programme involving scientific and applications projects. The
first was a more efficient use of existing capital resources and of new capital investment. Secondly,
such a programme would facilitate the attainment of more equitable geographical distribution of
contracts, "which is in the forefront of the new ESRO Directorate's preoccupations".828 Finally, a large
and challenging programme would require a substantial increase in ESRO's staff and would make the
Organisation's technical establishments more attractive in recruiting the best engineers. Bondi knew
however that ESRO owed its very existence to the European scientific community and that their
support was more than ever necessary in this delicate passage:
824 Ibidem, p. 63.
825 ESRO/C/347, 24 April 1968, annex, p. 3.
826 Auger (1967), p. 32.
827 ESRO/C/325, 25 January 1968, p. 2. This is Bondi's statement at the meeting of the Committee of
Deputies of the CETS (22-23 January 1968).
828 Ibidem, p. 1.
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The integration of [the CETS] project in ESRO's scientific activity constitutes one of the
most important issues that ever faced ESRO's Council. For a positive decision we require
the support of the scientific community which we have gone a long way (but have not
succeeded completely) in convincing that the application work is a beneficial complement
to our scientific programme and not a dangerous competitor.829
Bondi in fact undertook the very delicate task of convincing his scientific colleagues that "ESRO
could not survive on a very narrow base of pure scientific research". As he recalled later, "There was
really not much of a choice".830
9.4 The worries of the scientists
It was not obvious to ESRO, whose raison d'être was the pursuit of pure research, that it should
undertake the development of application satellites. At least, it was not so obvious to the scientists as it
was to the other direct protagonists of ESRO's activities. We have seen already the enthusiasm of the
ESRO staff. No major problems existed in the eyes of the Council's Administrative and Finance
Committee (AFC) either. The Committee recognised in fact that, from the legal point of view, articles
II and XIII of the Convention provided a sufficient basis for engaging ESRO in the work requested by
the CETS: the former mentioned the promotion of both space research and space technology as the
aims of the Organisation; the latter stated that, by a unanimous decision of the Council, ESRO could
cooperate with other international organisations.831
The scientists' perspective was different, however. As soon as the ESRO Council gave its first
"encouraging reply" to the CETS in November 1965, the vice-chairman of the Scientific and Technical
Committee (STC), the Danish physicist B. Peters, sent a long letter to chairman R. Lüst to express his
opinions about a question that, in his opinion, "will no doubt have a profound influence on the future
evolution of European space research".832
Peters recalled that ESRO had been funded as an organisation solely devoted to pure research and
stressed that its policy had to be dictated by scientific considerations only. He indicated the serious
disadvantages for scientific research which, in his opinion, could arise out of a merger of scientific,
technological and commercial activities. The first regarded the budget: in the long run, argued Peters,
the part of the ESRO budget devoted to the application programme would certainly become
predominant with respect to that devoted to scientific research. A second disadvantage regarded
institutional aspects: important policy decisions, he said, would depend on elements other than
scientific interest. As Peters vividly put it:
The rate of build up, the future launching programme, the relative scale of efforts going
into different ESRO establishments etc. will no longer be governed exclusively by dates
such as the solar maximum, an eclipse or the arrival of a comet but may often be
829 Ibidem, p. 2.
830 The first quotation is from Bondi's interview with M.S. Hochmuth, reported in Hochmuth (1974), p. 90.
The second is from his interview with J. Krige, on 5 November 1992, in the framework of the ESA
History Project (HAEC). In the latter interview, Bondi recalled in particular a long discussion on this
matter with the influential Dutch scientist H. van de Hulst, at that time the Chairman of ESRO's Scientific
and Technical Committee (STC). Typewritten notes on this meeting (24 October 1967) and Van de
Hulst's "Private notes on CETS" (dated 7 November 1967) are in fact in HAEC, folder 397.
831 AFC, 21st meeting (8-11 March 1966), ESRO/AF/MIN/21, 16 May 1966, p. 9-12. At this meeting only
the Italian delegation expressed concern and aversion towards ESRO's involvement in application satellite
work.
832 The letter, dated 1 December 1965, is reported in ESRO/ST/172, 3 January 1966. A copy of the original
is among the documents that Professor M. Golay has provided for the ESA History Project, HAEC.
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overruled by dates such as those of the Washington meeting [for Intelsat negotiations] in
early 1969.833
ESRO's executive staff would have to be elected taking into account the dual purpose of the
organisation, Peters continued, and "substantial commercial interests [would] have a more or less
direct influence on priorities in the execution of contracts which ESRO places with industry". An
important part of the objectives pursued in setting up the ESRO organisation might be lost, and "one
can even envisage that the scientific effort may become only an appendix". Peters concluded that
ESRO should remain a completely independent scientific organisation and that the best way to
strengthen Europe's position in the Intelsat negotiations was to demonstrate its space capability by
launching the Large Astronomical Satellite on schedule by an ELDO rocket.
At that time, Peters' views were probably shared by a significant fraction of the scientific
community.834 His drastic position, however, could hardly be defended in front of the clear political
drive towards commercial space activities. Scientists had to choose either to defend a rigid position
against ESRO's involvement in application satellites, which could only be defeated, or to state as
strongly as possible the necessary conditions to safeguard the scientific programme in the new
framework. Lüst circulated Peters' letter among several scientists active in ESRO, and the question of
the possible co-operation with the CETS was then discussed at an informal meeting held in Paris in
January 1966. The participants chose the second alternative:
The scientists who participated in the discussion expressed deep concern about the fact
that, whatever collaboration agreements ESRO may enter into with other organisations,
the scientific purpose of ESRO, its programme and the management of the programme by
ESRO, must be fully safeguarded. It was suggested that ESRO express its willingness to
consider, in principle, entering into arrangements on a contractual basis with CETS, for
the purpose of constructing communication satellites, provided that all necessary steps
are taken to ensure that such assistance can be rendered without jeopardising the extent
and time schedule of ESRO's programme.835
In a more formal setting, the matter was discussed again in February at the 8th meeting of the STC.836
The French delegate M. Bignier, speaking in the capacity of chairman of the CETS' Space Technology
Committee, stressed that "everything would be done to ensure that the programmes of CETS and
ESRO did not hinder one another or upset the execution of ESRO's scientific programme in any way".
He underlined that the CETS programme, at that stage, did not imply a commercial application for the
satellite. His arguments, however, did not completely convince the scientists. The Danish Delegation
(B. Peters and O. Petersen) expressed their fear that "the size of the CETS project would overwhelm
ESRO". The Italians (G. Occhialini and E. Cigerza) said that co-operation with the CETS was outside
ESRO's mandate. The British delegation (H. Massey and M.O. Robins) declared that they were in
favour of co-operation with the CETS, but felt that "this was not an inevitable decision for ESRO to
take but rather a special move on ESRO part to assist in the early, exploratory stages of a new
European project". Finally, ESRO's Scientific Director, B. Bolin, listed a few points which had to be
taken into account, "should co-operation with CETS be seriously envisaged". These were:
833 We should stress that Peters' argument here is typical of scientists' standard ideology. We have shown in
the previous chapters that the development of the ESRO scientific programme was hardly dependent only
on such "natural" events but always involved many non-scientific factors.
834 A similar opinion was expressed for example by Golay in a letter to Lüst, 17 January 1966, Golay papers
(HAEC).
835 ESRO/ST/178, 27 January 1966. The scientists present were: L. Biermann, J.E. Blamont, R. Boyd, J.
Coulomb,
R. Frith, B. Hultquist, C. de Jager, R. Lüst, R. Michard, G. Occhialini, B. Peters, P. Swings, A.P.
Willmore. Several letters from other scientists involved in space research but not active in ESRO were
also available at the time of the discussion.
836 STC, 8th meeting (14-15 February 1966), ESRO/ST/MIN/8, 4 April 1966, p. 19-22.
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The budgets must be absolutely separate; the programmes must be well defined, with
detailed planning to safeguard the priorities of the scientific programme; any commercial
aspects must be completely separate from the development phase of the programme; and
there must be a clear definition of the body with which ESRO would have to deal and its
responsibilities vis-à-vis the ESRO Council.837
In the event, the STC, with the Italian delegation voting against and the Belgian and Spanish
delegations abstaining, adopted a recommendation to the Council essentially identical to the statement
issued by the group of scientists one month before.
The subsequent development of discussions about the European space policy made it clear that very
little room existed for the scientists' arguments within the framework of the strong political and
economic interests in conflict. Just a few months after the STC meeting cited above, the outburst of
ESRO's financial crisis and the start of negotiations in view of the planned ESC meeting of July 1967
virtually blocked the decision-making process on ESRO's future scientific satellite programme and
cast a shadow on the very implementation of the programme already defined (the TD programme and
the LAS project). Nor did the Rome conference clear the situation, as we have seen, pending the
conclusions of the  Causse Committee. It became clear to scientists that their hopes and expectations
could only be satisfied within a framework defined at political level, in which all aspects of space
activities found a proper place. Within this framework, science could only be one, and certainly not
the most important, aspect. For national governments and policymakers, space research alone could
not justify the enormous technological, industrial and financial stress that the construction and
launching of spacecraft demanded. And for the space science community the only possibility to foster
their disciplines was to profit as much as possible from the political, economical, and industrial
machinery set in motion by the rapid development of applications satellites. "In the real world an
isolated scientific programme will not be viable itself", the ESRO General Report commented, and the
European space scientists realised that the control over the organisation they had created 6 years
before was definitely slipping out their hands.838
9.5 More political negotiations and new technical studies (1968-1970)
In spite of their enthusiastic reading of the  Causse report in December 1967, Bondi's and the ESRO
staff's optimism was not justified. The first negative signs had already manifested themselves in the
course of that year: in May de Gaulle's veto against the British application for full membership of the
European Community had nullified the main political rationale for Britain to continue supporting
ELDO; two launch failures of Europa I in August and September, due to malfunction in the French
second stage Coralie, called the design of the whole project into question; and in the United Kingdom,
important political circles insisted that Britain should oppose any further investment in ELDO-PAS
and should not take part in the television system proposed by the CETS, arguing that European
countries should relinquish their programmes in communications satellites in exchange for a reduction
of Comsat's dominant position in Intelsat.839 Then, in early 1968, the UK and the Netherlands firmly
opposed a request from the ESRO Directorate, supported by Causse and by the majority of the CETS
and ESC delegations, to authorise a new expenditure of 0.8 MFF in order to enable ESRO to retain the
team of engineers that had carried out the studies of the CETS project and to prepare the pertinent
tender documents, pending the ESC Bonn meeting.840 Finally, called to give its opinion on the Causse
Report, the British government announced in April 1968 that the United Kingdom would not
837 Ibidem, p. 20. The very same conditions had been expressed by Bolin just a few days before at the
meeting of the CO/STC working group: see "Summary Report", cit., p. 2-3).
838 ESRO, General Report, 1968, p. 11.
839 Estimates Committee (1967).
840 ESRO/C/311, 30 November 1967, and add. 1, 27 March 1968; ESRO/C/327, 5 February 1968.
Documents and correspondence related to this episode are in folders 397 and 402, HAEC.
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undertake further financial commitments to ELDO and would not participate in the CETS project for
the Eurovision satellite.841
The announcement came as a political bombshell that struck all those who kept advocating a European
"balanced space programme". Three meetings of the ELDO ministerial conference were held in four
months in order to keep the Europa programmes going on, in spite of the expected overspend above
the ceilings fixed in July 1966, and to determine the conditions for keeping the Organisation alive.842
As to the CETS, its Committee of Deputies held a meeting in London on 16-17 May to overcome the
British position and to define a joint policy document in view of the forthcoming Intelsat negotiations.
All efforts aborted, however, and the very legitimacy of CETS' role was put in question. In the words
of ESRO's legal adviser, H. Kaltenecker:
This example shows clearly the inefficiency of the CETS body as such and the need to
establish in Europe a strong guidance in this respect. [...] I think that the time is ripe for
the ESRO Secretariat to make its position clear. We have the obligation to make clear to
Member States, with a view to our future planned activities in the application satellite
sector, what legal, administrative, political and technical consequences might arise if the
European position with regard to the establishment of regional systems is not strongly
safeguarded in future Intelsat arrangements.843
For ESRO (and ELDO) top management a possible way out was that the Intelsat question be discussed
within the framework of the ESC, "even if that means that the CETS loses its last reason of being".
The situation was not better there, however, given the tight political interlinking between
communications satellites and launchers. In this disarray there was no foundation for convening the
new meeting of the ESC to discuss the  Causse Report, and the ESRO telecommunications programme
could certainly not start. If we consider that, in the same period, ESRO was still without an agreed
level of resources for its second three-year period and, moreover, it was suffering from the dramatic
failure of the TD programme, we can fully appreciate Bondi's comment one year later: "In the early
summer of 1968, it was hard not to despair of a European space future".844
9.5.1 The Bad Godesberg Conference
By the end of the year a possible compromise had been worked out and the third meeting of the
European Space Conference could finally be called, on 12-14 November 1968 in Bad Godesberg, near
Bonn.845 This compromise was based on three main elements. Firstly, it was decided that one European
space organisation should be created out of the existing ESRO, ELDO and CETS, and a Committee of
Senior Officials was set up to work out the procedures for the amalgamation. Secondly, it was agreed
that the programme of the new organisation should consist in a minimum programme, mandatory for
all Member States, and a number of optional programmes, in which only interested states would
841 "Space cutback by Britain puts ELDO future in doubt" and "ELDO: the booster we can well do without",
The Times, 17 April 1968. See also Krige (1992b).
842 The three sessions of the ELDO ministerial conference were held on 11-12 July, 1-2 October, and
11 November 1968, and are reported on respectively in ESRO/ELDO Bulletin, no. 2 (August 1968)
24-29;
no. 3 (November 1968) 21-32; no. 4 (January 1969) 39-41.
843 ESRO, Memorandum from Kaltenecker to Bondi, 10 July 1968, HAEC, folder 1143. A note from the
ELDO Executive expressing similar concern was attached to the memorandum. See also "More
negotiation for Intelsat", Nature, 218, 714 (25 May 1968). The inability of CETS to reach consensus vis-
à-vis the Intelsat negotiations is again registered by Kaltenecker six month later, in a memorandum dated
24 January 1969, commenting on the meeting of the CETS-Committee of Deputies of 22 January 1969;
and again by ELDO's M. Bourély in a report dated 3 November 1969, on the meeting of the same body of
29-30 October 1969: both in HAEC, folder 1143.
844 Bondi (1969), p. 4. See also Bondi (1984).
845 ESC, Bad Godesberg meeting (12-14 November 1968), CSE/CM(November 68)PV/1-4,
12-26 November 1968. The resolutions adopted at the Bad Godesberg conference are in
ESRO/ELDO Bulletin, n. 4 (January 1969), p. 8-13.
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participate. While it was clear that launcher development was to be considered as an optional
programme, the actual content of the minimum programme was left open, pending the definition of the
new Convention.846 Finally, the third element regarded the controversial issue of launchers. It was
agreed that the interested Member States could continue developing the programme for a European
launcher, on the basis of a revision of the ELDO-PAS project made necessary to keep it within the
foreseen budget. It was assumed that the European countries should undertake on average two
launches per year but, in order to protect the interests of non-launcher states, it was agreed that these
states should not pay for any price difference higher than 25 per cent of the price of comparable non-
European launchings.847
Two important decisions were taken by the Bad Godesberg conference regarding ESRO: the first was
the authorisation to the ESRO Council to approve a level of resources for the scientific programme in
the three-year period 1969-71 in the amount requested (860 MFF); the second was the authorisation of
financial commitments for individual scientific projects extending beyond 1971, i.e. beyond the period
covered by the original ESRO Convention. The Conference, however, frustrated ESRO's plans in the
application satellite field. It granted in fact the sum of 1 MAU (or 5 MFF) per year to pursue
preliminary studies on various application programmes, but it did not authorise the start of
development work on the Eurovision satellite. The interested Governments were rather requested to
express their opinion as to their participation by 1 March 1969. Subsequently, a governmental
conference would be called "in order to reach a decision on the execution of the project on the basis of
the economic and technical information available".848 This further delay was considered with some
disappointment in ESRO: "[It] is bound to have ill effects in industry and to lower their confidence in
us", Bondi commented in this respect.849
9.5.2 More ELDO problems
The lack of decision derived again from the unsolved problems in ELDO. The Bad Godesberg
compromise, in fact, was based on a sort of "confidence trick" which would be put to the test at the
following ELDO Council meeting.850 By a striking volte-face on its space policy, in fact, the UK
government, represented at the conference by the Minister of Technology Anthony W. Benn,
announced that it would support application satellite programmes in ESRO, including the CETS relay
satellite. Britain however conditioned her financial participation in such programmes on her release
from commitments to ELDO under the existing arrangements.851 This condition was not accepted by
other ELDO partners in Bad Godesberg and all decisions were thus deferred to the next ELDO
Council meeting which, in turn, was postponed in order to see the outcome of the key F7 test flight of
Europa 1, the first orbital test with all three stages operational.
The test, on 29 November, was a failure, due to a malfunction in the German third stage Astris, and
the Council meetings held on that same day and then on 19-20 December could not go better.852 The
846 An anticipation of optional programmes was the agreement on the TD-1 satellite project, approved by the
ESRO Council in October 1968 as a "special project" funded by all Member States bar Italy.
847 A crude analysis of the conflicting feelings and interests regarding the launcher problem is offered in
Bondi's comment on the Bad Godesberg conference: Bondi (1969).
848 ESRO/ELDO Bulletin, n. 4 (January 1969), p. 9. The sum of 5 MFF is reported in ESRO, General Report
1968, p. 12. The figure in the conference resolution is 1 MAU. Besides continuing studies on the
television satellite, the Conference recommended the start of studies on other application projects such as
meteorological satellites, satellites for air and maritime traffic control, semi-direct TV broadcasting, and
Earth resources.
849 Bondi (1969), p. 6. The frustration of the ESRO staff regarding the progress of the communications
satellite programme is also evident in ESRO, General Report, 1968, pp. 89-92.
850 "A key to European future", Nature, 220, 730-731 (23 November 1968). See also, ibidem, the pessimistic
editorial on the conclusions of the Bad Godesberg Conference: "Europe leaps into the dark", pp. 727-728.
851 CSE/CM(November 68)PV/1, Annex 3.
852 The F7 test flight is described in ESRO/ELDO Bulletin, n. 4 (January 1969), 14-19. A very short report
on the Council meetings is ibidem, 40-41. The dramatic development of discussions can be appreciated
from the minutes: ELDO/C(68)PV/7, 12 December 1968, and ELDO/C(68)PV/8, 17 January 1969.
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British and Italian governments formally announced that they were unwilling to pay their full share for
the completion of current programmes and were not interested in participating in the future
programmes. As a consequence, the 1969 budget could not be voted by the Council and a new
ministerial conference of ELDO Member States was called.853 The conference took place on 15 April
1969 and a solution was found to the Organisation's new budgetary crisis, with France, Germany,
Belgium and the Netherlands agreeing to make up the difference resulting from the reduction of the
British and Italian contribution. At the same time, in adherence to the programme described in the
Causse Report, these four countries, together with Australia and Italy, decided to start studies on a new
rocket, the two-stage Europa 3, capable of launching geostationary satellites with a mass up to 700 kg,
the size of the communications satellites foreseen in the 1970s. Finally, the Conference authorised
ELDO to study the conditions for producing not only prototype rockets but ready-for-use Europa
launchers on behalf of commercial users. This "production programme" was much sought after by
France and Germany, in view of their eventual order for two Europa 2 rockets to launch Symphonie.854
9.5.3 Dragging on
The uncertainty over ELDO affected negatively the progress of the Eurovision project in ESRO, and
the compromise on the ELDO budget reached in April did not ease the situation. In fact, the
governments interested in the CETS/EBU experimental satellite were unable to decide on participation
in the project by 1 March 1969, as requested by the Bad Godesberg conference, and an attempt by
Bondi to convene a governmental conference on the CETS-C project in June or early July aborted
because of the ongoing uncertainties.855 Although the attitudes of most governments appeared
favourable, the time was not ripe yet for a governmental conference to approve the project for at least
three reasons. The first regarded of course the launcher problem: even considering the new
compromise reached on ELDO, the PAS satellite project had to be considerably modified in order to
be adapted to the requirements of the CETS-C satellite and, moreover, most of the development costs
of the system (e.g. ground facilities and the apogee motor) were now to be borne by the CETS
programme. In this situation, ESRO engineers were requested to study the possibility of launching the
CETS/EBU satellites by means of a Thor-Delta rocket instead of Europa 2 and to compare the two
options. The study showed that the use of the American launcher was technically feasible and possibly
cheaper.856 As a matter of fact, the ESRO staff wanted to de-couple the satellite project from the
controversial question of the choice of the launcher, but this, of course, was opposed by the French
delegation at the CETS. It was then agreed to keep the satellite associate with the ELDO launcher but
to consider the possibility of using a Thor-Delta in two years' time after the start of the project. As a
consequence, the industrial studies for the definition phase of the project were requested to consider
both options as to the launching vehicle. However, given the complete uncertainty about the launching
system to be eventually adopted, no reliable information could be obtained on how much money
would be tied up in the expensive launcher business and the financing of the programme remained
uncertain.857
The second reason for uncertainty regarded the selection of prime contractorship for the programme
management. ESRO's study foresaw that this should be entrusted to ESRO itself but CETS Member
853 Italy's disillusion with ELDO derived from the fact that, in order to keep the project within the 1966
budget, the Europa programme had been scaled back by cancelling the apogee motor and the PAS test
satellite, both contracted with the Italian industry.
854 The resolutions approved at the ELDO ministerial conference are reported in ESRO/ELDO Bulletin, n. 5,
(May 1969), pp. 19-30. The growing importance of Germany in ELDO is testified by the fact that the
Conference agreed that German should become the third official language of the Organisation, "enjoying
equal status with English and French".
855 Information for this paragraph derives from correspondence and other documents in folder 1143, HAEC.
856 Telex from P. Blassel to J. Dinkespiler, 14 October 1968, in folders 402 and 1143, HAEC.
857 Simmons to Bignier, 20 December 191968 (reporting on a joint TPS/ESRO/EBU meeting on
18 December 1968); ESRO's L.T. Trollope, notes on the CETS STC meeting of 8 January 1969: both in
folder 1143, HAEC. CETS STC, meeting of 30 September 1969, SCL/ST.35/Report, 20 October 1969,
folder 397, HAEC.
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States insisted that it should be entrusted to industry. A first compromise was worked out by the ESRO
Directorate in May 1968, which was approved by the CETS. It foresaw a rather muddled procedure
which involved complex sharing of responsibility between CETS, ESRO, an industrial prime
contractor, and several subcontractors. Eventually, ESRO's usual method of placing a contract for the
whole project with one industrial consortium was adopted, but with some modification in order to
have a prolonged competitive phase. This involved a first phase where two or three consortia were
contracted to prepare design studies of the project, and then a competitive evaluation to select the
consortium to carry out full development.858 The formation of industrial consortia in the field of
satellite telecommunication and the definition of appropriate tender actions were thus necessary pre-
conditions for further actions in the ESRO/CETS programme. This was not plain, however, "since the
Member States did not all have a common industrial policy in this respect", as the ESRO staff
remarked disconsolately.859 In fact, the competition regarding industrial leadership to be gained in this
new field was added in this case to the ever present problem of fair geographical distribution of
contracts. The problem was further complicated by the presence of the already established consortium
working on Symphonie.
The foreseeable competition with Symphonie was in fact the third reason for uncertainty. It was
evident that the European market for regional communications satellites could not sustain two
competing products and therefore only one project could survive for operational activity after the
experimental phase. Delicate technical, industrial, and political issues were thus involved in any
decision regarding the "European" project. After the Bad Godesberg conference, the ESRO engineers
prepared two documents to confirm the validity of the Eurafrica satellite for the Eurovision needs, and
to stress the superiority of its design with respect both to the Franco-German project and to the Intelsat
III satellite.860 At the same time, however, the Symphonie industrial consortium and the executive
committee of the project started studying new versions of the satellite, Symphonie B and C, which
satisfied the EBU specifications and involved a wider range of European industry.861
The problem then was whether and how to correlate the Symphonie programme and the ESRO/CETS
programme, and this involved technical issues (i.e. compatibility between the two designs), industrial
competition (i.e. the relationship between the Symphonie industrial consortium and other European
aerospace and communications industries), and political questions related to the further development
of the European space telecommunications programme (from TV relay to semi-direct and direct TV
distribution) and of the ELDO launcher programme (from Europa II to Europa III).862 In this respect
the position of the CETS remained a very difficult one, as it officially sponsored one project (the
Eurafrica satellite) but its two most influent members were engaged in a competing project.863 Nor was
ESRO's position easier, for the very same reason.
858 Information for this paragraph is from documents in folder 402, HAEC.
859 ESRO, General Report 1968, p. 90.
860 "The distribution of Eurovision by satellite: the interest of the pre-operational CETS-C project",
31 December 1968; and "Comparaison des satellites CETS-C, Symphonie, Intelsat III et Intelsat IV au
point de vue de l'Eurovision", 3 January 1969: both in folder 1143, HAEC.
861 Davidson (1970), p. 12. Symphonie and CETS-C were the object of careful comparison by the EBU
representative at the 35th meeting of the CETS Space Technology Committee (30 September 1969),
SCL/ST.35/Report, 20 October 1969. See also Collette (1993).
862 These aspects are presented in an unsigned and undated handwritten note with the title "The problem of
Europe's telecommunications satellite", in folder 1143, HAEC. The author is most probably Bondi and it
appears that the note was written in spring 1969.
863 An example of this difficulty is given by the discussions at the meeting of the Committee of Deputy of
the CETS of 29-30 October 1969, as reported by ELDO's M. Bourély to ESRO's and ELDO's
Directorates, 3 November 1969, folder 1143, HAEC.
287
9.5.4 The PTTs step in
At the end of June, the EBU made an official request to the ESC, "asking to be told the Conference's
intentions with regard to the development of a space system for television distribution".864 Following
this move, the ESC's Committee of Senior Officials asked ESRO to start an industrial consultation in
order to obtain definite proposals for the realisation of the Eurafrica project. It also recommended that
a governmental conference should be called by mid-November in order to finally take a decision on
the execution of the television satellite programme and to inform accordingly the EBU Administrative
Council, whose meeting was scheduled for 20 November.865 Three large industrial consortia responded
to the request of consultation and submitted their proposals which, after proper evaluation, were
presented to the Committee of Senior Officials on 3-4 November.866 Here, however, a bad news and a
good news were announced that put everything under discussion again. The bad news was the EBU
report on their pessimistic conclusions about the costs of the 1975-1985 operational phase: after new
evaluation, a television relay satellite system embracing Europe and North Africa would be more
expensive than the terrestrial Eurovision network it sought to replace. The good news was the CEPT
announcement that they wished to be involved in the definition of a European communications
satellite on behalf of PTT administrations. Such a satellite, of course, was to provide allowance not
only for television but also for other classes of traffic of interest for the PTTs, such as intra-European
telephony, telegraphy and telex traffic, and data transmission.
Two main reasons can be identified for this change of attitude by the PTTs. The first was the now
demonstrated technical and commercial reliability of communications satellites, and the growth in
demand of telephony services they had determined. We should recall in this respect that the PTT move
happened just after the new Intelsat III satellites started providing world coverage for telephonic traffic
and TV links with the moon. The peculiar role of satellites vis-à-vis cables (i.e. not only competition
but also complementarity) in a world-wide telecommunications system was now evident. Satellites
orbiting above oceans and continents, rather than cables laid across mountains and seas, provided
easier and less expensive links with underdeveloped countries in large regions of the Earth, and
allowed greater flexibility in handling large fluctuations in the demand (e.g. when important events
like the Olympic Games or the outbreak of a local war called for much more capacity). The second
reason was more political and regarded the on-going negotiations for the definitive Intelsat
agreements, started in February 1969. We shall not deal with this matter here but a short comment
may be useful.867 European countries wanted to remove Comsat from its dominant position and
advocated the right to establish regional systems of satellite telecommunications besides Intelsat's
global network. The European space industry, represented by Eurospace, was very active in supporting
these concepts but it was also necessary that the PTT administrations play their part. Thus, a political
pressure likely existed on them to adopt a more sanguine approach to satellite telecommunications.
We can recall in this respect that in the autumn of 1969 the United States finally agreed to the
864 ESRO, General Report 1969, p. 124. See also "The European Space Conference", ESRO/ELDO Bulletin,
n. 6 (July 1969), p.15.
865 Resolution adopted by the ESC's Committee of Senior Officials at its meetings of 3-4 July 1969 and 28-
29 July 1969: CSE/HF/(69)28, 29 July 1969.
866 The three consortia were led respectively by Hawker Siddeley Dynamics (with Matra, Erno, Saab, Fiat,
and LCT), Thomson-CSF (with Fokker, Dornier, Elliot, Fiar, and GEC-AEI), and MBB and British
Aircraft (with Nord and Sud Aviation (eventually merging in Aérospatiale), ETCA, Selenia, Siemens and
AEG-Telefunken). The latter consortium was essentially that of Symphonie. ESRO, General Report 1969,
pp. 124-127.
867 The Intelsat negotiations started on 24 February 1969, in the presence of delegations from 63 Intelsat
Member States (they had become 77 by the time of the closing of the conference, in May 1971) as well as
from the United Nations, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), and ITU Member States not
Intelsat members. The Conference held three sessions at plenipotentiary level: in February-March 1969,
February-March 1970, and May 1971. The final vote for the definitive agreements took place on 21 May
and then, after the necessary ratifications, the permanent structure entered into force on 12 February 1973.
Alegrett (1979); Galloway (1972), pp. 155-164; Smith (1976), pp. 141-155.
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establishment of regional systems, provided that a two-thirds vote of the Intelsat Assembly recognised
there would be no economic or technical incompatibility between the two systems.868
Facing the new situation, the Committee of Senior Officials decided to submit the ESRO/CETS
mission to fresh study and set up a joint working group of representatives of ECS, CEPT, EBU, ESRO
and ELDO. The terms of reference of the Working Group were to study the possibility of carrying out
an economically viable European communications satellite programme that could satisfy the
requirements of the CEPT and EBU for the period 1975-1985. In the first phase, the satellite was to be
compatible with the capability of the Europa 2 launcher.869 By April 1970, the study on the new
mission was completed and a report issued. It recommended a two-phase approach: an initial (ca. 200
kg) experimental satellite carrying about 1000 telephony circuits and one television channel, suitable
for launch by Europa 2 in 1975, followed by a major (400 to 500 kg) satellite carrying up to 4000
telephony circuits and two television channels for launch around 1980. The Ministers of Posts and
Telecommunications of the CEPT countries, convened in Brussels on 28 April 1970, endorsed the
project.870
Again ESRO was ready for the new meeting of the ESC, scheduled on 22-24 July 1970 in Brussels.871
Three years had elapsed since the Organisation's first studies on a communications satellite for CETS,
and almost two years since the previous ESC session, in Bad Godesberg, which had approved the
principle that ESRO be involved in application satellite programmes. In the words of the
Organisation's Director General:
During this period, although considerable progress has been made in the studies, ESRO
has been rather like an athlete "limbering up" in anticipation of the starter's gun, at the
same time being somewhat uncertain when the gun would, in fact, be fired.872
ESRO, however, felt confident that a reliable partner had now been found and a politically appropriate
framework created: the PTT administrations in fact not only held legal monopolies on
telecommunications but also were part of the governments of the countries which were to be involved
in the programme. In spite of the difficulties and delays in the actual implementation of the Bad
Godesberg compromise, the ESRO staff could sound a note of optimism once again:
In these conditions, it is not unreasonable to expect the first half of 1970 to lead to our
governments' eagerly awaited full approval of the development of a telecommunication
satellite and to hope for the approval of a second line of applications before the end of
the year. [...] Applications stand at the very hinge of Europe's future in space. Without a
true involvement in applications, there can be no united political will, no increasing
industrial involvement, and no comprehensive or indeed comprehensible direction to the
space effort.873
868 Galloway (1972), pp. 155-164; Smith (1976), pp. 141-151. Eurospace's position was expressed in
Eurospace (1969).
869 "The European Space Conference", ESRO/ELDO Bulletin, n. 8 (January 1970), pp. 10-11; "Studies on
application satellites", Ibidem, n. 9 (April 1970), pp. 18-19; ESRO, General Report 1969, p. 124.
870 Davidson (1970). A summary of the Joint Working Group's report and of ESRO's comments on it are in
Select Committee (1971), pp. 242-244.
871 Together with the developments on the communications satellite programme described above, we should
mention that, in accordance with the Bad Godesberg resolutions, first studies were pursued in 1969 and
early 1970 on two other kinds of application missions, namely on an air traffic control satellite for the
North Atlantic (in co-operation with NASA) and on a meteorological satellite (in consultation with the
meteorological offices of member countries): "Studies on application satellites", ESRO/ELDO Bulletin, 9
(April 1970), 18-19.
872 Bondi (1970).
873 ESRO, General Report 1969, p. 9.
289
9.6 The crisis of the ESC and the ESRO "package deal" (1970-1971)
Once again, the optimism was not justified. Two sessions of the fourth meeting of the European Space
Conference, on 22-24 July and 4 November 1970, did not succeed in reaching an agreement on the
critical issues of launcher development and relationship with the United States.874 The latent crisis that
had for some years characterised the European space activities burst out at the second meeting, where
"the disunity between the countries favouring a 'coherent policy' including an independent European
launcher effort and the others reached such a magnitude that the meeting broke up".875 By the end of
the year, all plans for a unified European organisation receded and the future itself of Europe in space
appeared rather grim. Denmark and France went as far as to denounce the ESRO Convention in order
not to incur financial obligations extending beyond the first eight year period.
Given this situation, progress in the field of application satellites could only be very slow, in spite of
the fact that, at the first session of the Conference, "there was unanimous recognition of the fact that
applications satellites - in particular television satellites - must form the central element of any space
program worthy of Europe".876 In July, in fact, the ESC did finally decide to undertake a programme
aimed at developing the CEPT/EBU satellite, but the Conference authorised and funded only the very
first stage of the programme. Of the total cost of the project, estimated at 450 MAU, only a sum of
5 MAU was made available to ESRO up to mid-1971. This was certainly "a considerable step forward
from the 1 MAU per annum previously available for the whole application programme", Bondi
commented, but not yet a definite green light to programme development. The persisting uncertainty
about the future of Europe in space did not allow the participants in the ESC July meeting to enter into
a more resolute commitment. It was decided that decisions to proceed to the next stages of the
application programmes would be taken later by a "double qualified majority", namely a positive vote
of two-thirds of the states and two-thirds of the contributions. This was enough to justify Bondi's
prudent optimism in September; the dramatic conclusion of the November meeting showed that much
still had to be done.877
9.6.1 The ESRO "package deal" of 1971
Commenting on the grim events of 1970, the Chairman of the ESRO Council, the Dutch scientist
H. van de Hulst, wrote:
874 ESC, Brussel meetings (22-24 July 1970 and 4 November 1970), CSE/CM(July 70)PV/1-3 rev.,
30 July 1970; CSE/CM(November 70)PV/1-2, 4 November 1970 and 19 November 1970. It must be
recalled that the July meeting of the ESC was held about one month after the F9 (and actually last) launch
of Europa I, which failed again because of the accidental disconnection of a plug during the powered
flight of the first stage. The nose fairings were not jettisoned and, moreover, a deficiency of third-stage
thrust occurred in its flight. As a result, "the planned orbit was not achieved [and] the combined third
stage and nose fairings enclosing the satellite flew over the North Pole zone and came down in the
Caribbean north of Guyana". The satellite carried a communications experiment built by a number of
CETS Member States. ESRO/ELDO Bulletin, n. 10 (June 1970), 10-11, on p. 11.
875 ESRO, General Report 1970, p. 9. The November meeting concluded with a press release because the
participants could not agree on a formal resolution: ESRO/ELDO Bulletin, n. 12 (November 1970), pp. 6-
7. A contemporary account of the crisis, as seen by an advocate of a joint European effort in space
between the July and the November ESC meetings, is given in Tassin (1970).
876 Foreword of T. Lefèvre, President of the ECS, to ESRO/ELDO Bulletin, n. 11, September 1970, p. 4.
This issue of the Bulletin was entirely devoted to the July meeting and reports the resolutions approved.
877 The quotation is from Bondi (1970), p. 28. Positive decisions were also taken in July regarding two other
application programmes, i.e. an aeronautical satellite programme, in cooperation with NASA, and an
meteorological satellite programme, in consultation with the European meteorological authorities. The
sums of 5 MAU and 2.5 MAU were allocated for these programmes, respectively, up to end 1971.
Studies of other application satellites (Earth resources, and direct and semi-direct television broadcasting)
were also authorised within the budget allocated to the meteorological programme. For a description of
progress work in these application satellite programmes by the end of 1970, see ESRO General Report
1970, 9-17.
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If the metaphor is correct, that the European Space Conference is the roof covering the
various space activities and organisations in Europe, then ESRO has in 1970 been
working under a leaky roof. This had no immediate effects on the quality or quantity of
the work done internally but by the end of the year staff and delegations were making
ready to push the furniture around once it became clear where the drip would come
through the ceiling.
Facing the failure of the European Space Conference, ESRO Member States agreed that their
delegations to the Council should negotiate further, leaving aside the problems which had led the ECS
to deadlock. In spite of the difficulties and setbacks in the definition of a global space policy for
Europe, and against the failure of ELDO and CETS, ESRO had proved to be sufficiently reliable and
successful in its work, acquired maturity and competence in managing industrial contracts, and already
established a firm basis for the development of applications satellites, which appeared to be the true
political and economic rationale for European co-operation in space.878
The new Chairman of the Council, the Italian physicist G. Puppi, former Chairman of the ESC's
Committee of Senior Officials, was given the task of negotiating a suitable compromise in order to
drive the Organisation, as smoothly as possible, to its new institutional obligations in the application
field and, at the same time, to offer European space policymakers new ground for negotiations. After
one full year of intense negotiations and several Council meetings, the compromise was worked out
and it became known as the "first package deal".879 From the point of view of this chapter, the main
aspect of the deal is the decision that ESRO should finally cease to be an organisation solely devoted
to scientific research and undertake three application satellite programmes with different sets of
Member States involved (optional programmes), namely:
a. An aeronautical satellite programme, with the participation of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy,
the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, in co-operation with the
U.S. Federal Aviation Administration. The maximum level of resources made available by
European states for this programme was not to exceed 100 MAU.880
b. A meteorological satellite programme, with the participation of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy,
the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. The maximum level of resources
made available by these States was fixed at 115 MAU.881
c. A communications satellite programme, with the participation of Belgium, France, Germany,
Italy, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, according to plans already established for the
CEPT/EBU mission.882
These three programmes were to be executed simultaneously and, at the same time, ESRO would also
carry out exploratory studies in other application fields. In particular these studies regarded satellites
for Earth resource survey, for maritime navigation, and for semi-direct and direct TV broadcasting.883
878 "Statement by the Director General" at the 35th session of Council (22 December 1970), ESRO/C/483,
18 December 1970. See also van de Hulst's letter to the ESRO Council delegations (5 December 1970),
ESRO/C/473, 10 November 1970.
879 ESRO Council, 44th session, (20 December 1971), ESRO/C/MIN/44, 6 January 1972. The Council
resolution is reported in ESRO, General Report 1971, p. 129-132, and in ESRO/ELDO Bulletin, n. 17,
(February 1972), p. 6-11.
880 Canada was also involved in the programme and eventually Denmark joined the other ESRO Member
States. All figures are at mid-1971 prices.
881 The agreement to proceed with the Meteosat Programme was eventually signed in 1972 by Belgium,
Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
882 Eventually Denmark joined the programme.
883 Studies on such missions had already started in 1971 and are described in ESRO, General Report 1971,
pp. 53-56.
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To appreciate the growing importance of application programmes in the work of the Organisation, one
can considers that for the years 1972, 1973 and 1974 these were to be provided for by the participating
Member States at 22.8 MAU, 48.5 MAU and 63.4 MAU respectively, eventually reaching an annual
level of resources of 72 MAU in the period 1975-1977. ESRO's four major countries (France,
Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy) agreed in principle to contribute to a minimum total level of
resources of 70 MAU per year from 1974 to 1980 for the application programmes. In comparison, the
budget for the scientific satellite programme for 1972, 1973 and 1974 was fixed at 42.7 MAU,
37.0 MAU and 32.7 MAU respectively, eventually reaching the level of 28 MAU in the years
1975-1977 (Tables 9-2 and 9-3, and Figure 8-1).884
The 1971 package deal was made possible by essentially two key elements: the implementation of the
optional programme system announced at the Bad Godesberg conference of November 1968, and the
exclusion of the controversial launcher problem from the negotiations. It was agreed that only the
scientific programme and the basic activities should be included in the mandatory programme, to
which all Member States had to contribute according to their gross national product.885 This mandatory
programme was significantly reduced, as we have seen, in order to release funds for application
programmes. Participation in the optional programmes was based on a scale of contributions derived
from the mandatory budget, with the only modification that shortfalls due to the non-participation of
some Member States were distributed between the participating states pro rata to their normal share.
As to the hot question of launchers, the ESRO Council re-affirmed the Bad Godesberg agreement that
the Organisation would give priority to European launchers, "on the condition that the cost of a
launching does not exceed 125 % of the cost of the relevant non-European launching". It also stated,
however, that if an appropriate launcher for a specific mission were denied from outside Europe,
ESRO would procure the necessary launcher for this mission in Europe, contributing to its
development costs if necessary. The guidelines to be followed in this eventuality were carefully
defined in the Council resolution.
The 1971 package deal marked "the beginning of a new period in the life of ESRO".886 The
Organisation was definitely transformed into a space agency mainly devoted to applications satellites
with just a minor fraction of its activity and its funds devoted to science. Within this framework, the
telecommunications satellite programme could finally enter the development phase, after 5 years of
discussions and mission definition studies, and almost ten years after Telstar. The package deal also
represented the most important positive element in the ongoing discussions over the European space
policy which were to lead to the (second) package deal of 1973 and eventually to the creation of the
European Space Agency (ESA) in 1975. With the spectacular failure of the first - and actually the last
- launch of the Europa II rocket, on 5 November 1971, and the eventual cancellation of ELDO's
Europa programme in early 1973, ESRO became the very core and model of the new agency.
9.7 Concluding remarks
The difficult start of satellite telecommunications in Europe which we have discussed in this chapter
calls for a few considerations. The first is about the importance of the political dimension in the whole
story. From the technical point of view, designing and developing a communications satellite
programme was an interesting and stimulating job for ESTEC engineers and an important opportunity
for the European industry. The challenge was accepted and good results obtained.  The economics of a
884 All figures given above are at mid-1971 prizes and include contingency. Information for this paragraph is
taken from G. Puppi's and A. Hocker's comments to the Council resolution of December 1971,
ESRO/ELDO Bulletin, n. 17 (February 1972), p. 11-14 and 14-19.
885 The basic activities included technological studies, technical information and education programmes, and
common costs that could not be allocated to individual scientific and application programmes.
The inclusion of technological studies in the basic activities was a matter of controversy, as reported in
Hocker's comment on the council decisions: ESRO/ELDO Bulletin, n. 17 (February 1972), 14-19,
on p. 18.
886 ESRO, General Report 1971, p. 9.
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European communications satellite system was quite a different matter, however, and the lack of
enthusiasm among those responsible for telecommunications derived not only from their generally
conservative attitude but also from the great uncertainty about the actual possibility that such a system
might  become  more economical in comparison  with the expanding ground network. As late as 1970,
the estimates of the total number of telephone circuits in Europe to be routed via satellite varied from
3000 to 5000 for 1980, from 5000 to 10000 for 1985, and from 8000 to 20000 for 1990. And the
satellite system was expected to become more economical than the terrestrial network not before 1989
according to the pessimists, and by 1982-83 according to the optimists. The UK Ministry of Posts and
Telecommunications, for its part, insisted that satellites could never be cheaper than cables for intra-
European links.887
Here is how one of the protagonists, who was to become the Secretary General of Eutelsat, saw the
situation in his recollections:
The size of the European continent, and the relations within the countries in its western
part, meant that a satellite system would only be able to involve links carrying low-
density traffic. The distribution of television programmes seemed more promising, but the
EBU in its turn regarded the project as far too expensive, and rejected it. In 1967, then, it
was still madness to talk in terms of a satellite system within Europe. Unlike INTELSAT,
which was meeting a real need in improving communications between continents, a
telecommunications satellite for Europe seemed on the evidence available to be a 'luxury'
which Europe did not need and the telecommunications administrations could not
afford.888
In the event, it was politics that provided the necessary impulse, and the long negotiating process that
eventually led to the start of the programme was a matter of policy. The decision not to rely on the
US-dominated Intelsat system within the area of European cultural influence, the decision not to be
dependent on American launchers, and the decision to qualify the European industry for prime
contractorship in the promising market of satellite telecommunications were all aspects of a wider
political initiative which involved foreign policy, technological and industrial policy, and general
economic interests. The French government was the most convinced advocate of such decisions, with
the important support of Germany and Belgium; the United Kingdom was their main opponent,
backed by Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries; a way out could only be found on the political
ground and had to cover not just telecommunications but all aspects of space policy.
The second consideration regards "the pendulum swinging between cooperation at a European level
and selfishness at the national level".889 Here again the issue was mainly political. Facing the American
initiative in the early 1960s, the European countries felt they had to define a united position and
created the CETS. This, however, was a rather hybrid forum, involving foreign ministries, PTT
agencies, ministries of industry, etc. Thus, after the conclusion of the 1964 Intelsat Interim
Agreements, the conflict between different interests and concerns made discussions frustrating and
decisions useless. Both CETS's tasks could not be fulfilled, namely the definition of a common
European position vis-à-vis the negotiation for the definitive Intelsat arrangement and the realisation
of a joint European communications satellite project. With the crisis of ELDO and the successes of the
first Intelsat satellites, in 1967-1970, the pendulum swung towards national or bi-national projects.
France and Germany started Symphonie and Italy Sirio; Britain got involved in the Anglo-American
defence system Skynet. But Symphonie needed a launcher, and France and Germany needed Britain to
887 The figures are from Davidson (1970), p. 13. The pessimistic view was that of the joint working group set
up by the ESC at the end of 1969; the optimists were in ESRO. See Select Committee (1971), pp. 242-
244. The forecasts varied according to different estimates about the growth rate in total telephone traffic,
the minimum distance between centres to be linked by satellite circuits, and the proportion of total traffic
to be routed via the satellite.
888 Caruso (1984), p. 107.
889 Collette (1993), p. 83.
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get it. The pendulum had therefore to stay in the "European" field. In this field, the ESRO Directorate
and ESRO's smaller Member States (Belgium in particular) could play their best cards. Politics
demanded that both European ventures and national programmes be protected. Finding a compromise
required a long time and laborious negotiations but it had to be reached for Europe to keep a decent
role in space. The 1971 package deal was an important step forward for the joint European effort, and
it paved the way for the more important compromise of 1973. ESRO's project, however, still had to
fight on the commercial terrain against the Franco-German project. In the event, two industrial
consortia in the space telecommunications field emerged in Europe, one which was building
Symphonie and one which was eventually contracted to build ESRO's Orbiting Test Satellite (OTS).890
Finally, a last consideration regards the "genetic change" in ESRO. The transition from a scientifically
oriented programme to one primarily directed towards applications raised concern among scientists
but eventually gave them the assurance that scientific investigation in space was firmly anchored to
wider political and economic interests. The fact that the scientific programme was made mandatory
within the framework of strong institutional and financial commitments freed the development of
scientific projects from the uncertainties that had plagued the first phase of ESRO's history. Less
money was available, unfortunately, but long-term planning was finally possible. From the
organisational point of view, pending the outcome of ESC negotiations and the birth of the new space
agency, ESRO Member States had to define a new institutional framework, with new bodies delegated
to deal with application matters, and the ESRO management had to re-arrange its internal organisation
to confront the new tasks.
Many important questions about the role of Europe in space remained open after the 1971 package
deal, the most important being of course the ever-present problem of the launcher policy and the
relationship with the United States. But the decision of the ESRO Council that the Organisation should
assume a multiple role was a real turning point for the history of the European space effort. The path
was now open for the establishment of an organisation responsible for the execution of scientific and
applications satellite programmes and related industrial policy on the continental scale. Much still had
to be done, but it was now impossible to go back.
890 Collette (1993). Details on the OTS story in the following chapter. Both satellites and their follow-ups




Membership of European organisations in 1965
Countries CEPT CETS ESRO ELDO
Australia * x
Austria * x x
Belgium * x x x x
Cyprus x x
Denmark * x x x
Finland x
France * x x x x
Germany * x x x x
Greece * x x
Iceland x
Ireland * x x
Italy * x x x x
Liechtenstein x
Luxembourg x x
Monaco * x x
Netherlands * x x x x
Norway * x x
Portugal * x x
Spain * x x x
Sweden * x x x
Switzerland * x x x
Turkey x
United Kingdom * x x x x
Vatican City * x x
* Signatories of the Intelsat Interim Agreements
Table 9-2
Level of resources 1972-77 approved by the ESRO Council in December 1971
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
Scientific programme and basic activities 54.2 49.0 43.7 38.0 38.0 38.0
Scientific satellites 35.0 33.8 30.6 25.8 26.5 26.6
SAS-D --- 0.5 1.1 1.2 0.5 0.4
ESRIN and ESRANGE 6.7 1.7 --- --- --- ---
Basic activities 11.5 12.0 11.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
Contingency 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Application programmes 22.8 48.5 63.4 72.0 72.0 72.0
Aeronautical 4.0 17.9 20.5 18.0 18.8 6.2
Meteorological 2.1 7.9 16.3 26.8 25.8 25.0
Telecommunications 15.7 20.7 24.6 25.2 25.4 29.0
Other applications --- --- --- --- --- 9.8
Contingencies 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Total expenditures 77.0 97.5 107.1 110.0 110.0 110.0




Breakdown of ESRO staff in 1971 and 1972
End 1971 End 1972
Scientific satellites 181 116





Sounding rockets & ESRANGE 137 8
ESRIN 75 60
Basic activities * 339 323
Common costs (non fixed part) 272 280
Support ** 230 221
Total 1351 1195
* Includes studies, space technology, technical information, education and the fixed part
of common costs.
** Includes workshops and design office, testing, data acquisition and data processing.
Source: ESRO/ELDO Bulletin, 17 (February 1972), p. 19.
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Chapter 10: 
The Early Development of ESRO's Telecom Programme
and the OTS Project891
A. Russo
In the previous chapter we have discussed the first steps of ESRO's involvement in telecommunications
satellites. First studies on the technical feasibility and economic viability of a joint European
communications satellite system were undertaken by the Organisation in early 1967, on behalf of the
European Conference on Satellite Communications (CETS). It took almost five years of technical studies
and laborious negotiations before the ESRO Council could finally approve the start of a research and
development programme aiming at establishing such a system in the 1980s, in collaboration with the
Conference of European Postal and Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT). The main reasons for
this difficult beginning can be summarised in the following elements. Firstly, the European start in space
telecommunications occurred much later than the developments in this field realised in the United States.
The first commercial service of satellite communications was inaugurated in the summer of 1965 by the
American satellite Early Bird, after several years of experimentation with satellites like Echo, Telstar, and
Syncom. Early Bird, eventually renamed Intelsat I, was followed in 1967 by three Intelsat II satellites.
Two years later, the third generation of Intelsat satellites established a world-wide service, with one
satellite over each of the Earth's oceans and many ground stations spread all over the world. At the
beginning of the 1970s, the U.S. still controlled the technology of communications satellites and
dominated the international consortium Intelsat, created in 1964 with the task of establishing and
operating a global commercial system. Any European undertaking in this rapidly expanding field meant
leapfrogging the technological gap and finding a viable niche within the Intelsat system.
Secondly, it was necessary to establish a proper institutional framework in which a European initiative in
this field could be undertaken. ESRO had been formally established by ten European countries in 1964 as
an organisation solely devoted to space research. Its programme included the launching of sounding
rockets and spacecraft to investigate physical phenomena in the Earth's space environment and to observe
celestial bodies from outside the atmosphere. The Organisation's charter did not consider the building of
application satellites, and even though its Directorate and its technical staff looked with interest upon the
involvement in this field, this required the definition of a new Convention and of new financial
arrangements from Member States. This was not the only problem, however. More important by far was
the question of launching the spacecraft that ESRO was to build. A second multinational organisation did
exist in Europe to develop launchers, the European Launcher Development Organisation (ELDO), which
included six of ESRO's Member States, plus Australia. ELDO, however, was hampered by severe
technical and managerial problems and the cost of its programmes escalated dramatically. A strong
disagreement then arose between countries sceptical about the prospects of a European launcher
development programme and those firmly committed to achieving European autonomy in launching
capability. Britain and France led the opposite camps, the former stressing the high cost of the envisaged
European launchers in comparison with the American vehicles, and the latter insisting that Europe could
not sustain a credible space policy without the availability of its own launchers.
This brings us to the third element of the background, namely the discussions and negotiations about a
coherent space policy to be pursued by Europe. Ten years after the first Sputnik's historic launch, space
no longer appeared as merely a new frontier for esoteric scientific investigation or a spectacular stage for
the ongoing political and military confrontation between the two superpowers. Social and economic
objectives were more and more among the principal aims of space programmes, and space appeared as an
important ground for technological innovation in all industrialised countries. Whence a challenge for the
Old Continent. Which space policy for Europe? How to set European aerospace and electronic industry to
891 This chapter is essentially based on Russo (1994).
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compete successfully with their American counterparts? How to cope with the economic and cultural
challenges that communications satellites posed on a planetary scale? How to take advantage of Western
Europe's position in the "free market area" without suffering from the economic and military supremacy
of the United States? To these and other questions the European countries gave different and even
conflicting answers, according to their respective interests and policies. Finding a compromise, or a
"package deal" as it was eventually called, was not easy, nevertheless it was a necessary condition before
agreeing on the start of ESRO's telecommunications programme.
Finally, the fourth element we must recall here is the question of users. Developing a communications
satellite system for Europe implied in fact some commitment from the post, telephone and telegraph
(PTT) administrations and from television companies to use such a system to provide services to their
customers. But such a commitment could only be granted if satellites proved more economical than the
ground network, and this was by no means obvious. On the contrary, the potential users' economic studies
showed that the satellite system would hardly be viable and its operating cost could not be charged on
telephone bills.
When, in December 1971, the ESRO Council approved the start of the telecommunications programme,
the problems referred to above had found a first solution. The new Intelsat agreements provided for the
possibility of establishing regional communications satellite systems, and ESRO engineers, in
collaboration with industry, had designed a programme foreseeing the development of advanced
spacecraft and communications technologies. With regards to the institutional aspects, ESRO Member
States had agreed on a package deal that definitely transformed the Organisation into one mainly devoted
to the implementation of application satellite programmes. And if the problem of launchers was still
under discussion, a compromise was agreed on by which ESRO would give priority to European rockets,
if available, on the condition that the cost of launching did not exceed 125 % of the cost of using a non
European vehicle. Finally, the question of users had also been settled, at least partially. While not
committing themselves yet to using the envisaged satellite system, both the CEPT and the European
Broadcasting Union (EBU) had agreed to be involved in the design of ESRO's telecommunications
programme, on the basis of their forecasts about telecommunications traffic and Eurovision distribution in
the 1980s.
In this chapter we will discuss the first development phase of ESRO's telecommunications programme,
including the implementation of the OTS (Orbital Test Satellite) project. Two main questions were
debated in this period which posed a serious challenge to the ESRO Executive's negotiating capability.
The first is again the question of users, i.e. the economic viability of the system. While expressing their
interest in being involved in the experimental phase of the programme, the PTT administrations reserved
their position about the use of the eventual operational system until the real economic advantage of such a
system was demonstrated. The second question regarded the essential tension between the national
interests of ESRO Member States and their cooperative undertaking in the Organisation. The
telecommunication programme, in fact, involved a large scale technological effort in key industrial
sectors, with important financial investments and promising returns on the commercial level. ESRO's
scientific programme, adding to important national space programmes in some Member States, had made
possible the formation of a significant industrial capability in Europe. The consolidation and success of
national industries and individual companies now strongly depended on the much more important
communications satellite programmes of the 1970s and 1980s. ESRO's Member States entrusted to the
Organisation not only the task of building and launching application satellites but also that of achieving
this objective in the framework of an industrial policy whose main element was the so-called "just return"
principle, namely that each member state should receive a share of the Organisation's high-technology
industrial contracts equal to the share of its financial contribution to it. And it was not easy, of course, to
implement such a principle against strong conflicting interests in a rapidly expanding new field.892
892 For a thorough analysis of the industrial policy aspects of ESRO's telecommunications programme see
Müller (1990).
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The narrative is divided into three main parts. The first deals with the definition of the programme in the
months preceding its actual approval by the ESRO Council. This process involved negotiations with the
CEPT and intertwined with the discussions that eventually led to the ESRO's package deal. The
programme, as it was approved in December 1971, consisted of two phases: the first aiming at developing
and launching an experimental satellite; the second at developing and launching the final operational unit.
The start of the experimental phase until the approval of the OTS project and the associated technological
research programme will be the object of the second part of the chapter. The main issue in this analysis
will be the conflict between national interests, i.e. the conflict between those ESRO Member States which
supported national communications satellite programmes and those which did not. In this framework, the
OTS solution represented the result of a successful initiative of the ESRO Executive, supported by the
expertise of the Organisation's technical staff. The third part will present the early implementation of the
OTS project, with special emphasis on the industrial policy aspects involved in the choice of the
contractors for building the satellite and its Earth control station.
10.1 The definition of ESRO's Telecom Programme (1970-1971)
The fourth session of the European Space Conference (ESC), held in Brussels in July 1970, agreed that
ESRO should undertake a programme aimed at establishing by 1978-1980 an operational European
telecommunications satellite system (hereafter Telecom Programme). The objective of the programme
was to provide in the 1980s a satellite system capable of handling a certain percentage of the total
telecommunication traffic between CEPT member countries, and capable of distributing real-time
television programmes in the EBU Eurovision area. The programme was also intended to fulfil a
technological objective, i.e. the qualification of the European industry in the satellite telecommunication
field, in order to make it capable of participating competitively in the development of future
communications systems such as the Intelsat V system. The total cost of the programme was estimated at
450 MAU. The ESC decision came after several years of technical and economic studies. The
Conference, however, authorised and funded only the very first phase of the programme, i.e. "parametric
studies on all aspects of the operational system in cooperation with the telecommunication and television
administrations and agencies concerned [and] the development of the first experimental ground and
orbital elements of this satellite programme". The sum of 5 MAU was made available to ESRO to pursue
this preliminary work up to mid-1971, when a decision to proceed to the next stage of the programme
would be taken by the participating countries by a double qualified majority, i.e. a positive vote of two-
thirds of states covering at least two-thirds of contributions.893
The caution expressed by the participants in the Brussels meeting towards full commitment in the
telecommunications programme derived from three main reasons. Firstly, the still uncertain situation
regarding the overall European space policy, in particular about the controversial question of the Europe
launcher. Secondly, the uncertainty about the economic aspects of the programme, in particular whether a
European communications satellite system would be more economical compared with the expanding
ground network. Finally, the telecommunications programme represented an important technological
challenge for ESRO and for the European industry, which suffered from a ten-year delay with respect to
their American counterpart. In order to reach a competitive position in this rapidly expanding industrial
and commercial field Europe had to develop second generation communications satellites, and for all the
optimism of ESRO engineers success could not be assured.
The preparatory study programme for a European communications satellite system agreed at the July
1970 session of the ESC survived the dramatic crisis of the following November session of the same
conference, again in Brussels. Here, the deep disunity between countries favouring a "coherent space
policy"  that would include  the development of a European heavy satellite launcher, on the one hand, and
893 ESRO/ELDO Bulletin, 11 (September 1970), p. 12 (Resolution n. 1 of the Conference). MAU stands for
Million Accounting Units, ESRO's conventional monetary unit based on a gold standard. One AU was
roughly equivalent to one US dollar.
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those that considered that this was a wasteful use of limited resources, on the other, reached such a
magnitude that a compromise could not be agreed on and the conference collapsed after the first day. A
door was left open for further negotiation, however, as the Conference did agree on a resolution which
invited ESRO to take the appropriate budget decisions for 1971. In fact, the ESRO Council succeeded in
keeping alive the telecommunication and other application programmes, as well as the very idea of a
European joint effort in space.894 The Telecom Programme budget for 1971 was approved as outlined in
the resolution of the July ESC meeting (i.e. 5 MAU until mid-1971), and the Council authorised to
undertake hardware development. An Interim Application Programme Committee (IAPC) was also
created, with the task of supervising the implementation of these programmes and making
recommendations to the Council.895 The positive vote on the Telecom budget was not important from the
political point of view, as it concerned only the completion of the preliminary phase decided on in July by
the ministers. But in the delicate political situation following the ESC crisis it was by no means obvious
that the ESRO Member States would be willing to make a further commitment to a programme alien to
the Organisation's charter and whose future was so uncertain. In fact, this vote was made possible by one
important element, namely the decision to start negotiations for a revision of the ESRO Convention in
order to include application programmes and to provide for optional participation of Member States to the
various programmes instead of mandatory participation to all. Thanks to the negotiating capability of the
new chairman of the Council, the Italian physicist G. Puppi, a compromise was reached after one year of
intense negotiations, becoming known as the "first package deal". In this same period, the preliminary
study phase (or Phase 1) of the Telecom Programme was brought to an end and negotiations started for
the definition of the second phase.
10.1.1 Designing a European communications satellite system
Soon after the July 1970 session of the ESC, ESRO started studying a satellite system meeting the
instructions of the Conference, in collaboration with a special working group on telecommunication
satellites (SET Working Group, from the French initials) established by the CEPT's Coordinating
Committee on Satellite Communications (CCTS)896. The operational objective of the system was to
handle a significant fraction of intra-European traffic in the 1980s at a cost comparable with that of land-
based systems. The system was to provide two types of services: (a) public telecommunication services
(telephony, telegraphy and telex, with the possible addition of wideband data transmission), and (b)
television distribution of Eurovision programmes.
A key element in the design of the system was the estimate of the number of telecommunication circuits
to be routed through the space system in the decade 1980-1990. This depended on three main parameters,
i.e. the growth rate of traffic, the minimum distance between centres to be linked by satellite, and the
distribution of total traffic between the ground and the space networks. On the basis of the growth rate
calculated by the PTT administrations, and assuming that satellite circuits would be convenient over
distances of 800 km or more, the ESRO study adopted the figures reported in the table below for the
number of circuits to be routed by satellite.
Fraction of traffic routed by satellite 1980 1985 1990
one third 4600 8400 16000
one half 6900 12600 24000
two thirds 9200 16800 32000
894 ESRO Council, 35th meeting (25-26 November 1970), ESRO/C/MIN/35, 21 December 1970. See also: the
letter of the Council chairman to delegations (5 November 1970) reported in ESRO/C/473,
10 November 1970; the statement by the Director General in ESRO/C/483, 18 November 1970; and the note
by the Directorate in ESRO/C/482, 8 December 1970.
895 ESRO Council, 36th meeting (22 December 1970), ESRO/C/MIN/36, 5 March 1971. See also ESRO/C(71)6,
4 February 1971, and add. 1, 9 February 1971.
896 ESRO/ST/372, 2 October 191970. A description of these studies is in Contzen (1971). See also Davidson
(1970).
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The requirements for the television distribution service had been defined by the EBU. In this case, the
purpose of the system would be to replace all the terrestrial circuits used for transmitting television
programmes between European countries and between Europe and North Africa. Moreover, it had to
extend the Eurovision geographical coverage to those EBU member countries (Iceland, Cyprus, Lebanon,
etc.) where it was not possible to distribute programmes in real time. It was estimated that, after 1975,
Eurovision needs would be met by the provision of two permanent television channels capable of
transmitting colour TV programmes and high quality sound. An operational satellite with a mass in
geostationary orbit of 700 to 800 kg was assumed as the basic element of the space segment of the
system. It was eventually named ECS (European Communications Satellite). One or two such satellites
would be operated simultaneously by some 30 to 35 earth stations in Europe, North Africa and the Near
East, twenty of which for both telephony and television, a few for telephony alone and fewer than ten
(essentially the North African and Near Eastern ones) reserved to television.
As regards the technical characteristics of the communication system, the most important aspect was the
adoption of carrier frequencies above 10 GHz, i.e. in the so-called Ku-band. In particular, the
14.0-14.5 GHz band was adopted for uplink (ground-to-satellite) transmissions and three 250 MHz bands
between 10.95 and 12.75 GHz were adopted for downlink (satellite-to-ground) transmissions.897 This was
a novelty in satellite telecommunications, for which the use of frequencies in the C-band (around 6 GHz
for uplink transmissions and 4 GHz for downlink transmissions) was a standard because of the minimum
combination of natural and man-made noise sources. But the use of such a frequency band suffered from
being shared with terrestrial radio services, and this limited the choice of earth station sites and imposed
limitations in the power flux from the satellite in order to eliminate possible interference. The choice of
frequencies in the Ku band significantly reduced the overlapping and, as the lower frequencies were
becoming overcrowded, it was expected that future communications satellites would mostly operate in
this frequency band. At that time, however, there was little or no experience in satellite communication
technology above 10 GHz, and the use of such frequencies presented several difficulties for the design of
space communication systems.898
The first difficulty was that radio signals at frequencies around 12 GHz may be subject to heavy
attenuation in the atmosphere, mainly due to rain. Measurements of this phenomenon were rare,
particularly in Europe, and this implied a large margin of uncertainty in planning for satellite-Earth links.
An experimental programme was therefore required in order to get statistically reliable data from
measurements at different geographical locations, and extending over a sufficiently long period of time
and in different climatic conditions. Such a measurement programme could be carried out using either the
sky as a natural source of radiation or a satellite specially designed for this purpose.
The second difficulty derived from the limitation of the frequency bandwidth available for transmissions
(500 MHz for uplink and 250 MHz for downlink). This limited the capacity of the satellite and therefore,
in order to meet the expected demand for telephone circuits in the 1980s, it was necessary to study and
implement sophisticated transmission techniques. These included:
a. the use of spot-beam antennae to concentrate the radiated power around areas of highest traffic
density;
897 The problem of which frequency to adopt in the European communications satellite system was much
debated in that period within the CEPT's political and technical bodies. In the event it was agreed to adopt the
Ku band and the CEPT applied to the International Telecommunication Union's World Administrative Radio
Conference for Space Telecommunications held in Geneva in 1971 for use of the 12.75-13.25 GHz band for
uplink transmissions and 11.45-11.95 GHz band for downlink transmissions. This request was not accepted,
however, and the plan eventually adopted provided for the bands specified in the text. ESRO, General Report
1970, p. 12, and 1971, p. 46.
898 The following presentation is derived from Contzen (1971), pp. 292-295. The practicability of the Ku band
(at 14/12 GHz) was under study at that time in the joint NASA-Canada CTS (Communications Technology
Satellite) programme and in the Italian Sirio programme. The CTS was launched in January 1976, Sirio was
launched in August 1977. The first commercial use of the Ku band was on Canada's ANIK-B satellite,
launched in December 1978: Fordyce (1986), p. 206.
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b. the re-utilisation of frequencies within the allowed bandwidth, i.e., transmitting two different signals
on the same frequencies but with different polarisations;
c. the use of the speech interpolation technique, which enables the most efficient utilisation of the
telephone channels by assigning them to users only when they are actually talking;
d. the assignment of communication channels on demand rather than permanently.
Other difficulties derived from three technical requirements imposed by the use of such a technology. The
first was the need to develop new on-board repeater equipment including several microwave components,
notably a travelling wave tube amplifier (TWTA). The second was the need to achieve high pointing
accuracy, of the order of 0.1 degrees, and then to design a sophisticated three-axis stabilised spacecraft
instead of using the standard spin-stabilisation technique. Finally, a power as large as 1000 Watt was
required, which implied the development of a complex Sun-tracking solar array.
In conclusion, the telecommunication programme designed by ESRO's engineers envisaged a major
technological push, which they hoped would put Europe on an equal footing with the USA in
communications satellite technology. Thanks to the important financial effort by governments in the
R&D phase, channelled to industry through ESRO's managerial and technical expertise, the technological
leapfrogging that European industry needed in order to compete successfully on the world market would
be made possible. And the user organisations in the telecommunication field, on their part, would be
granted a reliable satellite system, technologically up to date and economically competitive.899
10.1.2 The search for a programme strategy
With the approval of the 1971 budget ESRO could keep implementing the preparatory activities of the
Telecom Programme, as defined by the ESC in July 1970. The aim was twofold: (a) to define the overall
programme development strategy, including phasing and costing, and (b) to initiate the industrial
development of important technical equipment, notably the TWTA and the repeater. At the end of this
preparatory phase, and on the basis of its results, it was expected that the CEPT and the EBU would
commit themselves to using the system. ESRO Member States could therefore decide on the continuation
of the programme and the start of the development phase.
In the first half of 1971 the three European industrial consortia COSMOS, MESH and STAR were
contracted to carry out studies on the complete system (satellites and launching, ground stations,
communication techniques) and study contracts were awarded for the TWTA and the modular repeater.900
The Executive then worked out an overall programme concept to be submitted to the IAPC.901 The most
important aspect of the proposed strategy was the definition of an intermediate phase between the
preparatory study activities (Phase 1) now near to completion, and the development of the operational
ECS satellite meeting the users' requirements (now called Phase 3). The intermediate phase (Phase 2) was
essentially devoted to technological development and to the qualification of critical equipment on board
an experimental satellite to be launched before the ECS satellite. Two motivations justified this
experimental phase: firstly, the need to test and qualify in the space environment the subsystems to be
used in the final system; secondly, the need to provide the users (PTT administrations and TV companies)
with some pre-operational capability, in order to enable them to gradually gain experience with satellite
telecommunications and to progressively integrate the space system in the existing terrestrial network.
899 Collette (1993).
900 ESRO, General report 1971, pp. 45-48; Müller (1990), pp. 138-143. The three consortia had been established
in the late 1960s in order to associate European industries with the twofold aim of sharing know-how and
management effort, and meeting just return requirements. On the formation and evolution of consortia, see
Beattie & De la Cruz (1967) and Dondi (1980b).
901 ESRO/IAPC(71)9, 24 May 1971.
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The experimental phase also included R&D work not involving tests in orbit and the ESRO participation
in the 12 GHz propagation experiments on the Sirio A satellite developed under the Italian national
programme.902 As regards the experimental satellite for the orbital tests, two options were presented
(Table 10-1). The first foresaw the use of a 200-kg satellite, mainly devoted to the testing of
communication techniques: this satellite could be either specially designed or derived from satellites
under development in national or multilateral programmes, namely the Italian Sirio and the Franco-
German Symphonie.903 The second option involved the development of a satellite of the 500 kg class,
able to test most of the spacecraft technology intended for use aboard the future ECS and to offer users
some kind of pre-operational communication capability. The total cost of the programme varied between
360 MAU and 436 MAU depending on the option, the least costly being Option Ib (Sirio-B) and the most
expensive Option II (Table 10-2). The latter, in particular, involved greater spending in the experimental
phase than in the operational one, because most of the development work for the test satellite would be
directly transferable to the operational unit.
The overall timetable of the programme depended on the option selected for the intermediate phase. If the
first option was approved, the test satellite could be developed in a relatively short time and launched in
the second half of 1975 or in mid-1976. In this case, however, in order to make up for the large technical
difference between the 200 kg test satellite and the large operational satellite to be launched in 1980, it
was necessary to develop a prototype flight models of the latter, to be launched in 1977. The true
operational satellite would be launched one year later. A different pattern presented itself for the
programme development in the second option. In this case, the development work for the 500 kg
experimental satellite and the 800 kg operational satellite would largely overlap, the former being
considered a technological prototype of the latter and the same industrial group being entrusted with the
task of building both. The experimental satellite would be launched by end-1976 or early 1977, with a
second one available for launching at the end of 1977 if necessary. No prototype for the operational
satellite was foreseen, two flight units of which would be developed and supplied to the users, as required
by the CEPT, one of them to be launched by the end of 1979 at ESRO's expense.
The programme elaborated by the Executive was submitted in June 1971 to the IAPC, called to issue a
recommendation to the July session of the Council where a final decision was to be taken.904 Here, not
surprisingly, France and Germany strongly supported Option Ic (also preferred by Belgium), and Italy
Option Ib. The ESRO programme, these delegations argued, should take advantage of the technology and
expertise already available as a consequence of national efforts, and the development of an experimental
satellite could be accomplished at a minimum cost by starting from an existing programme. In actual fact,
by supporting the integration of their national satellites into ESRO's Telecom Programme, these countries
wanted to guarantee their home industry the most favourable conditions in the future competitive tenders
for the most important ESRO contracts. The structure of the whole European industrial capability in the
field of communications satellites would thus be based around the core already established by the national
programmes. But for exactly the same reasons the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Spain gave
preference to Option II. As the UK delegation put it:
Option I was almost exclusively based on national satellite proposals and inherently led to a
bad geographical distribution [of ESRO's contracts], something which probably could not
be corrected by any reasonable industrial measure and which was likely to be perpetuated
throughout the programme.
902 Sirio (Satellite Italiano per la Ricerca Industriale Operativa) was a 200 kg spin stabilised satellite designed
for propagation experiments at frequencies above 10 GHz. It had originated from the PAS vehicle foreseen
on top of ELDO's Europa 2 rocket. On the Sirio programme see: Sirio (1978) and Ragno & Amatucci (1978),
pp. 63-122.
903 The Symphonie programme had been established by France and Germany in 1967 and it aimed at launching
a 250 kg three-axis-stabilised satellite for telecommunications experiments in the 4-6 GHz band. The primary
objective of the programme was to gain technical knowledge and experience in the development of
communications satellites.
904 IAPC, 3rd meeting (8 June 1971), ESRO/IAPC/MIN/3, 30 June 1971.
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The Dutch delegate, for his part, argued that "the Netherlands participation in the programme would
depend on a fair return to its industry, which seemed very difficult to achieve in the case of Option I".905
While ESRO's Member States tried to shape the joint programme as far as possible according to their
national interests, the CEPT, which attended the IAPC meeting as an observer, wanted to include as much
as possible of the R&D work in the ESRO programme, in order to limit the cost of the operational system
which the users would have to pay for. The CEPT representatives, in fact, emphasised that both carrying
out the communications experiments at an early stage, as foreseen in Option I, and testing the components
and subsystems intended for the operational unit on board a technological satellite, as foreseen in Option
II, were necessary. They stressed how important it was, on the one hand, to obtain reliable information
about the possibility of frequency re-use as soon as possible, because this had important implications for
the design of earth stations, and, on the other hand, to have maximum assurance on the good performance
of the final system, thanks to orbital tests of the most critical communications and spacecraft
technologies. The CEPT also made it clear that they were not particularly interested in pre-operational
capability on board prototypes before 1980. They rather expected two flight units of the ECS to be
supplied to them by that time - one of which in orbit. These were to be completely free of any prototype
aspect and built in conformity with the final configuration of the satellites that the PTT administrations
would subsequently procure and launch in order to maintain the system in operation.
Unable to reach an agreement and facing the CEPT requirements, the IAPC found itself in a deadlock and
a new meeting had to be called before the Council meeting. ESRO then worked out a third option which
combined the two basic elements expressed in the previous ones, namely the early launch of a 200 kg
satellite for telecommunications experiments and the development of a pre-operational satellite.906 Option
III foresaw a two-stage experimental phase: in the first, two satellites in the 200 kg class (i.e. Sirio-B or
Symphonie-B) would be placed in orbit in 1975, to be used primarily for radio propagation experiments at
11 and 13 MHz, for frequency re-use experiments, and for space qualification of critical communications
equipment. Subsequently, a 700 to 800 kg prototype of the operational satellite would be launched by
1977, to be used as a technological test bed for the final product and, possibly, for some pre-operational
activity of experimental character. Two flight units of the operational satellite would finally be supplied
to the users, one of them to be launched by the end of 1979 at ESRO's expense, as required by the CEPT.
The estimated cost of such a programme was 448 MAU, i.e. higher than in the case of option I but of the
same order of magnitude as in the case of Option II (Table 10-3). Most of the money would be spent in
the experimental phase, owing to the fact that the development and launching of both the 200 kg satellites
and the pre-operational satellite were included in this phase. In spite of the Executive's effort to find an
acceptable compromise, the national delegations in the IAPC were again unable to find an agreement. The
countries without a national programme in satellite telecommunications (Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and
the UK) continued to oppose any national bias in the joint programme and maintained their support for
Option II. France, Germany, Italy and Belgium, on the contrary, supported Option III. Switzerland also
expressed some inclination towards the latter, while Denmark abstained as it had not yet decided to
participate in application programmes. For the British delegation, Option II represented a single line of
development, whereas the new option "appeared to consist of two quite distinct and separable parts". The
first of these lines, they argued, satisfied the industrial interests of some Member States but "would be
carried out at the expense of development of the large satellite, certain aspects of which would be deleted
for want of money". The French, on the contrary, stressed that Option II was not acceptable, "because it
involved the successive and costly development of two different large satellites, of 500 and 700 kg".
Moreover, under this option, it would require six years before the first technological tests in orbit could be
conducted, while the use of a 200 kg satellite would permit them very quickly.907
905 ESRO/IAPC/MIN/3, cit., pp. 5 and 8. The British position was spelled out in detail after the meeting in
ESRO/IAPC(71)14, 29 June 1971.
906 ESRO/IAPC(71)9, add. 1, 18 June 1971.
907 IAPC, 4th meeting (9 July 1971), ESRO/IAPC/MIN/4, 20 August 1971, p. 7.
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Good technical reasons existed for both arguments, of course, but the issue was clearly not only technical
and involved important industrial policy considerations. Two main aspects were discussed by the
advocates of the two options under discussion. The first concerned the need to perform experiments on
frequency re-use at an early stage in order to test the possibility of implementing such a technology. The
CEPT stressed that, from the point of view of the construction of earth stations, this verification should be
effected at least two years before the start of the operational phase. It added however that, "for the
purposes of designing and developing these stations, it will be necessary to have the results of the
verification much sooner". But how much sooner remained unspecified, and the conclusion was that, "as
regards the potential user requirements, there is not sufficient difference between Options II and III for
CEPT to be able to recommend one in preference of the other"908. This position of CEPT's left the field
open to confrontation between divergent opinions. For the British delegation, frequency re-use
experiments could be done at considerably less expense by means of point-to-point ground links or using
an aircraft equipped with a stabilised platform. They also pointed out that a Canadian satellite scheduled
for launch in 1975 would conduct this type of experiment and it would be possible to use the results
provided by this satellite. France and Germany, for their part, insisted that the need to conduct the
technological tests in orbit very quickly could only be satisfied by using the 200 kg satellites and
underlined that Option III would permit advantage to be taken of development work already done in
Europe.909
The second aspect regarded the ever-present issue of just return. For the UK, Option III had the
"unacceptable disadvantage [...] of a geographical distribution of contracts that distinctly favoured certain
Member States from the outset".910 An ESRO study had shown, in fact, that the choice of this option
implied that 31 per cent of the extra-mural programme expenditure, excluding launchers, involved
constraints in the geographical distribution, i.e. it was likely to be allocated to companies of certain
Member States because of their unique competence in the programme. This percentage was only 17 per
cent in Option II.911 For the Executive, a fair geographical distribution of about 70 per cent of extra-mural
expenditure was still equitable, as it corresponded to what had been achieved in the scientific programme.
It was not so for the British delegation, who thought that in the new application programmes, which
involved much more important economic and technological aspects than in the scientific programme, an
unfavourable situation should not develop from the beginning.
The long discussion again came to nothing and the meeting ended with a resolution which registered the
disagreement among the delegations and left the Council with the task of choosing between Options II
and III. As the IAPC chairman, M. Bignier, explained to Council delegates: "There was no certainty that
the IAPC would be able to take a final decision, because political considerations might prevail over the
technical aspects".912 The Council, however, was not in a better position to take a decision.
10.1.3 Working out a "package deal"
In July 1971, the ESRO Council was actively engaged in the negotiations on the reform of the
Organisation that were to lead to the so-called "first package deal". While agreeing in principle that
ESRO should devote its main effort to  application satellite programmes,  Member States were still a long
908 ESRO/IAPC(71)15, 9 July 1971, pp. 1-2. See also ESRO/IAPC/MIN/4, cit., pp. 3-4.
909 ESRO's engineers did not like the British suggestions. They argued in fact that the use of an aircraft would
provide only data on local phenomena and of little statistical value while, as regards the Canadian satellite, it
was doubtful whether its position in orbit would be compatible with the measurements that needed to be
made in Europe. They also stressed that both Sirio-B and Symphonie-B had been designed to enable the
requisite verification to be made under truly representative conditions.
910 ESRO/IAPC/MIN/4, cit., p. 7.
911 ESRO/IAPC(71)9, add.1, cit., p. 8 (table III).
912 Council, 39th meeting (13-14 July 1971), ESRO/C/MIN/39, 3 August 1971, p. 23.
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way from the definition of a suitable framework for such undertakings. Divergences existed about the
financing and management of programmes which not all Member States were to be involved in; about the
relationship between the scientific programme and the application programmes; about the future of
ESRIN, the research institute near Rome whose activity was to be stopped, and ESRANGE, the shooting-
range near Kiruna no longer necessary after the winding up of the sounding rocket programme. And
finally, by far the most important issue, disagreement and uncertainty existed on the critical question of
the European launcher. No application satellite programme could be undertaken, in fact, without a
guarantee that it would actually be possible to launch such satellites. On this question the Council was in
a deadlock. The UK argued that American launchers would certainly be made available for European
communications satellites, as they always had been for scientific satellites, while ELDO's experience had
shown that it made no sense to embark on uncertain and expensive programmes to achieve European
independence. France, on the contrary, did not believe that the US would launch European satellites that
were potentially harmful for their commercial interests and insisted that Europe should build its own
launchers as a part of a coherent space policy. The position of the American authorities, in fact, was
ambiguous, and it seemed that it would depend on the outcome of the negotiations about the possible
European participation in NASA's post-Apollo programme. Informal negotiations were being pursued at
the U.S. embassy in Brussels by the ESC President T. Lefèvre in order to have a clarification of this
mostly important issue.
In the event, the Council adopted a proposal worked out by its chairman G. Puppi and generally accepted
as a basis for further negotiations.913 It recognised the need for Europe to undertake a substantial
telecommunications programme and stated that the countries willing to participate in such a programme
should eventually choose one of the proposed options. The four largest contributors to the ESRO budget
(France, Germany, Italy and the UK) committed themselves to participating in this as well as in other
approved application programmes and to contributing to a minimum total level of resources of 70 MAU
per year from 1974 to 1980 for their execution.914 The decision about which strategy should be adopted
for the Telecom Programme - indeed about the actual start of the programme - was postponed to when the
final package deal would be agreed on. The programme in fact was an element of a general agreement in
which all aspects of the European space policy were to find their own place. At the July meeting of the
Council an important step was actually achieved, i.e. the definite adoption of the principle of optional
programmes and the commitment of ESRO's "big four" to participate in all application programmes with
an assured minimum level of resources. It still depended on the negotiating ability of chairman Puppi to
bring the process to a successful outcome.
10.1.4 The CEPT report on the viability of the system
There was a second important reason for the Council to suspend the decision, namely that several PTT
administrations were not ready yet to commit themselves to using a satellite system for their
telecommunications needs. A few days before the Council meeting, the CEPT had issued a report on the
technical, financial and operational aspects of such a system from the user's perspective: a document
whose conclusions were discouraging.915
The report had been prepared by the CEPT's Coordinating Committee on Satellite Communications
(CCTS) and its SET Working Group with the aim of assisting the PTT administrations and the ministers
"in deciding under what terms [they] might take part in the [ECS] project". Starting from the already
defined mission requirements and from the available information on the technical and financial aspects of
the programme, several scenarios were discussed. These involved the following elements:
913 ESRO/C/MIN/39, cit., pp. 17-19. The approved resolution is reported in ESRO/C/XXXIX/Res. 4, with
attached ESRO/C/XXXIX/Res. 3, rev. 2 (draft), 14 July 1971. See also ESRO/ELDO Bulletin, n. 15 (August
1971), pp. 24-26.
914 An aeronautical and a meteorological satellite programme were also under study, and the expenditure for all
application programmes in 1972 and 1973 was established at 27 and 53 MAU, respectively.
915 CEPT, Study on a European telecommunication satellite system, Doc T/CCTS(71)24E, July 1971. Also
attached to ESRO/IAPC(71)18, 26 July 1971.
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a. two hypotheses on the fraction of circuits to be routed via satellite: one third and one half;
b. two values for the launch success probability: 0.75 and 0.9;
c. two confidence levels (i. e. the probability of not needing more than the stated number of satellites):
50 % and 90 %;
d. two different system configurations: with and without frequency re-use.
Having excluded the cost of the first operational satellite in orbit and a second spacecraft available on the
ground, both to be provided by ESRO, the total investments by the users for the decade 1980-1990 were
estimated at 139.1 to 271.2 MAU, depending on the hypotheses chosen. This amount included the
procurement and launch of subsequent satellites, the establishment of about 30 earth stations, and the
operating costs of the system. Most of the investments regarded the ground segment (i.e. the earth stations
and associated facilities), whose cost was estimated at 102.6 to 120.1, with an additional 5.7 to 5.9 MAU
if the Atlantic islands Madeira, Azores and Canaries were to be covered.916
The above figures had to be compared with the savings in the terrestrial network achievable as a
consequence of the transfer to the satellite system of part of the total telecommunication traffic. And the
comparison could not be more depressing. The total savings were estimated at 84 MAU if one third of the
traffic was shifted to the satellite system, and 113 if the fraction was one half. The possible inclusion of
the Atlantic islands added 6 and 10 MAU, respectively. In conclusion, the cost of operating the ECS
satellite system resulted in excess of the corresponding savings by some 65 to 175 % if the former was to
carry one third of the traffic, and 39 to 140 % if the fraction was one half. The lower figures, of course,
implied the most optimistic assumptions about the launch success probability and the performance of the
satellites in orbit.
The report acknowledged that this economic comparison did not take into account certain factors which
could not be evaluated in financial terms, such as the fact that the satellite system would provide the EBU
with a significantly more extensive coverage than that of their existing networks (and with two channels
instead of a single one), or the diversification and flexibility that satellites provided to the global
telecommunication system. It was also noted that the method employed for the economic evaluation
meant comparing the costs of establishing a new system with the costs of extending a system already in
existence. All the same, from the point of view of the CEPT no doubt could exist that, in one way or
another, the governments had to make themselves responsible for the difference between the actual costs
of the satellite system and those which the users would normally have to bear. The development of the
European aerospace and communications industry could not be financed by telephone subscribers, and
the financing of a European satellite telecommunication system required a political decision involving
both the ministers responsible for space activities and those responsible for telecommunications. The
commitment of the potential users to the Telecom Programme was of course a sine qua non condition for
the implementation of the programme itself, and therefore the CEPT report raised great concern. It
appeared once again that space was not a matter of crude economics but of political strategy on a
continental level. As the British delegation at the Council put it (with the Italians concurring):
Had the project under discussion been a United Kingdom national project it would certainly
have been turned down in view of the CEPT report and in view of the fact that it would
probably be necessary to subsidise the programme during its operational phase. However,
the case under discussion was not a national project but an international undertaking which
formed part of the package deal and with which [the UK delegation] could go along.917
916 In order to give an idea of how the cost was shared between the different elements of the system, we can note
that the study estimated the cost of the satellite at 9 to 11 MAU, depending on the configuration, and the
launching cost at 18 MAU if the Atlas Centaur rocket was used and at 22.5 if Europa 3 was used. These
figures were taken as a basis for calculation in the different scenarios.
917 Council, 42nd meeting (23-24 November 1971), ESRO/C/MIN/42, 3 December 1971, p. 14.
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In fact, it was only when such a political agreement was eventually reached, in December 1971, that the
start of the Telecom Programme could finally be approved.
10.1.5 A new option is worked out
As we have seen, the ESRO Council had decided in July 1971 that the three application programmes
(telecommunications, meteorological and aeronautical) should be executed simultaneously, and had fixed
an overall financial envelope for them, i.e. 27 MAU for 1972, 53 MAU for 1973, and 70 MAU per year
as of 1974. The Telecom Programme, under either Option II or III, could not be accommodated within
these limits and therefore the Executive was instructed to study a new programme strategy, compatible
with the stated budgetary constraints, as well as with the new situation emerging from the CEPT report.
One month later the new option had been worked out, which differed from the previous ones in two main
aspects.918 Firstly, Phase 2 was now essentially characterised by a technological programme, while the
orbital tests would be based on the utilisation of one experimental satellite to be realised within a
cooperative effort and therefore with some financial contributions from outside ESRO. Secondly, the
decision to proceed with Phase 3 would be required only by mid-1975, on the basis of the results of the
experimental phase as well as of the financial, technical and operational conditions prevailing in the mid-
1970s. The programme was thus broken into two clearly different ones, each requiring a specific decision
to start: the first aiming at launching an experimental satellite by the end of 1975, the second aiming at
developing the operational satellite as defined by the users' requirements.
Two possible alternatives for the realisation of the experimental satellite were discussed. The first was
cooperation with the on-going Symphonie programme, aiming at launching one Symphonie B spacecraft
by the end of 1975. This had been preferred to Sirio B because the latter did not allow the testing of either
three-axis stabilisation techniques (because Sirio was spin stabilised) or frequency re-use (because of on-
board antenna problems). The second alternative involved a collaboration with the American company
COMSAT within the framework of the Intelsat programme. As Intelsat's operating manager COMSAT
was in fact studying an experimental satellite as a technological step in the development of the new
Intelsat V spacecraft, and its project corresponded closely to that of the ESRO programme: it aimed at
launching in 1975 a 350 to 400 kg, three-axis stabilised satellite, with orienting solar panels, high gain
antennas, Ku band frequencies, and active thermal control.
Exploratory contacts had already been established between ESRO and COMSAT and collaboration
appeared possible along four main lines: (i) the satellite would be designed by a mixed ESRO/COMSAT
team; (ii) ESRO participation would be of the order of 30-40 % of expenditure;
(iii) the satellite and its subsystems would be developed by both European and American industry under
ESRO and COMSAT contracts, respectively; (iv) integration and testing would be conducted by the
COMSAT Laboratories at Clarksburg with the participation of an ESTEC team and representatives of
European industry.919
As regards the content of the operational phase, no specific proposal was presented at this stage. It was
suggested that a prototype satellite might be developed and launched by 1979-1980, followed by the
production of two flight models of the final operational unit and the launch of one of them in early 1982.
The latter could be either a 700 to 800 kg spacecraft, as previously envisaged, or a spacecraft of the order
of 400 kg, in the event that a review of the mission, the communications system and the technologies used
918 ESRO/IAPC(71)28, 9 November 1971.
919 ESRO/IAPC(71)28, cit., p. 9. The possible ESRO/COMSAT collaboration is reviewed in ESRO/IAPC(72)7,
21 February 1972.
311
showed such a mass to be adequate. In this latter case, an optimistic possibility was that this spacecraft
might be a direct follow-up of the experimental satellite, if the ESRO/COMSAT option was chosen, thus
making the prototype and the operational unit one and the same. In any case, no decision about the
operational phase was required before 1975, thus leaving enough time for clarifying the political and
economic aspects and obtaining the commitment of the potential users. This was much appreciated by
those delegations which were less enthusiastic about the European communications satellite programme.
The British, as usual, gave voice to them:
The United Kingdom delegation, recalling that it had laid down two conditions to be met
before it could vote in favour of proceeding to the second phase [i.e. the viability of the
programme and the commitment of the potential users], pointed out that this meant that
when the time came it would not be influenced by arguments of a political nature which
might, in the view of some countries, militate in favour of continuing the programme.920
The new programme strategy was presented to the IAPC in November 1971 together with the financial
implications of the different possibilities (Table 10-4). The CEPT, represented at the meeting by the
chairman of the SET Working Group, took a critical approach towards the new version of the programme
and expressed some resentment at not having being consulted by ESRO when the new option was being
elaborated. Two aspects in particular were criticised. The first regarded the envisaged collaboration with
COMSAT. Intelsat, in fact, had not as yet taken any decision on the execution of an experimental
programme in preparation of the Intelsat V series, and no guarantee existed that Comsat’s plans would
actually be approved by the governing body of the international consortium. The second aspect was that
under the new approach a decision on the operational system was not to come before 1975. This might
discourage certain users, e.g. the EBU, and might lead them to route their traffic differently.921 Regarding
the foreseen launch of the first operational satellite in 1982, the CEPT representative recognised that it
was difficult to assess the exact date at which a European system was actually required to be operational
and that CEPT had adopted 1980 as a working hypothesis. He added however:
If this was now to be postponed, the effects resulting from such a slippage would have to be
studied in detail. In this context, it could not be denied that a European system might run
certain risks if it became operational only after Intelsat V, because the history of
international telecommunications showed that the carrier who enters the market first is
usually the best placed competitor.922
Despite CEPT's reservations, the IAPC considered with great interest the envisaged ESRO/COMSAT
collaboration for an experimental communications satellite. Pending the Intelsat decision, however,
France and Germany insisted that the possibility of using Symphonie, at conditions still to be defined, be
maintained "as a veritable programme alternative".923 In the event, "after a lengthy discussion", no choice
between the various programme alternatives was clearly recommended: The IAPC simply recognised that
collaboration with COMSAT "might offer certain advantages" and recommended the Council to base its
examination of the Telecom Programme on the main principles set out by the new option, namely the
implementation of a cooperative experimental satellite programme and the procedure of staggered
decisions for the funding of successive phases.924
10.1.6 The 1971 package deal and the approval of the Telecom Programme
In the one-month period between 20 November and 20 December 1971, the ESRO Council held
three busy meetings.  These achieved bringing to conclusion the long  negotiating process started one year
920 ESRO/C/MIN/42, cit., p. 14.
921 As early as mid-1969 the EBU had in fact received an offer to use the Intelsat system for the needs of
Eurovision: CSE/HF(69)22, 16 July 1969.
922 IAPC, 9th meeting (9-10 November 1971), ESRO/IAPC/MIN/9, 22 December 1971, p. 23.
923 ESRO/IAPC/MIN/9, cit., p.24.
924 ESRO/IAPC/IX/Res. 5, 12 November 1971.
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before and destined to radically change the Organisation's role and aims. With the final approval of the
resolution on the "Reform of the Organisation", ESRO Member States agreed on a package deal which
definitely transformed the former space research organisation into an organisation mainly devoted to
space applications. While in the old framework all Member States were called to finance the
Organisation's programme according to the GNP (gross national product) formula, now this condition
applied only to the basic activities and the scientific programme. The application satellite programmes, on
the contrary, were considered optional, and each of them was financed only by the participating countries.
As a consequence of this agreement, the three programmes whose definition studies had been under
development for a few years were finally approved: the Telecom Programme we have been dealing with
in this and the previous chapter; an aeronautical satellite programme in collaboration with the US Federal
Aviation Administration and Canada; and a meteorological satellite programme deriving from a project
already studied by the French space agency. These programmes were to be executed simultaneously, with
the "big four" confirming the decision taken in July to participate in all three with a minimum total level
of resources of 70 MAU per year. At the same time, ESRO would also carry out exploratory studies in
other application fields such as satellites for Earth resource survey, maritime navigation, and semi-direct
and direct television broadcasting.925
After five years of technical studies and political negotiations, a decisive step was thus taken regarding
the Telecom Programme, which was supported by eight of ESRO's ten Member States: Belgium,
Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK.926 According to the plan elaborated
by the Executive and recommended by the IAPC, these participating countries decided to undertake Phase
2 (experimental) of the programme from 1972 to 1976, at a maximum cost of 100 MAU, and agreed that
a decision about the succeeding phase would be taken in 1975 by a double qualified majority.
10.2 The start of Phase 2 and the approval of the OTS project (1972-1973)
10.2.1 The content of the experimental phase programme
With the approval of Phase 2 of the Telecom Programme, real development work could finally start. The
programme for this phase was divided into four main parts (Table 10-5).927 The first regarded the
communication system and included studies on the satellite, the earth stations, the communication
techniques, and the propagation problems at 14/11 GHz. The latter, in particular, required an extensive
experimental programme which involved the building and installation of radiometers at five different
locations in Europe, the execution of propagation experiments on terrestrial links, and ESRO participation
in the Italian Sirio project.
The second part of the programme was the so-called Supporting Technology Programme (STP),
consisting in the development of the new technologies required by the advanced design of the envisaged
system. The most important elements in the STP programme were the travelling wave tube amplifier
(TWTA) and the modular repeater at 14/11 GHz, i.e. the basic components of the communication
payload. Preliminary industrial studies of these components had already started in 1971; in 1972 contracts
were awarded to the French firm Thomson-CSE for the development and qualification of the TWTA, and
to the German AEG-Telefunken for the development and qualification of the modular repeater. Most of
the critical equipment under the STP programme was contracted to industry during 1972.928
925 The final Council resolution, adopted at its 44th meeting (20 December 1971), is reported in ESRO/ELDO
Bulletin, 17 (February 1971), pp. 6-11.
926 Denmark's participation was actually decided at a later stage because Denmark had first to officially
withdraw its denunciation of the ESRO Convention pronounced by the Danish government at the end of
1970.
927 ESRO/IAPC(72)6, 23 February 1976.
928 ESRO/PB-TEL(72)1, 25 August 1972; Müller (1990), pp. 139-148 and 170-181.
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The third and by far the most important part of the programme consisted in the development and
launching of an experimental satellite by the end of 1975. This satellite would enable orbital tests of the
communications techniques foreseen, of the 14/11 GHz communications equipment and of the three-axis-
stabilised platform. As said above, the financial limitations on the programme imposed either the use of a
spacecraft modified from that employed in another programme (the Symphonie B option) or,
alternatively, the development of a new spacecraft in collaboration with another organisation (the
ESRO/COMSAT option). The Executive, however, recommended the latter for two main reasons. Firstly,
the Symphonie option was not compatible with the budgetary constraints unless France and Germany
undertook to cover part of the satellite cost and, secondly, the three-axis stabilisation techniques required
to be tested were in many cases different from the Symphonie configuration. This part of the programme
also included ESRO participation in the Canadian Communication Technology Satellite (CTS), by which
some key hardware developed under the STP programme could be tested on board the CTS, whose launch
was expected in March 1975, i.e. some eight months before the launching of the ESRO satellite.929
The fourth part of the programme consisted of preliminary studies of the operational ECS satellite, in
preparation of the subsequent Phase 3. These studies were to be performed in two steps. The first, in
1972, regarded the definition of the operational satellite configuration (Phase A study), in order to detail
the necessary supporting technology and flight experimentation. The second, whose aim was to prepare a
more definite design of the satellite (phase B study), would start after a two-year lapse, in order to take
advantage of the results of the other parts of the programme. In January 1972, six-month contracts for
phase A studies were placed with the three industrial consortia COSMOS, MESH and STAR, which
independently studied three possible configurations, namely:
a. a dual satellite system consisting of two 400 kg satellites separated by about 3 degrees and not
implementing frequency re-use technology (COSMOS);
b. a system using a single 680 kg satellite with frequency re-use (MESH);
c. the so-called "baseline system", involving the use of a single 800 kg satellite with frequency re-use
(STAR).930
Before closing this section we have to note that, with the start of the Phase 2 of the Telecom Programme,
contacts between ESRO and CEPT were resumed on a formal basis, after a period of cooling off in their
relations subsequent to the presentation of the CEPT report. Technical collaboration was thus re-
established with the SET Working Group, while some PTT administrations expressed their interest in the
developing and setting up of some earth stations already during the experimental phase of the
programme.931
10.2.2 The failure of the envisaged ESRO/COMSAT cooperation and the OTS proposal
The prospects of ESRO/COMSAT collaboration in the framework of the Intelsat programme were short-
lived. Comsat’s experimental satellite project in preparation of the new Intelsat V satellite generation was
in fact strongly opposed within Intelsat. The American company had a strong interest in developing this
programme in its laboratories in order to gain the expertise needed to compete in the U.S. domestic
satellite communications market. Most Intelsat signatories, however, felt that the international consortium
should not pay for Comsat’s apprenticeship in satellite design and construction. The issue, which coupled
with the fierce competition for the choice of the satellite destined to bridge the gap between Intelsat IV
and Intelsat V,  was hotly  debated  between late  1971  and early 1972  by  the  Interim  Communications
929 ESRO/IAPC(72)8, 21 February 1972; IAPC, 10th meeting (2-3 March 1972), ESRO/IAPC/MIN/10,
14 March 1972, p. 18. The hardware to be tested on board the CTS included the TWTA, the parametric
amplifier and the solar array blanket.
930 ESRO/PB-TEL(72)2, 11 August 1972.
931 Exchange of correspondence between the chairman of the CCTS and ESRO's Director General, in ESRO/PB-
TEL(72)4, 21 August 1972; also IAPC, 10th meeting (2-3 March 1971), ESRO/IAPC/MIN/10,
14 March 1972.
314
Satellite Committee (ICSC), Intelsat's governing body.932 On 3 March, the CEPT representative informed
the IAPC that the ICSC had decided to suspend discussions with ESRO until its June meeting, by which
time its technical sub-committee would have produced a report on whether or not Intelsat needed an
experimental satellite. But it was clear that Comsat’s plans could hardly win approval of two-thirds of
Intelsat members, as required under the new Intelsat agreements.933
The new situation re-opened the key question of the choice of the spacecraft for the orbital tests. This in
fact had never been completely settled, as France and Germany had always insisted that the Symphonie
option should be considered in parallel with the ESRO/COMSAT project. Now, however, the issue
presented itself in a much more controversial way. Against Symphonie B, Italy re-proposed its Sirio B
and, more important, the UK announced its intention to develop a national communications satellite,
named UKATS (United Kingdom Application Technology Satellite), and demanded that this satellite
should be used within the European programme. All three national options were unsatisfactory: Sirio B
was technically outdated, UKATS was still on the drawing board and the programme had not even been
approved yet, France and Germany had not made any firm offer of financing the use of Symphonie B
within the ESRO experimental programme. It was evident, however, that no major country would have
agreed to go along with another nationally-based project, and a deadlock seemed inevitable.
In these circumstances, the Executive decided to by-pass the IAPC and to re-examine the needs of a test
satellite in the framework of the ongoing configuration definition studies of the ECS system. Three new
independent study contracts were thus placed with COSMOS, MESH and STAR, "to give to industry an
opportunity to express their view freely on all aspects of the problem". These studies, conducted in the
summer 1972 in close relation with the ECS phase A studies, analysed separately, "on an open basis", a
range of satellite options from the 40 kg Franco-Russian SRET vehicle to a dedicated 400 kg ESRO
spacecraft, including of course Sirio B, Symphonie B and UKATS. The conclusions of these studies
paved the way for coming out of the impasse:
The common view is held by the consortia that there is no substitute for a dedicated orbital
test satellite with a configuration approaching as nearly as reasonable that of the proposed
operational vehicle. All three consortia, while using sometimes very different criteria, placed
such an experimental satellite well ahead of any other option.934
In order to understand this conclusion and its implications we have to analyse the results of the ECS
configuration definition studies and their relevance for the experimental satellite programme. As
discussed above, the three consortia had independently studied three different system configurations.
These studies, however, had resulted in a remarkable degree of similarity in the definition of the sub-
systems: identical modular repeater elements, same power conditioning, similar telemetry, tracking and
command (TT&C) subsystems, etc. All three approaches foresaw the use of advanced technologies and
recommended a comprehensive development, qualification and flight test programme, in order to meet
the planned schedule for the ECS deployment and to increase confidence in its ultimate successful
operation. It is in this framework that the three consortia assessed the different options for the
experimental satellite, i.e. each of them independently considered which option would allow the most
profitable orbital test programme from the point of view of the operational system defined by its own
phase A study.  The result  was  unequivocally  the same for all three:  a dedicated  350 to 400 kg satellite
932 The competition was mainly between Hughes Aircraft, supported by COMSAT, which proposed a modified
version of Intelsat IV (Intelsat IVA), and Lockheed Aircraft, supported by most other Intelsat signatories,
which proposed a completely new design (early Intelsat V programme). Both Hughes' and Lockheed's
satellite projects were also intended for US domestic services. Eventually, Hughes won the contract, thanks
to COMSAT's dominant position as the US representative in Intelsat. See Kinsley (1976), p. 125-126; Müller
(1990), p. 182; Podraczky & Pelton (1984), p. 111.
933 IAPC, 10th meeting (2-3 March 1972), ESRO/IAPC/MIN/10, 14 March 1972, p. 17.
934 ESRO/PB-TEL(72)2, 11 August 1972, pp. 2-3.
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whose configuration and critical technological content should be as close as possible to that of the ECS.
This satellite was eventually named OTS (Orbital Test Satellite).
Important technical and financial implications derived from the OTS proposal. The use of such a
dedicated satellite, in fact, required an integrated Phase 2/Phase 3 approach and a new programme
development. The launch of the experimental satellite was postponed to the end of 1976, the prototype
unit was no longer necessary, and the launch of the operational satellite was definitely planned in 1980
for any ECS configuration. The deletion of the prototype and the close technical similarities of the OTS
and ECS spacecraft resulted in significant savings of the programme costs. In comparison with the current
programme (ESRO/COMSAT test satellite plus 800 kg ECS with prototype) the total saving was 19
MAU in the case of an 800 kg ECS, and 112 MAU in the case of a 400 kg ECS.935 These savings,
however, could only be achieved at the expense of exceeding the overall ceiling of 100 MAU for the
experimental phase approved by the ESRO Council in December 1971, as a consequence of the effort for
the development and building of the OTS (Table 10-6).
The OTS proposal was presented at the first meeting of the newly created Telecommunication Satellite
Programme Board (PB-TEL), the Council's delegated body in charge of supervising the Telecom
Programme.936 Here, as to be expected, the initiative of the Executive was strongly criticised by the
German, French and British delegations. The Germans stressed that:
The procedure of the Secretariat was incorrect in approaching the consortia before all the
possibilities of [...] external collaboration had been definitely eliminated. It was evident that
the consortia would naturally prefer a new project to one in which they did not participate.
The French, for their part, proposed that "the possibility of passing from Symphonie B to an operational
satellite should also be studied". The British pointed out that the UKATS project (now renamed GTS,
Geostationary Technological Satellite) had been approved recently and that "the possibility of in-orbit
testing of equipment on this satellite should now be studied in detail by the Secretariat".
After a lengthy discussion of the technical and financial aspects of the OTS proposal, it was clear that no
decision could be reached at the meeting. It was finally agreed that ESRO should further study the
alternative approaches to experimentation in orbit, and that the CEPT's CCTS should be asked to express
their opinion, as potential users of the system, on which approach would give the greatest confidence in
the programme. In the event, the CCTS refrained from expressing any preference for the different
options, but it pointed out that the availability of a significant pre-operational communication capacity
during the experimental phase would be very useful. Such a capacity, the CCTS argued, could be used
free of charge for routing some telecommunication traffic via satellite, and it was "very desirable to
permit the progressive installation of a network of earth stations before the commencement of the
operational phase". For some national PTT administrations, they concluded, this was a prior condition to
the construction of an earth station.937 This emphasis on the need for pre-operational capability in fact
supported the OTS option, as this satellite could be designed to provide such a capability within the
remaining mission objectives of the test satellite.
935 The comparison is with option IV (iv) in Table 4.
936 PB-TEL, 1st meeting (6 October 1972), ESRO/PB-TEL/MIN/1, 2 November 1972; following quotations
from pp. 4-5. It must be noted that until the formal approval of the Telecom Programme, the PB-TEL acted
on a provisional basis and its decisions had to be endorsed by the Council.
937 ESRO/PB-TEL(72)8, 14 November 1972, annex II.
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The case for OTS was presented by the ESRO Directorate at the second meeting of the PB-TEL, on the
basis of a thorough comparative analysis of the various options under discussion.938 Their reasons for
selecting the OTS programme against others based on Symphonie or GTS can be summarised as follows:
a. Greater technical merit, i.e. relative fulfilment of the orbital test programme objectives;
b. Minimum overall programme cost;
c. Best solution from the point of view of industrial policy (i.e. geographical distribution of contracts
and return of investments in ESRO's Supporting Technology Programme);
d. Possibility of re-using the modular-designed OTS platform in support of other geostationary
missions;
e. Significant pre-operational activity in the experimental phase and start of operational activity by
1980;
f. Greater flexibility in the definition of the content of the operational phase.
Flexibility and industrial policy considerations were the two decisive factors that the Executive
particularly pointed out at the meeting. They stressed that the OTS "had been designed very much more
as a prototype than as a test bench" and that the communication capability offered by this satellite in 1977
would be 5000 telephone channels and 2 television channels, namely of the same order as that of an
Intelsat IV satellite.939 The discussion at the meeting made the strength of the Executive's proposal quite
evident against the national-biased alternatives. Despite the doubts and criticisms expressed by the
French, German and British delegations, the OTS option was strongly supported by the smaller Member
States, which also pressed for a decision to be taken very soon. The Belgian delegation, in its statement,
fully interpreted their opinions:
[All other options] involve one or several national industries having a preponderant position
and pose the issue of Europeanisation of the project [...] This issue of Europeanisation was
the stumbling block in all previous attempt to reach agreement on a telecommunications
programme. The Delegation considers that those industries in the Member States that are
engaged on national studies are thereby already placed in a sufficiently privileged position
and that there is no need to strengthen their position further through the medium of a
European budget.940
In the event, despite the reservations expressed by the British delegation, the Programme Board
recommended the Council to approve the Executive's proposal and to adopt the OTS project.941
10.2.3 The approval of the Telecom Programme Arrangement
After the PB-TEL approval of the OTS concept for the Telecom Programme's Phase 2, it still remained to
define the financial plan of the programme and the legal framework within which ESRO would
938 ESRO/PB-TEL(72)6, 7 November 1972; PB-TEL, 2nd meeting (17 November 1972), ESRO/PB-TEL/MIN/2,
11 December 1972. See also Müller (1990), p. 186.
939 ESRO/PB-TEL/MIN/2, cit., pp. 5-6.
940 ESRO/PB-TEL/MIN/2, cit., annex II.
941 ESRO/C(72)73, 4 December 1972. The precise objectives of the OTS programme were eventually discussed
by a group of experts consisting of ESRO staff, CEPT's Permanent Nucleus, and representatives appointed by
the delegations. The group held two meetings (on 8 December 1972 and 11 January 1973, respectively),
reported on in ESRO/PB-TEL/EXP/MIN/1, 18 December 1972, and ESRO/PB-TEL/EXP/MIN/2,
25 January 1973. Their final report, ESRO/PB-TEL(73)1, was discussed and amended at the 3rd meeting of
the PB-TEL (30 January 1973), ESRO/PB-TEL/MIN/3, 22 February 1973, and the conclusions are in
ESRO/PB-TEL(73)6, 13 February 1973.
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implement it. These elements were to be included in the formal arrangement between ESRO and the
governments of the participating Member States.942
The main controversial issue regarded the financial aspects, as the estimated cost of the experimental
phase now exceeded the upper limit of 100 MAU fixed by the Council in December 1971. The Executive
estimated the direct cost of this phase at 121.7 MAU, at mid-1972 prices, plus 28.8 MAU for the
programme share of ESRO's common and support costs (distributed pro rata among all programmes). The
payment schedule had also been changed, extending beyond the originally envisaged period of this phase
(1972-1976) up to 1978.943 Apart from inflation, the reasons for the increase were to be found, according
to the ESRO Director of Programmes and Planning, "in the decision [...] to develop an experimental
satellite on a purely European basis [as well as] in the objectives which the delegations had fixed in
respect of this satellite, with particular reference to the wish to have a certain pre-operational capacity".944
The argument did not convince all PB-TEL delegations, however. Belgium, France and the UK said that
if such cost estimates should be confirmed their participation in the programme would be called into
question. They noted in particular that the budget presented by ESRO included some elements in the
Supporting Technology Programme which seemed no longer necessary. The Board then decided to set up
a small group of experts with the task of reviewing the programme and suggesting possible cuts.
After a two-day meeting, the expert group could do no better than identify a few programme elements
that either could be started during the following operational phase or were not strictly indispensable for
the OTS or ECS. This allowed a possible reduction by 6.6 MAU.945 This gave rise to a hard confrontation
in the following PB-TEL meeting between the French delegation and the Executive. The former made it
clear that they would not subscribe to the programme if the budget for the experimental phase were not
reduced of 6.6 MAU, according to the findings of the expert group. Against this position, the Director of
ESTEC, O. Hammarström, "insisted on the speed with which the experts had had to carry out their work
and on the numerous doubts that still persisted regarding the possibility of actually cutting out certain
studies without seriously jeopardising the programme as a whole". The head of the Telecom Programme,
R. Collette, spoke out recalling that:
One of the basic aspects of the programme was the development of technologies that would
enable Europe to catch up with the United States in a number of fields. This was why ESRO
had preferred a three-axis-stabilised spacecraft to the conventional type of spin-stabilised
satellite and had also defined "advanced" telecommunications systems. A programme of this
kind therefore necessarily comprised a certain number of unknowns and risks, and if funds
were drastically curtailed it was to be feared that it would not be possible to overcome the
difficulties that were to arise. [...] It would not be realistic to maintain the technical
specifications and timetable of the programme, and at the same time to cut down the
expenditure considered indispensable to meet the specifications in question.946
Both Hammarström and Collette stressed that "very important decisions would soon need to be taken in
collaboration with industry" and that any further delay would endanger the normal progress of the work
which had been under way for two years. Just in those days, in fact, ESRO was evaluating the tenders for
the important phase B OTS contract, as we shall soon be considering.
942 The first draft of this Arrangement is ESRO/PB-TEL(72)7, 14 November 1972, and the laborious elaboration
of the final text is recorded in its various revisions and addenda. The final text is ESRO/PB-TEL(72)7, rev. 4,
7 May 1973, but the scale of contribution of participating countries was subsequently changed as in
ESRO/C(73)64, 8 October 1973.
943 ESRO/PB-TEL(73)4, 20 February 1973; PB-TEL(72)7, rev. 2, 13 February 1973.
944 PB-TEL, 4th meeting (27 February 1973), ESRO/PB-TEL/MIN/4, 15 March 1973, p. 5.
945 ESRO/PB-TEL(73)9, 28 March 1973. The precise figures were 2.8 MAU for expenditures that could be
deferred to the following phase and 3.8 MAU for not indispensable expenditures.
946 PB-TEL, 5th meeting (21 March 1973), ESRO/PB-TEL/MIN/5, 17 April 1973, pp. 3, 4 and 5-6.
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A tentative compromise was suggested by the Executive and supported by the British delegation, namely
that the original amount of 121.7 MAU should be retained but that the sum of 6.6 MAU would remain
blocked subject to subsequent decisions by the Board. But the French delegation "stated categorically"
that it was opposed to this proposal and the Board had to yield. It was agreed to remove that sum from the
budget and to fix the financial envelope for Phase 2 at 115.1 MAU, plus 28 MAU for common and
support costs. The work corresponding to the 6.6 MAU was placed in a so-called sub-phase 2 bis whose
execution would be decided, as in the case of the operational Phase 3, by a double-qualified majority
(Table 10-7). In this form the Telecom Arrangement was finally approved by the Board, with the French
delegation expressing its reservation, and then submitted to the Council for final approval.947
Why was the French delegation to the PB-TEL so critical of the technological work proposed by the
Executive as to risk jeopardising the whole experimental programme to defend savings of the order of 5
% of the estimated cost? And so unhappy about the solution eventually agreed on that it was unable to
approve even the text of the Arrangement that the Committee was to submit to the Council? Three
reasons were given by the delegation for its negative vote: (a) the uncertainty in the exact content of the
programme after the revision of the group of experts; (b) the fact that a substantial amount of the basic
technology in the programme was of general interest and yet was funded solely by the
telecommunications programme; and (c) the lack of coherence between the industrial policy pursued for
the technology programme and that followed for the development of the satellite. All this can hardly be
taken at face value. As to the first point, in fact, the group of experts had considered "satisfactory" the
technical content of the Supporting Technology Programme (STP) and had accepted the ESTEC analysis
of the OTS. Moreover, most of the industrial contracts under the STP had already been placed and it was
not desirable to interrupt work in progress. Finally, their revision had produced possible savings for 6.6
MAU over 121.7 MAU, certainly not a conclusion that could make the content of the programme
uncertain.
The second reason had some justification. The director of ESTEC, in fact, had recognised that "it was
very often extremely difficult to fix the dividing line" between studies of general interests and those
connected to a specific programme, a statement strongly criticised by the French delegation.948
Nevertheless, here again the amount of money involved was negligible: the group of experts had
concluded that studies worth only 3.8 MAU were not strictly indispensable for the OTS or ECS and
therefore had to be considered of general interest. Certainly not enough to justify a negative vote even
after these studies had been moved to Phase 2 bis and subject to approval by double-qualified majority.
The last point regarded the lack of coherence in the industrial policy. This term, in the ESRO framework,
meant essentially fair geographic distribution of industrial contracts or, more explicitly, the pressure from
Member States to get a share of technologically important contracts for their national industry that was
not less than their financial contribution to the Organisation (the "just return" concept). In this respect, a
difference did exist between the policy followed for the STP and that followed for the development of
OTS. In the latter case, owing to the importance of the contract, a procedure now standard for ESRO
procurement contracts was being used, i.e. tenders for detailed design studies of the satellite configuration
(Phase B studies) had been requested from the industrial consortia COSMOS, MESH and STAR.949 In the
case of the high-technology, small-value contracts under the STP, on the contrary, ESRO tended to award
these contracts more freely, on the basis of the technical experience and capability of bidding companies.
947 ESRO/PB-TEL/MIN/5, cit. p. 8. See also the report of the chairman of the PB-TEL to the Council:
ESRO/C(73)23, 6 April 1973. The text submitted to the Council (with the cover ESRO/C(73)11, add. 1,
26 March 1973) is ESRO/PB-TEL(72)7, rev. 3, Annex I, rev. 1 [21 March 1973]. The work to be performed
in Phase 2 and that shifted to Phase 2 bis were eventually detailed by the Executive in ESRO/PB-TEL(73)12,
6 July 1973.
948 ESRO/PB-TEL/MIN/5, cit., p. 3.
949 The selection process for the OTS contractor will be discussed in the following section.
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This of course resulted in a rather unbalanced distribution of contracts among the countries participating
in the telecommunications programme, with expenditures concentrated in those countries which
supported national communications satellite programmes: France, Germany and Italy.950 This situation
had been criticised at the PB-TEL by the Belgian delegation, which complained that "such scattering of
contracts might [...] distort the geographical distribution of work within the consortia"951. But while the
French delegation could rightly claim that a certain "lack of coherence" in industrial policy did exist
between these two parts of the programme, it is less clear why they felt unhappy about a situation in
which France was certainly not penalised, and which could in any case be justified and did not involve a
large fraction of the programme budget.
A more general answer should therefore be given to the question posed above. French space
policymakers, as we have seen, did not like the OTS project. They had to come to terms with it when it
became clear that Symphonie had no chance of being incorporated in the ESRO programme, but they
wanted to prevent ESRO from implementing a fully-fledged R&D technological programme in space
telecommunications which might lead to duplicating national activities. Such a concern about the
relationship between the technological research activity within ESRO's Telecom Programme and national
efforts in similar fields had already been expressed by France (and Germany as well) two years earlier,
and a whole IAPC meeting had been devoted to discussing this issue. The respective positions were
clearly expressed here. The French delegation argued that the ESRO programme should be used "in
complement of national efforts"; the German stressed "the importance of coordination with national
programmes"; and ESRO's Director of Programmes and Planning J.A. Dinkespiler advocated the need of
a certain degree of duplication appealing to the interest of all Member States of the Organisation:
When an action is carried out within the ESRO programme, the hardware or the software
which results from it becomes the property of the Organisation and the use of the know-how
which has been acquired is made available both to the Organisation and to each one of its
Member States. When a similar action is undertaken in one of the national programmes, the
know-how which results from it is made available to the Member State in question, not to the
Organisation as such or to the other Member States. It is therefore not a matter of
indifference to each one of the Member States to see an action undertaken in one of the
national programmes, rather than in the international programme. This means that all
Member States [i.e. not only those having national space programmes] must participate in
the decisions regarding coordination. It also means that this coordination would be greatly
facilitated and encouraged if some measure of symmetry was restored between national
programmes and the ESRO programme as regards access to technical know-how.952
The quotation is long but it makes it clear that what ESRO meant by coordination was just the opposite of
what France and Germany did. For these countries European space activities had to be considered as a
whole and therefore the international programme had to be used to increase the effectiveness of national
programmes and not to compete with them: coordination meant complementarity, integration and
rationalisation. For the ESRO Directorate, on the contrary, the Organisation had to develop its own
programmes on behalf of its whole membership and the relationship with the stronger Member States had
to be on equal footing.  "Coordination does  not necessarily mean that all  duplication should be avoided",
950 Müller (1990), 145-146.
951 ESRO/PB-TEL/MIN/5, cit., p. 6.
952 IAPC, 6th meeting (3 September 1971), ESRO/IAPC/MIN/6, 17 September 1971, p. 10 and 11-12. The issue
had been raised at the 4th meeting of the IAPC (9 July 1971), ESRO/IAPC/MIN/4, 20 August 1971. ESRO's
technology programme was presented in ESRO/IAPC(71)17, 31 August 1971.
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Dinkespiler argued, "some competition may be desirable; coordination efforts should aim at avoiding
haphazard duplications and at filling gaps"953. After further discussion in a round table organised by the
ESRO Applied Research Advisory Committee (ARAC) and in other IAPC meetings, the issue did not
resulted in major modifications in the STP plan for 1971-72.954 We have seen how the same issue was
still outstanding in spring 1973.
After this digression about the French aversion towards ESRO's technology programme, we can resume
our narrative. After the PB-TEL's approval of the Telecom Arrangement, the final decisions on the
programme had to take the practical form of: (a) a declaration by the Member States which had supported
the programme in December 1971 regarding their intention to participate in the programme as now
proposed; (b) the approval of the Telecom Arrangement by the Council; and (c) a Council resolution
authorising the Director General to sign the Arrangement in the name of ESRO. The Arrangement would
then enter into force after being signed by the governments of the participating states and by ESRO.
At the Council meeting in April 1973, the delegations from Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany,
Sweden, Switzerland and the UK confirmed the commitments of their governments to participate in the
Telecom Programme. The Italian delegation, however, pointed out that it could not take any position
because its government had not yet approved the new plans and budget for Phase 2 of the programme.
Hence all decisions were taken subject to the condition that by 1 June Italy confirmed its participation in
the programme.955 That date passed, however, without Italy having taken a decision because of a
government crisis (indeed an often recurring event in this country). Nor did a subsequent deferment of the
deadline by two weeks produce a decision. On the contrary, the Italian delegation declared that, pending
government endorsement of the modified programme, it was not even in a position to repeat its
commitment within the limits of the December 1971 agreement (i.e. within a total budget of 100 MAU
for Phase 2).956 This position created "a very serious situation". The 1971 package deal, in fact, was "the
legal basis for all undertakings of the Organisation since its adoption, [it] was equivalent to a promise to
participate in the programme and permitted the programmes to be modified on the basis of consultations
among Member States concerned". The Council then adopted a firm resolution expressing its "acute
disappointment" regarding the Italian government's attitude, "which threatens the very existence of this
important programme". The package deal could not be called into question, they stated.957 In the event,
after three months of negotiations, the Italian government did approve the programme as now defined and
the Telecom Arrangement could finally be signed.958
10.3 The Telecom Arrangement and the start of the OTS project (1973-1974)
The Telecom Arrangement formally entered into force on 21 September 1973, after being signed by the
governments of the eight Member States which had originally supported the programme in December
1971 (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland and the U.K.) and by the
Director General of ESRO. Subsequently, the Netherlands decided to join the programme too, with a
fixed contribution share of 2.5 % instead of 4.8 % as resulted from the GNP formula. The balance was
covered by the other participating countries on the basis of a GNP scale of contribution (Table 10-8).959
953 ESRO/IAPC/MIN/6, cit., p. 12. Müller (1990), pp. 171-175 and 208-214, presents the cases of the
development contracts for the TWTA and for the momentum wheels as interesting examples of the
relationship between ESRO's technology policy and national industrial interests.
954 The ARAC discussion is reported in ESRO/IAPC(71)26, 29 October 1971.
955 Council, 56th meeting (11-12 April 1973), ESRO/C/MIN/56, 3 May 1973.
956 Council, 57th meeting (1 June 1973), ESRO/C/MIN/57, 20 June 1973; 58th (extraordinary) meeting
(29 June 1973), ESRO/C/MIN/58, 13 July 1973.
957 ESRO/C/MIN/58, cit., p. 3. The quotations are from the French and the German delegations, respectively,
and from the Council resolution reported in ESRO/C/LVIII/Res. 1 (Final), 29 June 1973.
958 Council, 60th meeting (21 September 1973), ESRO/C/MIN/60, 3 October 1973. The final text of the
Arrangement is ESRO/PB-TEL(72)7, rev. 4, 7 May 1973.
959 ESRO/C(73)64, 8 October 1973.
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Spain thus remained the only ESRO member state not supporting the Telecom Programme.
10.3.1 The content of the Telecom Arrangement
The Telecom Arrangement consisted in a formal agreement between ESRO and the governments of the
states participating in ESRO's Telecom Programme. The Telecommunications Programme Board,
composed of representatives of the participating states, was made fully responsible for the programme
and delegated to take decisions related to it. The objectives of the programme were defined as follows:
To design, develop, construct and set up the experimental and pre-operational space
segment of a space communications system matching the objectives of the users, and to make
reliable operational satellites available to the users on completion of the programme.960
The programme, as discussed above, was broken down into two phases. The first phase (or Phase 2, as it
was called because it followed the preparatory study phase of 1970-71) was a technological and
experimental phase which the governments agreed to finance on the basis of a firm financial envelope of
115.1 MAU (at mid-1972 prices), with the addition of 28 MAU as the programme's share of ESRO's
common and support costs. This phase would run from 1972 to 1978, with the launch of the OTS at the
end of 1976. A possible sub-phase 2 bis was foreseen, covering further work on advanced technologies at
a cost of 6.6 MAU, plus a contingency allowance of 4.4 MAU. The decision to start such a sub-phase was
to be decided by a double-qualified majority.
The second phase of the programme (Phase 3) would be devoted to the development of two operational
flight units (ECS) to be made available to the users, one in orbit and the other on the ground, on terms still
to be defined. The launch of the first ECS was foreseen in 1980, but the possible launching of a prototype
model was also foreseen, if necessary. The indicative financial envelope of this phase, including common
and support costs and contingencies, was estimated at 160 to 283 MAU, depending on the configuration
of the satellite (i.e. 400 or 800 kg) and on the possible additional launching of a prototype. Decisions on
the start and precise content of this phase would be taken in 1975 by a double-qualified majority, and its
completion was foreseen for 1980, with the launch of the first ECS.
The Arrangement gave the participating states firm financial control over the programme but, at the same
time, it bound them to its execution up to completion. On the one hand, any change of the firm financial
envelope established in the Arrangement was subject to the approval by a two-thirds majority and the
same majority was required for approving the annual budgets relating to the programme. On the other
hand, no participant could withdraw from the programme unless the cumulative overruns of estimated
cost to completion exceeded 20 % of the amount of the firm financial envelope for reasons other than
changes in the price levels. Should this be the case, those participants wishing to continue the programme
would determine the arrangement for such continuation and report to the Council for any necessary
decision. The participating countries authorised ESRO to conclude the necessary contracts for the
execution of the programme in conformity with the Organisation's rules and procedures. The
Arrangement, however, stated explicitly that:
In placing contracts and sub-contracts for the execution of this programme, preference shall
be given, wherever possible, to execution of the work in the territories of the participants,
taking into consideration the Council's decisions in the matter of industrial policy and
distribution of work.961
960 ESRO/PB-TEL(72)7, rev. 4, cit., p. 3.
961 Ibidem, p. 7.
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We shall see in the following two sections how this statement, which touched the ever present question of
just return, became a hot issue when ESRO had to award the most important contracts in this phase,
namely for the construction of the OTS and for the satellite control and test station.
10.3.2 Selection of the OTS contractor
Two months after the approval of the Telecom Arrangement, ESRO brought to an end the selection
process for awarding the contract for the development and building of the OTS.962 This process had
started in October 1972, on the basis of the standard phase procedure adopted by ESRO for the
development of its satellite projects.963 This foresaw four main phases defined as follows:
Phase A: Definition of the mission, preliminary analysis of the satellite, identification of the
various possible design concepts.
Phase B: Detailed definition of the satellite and start of critical activities, especially as regards the
schedule.
Phase C: Final development of the subsystems, with production of mock-ups, test models and
engineering model of the satellite.
Phase D: Fabrication, integration and testing of the qualification and flight units of the satellite
followed by the launch.
Phase A studies had been performed by the COSMOS, MESH and STAR consortia between October
1972 and January 1973. The same consortia were then invited to tender for the more important phase-B
studies, for which only two parallel contracts were to be awarded. According to the technical specification
defined by ESRO, the final OTS had to incorporate three critical elements developed under the STP
programme, namely the repeater from AEG-Telefunken (D), the TWTA from Thomson-FIAR (F/I) and
the antenna from Selenia (I). As France, Germany and Italy had obtained such important contracts for
their national industries, a British company was the obvious choice for prime contractorship, in order to
achieve a balanced distribution of contracts within the overall programme. In fact, in their tenders all
consortia were led by British companies: COSMOS by Marconi, MESH by Hawker Siddeley Dynamics
(HSD) and STAR by British Aircraft Company (BAC).964 After proper evaluation, the Executive
recommended and the Administrative and Finance Committee (AFC) approved the awarding of phase B
contracts to MESH and STAR.965 The exclusion of the COSMOS consortium definitely left out of the
OTS development (and eventually of ESRO's Telecom Programme) the industries involved in the
Symphonie project, namely Aérospatiale (SNIAS) and Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (MBB), thus
predetermining the emergence of two major European industrial groupings for communications satellites,
one from the COSMOS consortium and the Symphonie experience and the other from the OTS/ECS
experience.966
At the end of September 1973, the MESH and STAR consortia had completed their competitive phase B
studies and submitted proposals for phase C/D, i.e. for the actual development of the OTS flight model.
962 This process has been described in detail by Müller (1990), pp. 195-214, and we recapitulate the story here,
after independent checking with the relevant documents.
963 ESRO/PB-TEL(72)10, 22 December 1972.
964 The other most important members of the consortia were: in COSMOS: SNIAS (F), SAT (F), MBB (D),
Selenia (I), ETCA (B); in MESH: MATRA (F), ERNO (D), SAAB (S), Aeritalia (I); in STAR: Thomson-
CSF (F), Dornier (D), FIAR (I), Fokker (NL), Contraves (CH), Ericsson (S).
965 ESRO/AF(73)35, 28 March 1973; AFC, 89th meeting (11 April 1973), ESRO/AF/MIN/89, 18 April 1973.
The value of the contract was 1.5 MAU for a 24-week period.
966 From the COSMOS consortium and the Symphonie experience emerged the Eurosatellite group. The other
was Satcom International, essentially deriving from the MESH consortium, the winner in the competition for
the OTS main contract. See Müller (1990), 302-337, and also Collette (1993). A comprehensive survey of the
European space industry in the late 1970s and early 1980s is in Dondi (1981).
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The selection of the final contractor was of vital importance:
The OTS contract was not only the largest single contract to be awarded, but since OTS was
basically a scaled-down model of the operational ECS, the industrial consortium which was
awarded the OTS contract would also be selected to develop and produce the subsequent
ECS satellites [...]. Because of its advanced nature and the financial resources involved, the
OTS contract was expected to hold importance beyond the Telecom Programme, shaping the
future technological competence of European industry in the area of communication
satellites.967
The two tenders were evaluated from the point of view of price and quality, and the result of the
evaluation was definitely in favour of the STAR proposal.968 The Executive then recommended the AFC
to award the contract to this consortium. When, however, the Committee discussed the question, only the
British, Dutch and Swiss delegations supported this recommendation. The other delegations, while
recognising the superior quality of the STAR tender, argued in favour of the MESH proposal on the basis
of industrial policy considerations.969 Awarding the OTS contract to STAR, they argued, could jeopardise
the future of the MESH consortium, since the two last major ESRO contracts, for the COS-B and GEOS
satellites, had been awarded to COSMOS and STAR, respectively, and the Meteosat contract was also
being awarded to COSMOS.970 This would endanger the conditions for real industrial competition in
Europe and would also raise serious problems of unemployment in some countries.
Against these arguments, the Executive defended the validity of its technical and financial evaluation.
They drew the delegations' attention to the real shortcomings of the MESH tender, "which were to be
found at the levels of project management and system engineering". And the Director General went as far
as to emphasise that:
If the AFC was to base its judgement merely on considerations of industrial policy,
independently of the Secretariat's technical and financial evaluation, the latter would
become meaningless.971
In the event, the Executive's proposal was put to the vote and rejected by six votes (Belgium, Denmark,
France, Germany, Italy and Sweden) to three (Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK). The AFC then
approved the awarding of the OTS contract to MESH with the negative vote of Switzerland and the
abstention of the UK.972 As we have intimated, this decision had important consequences on the shape of
the European aerospace industry, contributing to giving MATRA and ERNO the leading role they would
eventually have in France and Germany, alongside SNIAS and MBB respectively.
10.3.3 The OTS control and test station
The exploitation of OTS as an experimental satellite required the establishment of a dedicated earth
station to provide for the functions of telemetry, tracking and telecommand (TTC), and to carry out the
967 Müller (1990), p. 201.
968 ESRO/AF(73)127, 14 November 1973.
969 AFC, 95th meeting (29-30 November 1973), ESRO/AF/MIN/95, 13 December 1973.
970 MBB was the prime contractor for COS-B and BAC for GEOS; the Meteosat contract was awarded to
SNIAS as prime contractor for the COSMOS consortium. Müller (1990), p. 204, wrongly ascribed the COS-
B contract to STAR; this satellite was in fact being developed by the CESAR consortium, the forerunner of
COSMOS.
971 ESRO/AF/MIN/95, cit., p. 5.
972 The Spanish delegation did not take part in either vote because Spain did not participate in the Telecom
Programme. The contract was awarded on the condition that acceptable solutions would be found in respect
of those aspects of the tender which ESRO had considered poor, with no increase of the tender price and no
major change in the timetable for the programme.
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required experiments of the communications payload. It was envisaged that such a station should be
linked by high-quality data transmission link to ESRO's Operational Center (ESOC) in Darmstadt,
Germany. Two questions were involved in the discussions about the OTS control station: the first
regarded the choice of the site where the station had to be built, the second regarded the choice of the
contractor for its design and manufacture.973
With regard to the choice of the site, the starting point was the Council decision, taken in November
1972, that all ESRO's geostationary satellites should be operated by one control station located in
Odenwald, near Darmstadt. Should it prove impossible to operate any particular satellite from this station,
a second possibility was offered by installing the necessary facilities at the station ESRO had established
in Villafranca del Castillo, near Madrid, to operate the IUE satellite.974 On this basis, and having received
assurance from the German authorities that the 11 and 14 GHz frequency bands could be used at the
Odenwald site, the Council decided in April 1974 that the OTS control station should be located there.975
Meanwhile, a tender action was started for the choice of the contractor, and in June 1974 ESRO received
two offers, one from a consortium led by AEG-Telefunken and another from a consortium led by
Siemens. Neither of them was entirely satisfactory from the technical point of view, but the Executive
recommended the former, subject to the condition that the deficiencies found in the offer were overcome.
It was also expected that the British company Marconi would be included among the sub-contractors, in
order to achieve a more balanced geographical distribution of work. Pending this revision of the tender
proposal, and because the question of the location had been re-opened, only 0.750 MAU out of the 5.325
MAU contract value was committed for a 10-week design phase and for critical long-lead items.976
The question of the location was again on the table because in July the German authorities had informed
ESRO that the availability of the OTS frequencies could only be guaranteed in Odenwald until 1980.
Given this situation, the Executive considered it unreasonable to build the station there, both because the
OTS was likely to have a lifetime extending beyond 1980 and because the same station was also to be
used for the ECS, which would operate on the same frequency bands as OTS. On the other hand, the
Villafranca site also had to be excluded because the eccentric location of the station in relation to the
coverage area of the satellite antenna beams prevented the possibility of properly conducting the required
experiments on the OTS communications system.977
After the elimination of Odenwald and Villafranca, three other alternatives were analysed by ESRO, only
two of which, however, deserved consideration.978 The first was the offer by the German authorities to
build the OTS control station at the Usingen site, 30 km north-west of Frankfurt, where the Deutsche
Bundespost had its overseas transmitting station and where they planned to build the German station for
pre-operational use of OTS. The main problem with Usingen was the existence there of high-power HF
transmitters, with a risk of interference with the ESRO station. This problem was discussed
with representatives of the German PTT administration but could not be solved satisfactorily.  The second
973 As noted above, the national PTT administrations would set up, at their own expenses, the earth stations
required for the operational use of the ECS system. In addition, some administrations were willing to set up
facilities for the experimental programme and pre-operational use of the OTS. For ESRO/CEPT negotiations
on the future OTS operation see ESRO/PB-TEL(74)22, 21 August 1974, and ESRO/PB-TEL(74)26,
16 September 1974.
974 Council, 51st meeting (23-24 November 1972), ESRO/C/MIN/51, 5 December 1972. The Odenwald station
was already destined to operate the ESRO satellites GEOS and METEOSAT. The Villafranca station was
ESRO's main contribution to the joint NASA/UK/ESRO IUE space telescope in geostationary orbit.
975 Council, 64th meeting (29 April 1974), ESRO/C/MIN/64th, 10 May 1974. The Council decision was based on
ESRO/C(74)15, 25 March 1974, with add. 1 and 2, 29 April 1974. See also ESRO/PB-TEL(74)3,
1 February 1974.
976 ESRO/AF(74)82, 12 July 1974; AFC, 101st meeting (25 July 1974), ESRO/AF/MIN/101, 8 August 1974.
977 PB-TEL, 10th meeting (3 July 1974), ESRO/PB-TEL/MIN/10, 22 August 1974. About the problems at the
Villafranca site, see ESRO/C(74)15 and ESRO/PB-TEL(74)3, cit.
978 ESRO/C(74)50, 17 September 1974.
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alternative foresaw the building of the OTS control station at the Redu site, in Belgium, where one of the
stations of ESRO's satellite control network (ESTRACK) had been established since the beginning of the
Organisation's life. The choice of Redu did not present any major technical problems: all services and
facilities existed on the site, reliable data link to ESOC was quite feasible, and no objections existed to the
use of the required frequencies on the part of the Belgian authorities. In fact, the latter had already
advocated the choice of Redu for the OTS station even against Odenwald, in order to give more
prominence to "the Organisation's only facility located in Belgium".979 The third alternative was offered
by the Italian authorities. It consisted of having the OTS controlled under ESRO contract by the Italian
company Telespazio, which operated the PTT station at Fucino, near Rome. The OTS control station at
Fucino would be partly financed by Telespazio and used both for the ESRO experimental programme and
for OTS pre-operational use by the Italian company. Eventually, the station would become the Italian
earth station in the operational ECS system.980
The real choice was between Redu and Fucino, both solutions being acceptable and virtually equivalent
from the technical point of view. A significant difference did exist, however, from the political point of
view: while the earth station at Redu would be owned and operated by ESRO, the one at Fucino would be
owned by Telespazio and operated under ESRO contract. The Executive definitely recommended the
latter for two main reasons. Firstly, the Fucino/Telespazio option presented an appreciable economic
advantage over Redu, with regard to both the total cost and the timetable of payments. Secondly, it
involved a direct commitment by a telecommunication organisation and hence closer cooperation
between ESRO and users; this would facilitate the transition to the subsequent operational phase of the
programme.
The final choice of the site for the OTS control station pertained to the Council, as it involved a decision
running counter to its own decision of 1972, but the PB-TEL was invited to discuss the issue and express
its position.981 The discussion, however, came to nothing. On the one hand, the Belgian delegation
expressed "its deep regret" at the fact that the Redu solution had not been adopted outright and stressed
that, in choosing the Fucino site, ESRO was delegating one of its responsibilities to a member state. On
the other hand, the German delegation proposed a new site in Germany, Weilheim, near ESOC. They
argued that, since the Council's previous decision had been called into question, the choice of the site
should be fully open to discussion and the Executive should now assess the merits of their proposal. Italy,
of course, advocated the Fucino option. After a long discussion, the Board was unable to agree on a clear
recommendation and the question was deferred to the Council.982
At the Council meeting, one week later, the question had definitely become a highly political issue, with
four Member States advocating the establishment of the new facility in their own territory: Italy supported
the Fucino/Telespazio option recommended by the Executive; Belgium pressed for the Redu/ESRO
solution and stressed "the capital importance of the Organisation being the owner of the ground station";
Germany argued that the choice of the Weilheim site was the most consistent with the Council's
established policy about earth stations; and even Spain asked for reconsideration of the Villafranca site,
which had been rejected months before.983 The Belgian delegation was the most sanguine. According to
979 ESRO/C/MIN/64, cit., p. 7.
980 ESRO/C(74)33, 6 June 1974. It must be noted that, after receiving the Italian offer, all Member States were
invited to let ESRO know whether any other national bodies were interested in tendering for the setting up
and operation of the OTS control station. In addition to Telespazio, the German Bundespost and the Spanish
national telephone company (CTNE) offered their services. Both bodies, however, stated that they were not
willing to accept the contractor ESRO had selected for the construction of the station nor the fact that the
station itself might be used by ESRO after the end of the OTS nominal life of three years. Consequently,
these offers were not taken into consideration. For these negotiations see ESRO/AF(74)89, 12 July 1974,
with add. 1, 22 July 1974, and add. 2, 25 July 1974; together with ESRO/C(74)50, cit.
981 PB-TEL, 11th meeting (30 September 1974), ESRO/PB-TEL/MIN/11, 19 November 1974. At the PB-TEL
meeting, the document ESRO/C(74)50, cit., was presented under the cover ESRO/PB-TEL (74)23,
17 September 1974, with add. 1, 30 September 1974.
982 ESRO/C(74)50, add. 1, 1 October 1974, and add. 2, 7 October 1974.
983 Council, 68th meeting (8 October 1974), ESRO/C/MIN/68, 22 October 1974, p. 10.
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the minutes of the meeting:
The Belgian Delegation voiced the grave concern of its authorities about the situation that
had developed in the Organisation during recent months, in particular the repeated
postponement of the appointment of a Director General, the absence of a final decision on
the Aerosat [aeronautical satellite] programme, and now budget difficulties. Faced with the
Council's attitude towards a decision on the choice of the ground station, the Belgian
authorities wanted to see the whole of these problems dealt with at political level and they
reserved the right to initiate action to that end.984
The ESRO Council found itself in a very delicate situation. More than one year had elapsed since the
European Space Conference had finally agreed on the so-called "second package deal", which paved the
way to the transformation of ESRO into a European Space Agency (ESA) devoted to all kinds of space
activities (science, application and launchers). The birth of the new agency, however, had been repeatedly
postponed because of persisting political and financial problems, and the Council could not add to its
already hot agenda a critical consideration of the location of all the Organisation's facilities, as requested
by the Belgian delegation. They still had in mind the difficult situation in which ESRO had found itself
after the decision to stop the research activity at ESRIN and to wind up the sounding rocket programme
based in ESRANGE. In that circumstance, it had required laborious negotiations with the Italian and
Swedish authorities before a compromise about the future of these establishments could finally be
reached.985 After a harsh discussion in which the Dutch delegation supported the Redu solution and
France, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK supported Fucino, the Council decided, by the narrow margin of
four votes (Belgium, Germany, Netherlands and Switzerland) to one (Italy), with five abstentions
(Denmark, France, Spain, Sweden and the U.K.), to defer any decision on the location of the OTS control
station to its next meeting. The Council chairman, the French Maurice Lévy, who had been one of the
main authors of the second package deal, expressed his "grave disappointment" at this outcome of the
Council's discussion. And the Swiss delegation noted disconsolately that "concern for national interests
continued too often to predominate".986
The problem found a solution at the following Council meeting, at the end of October 1974, but the
persisting disagreement was recorded in the outcome of two votes. By the first, the Belgian proposal to
locate the OTS control station at Redu was rejected by four votes in favour (Belgium, Netherlands,
Sweden and Spain) and five against (Denmark, Germany, Italy, Switzerland and the UK), with one
abstention (France). By the second, the Council adopted a resolution, by seven votes to one (Belgium)
with two abstentions (Netherlands and Sweden), which provided for the OTS control station to be located
in the Telespazio facilities at Fucino.987
The issue of the site having being settled, the question of the contractor came to the forefront. In October,
AEG-Telefunken returned with a revised offer in which the price had escalated to 8.25 MAU, the reasons
for the increase being mainly ascribed to the introduction of new sub-contractors. Under these
circumstances, in which the just-return policy so considerably contrasted with the tender cost,
the Executive felt obliged to re-open competition by awarding an eight-week study contract of 150 kAU
984 ESRO/C/MIN/68, cit., p. 11. The lack of agreement on the choice of A. Hocker's successor as ESRO's
director general had led the Council to appoint the Director of Administration R. Gibson as acting director
general: Council, 66th (restricted) meeting (26 June 1974), ESRO/C/APP(74)17, 8 July 1974.
985 ESRIN became the seat of the new Agency's Space Documentation Centre; ESRANGE was transferred to the
Swedish government but it continued to be used by ESRO for its sounding rocket "special project". The
similarity between the Redu situation and that of ESRIN and ESRANGE was explicitly underlined by the
Belgian delegation.
986 ESRO/C/MIN/68, cit., p. 12.
987 Council, 69th meeting (30 October 1974), ESRO/C/MIN/69, 8 November 1974, with attached
ESRO/C/LXIX/Res. 1, 30 October 1974.
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to Siemens in order to make this company's former offer technically acceptable.988 Siemens, however,
could not submit a revised bid before the end of February 1975, which made it impossible to meet the
schedule of the OTS programme. Consequently, negotiations with AEG-Telefunken were undertaken
with a view to reducing their price. The company, in particular, was now instructed to review its design
using the cheapest sub-contractors.989 The newly revised offer of AEG-Telefunken, which excluded
Marconi, now amounted to 6.545 MAU, the increase compared to the original offer being mainly due to
the technical requirements imposed by the move from Odenwald to Fucino. In the event, two different
contracts were approved by the AFC, one directly with AEG-Telefunken, at a cost of 2.345 MAU, for the
ESRO share of the station's equipment, and another with Telespazio, at a cost of 3.854 MAU, for the
renting, maintenance and operation of the station over 3.5 years.990
10.4 Concluding remarks
The launch of the OTS, originally planned at the end of 1976, was eventually scheduled for September
1977. On Friday 13th of that month, an unfortunate date indeed, the Delta rocket carrying the satellite
exploded shortly after lift-off from Cape Canaveral and the 900 kg spacecraft was lost in the ocean.991
Fortunately enough, a back-up policy for the OTS project had been agreed in 1975, and a second flight
unit could thus be integrated in six months. This was successfully launched on 11 May 1978, opening a
"new era in European communications", the ESA Bulletin heralded.992 Earlier that year the ESA Council
had finally approved the undertaking of the next phase of the Telecom Programme, after two years of
laborious negotiations both among Member States and between ESA and EUTELSAT, the new
organisation to which the PTT administrations had delegated authority for owning and managing the
space segment of the communications satellite system. The ECS development could then go into full
swing and the first ECS satellite, now re-named EUTELSAT I, was eventually launched on 16 June 1983
from the ESA range in Kourou by an Ariane rocket. A second satellite was launched in August 1984
while the third was lost in September 1985 because of a launch failure. Two other satellites were then
launched in September 1987 and July 1988, respectively, thus bringing to completion the full ECS system
with four satellites in orbit. We should also recall that the Telecom Programme also produced the
MARECS satellite, a satellite for maritime communications based on the ECS design, two of which were
successfully launched in 1981 and 1984 (a launch failure occurred in 1982).
A thorough discussion of these developments will be presented in a subsequent chapter (in volume 2).
Concluding this second part of our story of ESRO's telecommunications programme, a few general
considerations are called for. The first, and the most obvious, concerns the long time required to get a
definite programme under way and to harvest the expected achievements. First ideas on a joint European
communications satellite programme were discussed as early as in 1963 and first plans were elaborated
by the end of 1965. It then required six years to get ESRO's Telecom Programme approved (but only the
first phase of it) and two more years before the programme arrangement was agreed on and the
construction of the OTS contracted with industry. The approval of the next phase then required another
four and a half years. When, in the summer of 1983, the first ECS finally began its operational life, six
Intelsat V satellites were orbiting over the Earth's oceans and another was about to move on to the
988 ESRO/AF(74)82, add. 1, 28 October 1974; AFC, 103rd meeting (29 October 1974), ESRO/AF/MIN/103,
8 November 1974.
989 AFC, 104th meeting (28-29 November 1974), ESRO/AF/MIN/104, 12 December 1974; ESRO/AF(74)154,
19 December 1974.
990 ESRO/AF(75)8, 23 January 1975; ESRO/AF(75)9, 24 January 1975; ESRO/AF(75)10, 24 January 1975.
AFC, 108th meeting (10-11 February 1975), ESRO/AF/MIN/108, 20 February 1975.
991 The satellite was heavier than originally designed because in 1974 it had been decided to use the new and
more powerful Delta 3914 launcher instead of the standard 2914 model. The upgrading of the OTS made it
possible to design it much closer to the operational ECS than originally planned. On the other hand, the use
of such a new vehicle involved some technical risk. See the discussion at the PB-TEL, 10th meeting
(3 July 1974), ESRO/PB-TEL/MIN/10, 22 August 1974, as well as the documents ESRO/PB-TEL(74)17,
25 June 1974, and ESRO/PB-TEL(74)19, 26 June 1974.
992 ESA Bulletin, 14 (May 1978): OTS opens new era in European communications. This issue was completely
devoted to a description of the OTS and its orbital test programme.
328
launching pad; domestic satellite telecommunications in the United States were being implemented by
several private companies (Western Union, AT&T, RCA, SBS, Hughes), the first launchings occurring in
1974; Canada had already launched seven satellites of the ANIK series; Japan, India and Indonesia had
also acquired independent space communications capability; and two Symphonie satellites were
approaching the end of orbital life after several years of good performance. Not all these spacecraft were
as complex and up-to-date as the ECS, but the European system was certainly too late to play a major role
in the competitive market of space telecommunications.993
The patient reader of this and the preceding chapter will agree that it was not technical difficulties that
caused such a prolongation in the development of ESRO's (eventually ESA's) telecommunications
programme. Notwithstanding the sophistication of the OTS and ECS design, engineers in ESTEC and in
industry seemed perfectly capable of meeting the technical challenge; at least, no evidence can be found
in the IAPC and PB-TEL documents of any major delay caused by technical difficulties. What we find,
on the contrary, is the evidence of the many political and institutional problems arising from the complex
framework of the history of space in Europe. Let us recall three of them that deserve some further
comment.
First was the laborious search for a coherent space policy for Europe. ESRO's Telecom Programme was
hardly considered or evaluated just for itself; it was an element of a process which involved many other
elements, such as the question of the European launcher and the relationship between Europe and the
United States, or the problems of industrial policy and European economic integration. In order to start a
viable space telecommunications programme, package deals had to be agreed on in which both common
undertakings and national interests could be guaranteed, and this took time.
The second problem regarded the question of users. As the Swiss delegation put it at a PB-TEL meeting:
The initiative to develop a telecommunications system rested entirely with the ministers of
ESRO's Member States, and [...] the decision had not been taken solely with a view to
meeting the users' requirements, but within a much wider political context. Indeed, it had to
be recognised that the users had never formally requested the introduction of such a
system.994
The development of space telecommunications in Europe was not spurred on by a strong demand, with
generous funding provided by interest groups. On the contrary, it was political push which furthered the
development. This however lacked clear objectives, firm determination and adequate funding, because of
the uncertainty regarding the economic benefits and the multinational structure of the institutions called to
implement the programme. Another kind of deal, in fact, had to be negotiated between ESA, the ministers
and the users organisations in order to cope with the financial aspects of the ECS system.
A third reason for delay was the rather cumbersome procedures for taking decisions. This was due to the
complex institutional framework in which the decision-making process developed, with several bodies
involved at different levels and different times. Not only did all major decisions of the
Telecommunications Programme Board have to be endorsed by the Council, but the latter was invested
with all issues of political relevance (i.e. each time the PB-TEL delegations could not find an agreement).
Questions affecting the budget and those regarding industrial policy had to be discussed by the
Administrative and Finance Committee. Those involving more than one programme had to be discussed
by the appropriate Programme Board or the Joint Programmes and Policy Committee (JPPC). Groups of
experts were often set up to discuss technical questions (which often had political importance, as we have
seen in the case of the STP programme), and the smoothness of the whole process depended of course
on the general political conditions.  The  decision  process was also  affected  by the performance of other
993 For technical information on all communication satellites up to 1992 see Martin (1991).
994 PB-TEL, 4th meeting (27 February 1973), ESRO/PB-TEL/MIN/4, 15 March 1973, p. 7.
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actors, like the CEPT and its committees, the national PTT administrations, the EBU, the governments of
ESRO's Member States, the individual ministers in those governments, and so on. And the multinational
structure of so many decision-making bodies added a new dimension to the usual slowness of any
complex bureaucratic process.
The second general consideration regards the political role of the ESRO/ESA Secretariat vis-à-vis the
legislative arms of the Organisation. We have seen how important this role was when, after the failure of
the envisaged ESRO/COMSAT cooperation, the Executive succeeded in proposing the OTS project and
getting it through against the no-issue situation of competing national interests. On the other hand, they
were not able to get good technical arguments recognised against "industrial policy" considerations when
the choice of the OTS contractor was discussed. ESRO was capable of defending the viability of the
Telecom Programme against the CEPT's pessimistic analysis on the financial aspects of the envisaged
ECS system; but they failed when claimed support for a fully fledged technological research programme.
A fair conclusion might be that the Telecom Programme certainly gave ESRO a more important political
role than the Organisation had when its programme was limited to scientific projects. The Executive
always acted now as an authoritative protagonist in the negotiating process, taking advantage of its
established technical and managerial capability, as well as the political credibility which ESRO had vis-à-
vis the setbacks of ELDO and the shortcomings of the European Space Conference. On the one hand, the
Telecom Programme had provided the Organisation's technical staff with invaluable know-how on
advanced space technology and on the management of important industrial contracts. On the other hand,
it became clear that projects like Symphonie or Sirio could not serve a European ideal in space, and if
such an ideal was to survive, ESRO was the only instrument to achieve it and the Telecom Programme its
main implement.
Our last consideration regards ESRO's industrial policy. The concern about this aspect was particularly
exasperated among the Organisation's Member States. The enforcement of the just return concept was
always at the core of any political negotiation or technical discussion, and the difficulty of finding a
compromise on this issue was often the main reason for delays and setbacks. The stakes in fact were high.
Telecommunications appeared as the most promising sector in space activities, both from the viewpoint
of economic investments and from that of commercial returns. Governments and industries could not
afford to miss the opportunity that ESRO's Telecom Programme was offering. The just return concept
was at the very core of ESRO's foundation. At the 1962 conference at which the ESRO Convention was
opened to signature, the plenipotentiaries had adopted a resolution which stated that the Organisation
should "place orders for equipment and industrial contracts among Member States as equitably as
possible, taking into account scientific, technological, economic and geographic considerations [our
emphasis]".995 The geographic constraint, however, had not been particularly emphasised in the first years
of the Organisation's existence, from 1964 to 1968, and it became an important issue only when ESRO
started to develop more sophisticated scientific satellites like the TD-1. With the undertaking of
application programmes, the budget escalation, and the evolution of ESRO towards a comprehensive
space agency, the just return principle became the main element of the Organisation's industrial policy.
Just return, however, could not be a substitute for a real industrial policy. The latter, in fact, should also
imply the planned use and development of Europe's industrial resources, with the aim of improving its
competitiveness and rationalising its structure and services, but this often contrasted with the
requirements of fair geographical distribution.996 We cannot discuss this topic here, but we should recall
that the pressure for fairly distributing industrial contracts among participating countries, on the one hand,
and the development of both national and joint European programmes, on the other, led in fact to
duplication and to productive over-capacity. In the event, this essential tension between industrial
rationalisation and just return, as well as between national policies and ESA's joint ventures, led to the
emergence  of two parallel  and competing  programmes on  second-generation communications satellites,
995 See chapter 2.
996 On the discussion about ESRO's and ESA's industrial policy see Beattie & De la Cruz (1967)
and Dondi (1980a). See also Müller (1990), pp. 353-357.
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Alternative options for the orbital tests









A specially developed satellite
Option II Development of a satellite of the 500-kg class
Source: ESRO/IAPC(71)9, 24 May 1971
Table 10-2








Ia 5 179 211 395
Ib 5 144 211 360
Ic 5 161 211 377
Id 5 176 211 392
II 5 255 176 436
Source: ESRO/IAPC(71)9, 24 May 1971
Table 10-3




























II 5 255 176 436
III 5 331 112 448
* Figures in this table include ESRO direct costs, industrial development contracts, and common and support costs
calculated according to the new programme budgeting and accounting which took into account the eventual
optionality of programmes (see ESRO/C(71)46, 21 September 1971, and add. 1, 18 October 1971). Common and
support costs were estimated at 91 MAU for Option III and at 56.5 to 85 MAU for the various sub-options in Option
IV.
Source: ESRO/IAPC(71)9, add. 1, 18 June 1971
332
Table 10-4
Cost-to-completion of Options II, III and IV (MAU at 1971 prices)
Option II 500-kg experimental satellite;
700-800 kg prototype/operational satellite
473
Option III 200-kg experimental satellite;
700-800 kg pre-operational satellite;









ESRO/COMSAT satellite and 400-kg operational satellite
without prototype
Symphonie-B financed outside ESRO and 400-kg
operational satellite with prototype
Symphonie-B financed outside ESRO and 800-kg
operational satellite with prototype
ESRO/COMSAT satellite and 800-kg operational satellite
with prototype







Source: ESRO/IAPC(71)28, 9 November 1971, and ESRO/IAPC/MIN/9, 22 December 1971, annex V.
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Table 10-5
Programme of the experimental phase (1972-1976) with estimated costs
(MAU at 1971 prices)
1. Communication system
a) Overall system studies
b) Studies of transmission problems
c) Propagation experiments
d) Earth segment studies
7.5
2. Supporting Technology Programme (STP)
a) Communication technology
a1) Travelling wave tube amplifier
a2) 14/11 GHz modular repeater




b1) Structures and mechanisms
b2) Thermal control
b3) Attitude and orbit control
b4) Energy conversion
33.0
3. Experimental satellite (including CTS)




4. Pre-operational and operational satellites
a) Satellite configuration definition studies (Phase A study)
b) Further work on the operational system (Phase B study)
5.5
Total cost 76.0
ESRO direct costs 10.0
Common and support costs 25.0
Grand total 101.0
Sources: ESRO/IAPC(71)28, 9 November 1971, and ESRO/IAPC(72)6, 23 February 1972
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Table 10-6
Cost estimates for the OTS option (MAU at 1971 prices)
Phase 3Phase 1 Phase 2



























Sub totals 5 111.0 112 188
Total cost 228 304
Common and support costs 60 77
Grand total 288 381
Sources: ESRO/PB-TEL(72)2, 11 August 1972, and ESRO/PB-TEL(72)6, 7 November 1972.
Table 10-7
Financial envelope of the experimental phase (Phase 2)
(MAU at 1972 prices)





















Source: ESRO/PB-TEL(73)12, 6 July 1973.
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Table 10-8
Scale of contributions to the Telecom Programme




















Source: ESRO/C(73)64, 8 October 1973.
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Chapter 11: 
The Long Struggle to Adopt a Balanced European Space Programme
J. Krige
The previous six chapters have described the evolution of ESRO’s scientific programme and the efforts to
embark on the development of a European telecommunications satellite. This turn to applications was, in
fact, indicative of a complete reorientation of the priorities of the European space programme. ESRO was
set up on the initiative of scientists who wanted to enter the new domain of research beyond the
atmosphere opened up by satellite technology. ELDO was primarily a political and industrial project; its
launcher was embarked on to draw the British government closer to its partners across the Channel and to
encourage national firms to develop advanced technologies. No specific use, or user community,
informed the earliest definitions of the rocket.
All of this began to change in the mid-1960s. Governments now saw space as a domain of commercial
and social importance, and grew increasingly interested in the possibility of using it for a variety of
purposes, above all telecommunications, but also meteorology, navigation, etc. Applications gradually
began to supplant science in the eyes of many fund givers as the prime rationale for investing in space.
This not only forced a reassessment of the balance of effort between space science and applications. It
also forced a reassessment of the kind of launcher that was needed, if indeed Europe needed a launcher at
all given its limited resources and the availability of American launch systems.
This redefinition of space priorities was a complex process, and inevitably different European countries
had different, and changing conceptions of what a ‘balanced’ European programme would involve.
Europe could not hope to do everything it would have liked. Choices had to be made, choices which had
to be made against the background of changing national and international political contexts. In particular,
Europe simply had to take account of developments across the Atlantic, and situate itself vis-à-vis the vast
American effort. It is for that reason that in this section we also have two chapters dealing specifically
with US-European cooperation in our period.
This chapter describes the seven difficult years during which Council delegates in ESRO and ELDO, and
their Ministers meeting in the European Space Conference, struggled to define a European space policy
which would win the adherence of the majority of the participants. Its most striking feature is that,
notwithstanding the very different priorities adopted by the Member States, the determination to find a
compromise which would hold the partners together eventually prevailed. This determination not to fail,
to build a European space community, and so to consolidate European collaboration in general, was the
underlying glue without which the entire edifice would have crumbled. What we are about to tell is then
not just a story of policy choice but of political will, a will which eventually overcame the momentary
tensions, conflicts, and threats which at times threatened to tear a collaborative European effort to shreds
and to replace it with bilateral and multilateral agreements.
11.1 The Causse Report
As we pointed out in chapter 4, the Ministers meeting in Rome in July 1966 were emphatic that the time
had come to coordinate the European space effort. They had before them a report drawn up by an ad hoc
group headed by Michel Bignier. It stressed the need for avoiding overlap between programmes, with one
eye on the potential competition between the telecommunication satellite foreseen for CETS and the
Franco-German Symphonie. It identified some major gaps in European activities, notably the absence of
powerful launcher able to put a satellite for direct TV broadcasting in geostationary orbit. And it insisted
that governments should be prepared to double their investments in space from 0.05% of GNP to 0.1%.
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To take matters further the European Space Conference (as the Ministerial meeting now became) decided
to set up an Advisory Committee on Programmes. Its task was to “elaborate proposals for a joint space
policy” and for “programmes in the framework of such a policy […]”.997 This policy had to conform to
several guidelines. It needed to suggest projects covering several years which were “harmoniously
divided between scientific and technical research activities, on the one hand, and practical applications on
the other, together with the construction of the launchers required for such projects”. The Committee was
asked to focus its attention on improved communications satellites and a “meaningful” scientific
programme concentrated on a “few” activities which opened up “new prospects in the research area”.
Wide-ranging proposals were not enough; the Committee had to establish priorities between the different
programmes, and cost each alternative.
The European Space Conference nominated Jean-Pierre Causse, the head of the French Space Centre at
Bretigny to chair this committee. He was assisted in this task by Technical and Economic Subcommittees,
and by representatives from each of the organisations comprising the European Space Conference, ESRO,
ELDO and CETS. The Causse Report was published within six months, in December 1967.998
The Causse Report began (and herein lay its great interest) by clearly differentiating the aims of a
European space effort from the space programmes of the Superpowers. At the time civil space, in the
public mind, was dominated by the space race between the United States and the Soviet Union, and was
synonymous with international rivalry, national prestige, and man-in-space programmes. Causse and his
colleagues emphasised instead the long-term commercial interest of space and Europe’s need to develop
the autonomy needed to collaborate from a position of strength with the space giants. “Rather than seek
the ‘power’ objective that has characterised other space policies”, it said, “Europe should above all
demonstrate her determination to be independent. Rather than indulge in illusory competition, she should
seek to practice the closest collaboration with the other space powers […]” on condition that she could
ensure intellectual, technical and commercial benefits commensurate with her efforts.999 Civilian space,
for the Causse Report, was thus to be seen above all as a domain of major economic significance. It was
an emerging field in which industrial and commercial rivalry around the exploitation of rapidly
developing new technologies, notably for telecommunications, would soon eclipse the political and
ideologically-inspired conflicts of the previous space decade.
The Causse Report recognised that many of Europe’s space goals could be achieved for the major
European powers by national efforts and through bilateral collaboration with the USA or the Soviet
Union. But no single European nation acting alone would have the political and economic weight to
protect its interests in confrontation with two space powers which had invested far greater resources for
many more years into their space programmes and their space-related industries. Thus, even while
stressing the economic, industrial and commercial advantages of space, the report stressed the political
nature of the decision that had to be taken. It put two major political objectives at the top of its list of aims
which could only be achieved through a cooperative European space effort, coordinated with national
programmes. First and foremost, such an effort would secure “Europe’s place in the world”. This would
be achieved by ensuring that there was a “fair partnership” in the “design, production and management of
the equipment needed for space exploration and exploitation”, by enabling Europe to have a “fair place”
in international activities like the World Weather Watch and Intelsat, by “raising the prestige of European
science” and ensuring that European scientific efforts would not be impeded by “the manner in which
facilities are made available by other space powers” (e.g. launch windows, conditions on access to data),
by reducing the brain drain, and by giving Europe the capacity to help underdeveloped countries.
Secondly, and crucially, only a combined European programme could secure European “autonomy of
political and cultural expression,”, i.e. “having the possibility to procure in case of need, the necessary
rockets, satellites, payloads and ground facilities for broadcasting radio and television programmes to
specific areas, without the present space powers being in a position to exercise control over these
broadcasts through their monopoly of launching facilities”.
997 For this paragraph seeF CSE/CM(July 67)14, Final, 13 July 1967.
998 The  Causse Report is CSE/CCP(67)5, December 1967.
999 Ibid. pp. 8-9.
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Having explained its overall philosophy the  Causse Report went on to define policy for each of the three
main areas of civil space, namely, scientific and applications satellites, and launchers. Its rationale for the
science programme once again attested to the group’s innovative spirit. The classic justification for a
collaborative European programme had always been that ESRO, like CERN, should embark on at least
one satellite which was beyond the resources of any of its Member States acting alone. Hence the
argument that a project like the Large Astronomical Satellite, the LAS (see chapter 5) was essential to, if
not the backbone of, the ESRO scientific programme. The LAS was so expensive, and so demanding
technically that it would necessarily require a cooperative venture. The Causse Report refocused the
problem completely. “ESRO’s scientific programme”, it wrote, “must be based on the existence of a
scientific community […]” (my emphasis). This community, the report went on, was not to be obliged to
found the greater part of its activities on national or bilateral programmes, leaving it to ESRO “to manage
a few large collective undertakings”. ESRO’s task then was not primarily to finance heavy equipment
otherwise unavailable to its Member States, as was the case at CERN. It was instead to build and to
consolidate a truly European space science community by giving them regular flight opportunities on a
range of appropriate satellites.
Causse and his advisers estimated that the European programme had to keep 25 space science groups
occupied. Assuming that each needed to undertake one experiment every two years to have a continuous
activity, the Report concluded that 12 to 15 experiments, chosen by the scientific community itself of
course, should be annually orbited. In round numbers this was equivalent to ESRO launching two
satellites per year. These satellites were to have the same complexity as the current TD1 and TD2 or
HEOS satellites in the ESRO programme; smaller and less complex satellites could be dealt with at the
national level.
These suggestions, the Report stressed, were not intended to exclude large programmes like the LAS
altogether, though it was felt that they might better be pursued at an international level in collaboration
with the USA or the USSR. Nor were experiments with sounding rockets to be stopped. They were a
useful testing ground for new ideas and for training newcomers to the field of space science and
technology. At the same time the Report felt that this programme should not be expanded. ESRO’s task
was to play a leadership role in the field of scientific satellites, not sounding rockets, for which anyway
“the framework of an international organisation provides an inevitably cumbersome environment”.
Turning next to applications satellites, the Causse Report first dealt with telecommunications. It identified
the development of a direct television broadcasting satellite as the long-term objective of the European
programme. Such satellite broadcasts could be picked up directly by ordinary domestic receivers with a
relatively small, domestically installed antenna directed towards the spacecraft. “A possibility of this
nature”, said the report, “appears as a revolution in many fields, such as techniques of
telecommunications and the methods of television distribution (there is no need to construct new ground
networks, and whole new networks could be created at one go in under-equipped or badly equipped
countries) […]”.1000
Technically speaking it seemed that to achieve this objective one would need to place in orbit a
geostationary satellite weighing at least 1500 kg, preferably 2 tons. To cover most of Western Europe it
would need an installed power of about 20k W, radiating at least 4 or 5 kW. Many technical problems still
had to be overcome, notably regarding the electrical power generators and on-board antennae. After all
the weight and installed power of the first geostationary satellites were merely some 50 kg and 50 W,
respectively. To arrive at the ultimate objective Causse thus suggested a two-step programme. Firstly, the
development of the  CETS-C satellite.  Weighing about 180 kg,  and with an  installed  power of 200 W it
1000 Ibid. p.23
340
required solar panels which oriented themselves automatically towards the Sun. This was at once an
improvement on Symphonie (installed power about 100 W) and met the requirements of the European
Broadcasting Union. And as “all progress towards direct television broadcasting is governed by progress
in the development of power sources” this was “a step in an essential direction”.1001
The next step proposed after the development of  CETS-C was a 500 kg semi-direct TV broadcasting
satellite with an onboard power of 1-2 kW to be launched in the mid-1970s. This would be based on
studies, envisaged by CETS and which needed “to be conducted with vigour and continuity”, into
improved on-board antennae and satellite stabilisation systems, and into the most suitable frequencies to
be used. The latter required in turn the development of the corresponding high-reliability components. By
following this programme Europe would acquire over a decade the industrial and operational experience
needed to make direct television possible.
Communications were not the only applications programme explored by the  Causse Report. It also
discussed the possibilities for aeronautical navigation and meteorology, and touched briefly on Earth
resources satellites. Air traffic control, particularly over the North Atlantic was a “public service activity”,
said the report, which would improve air traffic safety on the most crowded routes and produce
considerable savings for airline companies. The French were developing a twin set of satellites for this
purpose; the British were improving navigation by means of marine platforms in the Atlantic which were
equipped with radar. An aeronautical satellite was thus not a pressing priority for the European Space
Conference, but something that should be considered carefully and planned for in consultation with the
interested bodies.
Meteorology was similarly being revolutionised by the use remote sensing techniques, including
satellites. Meteorological satellites were able to provide global coverage of the conditions in the upper
atmosphere and so enabled forecasters to extend the period of validity of their predictions. This in turn
would have obvious economic and human benefits (e.g. through providing timely and accurate storm
warnings). Any meteorological programme necessarily had a global, or international component. The
Causse Report thus suggested that steps be taken, in consultation with meteorologists and with other
agencies developing such satellites, to define and develop a meteorological programme. It also indicated
the interest of exploring the possibilities of a European satellite similar to the US’s Landsat which could
be used for high-resolution analysis of the Earth’s surface.
Causse’s committee was “convinced of the importance of an independent launcher capability for
Europe”.1002 This was particularly needed, it stressed again, in the field of telecommunications where the
USA and the USSR were likely to place restrictions on the use of their launchers. But it was also
important for science, where restrictions ranging from approval of the scientific content of experiments to
be flown to an agreement on availability of results had been imposed by NASA in the past. Causse also
emphasised that a decision to abandon launcher development was irreversible, and that Europe’s position
would be “lost irretrievably” in such a case.
That granted the report insisted, first, that it was necessary to complete the Europa I and Europa II
(=ELDO-PAS) programmes. However, it was “already apparent” that more powerful launchers were
needed for application satellites. The committee recommended that this should be achieved in two steps,
labelled Europa III (500 kg in geostationary orbit) and Europa IV (2 ton payload), respectively. These two
launchers could be based on the use of Blue Streak with the minimum modification. Its power could be
increased by using strap-on boosters or by using more efficient upper stages employing cryogenic or
electrical propulsion. Significant investments had already been made in France in the former; various
forms of electrical or nuclear propulsion were still in the experimental phase, even in the USA and the
USSR. In the light of these considerations the Committee thought that a decision should be taken within a
year on Europa III, and in the light of the results of work on the liquid hydrogen technique. A decision to
1001 On CETS-C see R. Collette, “Space Communications in Europe. How did we make it happen?”, in J. Krige,
Choosing Big Technologies (Chur: Harwood Academic Press, 1993), pp. 83-93.
1002  Causse Report, p. 33.
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develop Europa IV could be taken three years later, and it might use electrical propulsion. As for the
development of an “intermediate launcher” able to put 400 kg in low-Earth orbit – the gap identified in
the Bignier report – the  Causse Committee suggested that that be left to national programmes or that US
launchers be used.
It was not enough to develop launchers; they also had to be produced. The Committee suggested that the
Space Conference decide that an order be placed for a first batch of five launchers at a rate of two per
year.
The implementation of a coherent space programme required a new institutional structure. The  Causse
Report suggested that the European Space Conference be the supreme body, grouping together at
Ministerial level all the States wishing to participate in space activities. Its meetings would be prepared by
a Standing Committee. The ESC would lay down space policy for Europe, it would coordinate national
activities and it would be responsible for international activities. A European organisation for space
research and development would fuse the current activities of ESRO and ELDO and would report directly
to the ESC.1003
In setting priorities and defining a “balanced” programme the  Causse Report assumed, firstly, that the
space budget, starting from its present level would increase by not more than 10% per year for a period of
several years., until a satisfactory balance was reached. In money terms, it assumed that the European
space budget would increase from 150 MAU in 1967 to 240 MAU in 1972. Development was divided
into four successive phases on which decisions were needed, respectively, in 1968, 1969, 1972 and some
time from 1970 onwards.
In Phase 1 the Europa I and II launchers would be continued, and the  CETS-C communications satellite
for Eurovision would be undertaken, along with a research and development programme in that area. The
science programme was a major headache, however, notably because of the LAS. The  Causse Report
defined this as a continuing astronomy programme involving four launchings beginning in 1973, the two
latter carrying scientific packages different from the two former. The development cost of the satellites
was estimated at 133.6 MAU, and the launchings cost 29 MAU. This was to be compared with the cost of
a TD-class satellite, whose development cost was some 24 MAU and which cost 8 MAU to launch. In
short the LAS programme -- and here was the key problem – was equivalent in terms of financing to
about five or six medium sized scientific satellites. It thus skewed the scientific programme enormously
in favour of one discipline.
Causse and his colleagues presented the Ministers with three options. They could continue with the LAS,
but this could only be done if ESRO’s scientific programme fell below the level they felt was necessary to
build a European space science community. In the other two options the LAS was abandoned. This
enabled the science programme to maintain a level of two satellites launched per year and to remain
within ESRO’s 8-year budget ceiling and, in one variant of the programme, also made it possible to
introduce an experimental meteorological satellite.
As so much hinged on the first decision, the other three phases were dealt with far more briefly by the
Committee. Phase 2 of the overall programme was to be decided on in 1969, as we said, and would
involve the development of Europa III with a liquid hydrogen second stage. This was to be done within an
annual limit of 90 MAU for all launcher work inside ELDO. A 500 kg-class applications satellite would
be developed at the same time. Phase 3 involved the development of Europa IV within the same financial
constraints along with the 2-ton geostationary satellite. Phase IV, if embarked on, would also see the
financing of a major international scientific (e.g. a LAS) or applications satellite.
1003 Ibid, chapter 5.
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11.2 The ELDO Crisis1004
Even as the ink was drying on Causse’s recommendations, they risked being overtaken by events in both
ELDO and ESRO. As we mentioned earlier, the first firings with a live second stage F6/1 (4 August
1967) and F6/2 (6 December 1967) had both failed due to the malfunctioning of Coralie. A detailed
investigation was undertaken by the French authorities along with representatives of the firm SEREB.
They concluded that several key components (power units, autopilot unit, sequences) should be replaced
by other such units already developed and qualified in France. They also insisted that major
improvements were needed to the electrical and electronic systems. Only under such conditions, they
concluded, could a second stage be built having a desirable standard of reliability.1005
The ELDO Scientific and Technical Committee discussed these proposals at its meeting on 22 and 23
February 1968. While appreciating French concerns, the committee was extremely disturbed by their
implications. In particular it pointed out that the French proposal would postpone by at least one year the
scheduled first flight of a live (German) third stage, firing F7. If overall time slippages were to be avoided
this delay would be at the expense of the time allowed for rectifying problems that would surely emerge
with Astris. If, on the contrary the schedule were rearranged to allow for time slippages, the cost-to-
completion of the programme would necessarily increase.
The Secretariat considered different ways of avoiding the situation, e.g. by adding a firing F6/3
comprising a dummy second stage and a live first and third stages. They concluded that this would have
no particular benefit. As a result, following the majority of the STC, it suggested that if there was to be a
fundamental redesign of Coralie it would have to take place in parallel with the scheduled programme.
Every possible effort should be made to fire F7 before the end of 1968 using the current Coralie modified
slightly. A new revised overall plan T8 would be drawn up by April to accommodate slippages of some
six months caused by the F/6 failures.
The French delegation initially opposed this plan. However, it withdrew its objection when the ELDO
Council met on 27 and 28 February 1968 with General Robert Aubinière (F) as President for the first
time. Insisting that Coralie required “surgery not medicine”, the French delegate nevertheless accepted
that it was necessary to fire F7 as planned before the end of 1968.1006 Realising that these decisions would
necessarily have implications on the cost-to-completion of the programme, the Council set up a working
group chaired by L. Williams (UK). Its task was to examine the extent to which the previous ceilings on
the ELDO programme of 626 MAU overall, and 331 MAU from 1 January 1967 were likely to be
exceeded, and to propose a new ceiling with an adequate contingency margin based on ELDO’s current
Target Plan T8.1007
The William’s Report was delivered in May.1008 Its first striking finding was that the contingency reserve
foreseen in the 626 MAU overall ceiling agreed by Ministers in July 1966 had almost all been eroded
away in 18 months. Of the 107 MAU originally set aside for the cost-to-completion, a mere 22 MAU
remained to be spent. The highest overrun in absolute terms was for the perigee-apogee system and its
associated launchings (36.5 MAU). This was particularly disturbing, the Report said, since the estimate
was for a programme which had just begun, and before most contracts had been placed. What is more the
1968 budget laid before Council had made no allowance for the failure of F6/2 and the additional costs
which that would necessarily incur. It was quite evident then that the overall ceiling was hopelessly
unrealistic, and indeed would have been exceeded even if the earlier Target Plan T7 had been respected.
1004 For a brief summary of the steps described here, and the pertinent documents, see ELDO/CM(July 68)3,
4 July 1968.
1005 See ELDO/C(68)PV/1, Minutes of Council Meeting held on 27, 28 February 1968, document dated
26 April 1968, and its Annex II, Report of the Chairman of the ELDO Scientific and Technical Committee on
its Meeting of 22 and 23 February 1968.
1006 See the Minutes referred to in the previous note.
1007 See ELDO/C(68)8, Final, 29 February 1968.
1008 It is ELDO/C(68)14, 14 May 1968, Report by the ELDO Council Working Group on the Overall Ceiling of
Expenditure.
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The second point brought out by the Williams Working Group was that the cost-to-completion of the
programme according to Target Plan T8 was likely to be at least 100 MAU more than the ceiling laid
down by Ministers in July 1966. T8, compared to T7, foresaw a slippage of six months in the firing of F7
as caused by the Coralie failures, and shifted the last three firings (F11, 12 and 13) from Woomera to
Kourou, which would be ready in mid-1970 for them. The Working Group insisted that Target Plans were
merely useful critical-path analysis management tools, rather than reliable financial instruments. Granted




Overspend of the July 1966
ceiling of 626 MAU
Optimistic hypothesis 710 MAU 84 MAU
Pessimistic hypothesis 770 MAU 144 MAU
Intermediate hypothesis 750 MAU 124 MAU
The Group said that it was “not in a position to assess the probability of each of these three events”. But it
was emphatic that the Secretariat’s estimate of 720 MAU was unduly optimistic given the current state of
the programme.
The conclusions of the Williams report had to be considered by the ELDO Council in the light of another
major blow: the British government’s refusal to support the “balanced” space programme proposed in the
Causse Report and, in particular, its reiterated refusal to contribute to any excess expenditure in ELDO
over and above the 626 MAU already agreed in July 1966. The Wilson government’s position was spelt
out in an Aide Mèmoire dated 16 April 1968 from Whitehall to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of all the
Member States of the European Space Conference. It was explained again at the ELDO Council, meeting
in restricted session on 22 May 1968.1010
The British began by stating that they were not against technological collaboration in Europe. However,
they felt that the only way to close the technological gap with the United States was through industry-led
rather than government financed projects, and in projects which had prospects of sound economic
benefits. Government’s role was essentially enabling rather than leading. The British particularly wanted
to see the mergers and amalgamations which were taking place on national level also occur at European
level. Only European scale industries were capable of generating the “vast sums required for research,
development and marketing” in fields like computers and electronics, airframes, nuclear energy and
motor vehicles.
Within that perspective, the UK’s “starting point for consideration of the proposals of the  Causse Report
has […] been that they should be judged on their economic merits and an assessment of the contribution
they could make to the strengthening of European industrial collaboration generally”. They were
disturbed to see that the Report promoted a sharp increase in space spending from 150 MAU to 240 MAU
annually in the early 1970s. They noted that the development of a TV relay satellite system would only be
commercially viable if research and development costs were written off. This did not mean than an
operational system would not be viable; only that there was no point in building the satellites themselves
in Europe. The UK also remarked that one could not make a realistic economic assessment of the value of
other application satellites, e.g. for meteorology. And that Europe would develop a launcher which would
surely be far more expensive than its US equivalent, where the civilian programme alone called for many
launchers a year.
1009 From the Report just cited at p. 25.
1010 The Aide Mèmoire is CSE/CS(68)23, add.2, 29 April 1968; the Minutes of the meeting held on 22 May are
ELDO/C(68)PV/2, Annex II, Confidential, (Rev), 31 July 1968.
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From this the British government had drawn the following conclusions. That they were willing to see
ESRO’s budget for scientific research increase by up to 6% annually for the next three years. That they
were not willing to participate in the CETS project for an experimental TV relay satellite since “the
economic case […] was not strong enough”. And that they were not willing to accept any new financial
commitments to ELDO. Not only had the programme proved to be far more difficult and costly than
originally anticipated. There were anyway no economically worthwhile applications of the launcher in
sight. The Aide Mèmoire concluded by insisting once again that the space programme proposed in the
Causse Report made “an economically unsound use of European technological resources and would not
strengthen Europe’s world standing in advanced technology”. “The weight of this economic and
technological argument”, it went on, “is so strong as to override arguments about the political or cultural
benefits” which Causse’s ‘balanced’ European space programme might have.
Faced with the cost overruns in the ELDO programme, and Britain’s determination not to contribute to
them, the Committee of Alternates of the ESC meeting on 10 May 1968 asked the ELDO Council to
instruct the Secretariat to propose a new austerity plan. This was quickly done and became known as
Target Plan T8/A.
The saving of T8/A with respect to T/8 was 45 MAU.1011 This reduced the Secretariat’s overall estimate of
720 MAU to 675 MAU including contingencies. The revised plan also had the advantage that the budget
for 1969 did not exceed 626MAU, the ceiling agreed in 1966 and the limit up to which the UK delegation
was prepared to contribute to the expenses of ELDO.
To achieve these objectives T8/A took into consideration work which was already so advanced that it
could not be halted and let the burden of savings fall in areas where a substantial part of design and
development had still to be completed. This meant that cuts fell particularly heavily on the supplementary
PAS programme. Here the Secretariat proposed that “the technical objectives of the PAS test satellite
should be reduced to the minimum necessary for full qualification of the launcher system (propulsion and
guidance)”. Developments and operations which were normally the responsibility of the customer, like
attitude control of the spacecraft, orbital adjustments, accurate tracking etc were to be excluded, along
with passenger experiments proposed by Italy and ESRO. As a result some foreseen elements of the
tracking system (antennae at Redu and modifications at Gove) were deleted. One firing would be cut from
the programme (F13), and no precise geostationary positioning would be attempted. These measures
accounted for almost 30 MAU of the 45 MAU cut from T/8 by T/8A.
The burden of these cuts fell on Italy (for the PAS satellite) and on Belgium (for the tracking facilities). It
was not surprising then that, when the ELDO Council met in June 1968 these two countries were the least
satisfied with the revised scheme. Thus while the delegates of five Member States (Australia, France,
Germany, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom) resolved that they were in favour of austerity plan
T/8A (with Britain of course refusing to fund the programme beyond the ceiling of 626 MAU), the
representatives from these two countries were more prudent.1012 The Belgian delegation felt that measures
should be taken to compensate it for the work that it lost, and was not prepared to recommend or to
oppose the adoption of T/8A until this was resolved. The Italian delegation (which had just made
arrangements to pay its backlog of 13 billion Lire to the ELDO budget) was even more emphatic. The
Secretariat, it said, should have looked for solutions other than those which removed technologically
important tasks from Member States. If, however, a unanimous decision was taken to cancel such tasks,
and in particular the development of an ‘operational’ PAS system, countries should be compensated for
their loss by being given work of the same nature in another programme carried out by the ELDO
Member States.
1011 Target Plan T8/A is described in ELDO/C(68)19, 27 June 1968.
1012 The relevant resolution is ELDO/C(68)20 Final, 26 June 1968, Resolution passed at the Council Meeting on
24, 25 June 1968.
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A Ministerial Conference of the representatives of the ELDO Member States was held on 11 and 12 July
with a view to resolving some of these difficulties. And even if the determination to find solutions was
there, the major partners demanded that progress could only be made if certain conditions acceptable to
them were satisfied. France was emphatic that Target Plan T/8 had to be abandoned. Italy was emphatic
that if T/8A was accepted it had to be compensated in the Symphonie or CETS programmes for the loss
of technically interesting work on the PAS test satellite. Britain reiterated its refusal to contribute to any
overspend of the July 1966 ceiling. It also insisted that any Blue Streaks produced for a firing of the
Europa rocket after F12 would be supplied on a strictly commercial basis at a cost to be negotiated to the
user, thus dashing the hopes of France and Germany that firings F12 and F13 could be used for
Symphonie within the framework of an ELDO programme. Belgium was willing to accept T/8A on
condition that it was compensated elsewhere in an overall European space programme, a view shared by
the Netherlands who also sought more coherence in the overall space effort. In a final resolution the
delegates agreed to proceed temporarily on the basis of Target Plan T/8A until the Ministerial meeting of
the European Space Conference scheduled for the autumn. All countries except Britain also agreed to
propose that their governments fund the overspend of the 626 MAU ceiling, subject to a number of
“reservations and observations” e.g. France and Germany called for the UK to share in that financing,
Italy required that a satisfactory technical plan be adopted, and so on.1013
The ELDO Ministerial Conference realised that it was essential to provide more clear-cut decisions for
the ESC meeting soon to be held. It thus instructed the President of the Conference, Mr. Theo Lefèvre,
the Belgian Minister in Charge of Scientific Policy and Planning, to consult with the delegations with a
view to having the reservations expressed in the resolution removed as soon as possible. Delegates met
again on 1 and 2 October to discuss the results of his consultations with the Ministers concerned.1014
Lefèvre’s report was dominated by two main considerations.1015 Firstly, considering the diametrically
opposed positions adopted by Britain and by France, he suggested that there was no way of breaking the
deadlock within the framework of the existing ELDO programme. Britain “could not contemplate
participating in the additional cost of the programme, in the subsequent stages of development of the
Europa rocket […]”. And it was only prepared to ensure the availability of Blue Streak “for a limited
number of years”. France, on the other hand, would only continue in ELDO if all the Member States
participated in Target Plan T/8A. It also insisted on “active long-term participation by Great Britain in
subsequent developments of the family of launchers which, from Blue Streak onwards, will make it
possible, by stages, to put satellites of 1 to 2 tons into synchronous orbit”. Other countries shared some of
the France’s positions, though were less uncompromising. Germany, Holland and Belgium, for example,
wanted Britain at least to give “adequate guarantees […] as to the long-term availability of Blue Streak”.
In any event it seemed clear that unless some major concessions were made, or some drastic measures
were taken, the whole European launcher programme, and the collaborative space effort along with it,
would be jeopardised.
The second major theme developed in Lefèvre’s report was intended to refocus ELDO’s difficulties and
to situate them within the broader framework of European industrial collaboration. In essence the Belgian
Minister’s point was the governments concerned had to think more carefully about the procurement and
use of the products of their investments in research and development (just as the British had insisted).
“Gradually”, said Lefèvre, “each of us has become aware of the inconsistency of engaging in research
leading to the development of advanced equipment without at the same time providing the industrial basis
and the market which these products demand in order to make a valid contribution to the economic
progress of our countries”. American success, he emphasised, was due not just to major government
investments in R and D.  It was  also  thanks to  the  support of public  procurement, the scale of the firms
1013 The proceedings of this meeting are ELDO/CM(July 68)PV/1,2,3,4 and the final resolution is
ELDO/CM(July 68)6 Final, 12 July 1968.
1014 The minutes are ELDO/CM(October 68)PV/1, PV/1 Restr., PV/2 Restr., and PV/3.
1015 Lefèvre’s report is Annex I to ELDO/CM(October 68)PV/1 Rev., 16 October 1968
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concerned and unity of a large market. In Europe, by contrast, organisation had been limited to research
and development, and had not been “slanted towards the actual needs of our nations but rather towards
the technical or scientific performance for its own sake”. They had not attempted to establish consortia or
unified industrial structures which could compete on an equal footing with US industry. And no public
procurement policy which could create a genuinely unified market had been developed for the advanced
products resulting from European technological collaboration. The only way to solve the ELDO problem,
Lefèvre concluded, was to “consider all the sectors of high technology [the nuclear, space, and
electronics] in a single renewed approach, as they are linked by the nature of the activities and enterprises
as well as by the convergence of their economic and industrial effects”.
Many Ministers shared Lefèvre’s conviction that European technological collaboration had to be
coordinated across sectors, rather than being tackled piecemeal. However, they also felt that this was a
long-term problem. Their priority now was to resolve the crisis in ELDO, and to provide guidelines for
the European Space Conference which was to meet in Bonn in six weeks time. In anticipation of this
meeting the Ministers agreed that ELDO could “continue provisionally its activity within the framework
of the T/8A Plan […]”. At the same time they asked the Council to “propose a programme within the
ceiling of 626 MAU […]”. And they set up a Committee of Senior Officials headed by Dr J. Spaey (NL)
which was asked to find a compromise between the ELDO Member States on the broad outlines of a
future European space programme.1016 The Ministers would meet again to consider the results of these
deliberations on the eve of the European Space Conference, scheduled for 12 November 1968.
On 30 October the Council was able to recommend two plans to Ministers which were feasible within the
626 MAU limit.1017 Plan A concentrated on developing the second and third stages of Europa but
abandoned all efforts to approach a geostationary capability. The programme ended with firings F8, F9
and F10 from Woomera. This plan was well within the 626 MAU figure and was unlikely to consume the
whole of that figure. Plan B allowed for F8 and F9 from Woomera and two further firings of the three-
stage launcher from Kourou. The perigee motor would be used to put 170 kg in equatorial transfer orbit.
The apogee motor would not be developed. This plan would cost 592 MAU without contingencies. It was
only feasible if a strict austerity policy and tight controls were implemented.
The choice between Plans A and B depended on the future role of Blue Streak in the programme. Plan A
was the obvious choice if it was decided to develop a European launcher using only the second and third
stages of Europa. Plan B was to be preferred if the Member States intended to persist with the British first
stage.
The Italian delegation, it should be said, could not accept either of these plans. Both were seen as striking
at the raison d’être for its membership of ELDO, which was to develop a test satellite in the geostationary
orbit with telecommunications potential. Italy thus proposed a third plan. Plan C maintained the
objectives of Plan 8/A to place 170 kg in geostationary orbit. Its cost was 602 MAU without
contingencies, and so would certainly exceed the 626 MAU ceiling imposed by Ministers. To overcome
this hurdle Italy suggested that each Member State should bear the cost of any overspend occurring on its
territory and attributable to technical reasons. The Italian suggestion was strongly resisted by the ELDO
Secretariat and the ELDO Council. It was completely at odds, they said, with the decision taken at the
1966 Ministerial conference that the Secretariat exert more control over the ELDO programme, and that
it, and not the Member States, manage the relationships with firms in the different countries. Italy, in
reply, insisted that the Secretariat was and its partners were at fault for not respecting the decision, taken
unanimously in 1966 to give her a test satellite.
1016 The resolution is ELDO/CM(October 68) 6, 4 October 1968.
1017 The plans are described in the Report by the President of the ELDO Council to the ELDO Ministerial
Conference, ELDO/CM(November 68)6, 8 November 1968.
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These proposals, and the Spaey Report, were laid before the ELDO Ministers meeting at Bad Godesberg
on 11 November 1968. Their conclusions were passed on to the wider meeting of the European Space
Conference which began the next day.
11.3 The Spaey Report and the ELDO Ministerial Meeting of 11 November 1968
A feeling of grave crisis pervaded the ELDO Ministerial meeting in Bonn/Bad Godesberg. The space
policies of the participating states were so divergent that it seemed that, unless a compromise could be
reached quickly, said Belgian Minister Theo Lefèvre, “I have the gravest fears for the immediate future of
the space institutions and programmes we have supported and conducted until now at such great
expense”.1018 The divergences over the use of launchers were at the heart of the issue, of course, but not
only they. Britain in fact demanded that a whole series of other conditions be met by the European space
programme. And then of course there were the difficulties faced by Italy.
A compromise solution to the launcher issue was put forward in the Spaey Report. It was deliberately
intended to keep the British in the programme.1019 It distinguished between a minimum programme of
activities which did not include the development of an autonomous launch capability and a basic
programme which included the minimum programme plus launcher development. The minimum
programme covered application satellites, space research, as well as range logistics and infrastructure, and
research directed towards future developments. Participation in these four activities was a qualifying
condition for being a Member State. In other words, the launcher programme would no longer be
mandatory; Britain could remain a partner in the European space effort without contributing to the
development of a rocket.
While there was general agreement on the overall features of the minimum programme, there were again
deep differences between Britain and the other Member States over its implementation. Firstly, regarding
the scientific programme. Britain suggested that this programme be funded at the rate of 50 MAU in
1968, and that it grow by 6% per annum for six years. Her partners wanted to stabilise its expenditure
immediately at 50 MAU. More importantly, they wanted scientific satellites to constitute “both a
preparatory phase in and a necessary use of the filiations of satellites” developed for applications, the
financing of science being phased at the same pace as commitments to applications. In short while the UK
wanted to retain the scientific programme “as an objective in itself” her partners in ELDO (though not in
the broader ESC) wanted it to be dovetailed into the applications programme and subservient to it.1020
The applications programme itself was the subject of controversy. Britain accepted that “a long-term
target might be a European capacity equivalent to a two ton information transfer satellite in geo-
synchronous orbit”. This target would of course be approached in phases. However, she wanted the
commitment to each of these stages to be conditional on there being “an operational requirement which
could shown to be economically viable in the broadest sense”. Her partners found that short-sighted and
dangerous.
Three interconnected issues were at stake here. Firstly, all of the ELDO Member States agreed that from
henceforth the commitment of member countries to a programme should end “with the achievement of
precise objectives and no longer simply by the expiration of a time limit or the using up of a sum of
money”. No longer were there to be decisions taken, like that to develop Europa I, “without stating why
this rocket was necessary or the uses to which it would be put […]”.1021 Nor was it to be possible for a
programme to be jeopardised by one partner just because time and money had run out. Commitment to a
1018 See his opening statement in the Minutes of the morning meeting on 11 November 1968,
ELDO/CM(November 68)PV/1, 11 November 1968.
1019 The Spaey Report is the Report to the Ministerial Conference on the Elaboration in Broad Outline of a
European Space Programme, 6 November 1968 (ELDO1003).
1020 These quotes are from the Spaey report, just cited, at p. 3, and from the Presentation of the Results of the
ELDO Ministerial Conference (11 November 1968), by Mr. Theo Lefèvre, Minister of State, President of the
Conference, Annex 1 to the Minutes of the meeting of the ESC on 12 November 1968, CSE/CM(November
68)PV/1, 12 November 1968, at pp. 5-6.
1021 Spaey Report, p. 10.
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programme would be to its completion. This is just what the British wanted to avoid as far as the 2-ton
satellite was concerned. Not yet convinced of its economic viability they wanted to proceed to that
objective by independent stages.
Related to this was the question of voting majorities. All agreed that an initial commitment to the
objectives and content of the basic programme should be taken unanimously. But what of the decisions to
embark on successive stages. Britain’s partners wanted this to be by majority vote, to stop any one
country from blocking the programme. The UK, on the other hand, wanted the decision on each
successive stage to be taken unanimously, so giving any one country veto power over the move from one
phase to the next.
This had major implications for launcher policy. For it meant that “a degree of uncertainty will attach to
the subsequent phases of the launcher utilisation programmes which is incompatible with the sound
management of launcher development and production”. Indeed, to ensure that there was a market for
Europa and its successors Britain’s partners wanted the launchers they had produced to be given priority,
under certain conditions, in the organisation’s programmes. Production could only be linked to
procurement, they felt, if a “guaranteed” market was available, as in the USA. By demanding that each
phase of an applications satellite programme be subject to unanimity Britain seemed to be threatening any
rational planning of launcher production.
The feeling that guarantees had to be given for the use of Europa were linked to the recognition that the
market would automatically be limited by cost considerations. Indeed it was admitted that the production
cost of European launchers then being built was more than twice that of the US equivalent. To get around
this problem the Netherlands delegation proposed that the price of launchers procured for the European
programme should be “reasonable”, and based on economic value and cost.1022 But what did reasonable
mean? The representatives of all countries bar the UK on the Spaey committee suggested that the cost to
the satellite programme “should not exceed the price of the American launcher by more than 50%,
calculated on the basis of a genuine, durable and commercial offer. The difference between the real cost
and this price”, they went on, “would be borne by the countries participating in the launcher programme”.
Britain’s position, by contrast, was quite simply that European launchers should not be used when they
“would compromise the viability of projects”.1023
The general stress on the leading role to be given to applications satellites, and the launchers to place
them in orbit, went along with the demand that institutional changes were needed. There was a unanimous
wish for a single, simplified organisation in which policy-making authority was clearly demarcated from
executive and management roles. Responsibility was to be devolved to industry, fixed price contracts
were to be negotiated wherever possible and the formation of European industrial consortia was to be
encouraged. “It is within the consortia that the geographical distribution of tasks would be arranged, at
overall programme level and not necessarily project by project”.1024 It was also suggested that Member
State contributions could be assessed independently of GNP, and in terms of their industrial returns. The
Belgian Minister put it clearly: “A group of countries, to which mine belongs, regards scientific and
technological cooperation as a means of transforming their industrial structures to achieve the dimension
and quality required by world competition, by way of a long-term programme. […] We reserve for the
national framework,” he went on, “technological projects of lesser scope and short-term economic
viability”.1025 In short the de-emphasis of the science programme, and the suggestion that it be tied to
applications, was just part of broader determination in the majority of the Member States to make space
policy part and parcel of industrial policy at the European level.
1022 The Dutch proposal is ELDO/CM (Nov 68)WP/1, 11 November 1968 (ELDO1008).
1023 Lefèvre’s report to the ESC, pp. 4-5.
1024 Lefèvre’s report to the ESC, p.3.
1025 Minutes of the meeting held on the morning of 11 November, ELDO/CM(November 68)PV/1,
11 November 1968.
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The ELDO Ministerial Conference of 11 November 1968 could not possibly resolve all these differences.
It did however take a few important decisions. Firstly, it resolved to continue with the current Europa I
and Europa II programmes until the 626 MAU were exhausted in accordance with the austerity Plan B
(See above) Secondly, it resolved to finance studies and experimental work for a further launcher able to
put communications satellites up to 500 kg in geostationary orbit.1026 These resolutions required that
guarantees be provided regarding the future availability of Blue Streak. They also required that Italy be
compensated for the loss of the apogee motor.
The first matter was settled relatively easily. Britain undertook to supply Blue Streak or components
thereof “at least up to 1976 to ELDO, to Member States of ELDO, to former members of ELDO or to any
grouping of former members […]” for peaceful purposes. This was on the “explicit understanding that no
additional financial burden” should fall upon the UK government and that orders were placed in time.1027
This statement both reassured Member States as to the availability of the first stage of Europa for the
foreseeable future, and persuaded them of the need to develop a launcher without Blue Streak to be
operational from the mid-1970s onwards (as the Resolution quoted in the previous paragraph indicates).
The Italian situation proved to be a far more thorny problem. The Italian position was that the adoption of
the PAS system in 1966, which foresaw placing the Italian test satellite in geostationary orbit, “was in the
nature of an international commitment unanimously adopted by Member States and thus required
unanimity before it could be modified”. Plan B, however, “involves cancellation of the only major tasks
allocated at that time to Italy, and of the only coherent and technologically meaningful set of works
assigned to Italian industry”. Italy, her delegate went on, demanded “tangible compensations” for this
loss. In particular, she asked that “work of a similar kind and technological importance to the tasks
cancelled under the PAS be entrusted to Italy within the scope of an existing programme under control of
two ELDO member countries, namely the [Franco-German] ‘Symphonie’ programme”.1028
A partial solution to the Italian demands was found at the end of the day. France and Germany agreed that
prime contractorship for the construction of the apogee motor for Symphonie should be entrusted to Italy,
“on condition that Italy makes an economic and competitive offer respecting the time scale […]”, and
that, if needed, Italian industry would give priority to firms in France and Germany for subcontracts. This
concession only partly satisfied the Italian delegate, however. He insisted that when the Italian Parliament
had voted additional funds for the ELDO programme in 1966, trebling its contribution, it been on the
assumption that the PAS programme would be completed. The apogee motor, desirable as it was, was
thus not sufficient compensation for the loss of work; Italy also required a reduction in her contribution to
ELDO.1029 The matter was left at that on 11 November, the French and German delegations not then being
in a position to make any further concessions.
11.4 The European Space Conference in Bonn/Bad Godesberg, November 1968
The Ministers of the three European space organisations meeting on 12 November did not only have to
deal with ELDO’s difficulties;1030 they also had to try to settle a long-simmering crisis in ESRO. The
revised proposals of the  Causse Report were laid before them to assist their decisions.
1026 Resolution of the Ministerial Conference, ELDO/CM(November 68)7 Final, 12 November 1968.
1027 The British conditions are appended to the Resolution just cited.
1028 Minutes of the meeting held on the morning of 11 November, and Annex III to ELDO/CM(November
68)PV/1, 11 November 1968.
1029 Minutes of the meeting held on the evening of 11 November, ELDO/CM(November 68)PV/3,
11 November 1968, and Resolution of the Conference, ELDO/CM(November 68)7 Final, 12 December 1968.
1030 Report by the Secretary General of ELDO summarises the situation, CSE/CM(November 68)8,
31 October 1968.
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ESRO’s difficulties could be traced back to 1966. In that year it became clear that the organisation would
not spend all of the resources allocated to it for the first three-year period; there was a remaining balance
of 122MFF in 1965 prices. The Executive thus suggested that this be carried forward to the next three-
year period (1967-1969), and that the budget for the second phase of the science programme be thus
increased to 808MFF in 1965 prices. The Council refused, insisting that the original figure of 686MFF be
adhered to. Meeting in December 1966 it could do more than adopt a budget of 230MFF for 1967, as
against the 260MFF requested by the Executive. This meant that, if work proceeded on the projects
already started (ESRO I, ESRO II and HEOS-A), there would not be enough money in the eight-year
programme for the two TD satellites and the LAS. Determined to leave some funds for new projects, the
LPAC decided to give top priority to the TD satellites and to restrict resources to the LAS to 300MFF
maximum.1031
These problems only grew more intractable with the passage of time. Early in 1968, with no three-year
budget yet voted, it emerged that the costs of the TD1/TD2 satellites had been hopelessly underestimated
by the consortium building them. Instead of the 109MFF foreseen, the final figure looked like being at
least twice or three times that figure. The problem was compounded by Italian objections that her industry
was poorly represented in the TD programme, a position which led her to block the vote on ESRO’s 1968
budget. A major crisis was only averted by the new Director General, Herman Bondi, who took over from
Pierre Auger in November 1967. Bondi suggested that, in accordance with Article VIII of the ESRO
Convention, one TD satellite could be treated as a Special Project and funded only by those states who
wished to participate in it. Every effort was made to relocate some experiments from the second TD
satellite on another spacecraft.1032
Of course the difficulties faced by ESRO were not only due to the lack of experience in the organisation
and in industry as reflected in their underestimate of the cost of building satellites. They were also
indicative of the re-orientation away from science towards applications and the associated determination
in some Member States to cut space science spending at the European level to a minimum. Faced with
this situation the  Causse Report had to revise its proposals in anticipation of the Ministerial conference in
November.
 Causse’s Advisory Committee on Programmes (ACP) realised that their original proposals would need to
be modified to take account of two new developments.1033 Firstly, they would have to accommodate the
recognition, deriving from the TD experience, that the costs of building satellites in Europe was higher
than originally expected. Secondly, and compounding the difficulty was the demand by some Member
States that the budget should increase annually by no more than 6% over the 1968 budget rather than the
10% asked for initially by Causse. This meant that ESRO’s eight-year ceiling for 1964-1971 would be
approximately 1650 MFF (330 MAU), even less than the 1890 MFF (378 MAU) foreseen in the
organisation’s Financial Protocol.
The ACP drew several conclusions from this new state of affairs. Firstly, ESRO’s first eight-year plan
would have to be restricted to the launch of ESRO I and ESRO II, HEOS-A and HEOS-A2, and to TD1.
Work on replacing TD2 could begin, but the LAS would have to be abandoned. No work on a new
satellite could begin until 1971-2, assuming the organisation continued in being, and this would lead to a
launch in 1975 at the earliest. If that satellite carried a dozen or so experiments, the average number of
experiments placed in orbit by ESRO between 1968 and 1975 (no more than eight annually) would be
about half the figure originally estimated by the ACP (12-15 per year) as necessary to satisfy the
requirements of the European space science community. While the Committee of course did not want to
impose the priorities on the ESRO scientific committees, it insisted that the Ministers should at least
decide whether or not they wanted to continue with a science programme after ESRO’s eight-year period
expired: it was “becoming materially impossible for the Organisation to carry through any new project
1031 See chapter 5 in this volume for more details.
1032 Ibid.
1033 See Addendum to the Report of the Advisory Committee on Programmes, CSE/CCP(67)5, addendum 1,
6 September 1968. See also the summary of the ACP Report, CSE/CM(Nov. 68)6, 29 October 1968.
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(even the TD2 replacement)”.1034 It was also evident that if ESRO had to survive with an annual budget
similar to its present one it would have to concentrate its activities on a smaller number of objectives.
Notwithstanding these re-orientations, the future augured well for ESRO when the Space Conference got
under way. On 17 May 1968 ESRO-II was successfully launched. A few months later, on 3 October it
was the turn of ESRO-I to be put in orbit. And with a solution found to the TD-1 problem, as DG Bondi
put it to the European Space Conference in November, “The past few months have seen a dramatic
change in ESRO’s standing and self-confidence”.1035
ESRO’s success undoubtedly contributed to the willingness of Ministers to put it back on a secure path at
the Bad Godesberg meeting. The first resolution they passed included a decision to instruct the Council to
accord the space research organisation 172 MAU (860 MFF) in summer 1968 prices for the period 1969-
1971, the figure the Executive had called for. The Ministers also agreed that the life of the organisation
could be extended beyond this period; they accepted that commitments could be undertaken beyond 1971.
What they did not do was to propose a provisional level of resources for the period 1972-1974. ESRO’s
future was further assured by the Ministers agreeing, in Chapter 2 of Resolution I, that it undertake a
space applications programme. More specifically they resolved that ESRO devote 1MAU annually for
studies on the economics, including market possibilities, and technology of application satellites such as
those for meteorology, air traffic control, navigation, etc. It was hoped that they would also agree on
building the CETS experimental television relay satellite for Eurovision costed at 103 MAU. This
decision was, however, postponed for the time being.1036
Writing after the Conference Bondi was naturally satisfied with the new stability given to his
organisation. However he felt that “perhaps the greatest, and essential achievement of the Space
Conference was the agreement on the use of European launchers [...]”.1037 Indeed Resolution No 5
committed the partners concerned to the production and use of European launchers. It estimated that
European countries would undertake an average of two launches per year in the period 1972-1976, of
which one or at most two would be for the science programme. And, following the debates at the ELDO
Ministerial Conference held just before, the delegates adopted a price formula for these launchings, a
formula more restrictive than the one proposed earlier. The Resolution stated that the price of a European
launcher would be compared to that of a non-European launcher made available without prohibitive
conditions and available on the basis of a “genuine, durable and commercial supply”. The user would be
expected to pay 125% of the price of a non-European launcher (as opposed to the 150% suggested
before), the balance being borne by the producer countries.1038
This Resolution, like others we will discuss in a moment, was adopted subject to an important reservation
by the United Kingdom. Indeed the Bonn/Bad Godesberg meeting was marked by a major policy
statement by the UK Minister of Technology, Anthony Wedgwood Benn. The basis of the British position
had not changed of course. Benn declared “unqualified and enthusiastic support” for the scientific
programme.1039 At the same time he insisted that Europe had to accept that her money was limited. “The
Americans do not solve their problems, they overwhelm them”, said Benn. Europe could not do the same.
It had to make choices and it was alarming to see “that because a thing is European, and because a thing
is international, this somehow excuses us from applying economic criteria”. On the basis of such criteria,
Benn went on, it was clear to his government that “the launcher priority is the wrong priority”. As for the
1034 Addendum to the ACP Report, p. 3.
1035 In CSE/CM(November 68)7. See also H. Bondi, “The Bad Godesberg Conference, November 1968”,
ESRO/ELDO Bulletin, No 4 (January 1969), pp. 4-6.
1036 The Resolution is CSE/CM(November 68)10 (Final), 14 November 1968. All the Resolutions are also
reproduced in the ESRO/ELDO Bulletin, No 4, January 1969, where the States that voted subject to
reservation, or which abstained are also mentioned. This source will thus be cited henceforth.
1037 His analysis is H. Bondi, “The Bad Godesberg Conference, November 1968”, ESRO/ELDO Bulletin, No 4
(January 1969), pp. 4-6).
1038 Resolution No 5 is on pp. 12-13 of the ESRO/ELDO Bulletin, No 4, January 1969.
1039 Minutes of the meeting held on 14 November, 1968, CSE/CM(November 1968)PV/4, 26 November 1968, p.
4
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political argument that the USA would only make launchers available for some applications under
prohibitive conditions, Benn was sanguine. “The Americans have spent 40 billion dollars on space”, he
said, “and it is most unlikely, I speak just as an observer of this, it is most unlikely that the Americans
will not want to get back some return on their investment in launchers”.1040
These positions informed a major, interconnected set of proposals made by the British Minister to the
Conference in which, overcoming his earlier hesitancy, he made a commitment to an applications
programme in addition to the scientific programme. Starting from the distinction drawn in the Spaey
Report between a basic and a minimum programme the UK declared that it would be prepared to support
a minimum programme having three components over and above science. Firstly, a project for an
information transfer satellite based on the CETS proposal to provide a point-to-point TV relay service for
the European Broadcasting Union by 1975. This could be seen as a step along the road to the 2-ton
geosynchronous satellite foreseen for the 1980s, if that was shown to be economically viable. Secondly,
Britain would support a programme for long-term applied technological research to make available
“materials, components, sub-systems, processes and knowledge not available in European industry or
research establishments but which would be needed for a viable space programme”. Thirdly, this
programme would include a study of the overall market and the economic returns of applications satellites
which could be used to guide further decisions. As for science, the UK was prepared to support a
programme for ESRO costing 250 MFF in 1968 and growing by 6% annually for three years, while also
allowing the organisation to assume, for planning purposes, the same growth rate for the period 1972-
1974.1041
Britain's agreement to finance applications was, however, conditional. As Benn put it, “we are prepared to
finance our proper share of these three programmes [i.e. elements of the minimum programme] on the
basis that if we are released from our existing commitments to ELDO we would put that as a part, not the
total, but as a part of our contribution towards these programmes”. This was then “a conscious switch of
resources" on the part of the UK "to the applications side in European space”.1042
Benn’s resolve to extricate his government as quickly as possible from launcher development was met by
the equally strong wish by four ELDO Member States, Belgium, Germany, France and The Netherlands,
to continue with a launcher programme. The Belgian government, said Lefèvre, “accords and equal
consideration to the scientific satellite programme, the applications programme, and the means of
launching” and if it was not possible for other countries to accept that package “we would seek the
possibility of cooperating in a more restricted framework with those who share our conviction […]”.1043
French Minister Galley felt that, with Britain refusing to fulfil its commitments to the ELDO programme,
“it was essential to make an effort to carry on the work that has already been undertaken in the launcher
field with those partners prepared to continue”.1044 German Minister Stoltenberg opened the meeting by
stating clearly stating that “in order to carry through the application programme it deemed it essential that
Europe should prove its ability to launch her satellites by her own launchers, even if that implied financial
sacrifices”.1045 The Netherlands Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, H.J. de Koster, affirmed that his
government believed that “scientific research projects and application projects, in which I include
launchers, should complement each other, thereby making the best possible use of all available
1040 Annex 3 to the Minutes of the meeting held on the morning of 12 November 1968, CSE/CM(November 68)
PV/1 add. 1, 3 March 1969 is Benn's statement verbatim.
1041 In addition to Benn's statement the UK proposal is formalised in CSE/CM(November 68)17,
12 November 1968.
1042 Benn statement just cited.
1043 Annex I to the Minutes of the meeting held on the afternoon of 12 November 1968, CSE/CM (November 68)
PV/2, 12 December 1968.
1044 Minutes of the meeting held on the afternoon of 12 November 1968, CSE/CM (November 68) PV/2,
12 December 1968.
1045 Minutes of the meeting held on the morning of 12 November 1968, CSE/CM (November 68) PV/1, add. 1,
3 March 1969.
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facilities”.1046 The Belgians in fact went even further. Growing impatient with the complications raised by
the wish to keep the United Kingdom in the European effort despite her unwillingness to finance ELDO
any longer, he suggested that the time might come when those who shared the same objectives would ‘go
it alone’. It is probable, said Lefèvre, though regrettable, “that if we do not manage to reconcile our points
of view, which I hope will not be the case, the countries whose aims and concepts are closest would have
to decide to establish cooperation among themselves in accordance with their views”, a move which
“would threaten from 1971 the survival of the existing organisations […]”.1047
Two other resolutions were taken in Bonn/Bad Godesberg which aimed to consolidate the fragile
consensus among the Member States. Firstly, Resolution No 2 instructed a Committee of Senior Officials
“to work out the procedure and the text of a Convention for a single Organisation, by October 1969”. As
called for in the Spaey Report, this was to be achieved by amalgamating the existing organisations, whose
participation in programmes had to be based on a system which was both flexible and which obliged them
to support projects through to the achievement of precise objectives. Resolution No 4 amplified this. It
took up the distinction drawn in the Spaey Report between a basic programme and minimum programme,
and asked that the Convention define the voting procedures required to pass from one successive stage to
the next in any programme.1048 In short it was now apparent that “the principles of European co-operation
in space”, to quote the title of Resolution No. 4 were going to have make allowance for the different and
sometimes conflicting national interests of the collaborating Member States if a unified programme and a
single organisation were going to be possible at all.1049
In the weeks after the Space Conference ESRO more than confirmed the confidence the Ministers had
placed in it. On 5 December 1968 HEOS-A was successfully launched, the third satellite put up by the
Organisation in a little more than six months. ELDO, by contrast, slid even deeper into the mire. On 29
November 1968 firing F7 of Europa took place from Woomera with three live stages. The first stage
worked perfectly again, as did separation of the first and second stage. Coralie also performed as expected
for the first time. Separation of the third stage went smoothly. And then, 5 seconds after ignition, the
propulsion of the third stage ceased, due apparently to a major helium leak coupled with strong
vibrations. The fairings opened all the same and the satellite was ejected and was followed until loss of
telemetry after 15.5 minutes.1050
The ELDO Executive insisted that the F7 firing had satisfied many of its objectives, despite the
disappointing failure not to orbit the satellite. “The success of the F7 firing”, said General Aubinière,
the President of the ELDO Council,  “thus relieves of all  anxiety delegations which doubted or feigned to
1046 Annex 4 to the Minutes of the meeting held on the morning of 12 November 1968, CSE/CM (November 68)
PV/1, 12 December 1968.
1047 Annex 1 to the Minutes of the meeting held on the morning of 12 November 1968, CSE/CM (November 68)
PV/1, 12 December 1968.
1048 Resolutions No. 2 and 4 are in the ESRO/ELDO Bulletin, No 4, January 1969, on pp. 10, and 11-12.
Resolution No 3 instructed the participating States to support the recommendations made by CETS for
establishing a joint European position in the forthcoming negotiations of the Intelsat agreements. The
Statement by the Chairman of CETS to the ESC is CSE/CM(November 68)9, 11 November 1968.
1049 Another working group, this one set up under the Chairmanship of J.H. Bannier to formulate proposals for
the institutional reorganisation of space, reached similar conclusions. Its idea was that each state should have
the obligation to take part in a common long-term research programme, whereas in individual programmes
(scientific space research, space applications and launcher development) only those states interested in
individual fields would take part. See the Report by the Chairman of the Committee of Alternates of the
European Space Conference, CSE/CM(November 68)5, 31 October 1968. The Bannier Report itself is
CSE/CS(68)43.
1050 The course of the F7 firing is described in ESRO/ELDO Bulletin, No 4, January 1969, on pp. 14-19.
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doubt the technical possibilities of this Organisation”.1051 This was more a reflection of the Presidents
anger than of the real state of affairs, however. For the failure of F7 simply reinforced Britain and Italy in
their conviction that the Organisation was not living up to their expectations, and led to another crisis at
the meeting of the ELDO Council on 19 and 20 December 1968.
In anticipation of this meeting the British delegation circulated another note to its partners. Taking its
position in Bonn a step further, it argued that it regarded the new austerity plan put forward by France and
Germany, and now labelled T9 to be a “further programme” within the meaning of Article 4(3) of the
ELDO Convention. This allowed the UK to declare herself “not interested” in the plan, and so not obliged
to contribute financially to it. Thus when the ELDO Council met in mid-December it proved impossible
to vote the 1969 budget. The UK made its agreement conditional on having its outstanding contribution to
ELDO reduced to £10 million (24 MAU) for the years 1969, 1970 and 1971. The balance of the amount
Britain would otherwise have contributed to ELDO (i.e. £7 million) would be switched, as the UK had
promised in Bonn, to applications programmes, long-term technological research and the production of
Blue Streak. Italy, still desirous to receive adequate compensation for the cancellation of the PAS
programme, reaffirmed that the prime contractorship of the apogee motor for Symphonie was not enough.
It supported the UK’s interpretation of the plan T9, declared itself “not interested” in financing this
“further programme” and also refused to vote the 1969 budget. These new developments, said the
German delegate, “put the organisation back in the situation in which it had been half way through 1968”.
The deadlock was total. The rule of provisional twelfths, which enabled ELDO to release funds one
month at a time in anticipation of the budget being voted, was adopted to allow the Organisation to keep
functioning. And another Ministerial meeting was planned for early 1969.1052
The Ministers of the ELDO Member States met again in April 1969 to try to resolve the difficulties posed
by the Italian and British delegations which, Aubinière said, had “plunged the Organisation into the
gravest crisis of its existence”.1053 Extensive negotiations with the partners resulted in Britain increasing
her offer of funding to ELDO for the execution of Plan T9 from £10 million to £11 million (26.4
MAU).1054 Italy, for her part, had her contribution to ELDO reduced by about 10 MAU to 57.6 MAU.1055
Both countries then agreed to vote the 1969 budget, Italy also accepting to pay her arrears on the budgets
for 1967 and 1968.
Determined to continue with the current programme the Ministers of Belgium, France, Germany and The
Netherlands agreed jointly to meet the shortfall resulting from the decrease in the Italian contribution.
They also accepted to absorb, by unanimous vote, any cost overruns in the Europa I and II programmes,
as well as to accept the financial consequences of delays or faults attributable to firms in their
countries.1056 Nor did their commitment to developing an autonomous launcher capability end there. They
also decided, with Italy’s support to embark on a new programme.
By April 1969 it was patently clear that any launcher programme beyond Europa I and II would have to
be undertaken without Britain. The Ministers of the remaining ELDO Member States thus confirmed their
resolve to fund studies for a programme of ‘Europa III’ launchers with a capability of placing 400-500 kg
in geostationary orbit. These studies, to be completed in time for a Ministerial meeting in January 1970,
would need to define the precise objectives of such a programme, its development timescale and cost, as
well as the configuration of the  launcher and the  participation by industry in it.1057  A new directorate, the
1051 In his Statement to the Ministers meeting in April 1969, ELDO/CM (April 69) PV/1, Annex 1, 10 July 1969.
1052 The Minutes of the Council meeting on 19 and 20 December are ELDO/C(68)87.
1053 In his Statement to the Ministers meeting in April 1969, ELDO/CM (April 69) PV/1, Annex 1, 10 July 1969.
1054 See Minutes of the afternoon session on 15 April 1969, ELDO/CM (April 69) PV/2, 10 July 1969, and
Resolution No. 1, ELDO/CM(April 69)6/Final Add., 16 May 1969. See also ELDO/CM (April 69)4,
15 April 1969.
1055 See Minutes of the morning session on 15 April 1969, ELDO/CM (April 69) PV/1, 10 July 1969, and
Minutes of the afternoon session on 15 April 1969, ELDO/CM (April 69) PV/2, 10 July 1969.
1056 The Declaration by these delegations in which they assume these responsibilities is ELDO/CM (April 69)
WP/8, 14 April 1969.
1057 Resolution No. 3, ELDO/CM (April 69)8 Final, 15 April 1969.
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Directorate of Future Activities, was set up within the ELDO Secretariat to carry out these studies and, if
called on to do so, to execute the corresponding development programme and to manage a production
programme in consultation with prospective users. J.P. Causse was nominated to head it1058 At last, it
seemed, the ‘British problem’ had been solved, and ELDO could move forward into the 1970s confident
of the support of its remaining Member States.
11.5 The offer of collaboration in the post-Apollo programme
While the Europeans were grappling with the difficulty of defining the modalities of a comprehensive
space programme which would respect their different priorities the terms of their debate were shifted once
again by an offer made by the United States to participate in the so-called post-Apollo programme. As
this offer and its historical context are discussed in detail in the next two chapters, we shall simply
highlight some of its main developments here.
On 14 October 1969, just a few months after NASA’s Apollo programme had successfully landed men on
the moon, the ESC’s Committee of Senior Officials was addressed by NASA Administrator Dr Thomas
Paine.1059 Paine sketched out the kind of programme that the new Nixon Administration had in mind for
the next decade of space activities. The vision was grandiose and the means to achieve it ambitious. “We
feel”, said Paine, “that space may represent another new world, a seventh continent, which is now
opening to mankind in the region 100 miles above the surface of the globe”. Developing the metaphor
Paine suggested that this new continent might be as economically important as was that “opened by
Columbus and developed by European settlers”. What the US planned to do in its post-Apollo programme
was “to start building the transportation systems and the structures and ports [...] which will allow us to
occupy and use this new continent for the benefit of man”. This was a challenge comparable to that taken
on in the first decade of space, and demanded comparable resources.
The programme’s components embodied the colonising metaphor. Firstly, there was to be a reusable
space shuttle. This was a new kind of space transportation system designed to carry men and materials
into low Earth orbit, and to return to Earth again, i.e. it could be re-used many times. It was designed to
carry payloads of 20000 to 50000 pounds. Reusability, NASA hoped would reduce the cost per pound in
orbit by an order of magnitude, from $ 500 to $ 50.
The second main element of the post-Apollo programme was a space station, a place “where men could
live and work in orbit for an indefinite period”. It would of modular construction, with different
components added successively as the need arose. Within a decade it would grow to “a very substantial
permanent space base in orbit”.
Finally, there was the NERVA, a nuclear powered deep space propulsion vehicle which would be used to
carry the first men to the planets. It used liquid hydrogen as a propellant which was heated by a nuclear
reactor and ejected through a nozzle. A prototype engine of this kind developing 70000 pounds of thrust
had just completed another series of very successful tests at the Nevada test site. It was planned to use it
for a nine-year human expedition to the outer planets at the end of the 1970s, a ‘Grand Tour’ of Jupiter,
Saturn, Uranus, Neptune and Pluto.
The post-Apollo programme did not stop there however. A major scientific programme associated with
the space station, e.g. optical and radio telescopes, research in biological and life sciences, etc was
foreseen. As for applications, the US intended to “continue to emphasise both meteorology and
communication satellite systems with new developments in such areas as navigation satellites and the
new Earth resource of Earth survey satellite systems”. The US, Paine mentioned, had just signed a
contract with India for direct broadcasting satellite experiments to 5000 villages and was working on
agreements with several Latin American countries for Earth resource satellites.
1058 Resolution No. 4, ELDO/CM (April 69)9 Final, 15 April 1969 and ELDO/C(69)PV/2, 28 July 1969..
1059 Paine’s presentation is reproduced in ESRO/ELDO Bulletin, No 8, January 1970.
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Paine made it clear on several occasions that the US would welcome European participation in this
initiative. “We have in space”, he said, “a unique opportunity for a new step forward in international
cooperation”. And as Europe defined its objectives in ELDO and ESRO, the US would “welcome your
suggestions as to new means whereby we can achieve a greater degree of cooperation between our
proposed space programs and your own plans for European programs”.
The Committee of Alternates instructed ESRO and ELDO to study NASA’s proposal. A working group
was set up with chairmen J.P. Causse and J. A. Dinkespiler. Their report was ready in April 1970.1060 It re-
iterated the revolutionary nature of the programme proposed by Paine to which a new element had now
been added, the space tug. The tug was a sort of Shuttle third stage, a manned vehicle intended to carry
payloads beyond the Shuttle’s orbit, e.g. up to geostationary orbit. The report suggested that Europe’s
needs would best be served if her industry was able to cooperate in developing elements which were
crucial to the system as a whole and sufficiently individualised for the management to be fully in
European hands. As for impact, it did not seem that Europe need adjust her scientific or application
programmes to the new situation. Since the Shuttle was not scheduled to be routinely operational until the
mid-1980s the Causse/Dinkespiler report insisted that a launcher such as Europa III, if available in 1978,
would have an active life of a decade. In any event they reported that Europe should only agree to
participate in the entire effort if she was given firm guarantees that her missions would be launched. Their
views were laid before the fourth meeting of the European Space Conference which opened in Brussels in
July 1970.
11.6 On the brink of collapse: The European Space Conferences in 1970
a) The July meeting
The Ministers meeting in Brussels had little difficulty in coming to agreement about what to do next as
regards post-Apollo. As the Chairman of the Committee of Senior Officials, Professor Giampiero Puppi
put it, Europe had been invited to participate at a preliminary stage of the programme, during which it
was still possible to influence final choices. While no firm decision was needed yet, it was urgent that
measures be adopted to ensure that a proper decision was taken when the need arose.1061 To this end the
Conference resolved that the Causse/ Dinkespiler working group prepare a detailed report on possible
fields of cooperation, along with a plan for its organisation. It endorsed the decision, taken some time
before by the ELDO Council, to undertake industrial studies of the tug system, and agreed to fund these
studies to the tune of 2.5 MAU up to June 1971. And it entrusted the President of the ESC, Belgian
Minister Theo Lefèvre, along with representatives from France and the UK, with the task of discussing
with the US government the “political, financial and other conditions for possible European participation
[…]”. The mission was to report back by December 1.1062
A second resolution on the setting up a single institution for European space affairs also received general
assent. It would take over the tasks then entrusted to ESRO, ELDO, CETS and the European Space
Conference. As Puppi put it, the necessity was felt “not only by scientific, industrial and administrative
circles in the various countries, but also within the existing Organisations”. A draft convention for such
an organisation had been prepared by a working group presided over by legal advisers M. Bourély and J.
Kaltenecker. It was not submitted to the conference, however, pending the solution of some outstanding
political issues. Indeed as Puppi put it, the creation of a new Organisation signified “an important political
choice in favour of Space, in relation to other possible sectors, as a priority means of European
1060 It is discussed at length in chapter 13, this volume. See document CSE/HF(70)13, and WG/COOP-US/6,
16 April 1970.
1061 Puppi’s statement is in Annex 2 to the Minutes of the meeting held on the morning of 22 July, 1970,
document CSE/CM(July 70)PV/1 Rev., 30 July 1970. His first Report of the Committee of Senior Officials,
CSE/HF(70)25, June 1970, on the reform of the organisation was also presented at this meeting.
1062 The Resolution is No 3, document CSE/CM(July 70)9 (Final), 24 July 1970.
357
cooperation in the technological field”. And this could not be “either an easy or an obvious decision”, he
was quick to add.1063
The debate over the financial measures needed to ensure the continuity of the activities of the new agency
gave a hint of just how difficult this was going to be. The Resolution proposed that the scientific and
technological research programmes be adopted with provisional eight year envelopes, and with firm
commitments from the Member States for five year periods. This firm commitment to the science
programme contrasted with a reluctance of many delegations to make similar engagements regarding
applications and launchers (see below). The French delegation thus only voted Resolution 2 subject to the
reservation that all Member States eventually took commitments in all three sectors.1064 “We consider it an
essential precondition that all the member countries of the Space Conference should subscribe to the
whole of the programme that is proposed to us,” said the French delegate.1065
The Ministers meeting in July resolved to discuss in November a draft convention embodying the
principles underlying a European space programme. Resolution No 2 even went so far as to ask the
Belgian government to convene a conference of plenipotentiaries in January 1971 in Brussels at which
this convention would be opened for signature. The friction between them over Resolution No 1, which
attempted to define a long-term programme, must have led many delegates to accept this timescale more
out of hope than from conviction.
Resolution No 1 had four “chapters” dealing, respectively, with applications satellites, launchers, the
scientific programme and, finally, applied research and common costs1066 It was not too difficult to
establish the content of the applications programme. The delegations resolved that they would carry out a
communications satellite programme costing about 450 MAU and satisfying the requirements of the
European PTTs and the European Broadcasting Union. They regarded an aeronautical satellite, to be
developed in collaboration with the US, of similar priority. And they expressed a strong interest in a
meteorological satellite. When it came to voting the money for these projects, and deciding how to move
from one phase to the next, however, there was a “profound divergence of views”.1067 For whereas France
and Germany wanted to make a major commitment immediately to these programmes, some their
partners insisted that a more prudent, stepwise approach was necessary.
Geoffrey Rippon set the tone. Rippon was the Minister of Technology in the just-elected, and nominally
pro-European government of Edward Heath; indeed the Conservative Party formally led Britain into the
EEC on 1 January 1973. He was in favour of all three satellite programmes, he said. However, he “wished
to limit his country’s participation to the predevelopment phase that would take place during the next
twelve months”. The results of these studies should be examined to see whether or not they satisfied the
requirements of the relevant user communities before proceeding to funding for the development phase.
This approach was taken up by the Spanish and Italian delegations, to the evident distress of some of their
colleagues. The French Minister of Industrial Development and Scientific Research, Mr. Ortoli, remarked
that there was no need to do another year of studies “to realise that, with its present technological and
industrial potential, Europe was capable of constructing an excellent communications satellite. To lag
behind in this sector of activities would amount to abandoning it altogether”, he went on. The Swiss
delegate pointed out that since the PTTs were currently investing in terrestrial systems they would not
make any forecasts for space systems if no decision was taken quickly to invest in a satellite. In similar
1063 See Report by E.A. Plate, Chairman of the Committee of Alternates, CSE/CM(July 70)5, 17 July 1970, and
Puppi report, CSE/CM(July 70)6, 20 July 1970, from which the quotations are taken.
1064 Annex to Resolution No 2, CSE/CM (July 70)11, 27 July 1970.
1065 Annex 4 to the Minutes of the meeting on the first morning, 22 July 1970, CSE/CM (July 70) PV/1,
30 July 197.
1066 Resolution No 1 is document CSE/CM (July 70)7 (Final), 24 July 1970.
1067 The phrase is from the report by the Chairman of the Committee of Alternates, CSE/CM (July 70)5,
17 July 1970.
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vein Lefèvre insisted that “It was for the space organisations to start on this project without waiting for
the P and T administrations to commit themselves”.1068 But to no avail.
Three clauses of the final version of Resolution No. 1, which differed markedly from a draft proposed to
their partners by France and Germany at the start of the meeting, were indicative of these differences of
approach.1069 Firstly, phrases were added to ensure that there was a genuine demand for the system from
the users before the project was embarked on. Thus the communications satellite would only be
undertaken “provided that the economic aspects are not disproportionate to terrestrial means”. Studies on
the meteorological satellite would only begin “as soon as the nature of any such [operational] system has
been established in consultation with the European national and international meteorological authorities
and agencies”.
Secondly, the movement from one phase of the programme to the next would not be automatic, as France
and Germany wanted, but subject to a double two-thirds majority. And finally, resources were cut
dramatically. France and Germany had proposed that 91 MAU be voted immediately for the three
projects to cover the years 1971, 1972 and 1973. The Resolution adopted by the conference estimated that
no more than 70 MAU would be needed in this period and, more importantly, limited expenditure on the
communications and aeronautical satellites to 5 MAU each up to mid-1971. No money was made
available yet to start developing the weather satellite.1070
The disagreements over the applications programme led several governments to refuse to make a long-
term commitment to the science programme. Resolution No. 2, we will remember, advanced the principle
that this should be funded for five years. The French and the Belgians took the lead in insisting that they
could not adopt a science programme unless the overall balance between the programmes was to their
satisfaction. In particular they wanted science to have a lower priority than applications and launchers and
tried to limit their approval of the programme to 1971 only. To satisfy these conflicting currents, the
delegates agreed to vote 112 MAU for three years, i.e. for 1971, 1972 and 1973. This money was to be
used to continue with projects already in the development phase, for COS-B and GEOS, for sounding
rockets, and for the start-up of at least one new medium-sized project. Belgium and France agreed to this
only on condition that no new commitments, or commitments extending beyond the three-year period
were then entered into.
What of launchers? On the first morning of the meeting some delegates hoped for a softening of the
position of the British delegation. The new Minister, who admitted to being a “long-time supporter of
European collaboration”, said that his delegation had come “wishing to play an active role in space
matters within a European framework”.1071 This did not extend to launchers, however, where the new
government moved only marginally away from that of its predecessor. “If a satisfactory agreement on
launchers could be obtained from the United States then the launcher problem no longer arose”, said the
British representative. “If however no satisfactory answer could be obtained”, he went on “his Delegation
was of the view that a new situation then would arise which they would have to consider”. Since France
demanded “total guarantees of availability of existing and future American launchers” if it was to
participate in the post-Apollo programme, it is clear that the two delegations were as far apart as ever,
notwithstanding the apparent British willingness to reconsider its policy. Indeed in the vote on that part of
Resolution 1 dealing with launchers, the UK was the only ELDO Member State to refuse to accept any
new engagements whatsoever.1072
1068 All quotations from Minutes to the meeting on the afternoon of 23 July, CSE/CM (July 70) PV/2 Rev.,
30 July 1970.
1069 For these comparisons see the Franco-German draft Resolution No 1, CSE/CM(July 70)7, 10 July 1970 and
the final version CSE/CM(July 70)7 Final, 24 July 1970.
1070 Though another 2.5MAU were allocated for “other studies and experimental work”.
1071 Annex 3 to the minutes, CSE/CM (July 70) PV/1, Rev. 30 July 1970.
1072 For the UK position see Minutes of the meeting on the afternoon of 23 July, CSE/CM (July 70) PV/3, Rev.,
30 July 1970. For the French see Annex 4 to the Minutes of the meeting held on the morning of 22 July,
CSE/CM (July 70) PV/1, Rev., 30 July 1970.
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Belgium, France and Germany remained resolutely committed to launchers notwithstanding the ongoing
difficulties in the Europa programme. The third stage had failed again in firing F8, held on 3 July 1969,
due to an electrical fault. Flight F9, the last from Woomera, took place a month before the Conference, on
12 June. The rocket was essentially a slightly improved version of that used in F8 with three live stages,
but with the addition of inertial guidance as a “passenger” in the third stage. It also included in its payload
some experimental telecommunications equipment. Once again the rocket failed to achieve its objectives.
A plug was disconnected during the powered flight of the first stage, and the nose fairing was not
jettisoned. Then a defective valve in the third stage vented helium into the atmosphere, causing a
progressive reduction in the thrust of the rocket. Europa I failed by about 10% to achieve its intended
escape velocity, and the combined third stage and nose fairings enclosing the satellite came down in the
Caribbean north of Guyana.
This setback did not deter these three countries. They agreed to fund together the Europa I and II
programmes through to completion, which meant accepting an increase of 15 MAU over the 626 MAU
ceiling. They also accepted to assume responsibility for funding the manufacture of 4 to 6 Europa
launchers of this class for potential users. And, along with The Netherlands (up to the end of 1971 only)
they agreed to make 128 MAU available during 1971 - 1973 for the development of Europa III, a two-
stage rocket without Blue Streak and including advanced cryogenic techniques. Their view was that since
the advanced cryogenic technology needed for Europa III could be used if Europe contributed the tug to
the post-Apollo programme, one should go ahead with the initial work anyway. It would not be wasted
even if Europe eventually decided not to develop its own launcher.1073
Britain’s position on launchers frustrated her partners. The German Minister for Education and Science
Mr. Leussink implored the UK to contribute a small sum to start work on Europa III. The President added
his voice. As Leussink said, if the UK did its bit one would have “unified support of the programme.
Without it [i.e. Britain] unified support would be impossible and the whole prospect of European
cooperation in space would be in danger.”1074 The UK delegation was unyielding, as we have said.
After three days of deliberations the Conference closed on a sombre note. As Lefèvre pointed out, there
were still “serious uncertainties” regarding participation in the programme. If these were not resolved
quickly, he went on, it was “to be feared that in the space field as in other fields, national, bilateral or
multilateral action will take the place of joint action, thus aggravating the structural weakness of Europe
in major aspects of technology and politics”.1075 The Conference agreed to reconvene on 3, 4 and 5
November in the hope that some of the differences which divided the major partners would be ironed out.
11.7 b) The November meeting and its aftermath
The Ministers met again as planned in November, but for one day instead of three as originally foreseen.
There had been some progress in the months since the previous session. In particular some delegations
were now able to lift the reservations they had placed on the Resolutions voted in July. The gathering was
dominated, however, by the impossibility of forging a consensus on the need for a joint programme
involving scientific and application satellites and launchers. This was partly due to there being different,
not to say opposing interpretations of the results of the ongoing discussions with the USA over
participation in the post-Apollo programme and its relationship to the availability of launchers for the
Europeans.
1073 The arguments are those of German Minister Leussink on the afternoon of 23 July, 1970, CSE/CM (July 70)
PV/3 Rev., 30 July 1970. We are still discussing Resolution no 1 of course.
1074 Minutes of the meeting held on the afternoon of 23 July 1970, CSE/CM (July 70) PV/3 Rev., 30 July 1970.
1075 In Minutes of the meeting held on the morning of 24 July 1970, CSE/CM (July 70) PV/4, 31 July 1970.
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The July meeting had instructed a team headed by Belgian Minister Lefèvre, and including senior
representatives of the UK and of France, to continue discussions with the Americans on behalf of the
ESC. They visited Washington on 16 and 17 September 1970, where they had detailed talks at the State
Department with Alexis Johnson, the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, with NASA’s Acting
Administrator George M. Low, and other senior US officials. Lefèvre reported to the November session
on their findings, coupling them with the content of a letter dated 2 October 1970 which he had
subsequently received from Alexis Johnson.1076
The European delegation was convinced that “the post-Apollo programme represents a completely new
stage in the conquest of space”, and that, to quote Lefèvre, we were “on the threshold of a technical
revolution that [would] render the present techniques obsolete”.1077 They were struck by the hospitable
welcome they received and the American negotiator’s willingness to answer questions. At the same time
the European delegation made it clear that, while it wanted to collaborate closely with the US, Europe
could not afford to develop its own launchers for the practical applications it had in mind and, at the same
time, make a significant contribution to the post-Apollo programme. From this it followed of course that
substantial collaboration was only possible if “from 1970 to 1980 or 1985, American launching facilities
could be made available on a commercial basis and without political conditions”. This requirement had to
be satisfied also for those satellites which, the Lefèvre team made clear, would be commercially
profitable at the operational stage and which might give rise to conflicts of interest at the economic level.
The American contingent, according to Lefèvre, made every attempt to satisfy the Europeans. They
agreed that if Europe made a “substantial” contribution to the post-Apollo programme – a figure of
$1 billion, or 10% of the estimated cost of developing the Shuttle over ten years was mentioned –, then
the US would indeed be prepared to reverse its standing policy on launch provision. Hitherto the US
authorities had responded to each request on a case-by-case basis. Now they were prepared to make a
“general” commitment to the provision of launches i.e. “without reserving a right of refusal or of
unilateral acquiescence on a case-by-case basis”. These launchers would be provided on a reimbursable
basis during the period before the commissioning of the Shuttle. However. And here was the rub, they
had to be used “for any peaceful purpose consistent with existing international agreements”.
Two agreements were pertinent here. They were that on the Outer Space Treaty, which seemed easy to
conform with, and the Intelsat Agreements, which posed “a rather more delicate problem”. The problem
arose if the Intelsat Assembly of Parties decided by a two-thirds majority that a European
telecommunications system was economically prejudicial to Intelsat. In that event, the US representatives
told the Europeans, Washington would “be released from its general promise to supply us with launch
facilities for all peaceful purposes”. The US, in other words, would resume the freedom of decision they
were otherwise willing to relinquish. This, as Lefèvre put it, left “a doubt as to the possibility of obtaining
US launch facilities for a European satellite system where such system is to be used for telephony,
telegraphy or data transmission, as well as for television relays through conventional channels in Europe
[...]”. And, he went on, referring to France’s cultural and political interest in telecommunication linkages
to North Africa, “the doubt is even stronger where a wider zone is involved”, i.e. when a regional system
was at issue.
Lefèvre’s report also defined the options open to Europe for participation in the post-Apollo programme.
The Nixon Administration, he stressed, had not yet decided to embark on this venture (remember that we
are in November 1970).  If the scheme went ahead  Europe had to  choose  between working on a separate
1076 The Lefèvre report is CSE/CM(November 70)6, 4 November 1970. the European delegation comprised the
Belgium Minister, M. Denisse (F) and Lord Bessborough (UK). In addition to Johnson and Low the three
other main US representatives were Edward E. David, Science Adviser to Nixon, William A. Anders, of the
National Aeronautics and Space Council and John H. Morse, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
European and NATO Affairs.
1077 See Lefèvre’s verbal report to the ESC on 4 November 1970, Annex I to CSE/CM (November 70) PV/1,
4 November 1970.
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element or joining in the production of components for major systems. The former had the advantage that
an “independent partnership” would be established, with Europe having “real prime contractorship
responsibility”, both of which were highly desirable. However, it was doubtful whether Europe could
afford this. In that event it would need to consider contributing to specific components. This option left a
greater margin of technical and financial flexibility, but also posed complex interface problems, with
unpredictable financial consequences.
In conclusion, Lefèvre insisted that, whatever the doubts surrounding launcher availability, Europe had
necessarily to place its decision-making in the framework of post-Apollo collaboration. It opened a new
phase in space activities, and the techniques and technologies developed within it would add a new
dimension to European efforts and give it a greater responsibility in international cooperation. However,
if Europe was to enter into the decision phase proper, it had to clarify its own position on a number of
issues.
To begin with, while Europe could assume that there would be “a large availability of American
launching devices within the framework of post-Apollo cooperation”, it had to gain American launching
guarantees for a specific telecommunications mission which crossed a national frontier and which might
be interpreted as being economically disadvantageous to Intelsat. If the negotiations with the US over that
mission failed to give satisfaction Europe should decide to build her own launcher. And to cover both
alternatives everyone should agree both to finance a specific studies programme related to participation in
post-Apollo, and a re-oriented Europa III programme, which would also place particular emphasis on
techniques applicable to the post-Apollo programme. A consensus was also imperative and urgent on the
start of a telecommunications programme, and on the level of the science programme. The “time has
come to act”, said the Belgian Minister. “We must know exactly which countries are willing to continue
and organise a joint effort, meaningful and reasonable, so that Europe will efficiently participate in the
development of space techniques” to promote technological progress and to keep its political and cultural
independence.
It rapidly emerged that the British had a somewhat different impression of the American position to that
outlined by Lefèvre. The mission to Washington, said her Minister of Aviation Supply, showed that “for
all purposes for which Europe is likely to require launchers , we can expect to be able to rely on a
reasonable American response”. The UK, he added, did not intend to launch any satellites which were not
compatible with Intelsat. She did not, therefore, see any need or scientific value “for the development of
an independent launching capability. We do not, therefore, feel able to bear any cost of developing
Europa III”.1078
But what of the claim made by Lefèvre that the new US policy on launcher availability was conditional
on participation in post-Apollo? The UK was not convinced. “We do not believe it is correct to say that
the US assurances of availability depend on 10% European participation in the post-Apollo programme”,
the Minister asserted. This was only needed if one wanted blanket assurances. But Britain saw no need for
such assurances. There was no reason, the Minister went on, “to believe that there will not be ad hoc
procedures for conventional launchers in the interim period [i.e. until the Shuttle was operational] as has
been the case in the recent past, unless we collaborate in the post-Apollo programme”. Britain was still
prepared to contribute to studies looking into how Europe could collaborate with the USA. She was not
prepared to make a commitment now to “share the costs of a 10% participation, running to as yet
unquantifiable but probably very large sums of money and this in the context of a project too loosely
defined to make any assessment of the benefits in relation to resources involved.”1079
The French delegation was just as aware as was the British over the lack of definition of the post-Apollo
programme and its costs. And Mr. Ortoli agreed with his British counterpart that there should be ongoing
1078 See Annex V to the Minutes of the meeting held on the morning of 4 November 1970, CSE/CM (November
70) PV/1, 4 November 1970 and minutes of the session held that afternoon, CSE/CM (November 70) PV/2,
19 November 1970.
1079 See Annex V just cited.
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consultation with the US over the content of the scheme and the role that Europe might play in it. But he
drew just the opposite implications as far as launchers were concerned. It was clear that there was no
longer any question of “replacing” the building of a European launcher by participation in post-Apollo.
For one thing the latter option was far more expensive. And anyway the launch guarantees given by the
US were “insufficient in comparison with what Europe could expect of a partner”.1080 “I do not think”,
said Ortoli, “that Europe can seriously envisage giving up a necessary element of its own space
programme on the ground of an uncertain participation in a programme which is itself uncertain”. We
should not forget, he went on, that “at less cost and greater certainty for Europe, one can embark here and
now on a launcher programme”.1081 In sum, both Britain and France saw in the American position the
confirmation of their own previous views on the desirability of an autonomous launch capability.
The climax of these discussions was reached on the afternoon of November 4. Impatient at the
impossibility of making progress, Belgium, France and Germany finally, and after several warnings,
threw down the gauntlet to their partners. Together they shared the conviction that Europe needed to
adopt an “integrated space programme” covering launchers, satellites and applications, and that it should
continue its efforts to be associated with the post-Apollo programme. A series of votes revealed that they,
and only they, were prepared to support, in principle, this multi-pronged approach. At this point, Leussink
suggested that the three of them go it alone and set up a new structure coherent with these objectives.
Countries that wished to join in only part of the programme had until 31 December 1970 to make their
views known, and could apply for associate membership. “If Europe is not to lose its last chance of
collaborating in a manner commensurate with its possibilities and capabilities in the world-wide
development and exploitation of space technology”, said a German memorandum, “the necessary
decisions can no longer be postponed any further”.1082
This move was bitterly resented by the Swiss delegate. The Conference, he said, was “destroying
everything that had been built up”. Indeed it was not just the painfully brokered compromises on elements
of the scientific and applications programmes that were being put in question here. It was the very idea of
a European-wide space organisation. As Leussink said, “Should we reach a point where only a relatively
small ‘club’ carries out the overall programme then I am not sure that there would be much point in
carrying to the conclusion all our fine ideas about the amalgamation of the Organisations, and the creation
of a new Organisation”. Regrettable as it was, the Belgian delegate said, this was “the consequences of
the indecision that had prevailed. The fact that the Conference could not reach agreement did not mean
that those who wished to go ahead must be prevented from doing so”.1083
A week after the meeting, on 12 November 1970 Leussink, in consultation with Ortoli and Lefèvre, sent a
letter to the appropriate ministers in the other Member States of the ESC. Reaffirming the views
expressed the week before, it asked them “to review their attitude and state whether they were prepared to
support a complete European programme, including participation in launchers and the post-Apollo
programme.” At the subsequent ESRO Council meeting on 25 November delegates from the three
countries insisted that, until this issue was clarified, they would block those parts of the ESRO budget
concerning expenditure to be made in 1972.1084 What is more, France said, if a budget for 1971 was
imposed on her by a two-thirds majority (as was legally possible), she would simply veto the next three-
year ceiling for 1972-74 which had to be unanimously agreed before the year was out. Escalating the
tone, this delegation then also refused to vote the ESC figure of 12.5 MAU for applications for 1971. That
agreement, said the French, formed part of an overall package, and in the absence of a consensus on the
package she would only accept that 1 MAU be spent on applications studies in the year ahead (i.e. the
amount previously devoted to this).
1080 See the Minutes of the meeting held on the morning of 4 November 1970, CSE/CM (November 70) PV/1,
4 November 1970.
1081 Annex VII to Minutes of the meeting held on the morning of 4 November 1970, CSE/CM (November 70)
PV/1, 4 November 1970.
1082 The memorandum is CSE/CM (November 70) 8, 4 November 1970.
1083 The quotations are from the Minutes of the morning and afternoon sessions.
1084 The Minutes of the meeting on 25 November 1970 are ESRO/C/MIN/34.
363
To resolve the crisis it was decided to hold an extraordinary ESRO Council session just before
Christmas.1085 The delegations from Belgium and France again took the floor. The gist of their remarks,
which were supported by Germany was that, since only a few countries were prepared to spend money on
a launcher which they deemed essential, sacrifices would have to be made elsewhere in the programme.
They singled out science for special mention. Insisting that they had no wish to destroy ESRO, but that
this kind of activity could more profitably be pursued at the national level, they proposed to reduce the
three-year ceiling for science to 70 MAU (as opposed to the 112 MAU proposed by the ESC in July).
This change of emphasis, said the three, was to be coupled with a whole series of organisational reforms
which made allowances for optional programmes. New procedures would have to be worked out to
ensure that partners were committed to pursue programmes through to completion, with voting powers
weighted according to the respective contributions of each participant. ESRO would have to introduce
management and accounting methods compatible with each project being treated as a separate entity.
Existing national resources would have to be exploited to the full, and greater use be made of national
“promoters” who would be responsible for system design and inspection in industry, with multinational
prime contractors taking care of hardware development. And to ensure at least a minimum market for the
European launcher, satellites would need to be so designed as to be compatible with it. To put teeth into
these proposals, France then signalled her intention to withdraw from ESRO in 1972 if a suitable
compromise embodying her key requirements could not be found.
This strong line “amazed” some of the other delegates, who feared that it would have a “disastrous
psychological effect” on public and parliamentary opinion and on the morale of ESRO staff. The small
countries were particularly angry, feeling that they were being bullied into submission. And as first the
UK then Sweden threatened to follow France and denounce the convention, Director General Bondi
sounded the alarm: this course of action, he said, whereby several countries bound themselves either to
get their way or to leave, could only lead to the dissolution of ESRO. Time was needed to seek a
compromise. It was in these inauspicious circumstances that the incoming Council Chairman Giampiero
Puppi was instructed to conduct negotiations with the Member States with a view to coming up with
suggestions for the reform of the organisation. These were to be submitted no later than 30 June 1971,
until which time the French agreed to suspend temporarily their threat to withdraw.
11.8 The first package deal
Puppi spent the first few months of 1971 in preliminary discussions with the Member States delegations
before entering into negotiations with them in March and April. He came up with his suggestions for the
reform of the organisation early in May.1086 Three points are to be noted about this first stab at a solution.
Firstly, he identified a transitional period, lasting from 1972-74, during which ESRO's role would be
reoriented towards applications. There would be a progressive redistribution of resources away from
science in this period, and the role of ESRANGE and ESRIN would have to be reassessed. The decision
making structures would need to be reformed and a better coordination and harmonisation between
national and European activities would be sought. Secondly, regarding the programmes themselves, Puppi
noted that it was generally assumed that the applications programmes should be optional. As for science,
he suggested that it remain mandatory only until the end of the transitional period, after which it should
be optional too. In fact Puppi suggested that, from 1975 onwards, to qualify for membership of the new
organisation a country would only be obliged to participate in what were called “Basic activities (notably
a space technology R and D programme) and common costs,” and in any one additional programme of
its choice.  Finally, as regards funding, he saw the overall ESRO budget doubling from 74 MAU (in 1971
1085 The Minutes of the Meeting on 22 December 1970 are ESRO/C/MIN/35.
1086 The Puppi proposals are ESRO/C(71)24, with add. 1 and add. 2, and ESRO/C/APP(71)9, 30 April 1971.
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prices) to 150 MAU by 1974, where he pegged it for the rest of the decade. Within this profile Puppi
proposed that the scientific satellite programme be gradually reduced to achieve a fixed level of 35 MAU
per annum (in 1971 prices) from 1974 onwards. This, he said, seemed to be the minimum required for a
viable scientific satellite programme. As for applications they should rapidly climb to a fixed level of
90 MAU by 1974.
These proposals were discussed by the ESRO Council at the end of May.1087 The debate, which was
intended primarily to solicit first reactions, was concentrated on the status and funding of the scientific
programme. Here it emerged that, while there was considerable sympathy for the idea that the sounding
rocket programme become optional, most delegations were emphatic that the scientific satellite
programme remain mandatory beyond the transitional period. This programme, it was argued, would give
cohesion and stability to the organisation, and would serve as a sign of European determination and
European unity. As for funding, these delegations confirmed that 35 MAU annually (in 1971 prices)
seemed to be the minimum needed for a viable programme (though even that was well below what the
scientists sought: 43-47 MAU). The most important discordant voice was that of the French. France was
not against having an optional science programme. In addition her delegation stated quite categorically
that it would not support a mandatory science programme to the tune of 35 MAU annually.
The Council met again in July 1971.1088 The most striking development here was that the “big four” had
accepted that there be a dramatic restriction in their scope for optional participation in programmes. More
specifically — and this was the substance of the package deal —they accepted that the scientific satellite
programme be mandatory for all and that they treat an applications programme as if it were mandatory for
them, other Member States being free to join them on an optional basis. Contributions, as before,
remained pegged to each participating states' GNP. To give substance to this commitment, Britain,
France, Germany and Italy agreed to guarantee together 70 MAU per year (in 1971 prices) for
applications from 1974 to 1980. In the first instance this money would be spread between a
telecommunications, an aeronautical and a meteorological satellite. As for the level of the science budget
France insisted that it be fixed at 27 MAU per year from 1974 onwards, though conceded that it could be
bit higher before that. This ceiling, it remarked, would enable one scientific satellite to be launched every
two years.
The package deal agreed by the major Member States of ESRO formed part of a wide-ranging resolution
which was discussed in draft by the Council in July 1971, and finally voted in its entirety after several
revisions in December of that year.1089 Let us briefly survey its highlights.
Nine Member States — Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland
and the United Kingdom — agreed in principle to participate in a joint aeronautical satellite programme
with at least the USA and Canada which was to cost no more than 100 MAU (at mid-1971 prices.) (The
tenth state, Denmark, had withdrawn from ESRO at the end of 1971, and did not commit itself to any
programmes.). The same nine states also agreed to fund together an as yet undecided meteorological
satellite programme to a ceiling of 115 MAU. Finally, all of them bar Spain agreed to participate in
communications satellite programme, and to contribute a maximum of 100 MAU from 1972 to 1976 for
its experimental phase. A further decision on its content, and whether to undertake succeeding phases of
the programme would be taken in 1975 by a double two-thirds majority.
1087 The Minutes of the 38th (extraordinary) Council session held on 25-26 May 1971 are ESRO/C/MIN/38,
11 June 1971.
1088 The Minutes of the 39th (extraordinary) Council session held on 13-14 July 1971 are ESRO/C/MIN39,
3 August 1971.
1089 The Minutes of the meeting held on 20 December 1971 are ESRO/C/MIN/44, 6 January 1972. The final
version of the resolution defining the first package deal is reproduced in ESRO/ELDO Bulletin, 17
(February 1972), pp. 6-11, and ESRO General Report 1971, pp. 129-132.
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Regarding the science programme, the satellite component was made mandatory, as we know, and its
annual resources were set at not less than 27 MAU (plus 1 MAU contingency) from 1972 to 1977 —
essentially the French figure. Additional funds were made available in the transition period
(see Figure 8-1). These reductions could only be achieved by delaying somewhat the start of the COS-B
and GEOS projects, and by cutting back the activities at ESRANGE and at ESRIN. Of the 36 approved
sounding rocket firings only 16 were authorised, and a small sum of money was made available for the
scientists concerned with the remaining 20 firings to enable them to complete their payloads.
Arrangements were made for Sweden to take over ESRANGE as from July 1972, and it was regretfully
concluded that ESRIN's scientific research activities would have to be terminated by September 1973.
Thereupon, it was suggested, its main activity should be to run a technical information service.
The amount to be spent on basic activities and common costs (finally set at 10 MAU per annum) was not
easily settled. Puppi originally suggested that this be pegged at about 15 MAU, more than half of which
was to be for basic technological research. This figure was forced down by the French, who felt that the
development of space technology could be done exclusively in national programmes. Sweden, in
particular, protested vigorously, insisting that it was the only way in which a small country without a
major national programme could acquire the skills and know-how needed for it to participate
meaningfully in future programmes. In the event only about 4 MAU was set aside annually for
technological support, about half the figure first proposed by the Council chairman.
Launchers were another thorny issue. The first version of the draft resolution discussed in July 1971
reaffirmed the so-called 125% rule adopted by the ESC at Bad Godesberg some three years before, but
with one important twist. The rule — that priority would be given to the purchase of a European launcher
provided that it did not cost more than 125% of the equivalent US launcher — would only be invoked
provided that the US formally agreed to provide launchers for all missions referred to in the resolution,
including the operational stages of applications satellites. Failing that, a European launcher would be
acquired or developed either with ELDO or with European industry. This text was obviously intended to
secure guarantees for a European launcher industry unless the US could give (impossible to have) cast-
iron commitments that it would always meet European needs. As we would expect this text was backed
by the French, opposed by the British, and revised at the last minute in a spirit of compromise and to
accommodate the new situation which arose after the dramatic failure of Europa II in November 1971
(see below). The final arrangement was complex. It satisfied the British in that it reaffirmed the 125%
rule without making its application conditional on the USA guaranteeing in advance that Europe could
use its launcher for any (civilian) mission. It satisfied the French in that it stated that the 125% rule would
fall away if the US ever refused to launch a European satellite, so clearing the way for a continuous and
assured market for a launcher developed and built on this side of the Atlantic.
It would be misleading to suggest that the agreements formally reached in 1971 were readily accepted by
all. Indeed, as in all such cases, the texts were so worded as to identify the points on which all could agree
and left considerable scope for interpretation and conflict. And conflict there was. Italy was most
distressed about the change in ESRIN's role, even threatening to withdraw from the package deal if an
activity more “noble” than a space documentation service was not attributed it. There were bruising
debates over the content of the communications satellite programme as we have seen in chapter 10. There
was also some disagreement over the meteorological programme. The French, who ultimately prevailed,
wanted it to be the “Europeanisation” of a geostationary satellite they were designing with NASA called
Meteosat. They also wanted the project management team to be based at the CNES Space Centre in
Toulouse, with staff drawn equally from ESRO and from their national project.1090 Finally, after several
more years of protracted negotiations, the joint aeronautical satellite project was in fact abandoned.1091
1090 Meteosat is discussed at length in J. Krige, The European Meteorological Satellite Programme,
(ESA HSR-22, March 1998). It is also treated in volume II of this work.
1091 Aerosat is discussed at length in L. Sebesta, The Aeronautical Satellite System: an example of international
bargaining, (Noordwijk: ESA HSR-17, February 1996). It is also treated in volume II of this work.
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That granted it would be just as misleading to allow these difficulties to obscure the importance of the
compromises involved in the first package deal. For one thing they ensured that ESRO, or a suitably
reformed European space organisation, continue beyond 1972, when its initial mandate expired, so
breathing new life into the collaborative effort. For another, they guaranteed the funding needed until the
end of the decade to get a meaningful applications programme off the ground. Finally, and related to this,
they sealed the participation of the smaller countries in the organisation and in the à la carte system. In
guaranteeing the adhesion of the major contributors to the applications programmes, they reassured the
smaller states that they would not find themselves saddled with an intolerable financial burden because
one of the big four decided not to join in. In this respect they laid the basis of a new European space
agency, an agency that inherited both a new programmatic framework in which to operate, and the
historical residues of the disagreements that preceded its birth.
11.9 The background to the second package deal
As ESRO was consolidating its position, and laying the foundations of a European space agency, ELDO
continued to be plagued by technical and financial crises, which now had to be placed in the context of
the lure of the post-Apollo programme, and the fear that maybe Europe was developing an obsolete
launcher system anyway. Indeed, the determination of delegations from Belgium, France and Germany to
form their own space club if necessary, so forcefully expressed at the end of 1970, soon withered. Each
major partner went his own way, taking positions towards collaboration with the United States which
were coherent with the foreign policies of Paris and of Bonn as they had evolved throughout the 1960s.
The different tendencies were reconciled in what came to be known in the second package deal, adopted
in July 1973.
The maiden test flight of Europa II proved to be the turning point. Early on the morning of the
5 November 1971 tense optimism reigned in ELDO and at Kourou in French Guyana. The new French-
sponsored equatorial base had been successfully commissioned six months before with the static firing of
a multistage reference vehicle fully representative of the rocket. The countdown was without a hitch.
Europa II blasted off right on schedule before a crowd of assembled dignitaries and journalists. The
trajectory was normal for the first 130 seconds. Then, to everyone's dismay, a number of simultaneous
anomalies, including the failure of the inertial guidance computer, caused it to incline gradually towards
the right. The rocket broke up in flight 20 seconds later.
The ELDO Council met on 18 November.1092 The potentially grave consequences of this setback for the
future of ELDO were clear to all. A commission of enquiry was established immediately. It was chaired
by the incoming ELDO Secretary General, General R. Aubinière, the then Director General of CNES.
Aubinière was asked to submit his report by May 1972. He was specifically instructed not only to look
into the technical causes of the failure but also at the management structure of the entire project.
Aubinière's report was laid before the ELDO Council on 8 June 1972.1093 It did not mince words, and was
a damning indictment of the management of the Europa programme both by ELDO and inside industry.
The heart of the problem was the limited technical authority of the Secretariat, which had been restricted
from the outset by the demand of the founder members of ELDO that national agencies be responsible
for  placing  contracts in  their industries.  This  was  compounded by the poor internal organisation of the
1092 Its minutes are ELDO/C(71)PV/6, 6 January 1972.
1093 The Report of the Project Review Commission is document ELDO/C(72)18, 19 May 1972.
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Secretariat itself which lacked an adequate chain of command and in which responsibilities were not
clearly defined. As a result there was no central, project-oriented team in ELDO which could or did take
overall technical authority for piloting the programme, dealing with vehicle integration and acting as a
coordinator of firms. Due to the remoteness of the technical staff from actual design and development
most of the contracts placed by ELDO were deficient in several respects (e.g. completeness of
specification, freezing of procedures and design): even some of the most basic technical documentation
was lacking. The matter was not helped by the firms themselves, who tended to regard ELDO personnel
as bureaucrats rather than technical authorities.
This lack of overall control over industry had some startling consequences. In particular there was a
serious lack of integration of electrical systems in the third stage. For example, the wiring between the
upper section of the electrical system manufactured by MBB and the lower manufactured by ERNO
obeyed “none of the elementary rules concerning separation of high and low level signals, separation of
signals and electrical power supply, screening, earthing, bonding, etc.” No one took responsibility for
this, not even the firm ASAT (Arbeitsgemeinschaft Satellitenträgersystem), the stage manufacturer for
which MBB and ERNO were working.
Simple technical deficiencies of this kind, the commission thought, were probably responsible for the
computer stoppage. The computer itself, they pointed out, was a prototype initially used in the
development of the British Jaguar fighter aircraft programme, and subsequently replaced. It was not being
used operationally anywhere but in the Europa II project and, in their view, was inevitably defective due
to the resulting inadequate standards of manufacture, inspection and acceptance.
Aubinière's commission concluded that the Europa II rocket “in its current configuration [was]
unflightworthy”. However, it was confident that the enormous technical and management defects in the
Europa programme could be overcome if suitable measures were taken immediately. In particular, it was
insistent that the ELDO Secretariat be turned into a centralised technical authority with overall
responsibility for the project and with the competence and power needed to impose its wishes on the
contractors. It estimated that if this was done and a further 21 to 27 MAU was made available for the
programme, one could reasonably schedule the next launch of the rocket for the summer of 1973 — a
slippage of about 18 months. And while success could not be guaranteed Aubinière’s commission felt
that, if their conditions were met, there was no reason why the Europa II vehicle would not “achieve a
normal probability of correct functioning to match that of comparable space projects.”
The ELDO Council meeting on 8 June considered Aubinière's report.1094 It was loath to take a decision on
whether or not to continue with the Europa II development and production programme. It also hesitated to
engage itself further in the Europa III project. The design concept for Europa III proposed by the ELDO
Secretariat in April 1972 foresaw the construction of a two stage rocket able to put 750 kg in
geostationary orbit. Its first stage used well developed technology while its second would use cryogenic
techniques not yet developed in Europe. Its cost was estimated at 470 MAU plus a 20% contingency
margin, which took the price to 565 MAU (3138 MFF) in 1971 prices and exchange rates. The German
delegation found this far too expensive and insisted that a number of low-cost alternatives which did not
use a cryogenic upper stage should be looked into. These alternatives were presented to the ELDO
Council on 8 June. They proved more expensive than the original design. The configuration also posed
problems of geographical return and technology transfer.1095 Defeated, the ELDO Council referred the
launcher question to the Ministers who had been scheduled to meet in July.
In the event the date of this meeting slipped steadily. The Ministers had met informally on 19 May 1972
to plan this gathering.1096 It quickly emerged that it would be precipitate to meet in July, as originally
envisaged. The nature of Europe's participation in the post-Apollo programme was one reason for the
delay. On 5 January 1972 Nixon had approved the space Shuttle programme. At the same time post-
1094 The Minutes of the 57th ELDO Council meeting on 8 June 1972 are ELDO/C(72)PV/3, 16 June 1962.
1095 Low Cost Launchers. Conclusions of the Europa III Ad Hoc Group, ELDO/C(72)14 Add., 30 May 1972.
1096 The minutes of this Informal Ministerial Meeting - 19 May 1972 are in (ESC 1473).
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Apollo had undergone major changes. The space station concept had been radically altered and its
development put back to after that of the Shuttle. The design of the Shuttle itself had been changed,
leaving only parts of it really reusable, and the elements in which Europe could participate were reduced
from twelve to five. To clarify matters the Ministers agreed that a high-level European delegation should
visit NASA in June. There, to their amazement, the tug was withdrawn, the number of Shuttle elements
was reduced even further to four, all of relatively minor technological interest to Europe, and “the talks on
European participation — which [was] still desired — were suddenly focussed on the sortie module
alone”.1097 This was a Shuttle-borne, shirt-sleeve environment laboratory for scientific research under low-
gravity conditions in fields like biomedicine and materials science. Work on the tug was stopped, Shuttle
technology studies were wound down and ESRO immediately intensified its work on a European sortie
module concept in consultation with NASA. 1098
The Committee of Alternates of the ESC decided that, with the situation as fluid as this, it was pointless
to hold the next ministerial meeting in July as planned. In fact the Europa II setback and the reduction in
the scope of European participation in the post-Apollo programme set in train a major revision of
Europe's space priorities in some governments. It also left ELDO in limbo, with a dark cloud hanging
over its existing programme, no commitment to continue with the Europa III programme, and the space
tug, for which it had been responsible, summarily cut from its activities.
11.10 The second package deal
The date of the Ministerial meeting was finally fixed for 20 December. It was becoming increasingly
clear that procrastination was no longer possible. Nixon's endorsement of the Shuttle in January, and the
identification in June of the sortie module as the only potentially interesting element for Europe in the
post-Apollo programme, imposed a deadline which, if missed, would imply that the opportunity of
working with the United States would be lost. In August the US informed the Europeans that NASA
required a commitment in principle by the end of the year, following which the formal agreements would
be prepared for adoption no later than 15 August 1973. This commitment would be coupled with the
funding of a definition phase, and if the cost figures arrived at “unacceptably exceed the financial ceiling
agreed by the ESC Ministerial Conference, the Europeans would be allowed to withdraw from their
commitment”.1099
These pressures from across the Atlantic went along with a basic re-orientation of the lines of force
shaping European policy. On the one hand Germany, which had always been one of the most ardent
supporters of a European launcher, now began to have second thoughts. The difficulties faced by German
industry in the Europa I programme led the government to believe that there was much to be gained from
participation in the post-Apollo programme, particularly at the level of system management. At the same
time Bonn came round to the view that the costs of developing a European launcher were unjustifiably
high in relation to the very small number of satellites that the US was likely to refuse to launch. The
German government thus became increasingly interested in collaborating with NASA and American
industry in building the sortie module.
Some people in the French government, on the other hand, remained convinced, or convinced themselves
that America could not be relied on to launch regional telecommunications satellites without imposing
intolerable conditions, and that an autonomous European launcher was needed. The inept US handling of
the negotiations over the launch of the Franco-German satellite Symphonie provided a crucial argument
to those in Paris who believed in this policy. In September 1972 NASA confirmed its earlier view that the
1097 The quotations are from the Report by the Secretary General of the European Space Conference on the
Status of European Space Programmes, CSE/CM (October 72)WP/1, 12 October 1972.
1098 See the report on the technical discussions between NASA and ESRO held from 26 to 29 June 1972,
CSE/CS(72)18, Annex 1, 4 July 1972.
1099 Report by the Secretary General of the European Space Conference on the Status of European Space
Programmes, CSE/CM(Dec. 72)5, rev. 1, 12 October 1972 (ESC 127).
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satellite would be launched unconditionally if it was purely experimental. But it added that if the
Europeans wished “to retain an option for eventual commercial use, a launching would have to be subject
to the US version of the Intelsat clearance requirements”. The 'US version' of those requirements,
renegotiated the year before, was that if anyone wanted to launch a regional, commercial communication
satellite system, as did Europe, “the US in effect will launch anything it supports or anything that two-
thirds of the Intelsat membership will support”.1100 This position was judged by some Europeans to be
particularly menacing. As Lefèvre put it in November 1972, America will cooperate “on condition that
launching our satellites is considered when the time comes, compatible with interests the American
Government feels it ought to protect”.1101 This was brought home when the French (Michel Bignier) and
German (Herman Strub) negotiators went to Washington early in 1973 to discuss the terms for launching
Symphonie with an American Thor-Delta rocket. They were stunned by American inflexibility; in the
margin of the document laying down the US conditions Strub scribbled the words “Es ist schwer!” (That's
tough!).1102
The US position, as we said, played into the hands of those people in France who believed that her
national interest demanded that Europe have her own launcher. Indeed a three-stage launcher of
geostationary capability had already been conceived by the engineers at CNES. In September 1972 they
published a report entitled "Programme National de Lanceur de Satellites de Classe Identique à EUROPA
III.B".1103 It proposed that the first stage of Europa IIIB simply be recycled as the first stage of the national
launcher LIIIS (labelled L150 with reference to the 150 tons of ergols needed). To this would be added a
cryogenic stage powered by the HM6 motor, whose development was already well advanced. Carrying
six tons of ergols, its label was H6. An intermediary second stage was also needed, however, if the rocket
was to put 7-800 kg in geostationary orbit. None of France's existing civilian or military rockets were
suitable, however. CNES thus proposed basing the second stage on the first, using the same materials and
a single, in-built Viking motor. The label of this stage was L30. The overall configuration of the launcher
LIIIS proposed was thus L150 - L30 - H6. As for cost the CNES report estimated that the development of
LIIIS on a national basis would cost 1700 MFF 'hors taxes' in 1971 prices, plus a 10% contingency . A
later figure increased this 1824 MFF in 1973 prices, plus a contingency of 20%. These were far less than
the estimated cost of Europa IIIB (over FF 3,000 million as we saw), though somewhat more than
France's contribution to ELDO.
The sortie lab and LIIIS options provided new focal points to break the existing deadlock and to define a
new collaborative framework. An informal meeting of space ministers was held on 8 November 1972 to
identify what common political ground, if any, existed between them. Several points emerged clearly at
this meeting.1104 Firstly, there was very little support for continuing with Europa III. It seemed, to quote
the Belgian Minister Lefèvre, “too powerful for the initial missions envisaged and too advanced for
operational phases of the 1980s whose requirements are moreover not at the moment sufficiently
defined”. At $1.5 billion it was also very expensive, insisted Germany. And it was not needed politically
said Italy whose delegate was “highly confident on the future positive evolution of the political
relationship between Europe and the U.S.” The French disagreed, but did hint that a new proposal was in
the air, a proposal involving “other methods of management than those used so far and, therefore, other
technical solutions to achieve the same objective”.
1100 Quotations from the NASA briefing prior to Von Dohnanyi's visit to Washington, 12 September 1972,
quoted in
E. Chadeau (ed), L'Ambition Technologique: Naissance d'Ariane (Paris: Editions Rive Droite, 1995),
p. 352.
1101 Lefèvre to the Ministerial meeting on 8 November 1972, CSE/CM(Nov. 72) Add.1, 11 December 1972 (ESC
120). The text of Nixon's announcement is reproduced in the Annex to L. Sebesta, The Availability of
American launchers and Europe’s Decision’To Go it Alone’, (Noordwijk: ESA HSR-18, September 1996).
1102 Quoted in A. Lebeau, “La naissance d'Ariane", in Chadeau, op. cit, pp. 75 -91, at p. 85.
1103 The document is reproduced in part in Chadeau, op. cit, pp. 364-71.
1104 All the quotations in the next three paragraphs are from the minutes of this meeting, document
CSE/CM(Nov.72),4, 17 November 1972 (ESC 120).
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The second point stressed at the meeting was that Germany was determined to participate in the sortie
laboratory, and that she wanted a decision quickly. Europe would miss the “post-Apollo bus” if a decision
to fund the project had not been taken by 15 August 1973. Italy was fully behind Germany, insisting that
definition phase studies should be authorised immediately. French Minister Charbonnel, while
recognising that there was some interest in the project asserted that, in his view, “none of the economic
needs of the next decade would be met by the development in Europe of the sortie lab, which can in no
case be considered a substitute for the launcher programme”.
Finally, these position statements notwithstanding, the chief protagonists also sent signals to each other
that they were willing to compromise. And they were encouraged by the British minister now responsible
for space in the Conservative government, Michael Heseltine, who signalled a sharp turn in his country's
position. He proposed that Europe be endowed with a single space agency built from ESRO and ELDO,
and that national programmes be gradually phased out in preference for collaborative European solutions.
Indeed he suggested that the UK would be prepared to phase all of the money it spent on space, both
nationally and at the European level into this single agency. For that to be effective though, Heseltine
indicated that the new body should have specialised programmes in which Member States could
participate to the level that they wished, and not necessarily proportionally to their GNP's which, he said,
had always been the stumbling block up to then.
Charbonnel made a definitive move a month later. Writing to Lefèvre he said that France was in favour of
abandoning Europa III. It would propose instead to the European Space Conference “the common
development of a heavy launcher for which France would agree to be the prime contractor and provide
the major part of the finance”. He was of course referring to LIIIS, no longer conceived as a national
project but as the basis for a collaborative venture. Her partners would have to contribute at least 40% of
the cost and agree that it would have priority of use in Europe compared with means of launching
developed elsewhere. In return his "could envisage in parallel a limited participation in the post-Apollo
programme".1105 The French Minister developed these arguments at the Ministerial meeting on 20
December.1106 He explained that France was “proposing to its partners to shoulder the major part of the
funding and to bear the development risks of a launcher with a capability equivalent to EUROPA III, 750
kg in geostationary orbit, for an overall cost of 550 MAU, of which France would like 40% to be
provided by its partners”.1107 France wanted CNES to take executive responsibility for the project. It
would entrust the work to a prime contractor, which would be a French firm or French-headed
consortium. The prime contractor would be left to choose the foreign industrial partners who would
participate in the venture, bearing in mind cost, timescale and the quality of their work. This was
sufficiently interesting for the those present to draft a resolution in which, inter alia, they agreed in
principle to carry out the sortie lab project and the French launcher within a common European
framework. They also agreed to drop Europa III forthwith.1108
The Ministerial decisions were duly implemented by the ELDO Council meeting the next day: Europa III
was formally abandoned as from 31 December 1972, and its staff officially fired as from 1 February
1973. What is more the future of Europa II was also put in question by the Council even though it had not
actually been discussed the day before.  Germany did not want to fund the  existing  programme for more
1105 Letter Charbonnel to Lefèvre, 15 December 1972, CSE/CM(Dec. 72)7, 19 December 1972 (ESC 129). The
French original is in file (ESC 1457).
1106 The minutes of this meeting are document CSE/CM(Dec. 72)PV/1 for the morning session (ESC 121) and
PV/2 for the afternoon session (ESC 122). Charbonnel's statement opened the afternoon session.
1107 Both these figures were of course overestimates. As we know from above the cost of 550 MAU was close to
that of Europa III, and far greater than CNES's estimates for LIIIS, and the Finance Ministry in France had
set a 35% limit on participation by other states.
1108 The resolution terminates the minutes of the afternoon session and was also released as CSE/CM(Dec.72)8,
20 December 1972 (ESC 130).
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than a month and Belgium was bickering about its rate of contribution.1109 France struggled on valiantly
with patchwork arrangements to save Europa II for Symphonie, but finally yielded to the inevitable. At
the ELDO Council meeting on 27 April 1973 the two major contributors agreed that the Europa II
programme should be stopped immediately, even as the F12 launch vehicle was on its way to Guyana.1110
The next six months were engaged in detailed negotiations between the interested states on the
management structure, financial contributions, geographical returns and legal texts surrounding these
major projects.1111 The draft arrangement for executing the LIIIS programme foresaw expenditure of 2472
MFF (445 MAU) in 1 January 1973 prices, with a technical contingency margin included. The draft
agreement for the execution of Spacelab, as the sortie module was now called, was opened for signature
from 1 March to 10 August 1973. The financial envelope for this programme was set at 308 MAU in mid-
1973 prices. As we mentioned earlier, participating states were still free to withdraw from this programme
before 10 August, however, if further studies indicated that these estimates would be significantly
exceeded.1112 ESRO DG Hocker reassured Ministers in July that these figures could indeed be kept to
despite recent “rather severe changes in the shuttle specifications”.1113
When Ministers met on 12 July 1973 to take stock of where they stood, the situation was far from
promising.1114 France had agreed to contribute 10% to Spacelab, while Bonn offered DM 320 million
spread over eight years (about 18.5%) for LIIIS. No other major contributions were forthcoming,
however. Britain was not interested in the launcher and the Italian delegate was not yet able to commit his
new government, though he stressed that they would give “top priority” to Spacelab. To avoid having to
accept defeat, the Belgian Chairman of the Ministerial Space Conference, Charles Hanin, suggested that
the meeting adjourn until the end of the month, imploring delegations which were still undecided to
clarify their positions in the interim. Hanin spent the next two weeks jetting between European capitals.
His efforts bore little fruit, however. The only important new development was that Britain agreed to
contribute £4 million to LIIIS, equivalent to 1.8%, with UK firms being awarded the inertial guidance
system on the launcher. This was conditional on France being willing to contribute to a British project
called Marots, a maritime satellite costing some 60 MAU which Minister Heseltine now introduced as
part of the overall package.
Marots was the product of Heseltine’s determination to rationalise space spending. He was disturbed to
find that two maritime navigation satellites then under consideration: GTS, a British national satellite
originally intended for telecommunications but subsequently reoriented to maritime navigation, and
Marots, which had similar objectives but which had been studied by ESRO.1115 GTS was mainly an
experimental, technological development satellite of the OTS class. Marots was a pre-operational satellite
(i.e. it could be the first of a system intended to perform reliably with tested technologies), and to choose
it was also to make a choice for long-term European space policy. In December Heseltine's preference
was to Europeanise GTS. Six months later the UK government had decided instead to finance a major
part of Marots, and to use this as a bargaining chip in dealing with France and Germany over Britain's
contributions to their projects.
1109 See minutes of the 61st ELDO Council session, 21 December 1972, document ELDO/C(72)PV/7,
13 February 1973 (ELDO 1549).
1110 The minutes are ELDO/C(73)PV/3, 22 June 1973 (ELDO 1600).
1111 For an account of the interministerial discussions between France and Germany see P. Louët, "Les aspects
diplomatiques de la naissance d'Ariane, 1970-1973", in Chadeau, op cit. pp. 117-129,
at pp. 127-128.
1112 For these data see Report on the Implementation of the Decisions of the Ministerial Conference of
20 December 1972, CSE/CS(73)WP/4, 27 June 1973 (ESC 738).
1113 See his contribution in Annex 5 to the Minutes of the meeting on 12 July, CSE/CM(July 73)PV/1,
24 July 1973 (ESC 132). How wrong he was! See Proceedings of the Workshop on the History of Spacelab,
ESTEC, Noordwijk, 22-23 April 1997, Report ESA SP-411.
1114 The minutes of the meeting on 12 July 1973 are document CSE/CM(July 73)PV/1, 24 July 1973 (ESC 132).
1115 See Report on the Implementation of the Decisions of the Ministerial Conference of 20 December 1972,
CSE/CS(73)WP/4, 27 June 1973, and the UK Amendment, add. 1, 28 June 1973 (ESC 738).
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The Ministers reconvened on 31 July 1973.1116 The Spacelab deadline was just two weeks away. Crisis
was in the air. The core of the problem was Italy. Her level of commitment (an Italian contribution of as
much as 20% to Spacelab was being spoken of) had major repercussions on how her partners distributed
their available resources between the three projects. The Italian Ambassador was the first to speak — only
to regret that he was still not in a position to commit his government which was “currently having to
contend with extremely serious financial and monetary difficulties”. In the hope of breaking the ensuing
deadlock, the Italian Ambassador telephoned Rome. But no, the Italian position would indeed only be
known by mid-September. It was now or never. Hanin suspended the meeting and consulted in private
with each of the participants. His aim was to bypass the public horse-trading between them and to get
each delegation to admit in private the maximum figure which it was able to contribute. Speaking years
afterwards of the experience, the Belgian Minister for Scientific Policy and Planning described the
process in these terms:
“I had the impression that I had taken part in an extraordinary game of poker in which each player hoped
that the other would make the move that he himself did not dare make. I was also struck by the
interdependence of the three projects: the success of one depended on that of the others, each country
refusing to take part in the other's projects if theirs was not accepted. The third strong feeling that I had
was that at certain moments it is imperative that decisions be taken at any price, failing which they will
never be taken at all.”.1117 Each Minister raised his contribution as far as he could, but there will still
shortfalls on all the major programmes. Exhausted by an all-night session of bargaining and “Seized
suddenly by a strange sense of optimism, we decided that the countries which had not yet made up their
minds would cover the shortfall” (Hanin writes).1118 The agreement with the unusual budget line "Italy
and others” was signed at 5 o'clock in the morning of 1 August 1973. At that stage the percentage
contributions to the various programmes were as given in the table below:1119
Country Launcher LIIIS Spacelab MAROTS
Belgium 5.00% 4.20% 1.00%
Denmark 0.50% — —






Netherlands 1.00% 2.00% —
Spain 2.00% 2.80% —
Switzerland 1.15% 1.05% —
United Kingdom 11,25MAU 6.30% 56.00%
Italy and others 6.00% 21.10% 8.00%
*Note. Germany agreed to contribute 4 annual contributions of DM 40 million and, after re-evaluation, a further
4 x DM 40 million.
1116 The minutes of the second session are CSE/CM (July 73)PV/2, document dated 27 August 1973 (ESC 133).
1117 C. Hanin, in Chadeau, op. cit., p. 136.
1118 Hanin in Chadeau, op. cit., p. 136.
1119 From Minutes of the meeting of the Ministerial Conference held in Brussels on 31 July 1973, CSE/CM (July
73) PV/2, 27 August 1973.
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With these agreements reached a sound basis had finally laid for the next decade of Europe's space effort.
Of course a good deal of work still had to be done before the new Agency could come into being —
indeed the hope of setting it up early in 1974 was to be disappointed for a year. In the event the
convention establishing the European Space Agency and its five annexes was signed on 31 May 1975 by
representatives of ten European governments (Belgium, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany,
Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom). The story of the transition
to that Agency, and the first decade or so of its life, is told in volume II of this book.
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Chapter 12: 
US-European Cooperation in Space During the 1960s
L. Sebesta
12.1 Introduction
Euro-American relationships in space have passed through several phases. According to the ex-Director
General of ESA, Reimar Lüst, during the first, from the early 1960s to the early 1970s, the US exercised
"tutorship" of Europe. During the second, which lasted until the beginning of the mid-1980s, Europe
became America’s "junior partner" while during the third, and current, phase there has been both
"partnership and competition" 1120.
Chapters 12 and 13 will deal with the first phase, analysing the fields of cooperation and the underlying
changing patterns of cooperative policy between NASA and ESRO/ELDO from 1958 to 1973. The first
will concentrate on 1959 - 1968, while the second will deal with the opening stages of the period of
"junior partnership" which will be explored further in vol. II.
12.2 Which kind of space cooperation for the post-war period?
Space was chosen as a privileged field of international scientific cooperation as early as 1950 when, under
the inspired leadership of Lloyd Berkner1121, an institutional framework to set up an International
Geophysical Year (1957 -1958) was put in place. The IGY materialised in 1957 - 1958 and consisted of a
coordinated study of the Earth and its cosmic surroundings, involving thousands of scientists and
technicians from more than 60 nations (among which the US and the USSR). Investigations within its
framework mainly dealt with the physics of the upper atmosphere, the Earth's heat and water regime and
the Earth’s structure and shape. The first artificial satellites, among which the Soviet Sputnik, were
proposed and built to carry out some of the investigations proposed within this framework.
During the IGY, however, "there was no significant integration of national programmes involving
governmental agreement". All the national programmes were coordinated by a non-governmental
mechanism, whose main body had no supranational authority1122.
Before the end of this activity, much thought was given to the possibility of continuing the coordination
of peaceful activities in outer space. Following up the final recommendation of the Fifth General
Assembly of the IGY Committee, held in Moscow in August 1958, the International Council of Scientific
Unions (ICSU)1123 decided in October to set up a Committee of Space Research (COSPAR) on a
provisional basis. Reflecting the dual nature of ICSU, COSPAR had a mixed membership: representatives
of 18 national academies (or equivalent institutions) and of 10 international scientific unions being in the
1120 R.Lüst, "Cooperation between Europe and the US in Space", ESA Bulletin, no. 50, May 1987,
pp. 98-104.
1121 Chairman of the National Academy of Science's Space Science Board, which had a fundamental role in
devising US space international programmes: H.Newell, Beyond the Atmosphere. The Early Years of Space
Science (Washington: NASA History Series, 1980), p.120. See also: A.A. Needell, “From Military Research
to Big Science: Lloyd Berkner and the Postwar Era”, in P. Galison & B. Hevley (eds), Big Science (Stanford
University Press, 1992), pp. 290 – 311.
1122 Arnold Frutkin, International Cooperation in space (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp.18-19.
1123 Set up in 1931 to coordinate and facilitate the activities of the international scientific unions in the field of
natural sciences. National Archives, Washington DC (NAW), RG 359, box 19, Report of the Secretary-
General, ad hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, International Scientific Organizations June
16, 1959.
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Committee. All the countries having a major programme in rocket research (Australia, Canada, France,
Japan, USSR, UK and the US) were represented1124.
COSPAR's aim was "to further on an international scale the progress of all kinds of scientific
investigations which (were) carried out with the use of rockets or rocket-propelled vehicles". The
organisation, though, should "not normally concern itself with such technological problems as propulsion,
construction of rockets, guidance and control"1125. It would keep itself informed of United Nations or
other international activities in the space field and proposed itself as a forum for exchanging information
about the results attained through bilateral or multilateral cooperation. It took one year for the members to
agree on the organisation’s definite charter, which was eventually approved in November 1959. During
this time, the Soviet Academy of Sciences did not participate in the COSPAR work1126.
The effort to broaden scientific cooperation took parallel and alternative paths during the same period. In
the mid-1950s, consideration was given to the opportunity to extend the Atlantic Alliance, the military
alliance that, since 1949, linked Western Europe to the USA, beyond the purely defensive aims with
which it had been associated since its inception. The increase in cooperation in the economic, scientific
and social fields (art. 2 of the Treaty) was accordingly suggested by an official report in late 19561127.
This led to the creation, in 1958, of the NATO Science Committee, with a full-time American Science
Adviser, the brilliant nuclear physicist from Harvard, Norman Ramsey, who served as its chairman1128.
In November of the same year, speaking in front of the Fourth NATO Parliamentarian's Conference,
American Senator Henry Jackson1129 called for an appropriate response to the Sputnik lunched by the
USSR in October 1957. A shift in the balance of scientific power between the eastern and western blocs
was seen by Jackson as an essential component to upset the balance of military power in terms favourable
to the West. As a catalysing element in the quest, Jackson proposed "a satellite for peaceful outer space
research, bearing the emblem of the Atlantic Community and circling the Earth by 1960"1130.
Soon after (January 1959), the Avionics Panel of AGARD — the NATO Advisory Group for
Aeronautical Research and Development set up in 1952 under the aegis of the aeronautical engineer
Theodore von Kármán — elaborated the proposal and suggested "to make a technical review and study of
a satellite as a tool for research" in some specific areas1131.
Meanwhile, NASA was founded as an independent civil agency exercising control over the aeronautical
and space activities of the USA (except those related to military affairs). Its founding act, approved in
July 1958, adopted international cooperation as a fundamental principle of US space policy. It provided,
inter alia, that "the space activities of the United States shall be conducted so as to contribute materially
1124 Ibid.
1125 H. Massey and M.O.Robins, History of British Space Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1986), Annex 2, Charter of COSPAR, p. 449 for the citation.
1126 NASA Historical Office, Washington DC, RG 255, 64-A-664, box 1, ICSU, Ninth General Assembly, Report
of the President of the COSPAR, September 25-28 1961.
1127 The text of this proposal is in Department of State Bulletin, January 7, 1957, pp. 18-28.
1128 Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington DC (LCMD), Rabi's papers, box 25, Discussion
Meeting Report, Council of Foreign Relations, Science and Foreign Policy, November 4, 1963.
1129 Chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Applications of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the US
Congress and Chairman of the Scientific and Technical Committee of the NATO Parliamentarian's
Conference.
1130 National Air and Space Museum, Washington DC (NASM), von Kármán's papers (microfiche version - the
original collection is at the California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, Ca), box 36.10, NATO
Parliamentarians' Conference, Fourth Annual Conference, 17-21 November 1958.
1131 National Air and Space Museum, von Kármán's papers, box 35.3, Notes for national delegates meeting,
23 January 1959.
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to (...) cooperation by the United States with other nations and groups of nations in work done pursuant to
this Act and the peaceful application of the results thereof" (sec. 201)1132.
An official offer of cooperation in space was subsequently extended by NASA to the international
community through COSPAR. At the March 1959 meeting of the Committee, the National Academy of
Sciences representative (R.W. Porter, Chairman of the Space Science Board's Committee on International
Relations1133) was authorised by NASA to offer support for projects intended to orbit individual
experiments or complete satellite payloads, of mutual interest, prepared by scientists of other nations.
NASA made available launching vehicles, spacecraft, technical guidance, and laboratory support for
projects of this type. Resident research associateships at NASA were offered as well.
The idea of a "NATO satellite" was finally dismissed by the Science Committee soon after the COSPAR
meeting, in April 19591134. All the same, von Kármán and the new American Science Advisor inside the
NATO Science Committee, F. Seitz, were unconvinced. "The leading space research of scientific quality"
Seitz explained "will follow closely upon the heels of the development of military vehicles, appropriate
modifications in loading, propulsion and instrumentation being made to provide information of basic
research interest". As the development of most advanced ballistic missiles and engines would continue to
be tremendously expensive in the future, it was considered unlikely that European states, both
individually or collectively, could develop such missiles at their own expense. An independent centre for
space science, such as CERN for high energy physics, entirely financed by European funds, was
considered to be "improbable and, in fact, impracticable". Indeed, duplication between the two sides of
the Atlantic would be deplorable. What was alternatively suggested was the establishment of a NATO
agency in Western Europe resembling NASA and which could work with it in planning the utilisation for
scientific purposes of “the best missiles available for space research in the NATO family"1135.
Seitz's reflections brought to the forefront a special feature of space research, the tools and objectives of
which are partly shared by the military and science1136. Two groups were clearly facing each other on the
question of which kind of cooperation should be adopted for space. On the one hand there were those who
thought it possible for international space science to benefit from military developments and, for this
reason, rejected the idea of extending cooperation via an organisation, COSPAR, that had the USSR
among its funding members. They were "realist" enough to reject implicitly the idea of the "neutrality" of
science and, for practical purposes, saw it much more profitably linked to the existing military
cooperation. However, their realism stopped at the scientific and technical field; on the political level,
they seemed to be so naive as to think that military secrets were to be kept from the USSR, but not from
the allies.
The other group relied on the neutrality of science as a major legitimising factor of its international
character. It also made implicit reference to the need, for security reasons, to keep all military-
1132 The first director of NASA's Office of International Programs, Henry Billingsley, who, according to Frutkin's
testimony, favoured the NATO satellite idea, was soon replaced, in September 1959, by Arnold Frutkin, who
would remain for more than a decade. NASA Historical Office, RG 255, Press Release no. 59-210,
3 September 1959, Arnold Frutkin appointed NASA's Director of International Programs. Interview with Arnold
Frutkin, Washington DC, 8 November 1993 (interviewers John Logsdon and Lorenza Sebesta).
1133 The Space Science Board was established in June 1958 by the President of the National Academy of Sciences to
serve as the focus of the Academy's interests in space science, with advisory and consultative functions. Lloyd
Berkner had acted as chairman of this body from the beginning. US Aeronautics and Space Activities, January 1
to December 31, 1960 (Washington DC: United States Printing Office, 1961). See also H. Newell, op. cit, pp. 205
– 206.
1134 LCMD, Rabi's papers, box 39, AC/137-D/54, Science Committee, Memo on Space Research by the Science
Adviser (Seitz) already distributed to members of the Science Committee in the form of a letter dated
24 November 1959, 9 December 191959.
1135 Ibid.
1136 A.Frutkin, op. cit., p.5.
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technological information linked to space (those related to launcher and spy satellites, for example) safe
from international intervention. Last but not least, there was a widespread fear that "a Western
cooperative effort based on NATO would be divisive, risking the effect of a Russian countervailing action
in the establishment of an Iron Curtain cooperative effort"1137. If science were neutral, it had to be shared
with everyone, not in a politically-oriented organisation such as NATO. If information related to military-
oriented space technology were a national prerogative, it should be shared neither with the USSR nor with
NATO allies. Space cooperation could not change this basic fact.
Supporters of this second group were to be found among scientists and politicians (coming from the State
Department and NASA1138) who struggled vigorously, in view of different interests, for the same aim.
They were the people who conceived and managed US cooperative space policy in the entire post-war
period.
Their efforts produced a hybrid, whereby the intellectual and geographical scope of cooperation in space
was somehow artificially limited. First of all, cooperation was reduced to its purely scientific aspects
(even if the difficulty of drawing the line between civilian and military projects was always recognised at
a more general level1139), i.e. those experiments with no military or commercial relevance. On the other
hand, cooperation was formally offered within an international forum, COSPAR, where the Soviets were
theoretically, if not physically present. Inevitably, as happened even more forcefully in 1947 with the
Marshall Plan, in practice the offer took a "Western" flavour and materialised in a series of US-European
bilateral agreements - coupled with some arrangements favouring under-developed countries.
12.3 The original rationale for space cooperation in Europe.
US-European cooperation in space had its origins in the aftermath of the "Sputnik crisis" and was conceived
by the USA as part of a larger space strategy to recover from the loss of prestige linked to that event. This
strategy had two pillars:
1. staying ahead of the USSR in areas which had a special military or symbolic value (ICBM, ABM and
Apollo mission); reaching with them an informal agreement on the acceptability of reconnaissance
through satellites and agreeing on some minor goodwill cooperative ventures in civilian space1140;
2. "demonstrating and reaffirming"1141 US political leadership among its allies by engaging them in
cooperative ventures in which the US served mainly as the provider of launching facilities, the most
technologically sophisticated space devices. Granting launching services should demonstrate, at a low
price, the US benevolence and advance with regards to her European counterparts and, at the very least,
were to symbolise the benefits of a technologically-oriented democratic society 1142.
1137 NASA Historical Office, RG 255, 64-A-664, box 4, Frutkin Memorandum for the file, 1 December 1959.
1138 For the State Department position, see Theodore von Kármán with Lee Edson, The Wind and Beyond: Theodore
von Kármán, Pioneer in Aviation and Pathfinder in Space (Boston: Little, Brown and Co, 1967), pp. 323-339;
and this volume, Chapter 1.For references to NASA's strong opposition to the idea set forth by Senator Jackson,
see Arnold Frutkin inverview (cf Note 1132).
1139 See, for example, RG 255, 64-A-664, b.3, Frutkin Memorandum for the file, 23 May 1960.
1140 A bilateral Space Agreement was signed in 1962 by NASA and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, involving
the coordinated launching of meteorological satellites, the exchange of data from these satellites and the program
to map the magnetic fields of the Earth by means of coordinated launching of geomagnetic satellites and related
ground observations; it was implemented by a second Memorandum of Understanding approved by the two
organisations on November 5, 1964. National Aeronautic and Space Council, U.S. Aeronautics and Space
Activities, 1968 (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, n.d.).
1141 K. Pedersen, "Thoughts on international space cooperation and interests in the post-cold war world", Space
Policy, August 1992, p. 207.
1142 For this last concept, R. Colino, "The US Space Program. An International Viewpoint", International Security,
Spring 1987, vol. 11, n.4, p. 159. See also S.M. Shaffer and L. Robock Shaffer, The Politics of International
Cooperation: A Comparison of the US Experience in space and in security, vol. 17, book 4, Monograph Series in
World Affairs (Denver: Univ. of Denver, 1980).
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Political willingness, though, had to be coupled with technical and scientific soundness, which was to be the
basic criterion for an appropriate cooperative venture. Arnold Frutkin, the main author and executor of
NASA cooperative policy, refers to it as reflecting "conservative values"1143. Speaking in front of the newly
created Subcommittee on International Cooperation in Science and Space1144, he clarified in 1971 the
guidelines that had inspired NASA's effort during the previous decade.
1. To "work on a project-by-project basis rather than on the basis of generalised program agreements".
Following a well-established national tradition in scientific research, cooperation should not be
institutionalised, but approved on the basis of projects presented and executed by scientists
individually.1145 More to the point, one could not but notice the enormous difference in absolute terms
of the space expenditure in the USA and Europe taken as a whole, these last being but a small fraction
of the first. Europe could not be considered an equal partner and, thus, the USA could not commit itself
to a real partnership, but to a cooperation limited in scope and time 1146.
2. To judge the soundness of a project on the basis of its "scientific or technical validity". "We appreciate"
Frutkin added "the intangible values of international cooperation, but we believe they are best served by
projects valid in themselves";
3. To ask real contributions by everyone involved; a project, in other words, should be valuable for all its
participants, with mutual benefits, even if not always in kind;
4. Each nation had to fund it own activities; there would be no "give-away", thus no exchange of funds.
This concept of cooperation not only fitted in the more general American strategy for space policy, but
perfectly suited the European space philosophy as originally set out in the preliminary stage of ESRO and
ELDO. It was a space philosophy that emerged from economic contingencies, from a straightforward
political willingness to leave military affairs out of any cooperative venture, from a yet unsettled judgement
1143 A.Frutkin, op. cit., p.32; see also S.Shaffer and L.Robock Shaffer, op. cit., p. 49.
1144 Created by the Chairman of the Committee on Science and Astronautics, House of Representatives, George
P.Miller (California) in Spring 1971 "in view of the increasing interest in and activity on the international scene in
space, and in science generally, and because there appear to be excellent opportunities in the years just ahead for
our Nation to enter into more extensive cooperative ventures in many of these fields". Opening speech by Fuqua,
Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Cooperation in Science and Space of the Committee on
Science and Astronautics, US House of Representatives, 92nd Congr., 1st Sess.,
May 18-19-20, 1971, A General Review of International Cooperation in Science and Space, US Government
Printing Office, Washington, 1971, p.1. The Subcommittee consisted of Don Fuqua (Florida), Chairman, John W.
Davis, Robert A.Roe, William R. Cotter, Morgan F. Murphy, Mendel J.Davis, James G.Fulton, Charles A.
Mosher, Alphonzo Bell, Larry Winn jr. On its creation, see Ken Hechler, Toward the endless frontier. History of
the Committee on Science and Technology, 1959-79 (Washington DC: US GPO, 1980), pp. 398-399.
1145 For this as being a fundamental characteristic of American research policy as opposed to the European one,
where research tend to be institutionalised, i.e. entirely entrusted to universities. J.-J.Salomon, General
Introduction, in G.Caty, G.Drilhon, G.Ferné, J-J.Salomon and S.Wald, The research system. Comparative Survey
of the Organisation and Financing of Fundamental Research, vol.I (Paris: OECD, 1972), pp. 20-21
1146 These were but a confirmation of the views already expressed in 1965 in Frutkin’s book on cooperation, where he
wrote: "Valuable individual and specific technical exchanges and cooperation may be had, together with valuable
political impact, but no large-scale sharing of major research and development programs is yet in view".
A. Frutkin, op. cit. p.141.
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about the soundness of high technology industrial cooperation, and from some entrenched European cultural
traditions, best embodied in one of the founding fathers of the European space organisations, Edoardo
Amaldi1147. For him, space research should not touch upon anything that could be connected with "interest",
military first of all. It was the dominant concept of science at the time, well entrenched in western scientific
culture, that had its adherents, as we have seen, in both the USA and Europe. Few were the European
voices, among the scientists as well as the administrators of science (Blackett, Snow and Salomon, just to
cite a few names), which, on the basis of the world war II experiences, begun to challenge something which
had been considered for a long time a permanent assumption1148.
12.4 How US-European space cooperation was put into practice
America’s official offer, which had been preceded in some cases by contacts outside diplomatic
channels1149, was followed by a series of bilateral memoranda of understanding with western allies.
Cooperation covered various fields which can be broadly divided into:
1. space segment cooperation -including foreign contributions to US projects and reimbursable launches of
foreign satellites;
2. tracking, telemetry and command duties;
3. ground based cooperation in data reception1150.
Attention will be devoted, above all, to cooperation within the space segment, which represented the field in
which the majority of cooperative agreements were signed throughout the 1960s. We will refer primarily to
the bilateral agreements signed with Great Britain, France, Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany that,
even if not covering all agreements signed by the USA with European countries, were the most conspicuous
from a financial point of view.
It must be remembered that, along with the major cooperative ventures described here, these countries were
offered, and accepted, from 1962, the opportunity to launch national experiments in NASA scientific
programmes, such as the orbiting solar observatories or the Polar Orbiting Geophysical Observatory
(POGO), where COPERS functioned as an administrative filter between NASA and the national teams of
experimenters.
A) The first satellites built under this programme were prepared by the UK and Canada. The UK satellite, S-
51 or UK-Q (later named Ariel I), the world's first international satellite, carried devices to study electron
temperatures and concentrations in the ionosphere, and instruments to determine electron densities in the
vicinity of the satellite, to measure solar radiation and correlate it with ionospheric phenomena, and to
observe primary cosmic rays and study their interactions with the Earth’s magnetic field. The choice of
these experiments was based on previous experience with British Skylark rockets1151. The selection was
made by scientists of the UK "in consultation" with NASA counterparts. Devices were built by UK
scientists, who were responsible for data analysis. NASA designed, fabricated and tested the prototype
and flight models. A joint US-British working group was set up after the signature of the exchange of
1147 This volume, Chapter 1.
1148 The conceptualisation, in critical terms, of the "scientist-gadgeteer" (he who is fascinated essentially by his tools
and researches) and the political dangers of this position is skillfully outlined by C.P. Snow in his famous 1962
booklet on Science and Government.
1149 NASA Historical Office, RG 255, 64-A-664, Frutkin Memorandum for the file, 3 August 1960. Frutkin makes
reference to the cases of Great Britain and Italy.
1150 S. Shaffer and L. Robock Shaffer, op. cit., p. 19.
1151 NASA Historical Office, RG 255, 64-A-508, box 1, Conference Report, Discussion on 20 January 1960 of the
proposed British experiments to be flown on the Scout vehicle, 20 January 1960.
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notes in September 1961 and met regularly in order to solve technical problems in design and test
requirements1152.
After Ariel I was launched from Cape Canaveral on 26 April 1962 with a Thor-Delta rocket, work went
forward in 1962 on a second joint satellite, S-52 (later named Ariel II) and discussions continued on
definition of the experimentation for a third satellite, S-53, to be engineered, built and tested entirely in
the United Kingdom, that would eventually deliver a flight-qualified spacecraft to the launching site.
Ariel II, still a US-built spacecraft, was to regularly transmit data on galactic radio noise, vertical
distribution of ozone, and micrometeoroid flux. By the end of the 1970s, the number of Ariels developed
cooperatively would be six 1153.
In 1962, Vice President Lyndon Johnson and Italian Foreign Minister Attilio Piccioni exchanged notes in
Rome to confirm the establishment of the joint NASA-Italian Space Committee project San Marco. The
project was divided into three phases and was to culminate with the launching of an Italian satellite into
equatorial orbit from a towable platform off the cost of Kenya, to be built by the Italians. San Marco's
main objective was to determine the local density of the upper atmosphere in the equatorial planes.
Italian engineers began training related to the project and took operational assignments at NASA field
centres. Phase I of the project, as usual in this type of project, required first the sounding rocket test of
satellite components, i.e. of the atmospheric drag balance mechanism, the heart of the San Marco
spacecraft. It took place, as scheduled, at Wallops Island on 20 April 1963. As the test was only partially
successful, (the rocket's despin mechanism failed to operate properly, preventing a true test of the
sensitivity of the balance), it was rescheduled for late summer. The new, successful, flight test was
conducted on 3 August 1963 on a Shotput sounding rocket launched at the same range by an Italian
crew. After the testing of the operational state of the towable ocean-going platform, by launching
sounding rockets from it in coastal waters off Kenya in March 1964, Phase II of the cooperative venture
took place in December 1964. An Italian crew launched the first San Marco-1 satellite on a Scout vehicle
from Wallops Island. The three-phase scientific venture culminated less than three years later with the
launch of San Marco-2 from the towable floating Italian platform. This launching-site was later used by
NASA, on a reimbursable basis, for the launch of its own rockets1154.
After a first programmatic agreement between NASA and the Comité de la recherche spatiale in March
1961, NASA agreed, in February 1963, to cooperate with the newly-born CNES (the French National
Centre for Space Studies),in a programme for launching French very low frequency (VLF) experiments
on Aerobee sounding rockets from Wallops Island in 1963. This was to be followed by the launching of
a VLF satellite if these rocket flights should demonstrate its feasibility. FR-1, the first satellite launched
in cooperation with France, was duly placed in orbit on December 6, 1965, to provide data on very low
frequency electromagnetic wave propagation. Although it was only planned to send data over a three
months period, the design lifetime of the spacecraft, this only failed to respond to commands 33 months
later, in August 1968. A second satellite, FR-2, was planned for launching by NASA at the beginning of
the 1970s.
On the other hand, in a unique reversal of roles, in 1963 NASA made plans to fly US payloads on French
rockets from a French range, Hammaguir, in Algeria. These launches were devised to carry joint
experiments from the Goddard Space Flight Center and CNES, to measure simultaneously electron and
ion temperatures in the upper atmosphere. The launchings took place in 1964: instrumentation prepared
1152 US Aeronautics and Space Activities, 1961, (Washington DC, US Government Printing Office, 1962),
pp.26-27.
1153 H.Massey and M.O.Robins, op. cit., chap.5. See also US Aeronautics and Space Activities, 1961
cit. pp. 26-27; Report of the Projects and Progress of the NASA for the period of January 1, 1963 through June
30, 1963 (Washington DC: US GPO, 1964), p.134;
1154 Reports of the Projects and Progress of the NASA for the period July 1 through December 31, 1962 (Washington
DC: US GPO, 1963), p. 144. See also G.Caprara, L'Italia nello spazio. Storia, realizzazioni e programmi della
ricerca spaziale italiana (Milano:Valerio Levi, 1992), chaps 2 and 3
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by the Goddard Space Flight Center was launched on two Dragon and two Centaure rockets supplied by
CNES1155.
On the basis of a general offer extended by a NASA team travelling in Europe in 1965, discussions
began between NASA's administrator and the German Minister of Scientific Research, Stoltenberg, in
Bonn in September 1966. The aim was to undertake a cooperative solar probe project, Project Helios, by
far the most ambitious US-German collaborative venture1156. In June 1967 a formal written proposal was
received by NASA from the German Ministry. This became the basis for a two-year comprehensive
study by the Joint Mission Definition Group. The group's final report in April 1969 led to the signing of
a Memorandum of Understanding in June of the same year. Project Helios provided for the launching of
two German-built probes to within 45 million kilometres of the Sun. The Helios solar spacecraft were
designed to contribute to an understanding of solar processes and solar-terrestrial relationships. The FRG
designed, manufactured and integrated the two spacecraft, provided seven out of the ten experiments, the
rest being American, operated and controlled the spacecraft from a German control centre and provided
data to all the experimenters. NASA provided two advanced launch vehicles, and the use of its deep-
space network to support the mission. Helios-A was placed in heliocentric orbit by a Titan III/Centaur
rocket on 10 December 1974; it was followed by Helios-B on 15 January 1976. The interesting feature of
the Helios project was that the construction of the spacecraft imposed technical requirements of an
advanced character on German industry, particularly for the development of the on-board power system
and thermal controls. On-board data-processing systems also had to be highly sophisticated. Scientific
payloads had to be supplemented by a large group of experimenters, representing 12 universities and
government laboratories in Germany, the US, Italy and Australia1157.
Contacts between NASA and European representatives as a single negotiating agent were taken since the
times of the ESRO Preparatory Commission. After discussions held in Washington (December 1963)
and Paris (January 1964), Europeans submitted two satellite projects to their NASA counterparts. Soon
after the birth of ESRO (March 1964), a memorandum of understanding was signed by Auger and
Dryden on behalf, of ESRO and NASA (July 1964) concerning the preparation, launch and use of
ESRO's first two small non-stabilised satellites, ESRO-I and ESRO-II. The two satellites would be
launched with a Scout rocket, free of charge as a "christening gift" for ESRO1158. In exchange for the
launchings, it was agreed that scientific results obtained from these satellites would be shared between
the two parties1159.
Responsibilities for the projects were divided between the agencies as follows:
1155 NASA News, no. 63-49, March 11, 1963;The Tenth Semi-annual Report by the NASA for the Period July 1 to
December 31, 1963, cit, p. 154; United States Aeronautics and Space Activities, 1964 (Washington DC: US
Government Printing Office, no date), p.38; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division (LCMD),
Paine Papers, box 33, Summaries of European space activities, prepared for Paine on his
European visit 3-16 June 1969.
1156 The previous cooperative programme agreement was signed in July 1965. It consisted, as was usually the case, of
a two-phase project, the first phase consisting of a series of sounding rocket launchings designed to check out the
German satellite (GRS-A, later called Azur) instrumentation and the launching of the satellite intended to
perform an integrated study of the spectra and fluxes of energetic particles in the Earth's inner radiation belts;
LCMD, Paine Papers, box 34, NASA press kit, release 69-146, 2 November 1969. In general,
see A. Frutkin, "International Cooperation in Space", Science, vol. 169, no.3943, July 1970, p.336.
1157 A General Review of International Cooperation in Science and Space, Hearings before the Subcommittee on
International Cooperation in Science and Space of the Committee on Science and Astronautics, US House of
Representatives, May 18 to 20, 1971 (Washington DC: US GPO, 1971) p.86. LCMD, Paine Papers, box 25,
Memorandum Frutkin to Paine on Cooperative solar probe project with the Ministry for Scientific Research,
Federal Republic of Germany (Project Helios), 23 May 1969. See also, J.Krige and L.Sebesta, US-European
Cooperation in Space in the decade after Sputnik, in G. Gemelli (ed.), Intellectual Cooperation in Large-Scale
Cultural and Technical Systems (Bologna: Kluwer, 1994) pp. 268-285..
1158 ESRO/25, 18 July 191964.
1159 M. Bourély, "The Legal Hazards of Transatlantic Cooperation in Space", Space Research, November 1990,
p.325.
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• ESRO would provide the experimental instrumentation; design, construct and test the spacecraft;
provide ground checkout and launch support equipment; track and acquire data from the spacecraft
within the capability of its projected network; and reduce and analyse all data.
• NASA would train ESRO personnel as mutually determined, provide the Scout launching vehicles and
conduct launching operations. NASA would also provide necessary supplemental tracking and data
acquisition support1160.
Two years later, while there was intense discussion about the opportunity to carry on the building of an
autonomous European launcher, NASA and ESRO signed a Memorandum of Understanding
(30 December 1966) whereby NASA would carry out, against reimbursement, the launching of future
ESRO scientific satellites and provide initial tracking and reception of telemetry data from these
spacecraft.1161. The drafting of the definitive text was slowed down by one major divergence. It
concerned the availability of raw data coming from European satellites launched by NASA: NASA
insisted on its right of access to data without reservation, agreeing to provide guarantees about the use (in
publications) of such material in order not to compromise the intellectual property rights of ESRO and its
experimenters. European scientists reminded US negotiators in strong terms that it was normal scientific
practice for such data to be made available only upon request1162. Finding the proposed clause to be in
conflict with the principles of intellectual property rights, their reaction went from "the deep concern"
expressed by the German delegate, to the description of the US wording as unacceptable (the French
delegate). The only different opinion came from the UK, which had experienced the liberal rights of
access granted by NASA to the data received from US satellites by the American tracking station in
Great Britain (Winkfield). To this, the French retorted that this was neither an agreement on a telemetry
station, nor an agreement of cooperation, relating more appropriately to the purchase of launching
vehicles and associated services1163.
As had been made clear since the Autumn of 1966, NASA’s inflexibility was based not so much on
scientific or intellectual principles, but on questions of national security - NASA should "be in a position
to reply to any question about its activities for ESRO"1164 - and, more precisely, as was made clear by
NASA's administrator Webb, satisfy concerns about the Agency's ability "to be in a position to report to
Congress and the people that it does, in principle, have full access to data acquired by any satellite
launched from United States' territory"1165.
The problem was solved by producing a text that, though complying with American wishes, satisfied
European desires that data should be provided only "upon request" and gave sufficient safeguards for the
intellectual property rights of ESRO and its experimenters - the period of protection of priority rights of
experimenters being identified with that in (then) current ESRO practice (see art. IV c. of the
Memorandum of Understanding).
Another point of conflict, NASA's liability in case of failure of a launch - the case in point was ESRO’s
accountability as regards reimbursement to NASA of costs resulting from damage to or loss of a
vehicle -, was solved by charging ESRO with financial responsibility in connection with and during
preparation (not the launch) for an agreed launch, thereby restricting the field of ESRO responsibility
(see art.III of the Memorandum of Understanding) 1166.
1160 NASA News, no. 64-178, July 22, 1964.
1161 ESRO/CERS Bulletin, no.1, 1967, p.23; see also M.Bourély, art. cit., p. 325.
1162 ESRO/ST/MIN/10, 6 July 1966, Draft Summary Minutes of ESRO Scientific and Technical Committee.
1163 For the German reaction, see ESRO/C/MIN/14, 20 January 1967, p.35; for the French and British views,
ESRO/C/MIN/12, 21 November 1966 p.11.
1164 ESRO/C/233, Note by the Secretariat, 14 November 1966.
1165 ESRO/C/233, Memorandum of Understanding with NASA concerning the furnishing of satellite launching and
associated services, Note by the Secretariat, 14 November 1966.
1166 ESRO/C/MIN/12, 21 November 1966, p.19; for the exact meaning of the very confused article, ESRO/C/233,
Memorandum of understanding with NASA concerning the furnishing of satellite launching and associated
services, Note by the Secretariat 14 November 1966.
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In 1968, after almost five years of active cooperation, NASA launched three ESRO satellites. ESRO II
(renamed Iris after the launch), designed for the integrated study of cosmic rays and solar radiation, was
launched from the Eastern Test Range in May; ESRO-I (renamed Aurorae) which was launched in
October from the Western Test Range, continued to study high-latitude energetic particles and their
effects on the ionosphere. It was designed and built in Europe and carried eight experiments from
Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the UK to study the Aurora Borealis and related phenomena in the polar
ionosphere. Both satellites were launched by Scout vehicles. In December, the Highly Eccentric Orbit
Satellite (HEOS-A, then renamed HEOS-I) was launched from Cape Kennedy on a Thor-Delta vehicle
for a study of interplanetary physics - plasma, magnetic fields and cosmic rays. This last one was
launched following the new rules set out by the 1966 Memorandum of understanding; it was the first
foreign satellite to be launched by NASA on a reimbursable basis1167.
B) NASA's cooperation focused from the beginning on scientific investigations with sounding rockets. They
were a relatively cheap and uncomplicated method to get valuable information about the Earth's
atmospheric envelope and its near-space environment and to test proposed satellite instrumentation and
to verify the performance of the proposed experiments.
The first of these launches took place in Italy, in 1961 and involved the emission of sodium vapour
clouds for a measurement of winds and temperatures in the high atmosphere. Bilateral contacts
materialising in launching of sounding rockets were held with France, Norway, Denmark, the Federal
Republic of Germany, the UK and Sweden (as far as Europe is concerned); their aim was to investigate
the ionosphere, the upper atmosphere, and the geomagnetic and auroral phenomena1168.
C) Tracking and data acquisition systems were also developed from 1959 onwards. Generally speaking,
these stations were specialised in tracking the satellites, both during and after the launch; receiving
telemetry data back from the satellites, providing information on their performance and status; and
transmitting commands when necessary to change the position of the satellites or to initiate onboard
activities.
During 1959, the Minitrack system (composed of 10-station Minitrack Earth satellite network),
established for the IGY for tracking Earth satellites, began to be expanded to high-latitude coverage and
to be placed on a more permanent basis. A network of deep-space stations, to provide communications
with and control of, spacecraft orbiting at lunar and planetary distances, was begun. It consisted of
ground tracking stations spaced at intervals of approximately 120 degrees longitude around the world in
California, Australia, Spain and South Africa (together with a control centre located at the Jet Propulsion
laboratory, Pasadena, California) 1169.
The European ground segment consisted at first of the Redu tracking station (in Belgium) and the control
centre at ESTEC, at Noordwijk in the Netherlands. To extend the tracking network, the stations at
Fairbanks, Alaska (USA), Spitzbergen (Norway) and in the Falkland Islands (UK) were added, while the
European Space Operations Centre, ESOC, in Darmstadt, FRG, became fully operational in 19681170.
The ESRO polar telemetry, command and tracking station at Fairbanks, Alaska, was established in
November 1966, by exchange of notes between ESRO and NASA1171. Major discussions focused on the
question of access and use of the raw data received by ESRO from its satellites within this station. They
paralleled those taking place at the same time with respect to the Memorandum of Understanding on the
furnishing of launching and associated services and were solved by the wording of the relevant article,
which was very similar to the one described above.
1167 US Aeronautics and Space Activities, 1968, cit., pp.4 and 31. For the other ESRO satellites launched by NASA in
1972 and for a detailed description of the first ESRO scientific satellites, see this volume, Chapter 5.
1168 US Aeronautics and Space Activities, 1961, p.27, A. Frutkin, op. cit. pp 51-59.
1169 US Aeronautics and Space Activities, 1965, p.40.
1170 B. Lacoste, Europe: Stepping Stones to Space (Bedfordshire: Orbic, 1990), p. 53.
1171 LCMD, Paine Papers, box 33, European space activities, Paper prepared for Paine’s European visit,
3-16 June 1969. See also G. van Reeth and K. Madders, "Reflections on the quest for international cooperation",
Space Policy, August 1992, p.223.
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D) Exchange of technical and scientific information between ESRO, ELDO and NASA was formalised with
an exchange of letters in May 1964. Following a generalised concern that has always been at the core of
scientific cooperation since the beginning of the twentieth century, a big effort was given to the
improvement of the circulation of information1172. This led, among other activities, to the establishment
of a joint ESRO/ELDO Space Documentation Service (SDS) to cover both space research and space
technology; exchanges of information with the NASA Information System were begun. NASA STAR
(Scientific and Technical Aerospace Reports) and IAA (International Aerospace Abstracts) databanks
were maintained by SDS. This single databank, still functioning today, has been continuously updated by
American and European partners1173.
E) Personnel exchanges, training programmes and NASA International University fellowships in space
science were initiated in 1961 while NASA Post-doctoral and Senior Resident research associateships
had already been set up in 19591174.
F) A programme of ground-based cooperation in data reception was organised in relation to a number of
experimental and operational application satellite projects. Some of the most interesting experiments
took place in the field of telecommunications. Ground terminals were built in the 1960s in the UK,
France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and Spain for experiments in overseas television,
telephone and telegraph transmissions via satellite. Echo I, the first passive telecommunication satellite,
reflected radio waves from transmitters in the USA to receiving stations in Europe in 1960. With the
cooperation of French and British facilities, the experiment resulted in the first transatlantic real-time
communications by means of an artificial satellite1175. In July 1962 the first live television pictures were
relayed by Telstar to Europe. In 1963, Syncom II, the first experimental geosynchronous satellite, was
launched. In 1965, a transatlantic commercial communications service was established, using Early Bird
(later renamed Intelsat I)1176. While a sizeable ground station network was in existence throughout
Europe, by the end of the 1960s, the whole space segment was provided by the USA1177.
Beginning in 1959, another extensive ground-support programme was organised jointly in the field of
meteorology. The USA played a leading role in bringing to the attention of the World Meteorological
Organisation (WMO) the operational and research potentialities of satellites and declared their willingness
to share the benefits that could come from such a use. Meteorological satellites of the Nimbus and Tiros
type were developed by NASA (to which Tiros was transferred from April 1959 by the Department of
Defense1178) in order to survey and transmit to the ground information about cloud coverage of the globe in
order to improve weather forecasting. An extensive network of weather satellite cooperation was established
by NASA and the US Weather Bureau following the successful operation in 1960 of Tiros-1, the first US
1172 J-J. Salomon, Science et Politique (Paris: Ed. du Seuil, 1970), p. 325.
1173 M. Bourély, "The legal hazards of transatlantic cooperation in space", Space Research, November 1990, p.325.
1174 US Aeronautics and Space Activities 1968, cit. and A. Frutkin, op. cit, Table V.
1175 US Aeronautics and Space Activities 1961, cit. p. 27 and this volume, Chapters 9 and 10.
1176 Pleumeur Bodou no. 1 (France), Raisting (FRG), Goonhilly Downs (UK) and the small station at Fucino
(Italy) were used from 1965 for commercial service via Early Bird. Spain was also active in the second half
of the 1960s in the establishment of satellite earth-stations. A detailed report on the status of the 51 stations
operating around the World by the end of 1970 is given in Hearings of the Committee on Science and
Astronautics, US House of Representatives, 18 to 20 May 1971 (Washington DC, US GPO, 1971).
1177 In order to coordinate the European position in negotiations on the future Intelsat agreement and to promote
European programmes in the field, a European Conference for Satellite Communications (CETS) had been
established by European countries in 1963. A. Russo, op. cit., pp 16-21. See also CSE/CM
(July 1967) 9, Report of Director General of ESRO. Present state of development of the European Space
Research Organisation and proposals for its activities during the period 1968 – 1975, 23 June 1967.
1178 US Aeronautics and Space Activities, January 1 to December 31, 1959, (Washington DC: US GPO, no date),
p.vi.
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weather satellite. "Tiros-1 could only take pictures by day of zones of non-extreme latitudes. But experts
were amazed to see the photo-mosaic of pictures taken 720 km out in space. Through its tiny TV cameras,
Tiros-1 carried the human eye into space so that man for the first time saw clouds from above, riding the
backs of invisible winds, the key to global weather systems" 1179. Tiros not only showed the complexities of
weather systems with a clarity never seen before, but it revealed previously unknown phenomena. More
Tiros satellites followed, with improved cameras, longer lifetimes and increasing applications to weather
forecasting. European and Extra-European nations agreed to conduct special observations of weather
phenomena, to be coordinated with the cloud-cover photographs made by Tiros-2 and subsequent
meteorological satellites1180.
The WMO pushed ahead with its plans for a world weather system, while invitations to European and other
countries were extended in 1963 to participate in tests of the Automatic Picture Transmission (APT)
Systems. The incorporation on subsequent US polar orbiters of the APT system made it possible to receive
local cloud-cover images anywhere in the world using ground equipment costing only a few thousand
dollars. Any station with a relatively inexpensive receiver might receive these pictures when the satellite
was overhead1181.
12.5 Changing political and technological frameworks
The 1960s was a period of great political, social and economic development for Europe. Governments had
overcome the phase of post-war economic recovery and reached internal political stabilisation by the mid-
1950s. They were experiencing economic growth (of production and markets) and a parallel willingness to
recover at least part of their pre-war international political assertiveness. Technology had acquired a central
importance in this endeavour1182.
The growing attention to technology as an important factor in the economic growth was mainly channelled
into and institutionalised by OECD. The Freeman and Young study published in 1965 marked the official
recognition of the problem by the organisation and functioned as a major element in rising American
interest in European disaffection. Related to 1962 data - and, thus, still linked to old "national" statistics1183 -
the study referred to the US-European disparity in resources devoted to R and D. It quantified it in terms of
the amount of R and D in dollars, in manpower and in patent rights and concentrated on the dominant
position of US firms in research-intensive industrial areas such as aircraft, vehicles, electronic and non-
electronic machinery, chemicals. These were the same firms that were exporting their capital , but not their
know-how, towards Europe in the 1960s1184.
Some of the conclusions of the study are worthwhile citing: "(...) the existence of a major difference in the
resources committed to research between two countries or areas" the authors said "does not necessarily
mean that policy should be directed towards its reduction. Circumstances are different in every country, and
so are policy objectives. Military, economic and welfare aims will all influence the allocation of resources to
research and development, as well as more direct scientific considerations. The balance and the priorities in
any one country will depend to a large extent on political decisions. The available resources, especially in
scientific manpower, will often be the limiting factor. Some countries, especially smaller ones, will
inevitably be obliged to concentrate their effort on a limited number of fields and cannot hope to compete in
1179 For the citation, see B. Lacoste, op. cit., pp. 59-60.
1180 US Aeronautics and Space Activities, 1961, cit. p.27 and A. Frutkin, op. cit., Table IV.
1181 R. Barnes,"A useful though incomplete primer", review of J.Johnson-Freese's book, Space Policy, August 1991,
p. 273.
1182 This is not the place to elaborate on the relationship between technology and political assertiveness; autonomy in
the security field is an essential element in it.
1183 In June 1963, the Frascati Conference of experts from member countries of the OECD adopted a manual for
"Standard Practice for Surveys of Research and Development", providing for the first time an agreed basis for
international comparisons in the field.
1184 A. Grosser, Les Occidenteaux: les pays d'Europe et les Etats Unis depuis la guerre, 1944-1977 (Paris: Fayard,
1978), pp278-279.
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some very expensive fields of research and development, except in association with a larger group of
countries, or through international organisations. (...) The most rapid and widespread dissemination of new
knowledge is the fundamental interest of all countries and any policy aimed at limiting this flow or
substituting a kind of scientific "autarchy" would damage the prospects of all"1185.
At the same time, the 1960s experienced not only a quantitative growth in the interest in space science and
technology, but a progressive, though indecisive, reorientation of European interest away from "pure" space
science toward a kind of activity linked not only to military but also to commercial interests, especially in
the field of satellites. This trend was coupled with a greater sophistication in the research itself (from
balloons to rockets, from non-stabilised to attitude-controlled rockets, from small non-stabilised satellites to
medium-stabilised satellites) and, thus, with rising costs.
Space developments, however, had been almost entirely "the preserve of the US and Russia" since the war.
Nowhere else had the requirements been sufficient to support firms exclusively or even largely engaged in
space technology. The smallness of national and international programmes and the uncertainty which had
characterised their development had not created, generally speaking, a propitious climate for growth in
Europe 1186. France, under the energetic leadership of de Gaulle, had been the only case in which the state, in
the framework of an independent security policy and within a generalised interest for a new public policy
for research, had intervened to support both the research and the productive sector linked to space
activities1187.
This progressively led Europeans to a double concern.
• Technological gaps that had arisen between Europe and the USA since the 1950s were becoming more
pronounced "putting Europe in a position where it (would) be impossible to catch up technologically if
decisions (were) not taken soon". This stemmed from various factors, above all the lack of leading edge
basic research in such fields as high-energy physics, electronics and special alloys, where military
financing, in some cases used for space-related devices, had been abundant in the USA. In addition, the
existence of huge space programmes (like Apollo) had led to an expansion of the field of systems
engineering-management, while the absence of such major programmes - and the political restrictions
imposed on the main one, i.e. ELDO - had impeded European training in this field. Nor had Intelsat
given any impetus to European knowledge, because within its framework European industries could
only work as subcontractors to American companies 1188.
• On the other hand, the growing importance of communication satellites forced Europeans to think about
launchers not only as means to send small or larger scientific spacecraft into low orbit, but as a means to
place heavy commercial spacecraft in geostationary orbit. Europeans had two choices: a) improve
qualitatively and quantitatively their own original ELDO launcher, Europa I; or b)  rely on the
availability of American launchers, inside the framework of Intelsat. In this context, collaboration
between Europe and the USA in the second half of the 1960s progressively came to be viewed by the
Europeans, as we shall soon see, as one answer to these concerns.
1185 C.Freeman and A.Young, The Research and Development Effort. Western Europe, North America and the Soviet
Union. An Experimental International Comparison of Research Expenditures and manpower in 1961 (Paris:
OECD, 1965), p.70.
1186 CSE/CM (July 1967) 9; cit. in footnote 11778.
1187 L. Sebesta, “La science, instrument politique de securité nationale? L’espace, la France et l’Europe, 1957 –
1962”, Revue d’histoire diplomatique, no.4, 1992, pp. 313 to 341.
1188 Project management was all the more important because in the mid-1960s it began to be used extensively in
public policy projects, such as the construction of motorways and other infrastructures. For the citations, see
CSE/CM(July 1967) 6, June 30, 1967, Report by the chairman of the ad hoc working group on programmes
(May 30, 1967).
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In April 1965, during his visit to Paris, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko accused the USA of using
international scientific cooperation as a vehicle for domination and the brain drain and opened prospects for
a technological alliance with Europe. French President de Gaulle echoed Soviet proposals, encouraging
possible multiplication of scientific and technical contacts with the USSR. In the summer of 1966, these
gestures materialised in the signature of a series of bilateral agreements between the two countries,
including a space research agreement envisaging the launching of a French Earth satellite by the Soviet
Union and cooperation in the field of weather and communication satellites1189.
From 1965 to 1967, British Prime Minister Wilson, German Federal Chancellor Erhard, Belgian Prime
Minister Pierre Harmel and Italian Foreign Minister Amintore Fanfani took formal and informal actions to
counteract the French proposal with ideas of a much more Atlantic flavour. In particular Fanfani, in a
proposal delivered to Secretary of State Rusk in September 1965, suggested the creation of a 10-year
"technological Marshall Plan" for Europe, while Harmel, in a private talk with Donald Horning (Special
Assistant to the President for Science and Technology and Director of the Office of Science and
Technology, 1964-1969), referred in strong terms to the technological gap as being a major problem in
transatlantic relationships1190.During a following visit, Harmel handed over to Horning a note in which two
alternative courses for future European action were stated:
1. an autonomous one, which Harmel referred to as sponsored by the French;
2. an intensification of the Atlantic partnership, which was offered as the only viable (Belgian) alternative
to the previous one.
During this meeting, Harmel stressed the urgency of the problem and the need for effective action by the
US1191. These preoccupations were echoed in a 1967 NATO report on "The Future Task of the Alliance",
where Harmel argued in favour of a policy based on the twin pillars of defence and détente. This had to be
coupled with an extension of intergovernmental cooperation, in the framework of NATO, on foreign policy,
defence, security and technology.
12.6 New ideas
These complex shifts in US-European relationships were paralleled by a debate in the USA and in Europe
over the nature of future space cooperation.
Some sectors of the US administration were inclined to consider space as a privileged laboratory to prove
their willingness to help Europeans bridging the technological gap. The space field represented an advanced
technological sector par excellence (high research and development costs, lengthy development time, rapid
obsolescence)1192. Moreover, because it was heavily subsidised by the state, which also functioned as a
major buyer, it seemed to be, among all the technological sectors, the most suitable to be used as a political
tool.
From 1965 onwards, the State Department, the National Security Council, NASA, the PSAC and the
President himself were working on possible solutions to "the frequently-stated European desire for greater
1189 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol. XV, 1965-66 (Bristol: Keesing's Publ. Limited, no date), pp.20782 and
21545.
1190 In his meeting with Horning, Harmel referred to a paper prepared by Lefèvre, the future European negotiator in
post-Apollo negotiations, in which figures on license fees and patent registrations were cited to demonstrate the
seriousness of the widening technological gap between Europe and the USA. See NAW, RG 359, box 610, Letter
Donald Hornig to Philip Trezise, US Representative to the OECD, 2 March 1966. For previous information, see
B. Nelson, "Horning Committee: Beginning of a technological Marshall Plan?", Science, vol. 154, 9 December
1966, pp. 1307-1309.
1191 NAW 359, box 610, Memorandum of conversation on technological gap between the US and Europe, between
Belgian and American representatives, 20 May 1966.
1192 J.W. Müller, European Collaboration in Advanced Technology, Amsterdam, Elsevier, 1990, pp. 8-11.
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participation in the development of space technology"1193. There was a shared conviction that imagination
and thoughtfulness at the highest political levels were needed to study how science and technology could be
used to mutual advantage and to improve international relations1194.
Since his meeting with Erhard in December 1965, Johnson had made clear his willingness "to consider
cooperative projects of considerably greater magnitude and more far-reaching technological implication
than anything proposed heretofore". The President's specific suggestion of Jupiter or solar probes as possible
fields of cooperation, reiterated by an official NASA mission which briefed the European Space Conference
in February 1966, should be understood only as examples of what could be done. Values referred to by the
Department of State as the core of these attempts were "the contribution major advanced technological
exercises can make to the partnership between government, university and industry, to the development of
critical management capabilities, to economic security, and to common political objectives of institution-
building and Western cohesion". The immediate aim was to "direct discussion toward spacecraft
responsibilities for Europe rather than delivery-vehicle-related responsibilities". American experience and
competence would be transferred to European partners through two channels:
1. a joint working group at the project level;
2. commercial ties between firms, with export arrangements facilitated by the USA1195.
Proposals focussed around a political mission to Europe, which should include NASA's Director. By
January 1966 Hornig suggested that highly visible pro-European personalities be included, such as John
McCloy, "with a view of using space cooperation as a lever to give new vitality to European integration and
to strengthen US-European ties in science and technology".
There was, however, strong disagreement about the potentialities of this lever. While there was an
inclination, shared by American Ambassador in Paris, Cleveland, and by Rabi, to frame this offer in a
multilateral framework, possibly NATO, Arnold Frutkin thought NATO was disqualified because of its
military features. Moreover, he stated, an ambitious programme was "not warranted by realities of possible
cooperation in space"1196.
Frutkin's views apparently won and the NASA team which visited Europe in 1966 was not headed by the
Director of the Agency, but by the responsible for scientific affairs. The offer of collaboration on a solar or
Jupiter probe was coolly received by the Europeans with the exception of the Federal Republic of Germany.
In a time of tight finances and difficulties over the re-orientation of the European organisation toward
commercially-oriented endeavours, the US proposal seemed to avoid rather than to appeal to Europe's main
worries1197. It concerned a spacecraft of a higher technological and scientific relevance than the previous
satellites put in orbit by NASA on behalf of some European nations; it did not meet, however, any of the
new European needs in the fields of application satellites and launchers. As we saw earlier in this chapter,
the offer was eventually accepted by the Federal Republic of Germany. In this case, however, there seems to
have been an important external cause pushing the Federal Republic towards collaboration. Since the end of
the war the government had to meet "offset" obligations with the USA (a sort of compensation for the
stationing of American troops on its soil) by the purchase in the USA of military items. For several reasons,
the German government was now keen to extend its "shopping-list" beyond military material and suggested
that space expenses be included in this broader package 1198.
1193 NAW, RG 359, box 610, Position Paper for Advance Team on European Space Cooperation, Nesbitt, 7 February
1966; box 458, Memo PSAC from Daniel Margolies to members PSAC, 10 December 1965.
1194 NAW, RG 359, box 564, Memo by Margolies, 3 January 1966.
1195 Ibid.
1196 NAW, RG 359, box 564, Memorandum Horning to Margolis on Webb Mission in space, 3 January 1966.
1197 J.Krige and L.Sebesta, US-European Cooperation in Space in the Decade after Sputnik, cit.
1198 Johnson's Library, Austin, Texas, NSF, Country File, Germany, box 187, Memorandum for the President, Visit
of Chancellor Erhard, September 26-27, 1966. I am indebted to Hubert Zimmermann for passing me this
document.
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Soon after, during the Summer of 1966, the new "imaginative" US approach to cooperation with Europe
became concrete, at least on paper. It was spelt out in an internal document approved by the National
Security Council, the body at the top of the decision-making hierarchy on topics related to national security.
Focus was shifted, in the document, from collaboration on spacecraft to collaboration on launchers. Three
conditions for cooperation were laid down. Launcher vehicles, components and technology sold by the USA
should not be used:
1. for improving communication satellite capability other than a) to permit participation in the US National
Defense Communication Satellite System; b) in accordance with the Intelsat agreements regulating
(civilian) telecommunication satellite policy (see below);
2. for improving nuclear missile delivery capabilities;
3. for transmittal to third countries1199.
Intelsat was a consortium for the development and management of "a single global commercial
communications satellites system". Its signatories, the telecommunications entities of the countries involved
(a rapidly increasing number from the original 12, to 83 in 1972) had been operating a global
communication satellites system since 1964 under "interim arrangements". In the American case, the
signatory was Comsat, a private corporation which also ran the system from a managerial point of view, but
in most cases the signatories were the national postal, telephone and telegraph (PTT) administrations. The
voting power was based on the percentage contribution to the system. Comsat was guaranteed an absolute
majority of at least 50.5% and a veto power over its partners. The interim agreements were to be
renegotiated five years later, when the Europeans hoped to have more power to shape the policy of the
organisation1200. As things stood they feared that the USA would use Intelsat to impede their developing a
telecommunication satellite industry. The limits of America's willingness to collaborate with foreign
countries in space were clear, being set by the increasing commercial interest of communications.
In August of the same year, Europeans were informed about American willingness to support them in the
development of a European launch vehicle capability through ELDO. Among the many ways suggested to
do this, the USA offered:
1. to enable the procurement of flight hardware in the USA, including such items as a miniature
integrating gyro (MIG) strapped down "guidance" (auto-pilot) package used on the Scout vehicles.
2. to assist in the long range development of follow-up ELDO projects using high-energy cryogenic upper
stages (e.g. ELDO B) through a) technical information and contacts; b) bringing ELDO personnel into
close touch with the major problems linked to systems design, integration and programme management
of a high-energy upper stage such as Centaur; c) joint use of a high-energy upper stage developed in
Europe
3. to supplement ELDO launch capabilities either by the sale of configurations of Scout, Thor and Atlas
vehicles, or by the sale of launch services for scientific and applications satellite projects1201.
1199 NAW, RG 273, NSAM 354, US Cooperation with the European Launcher Development Organisation (ELDO),
29 July, 1966.
1200 See this volume, Chapters 9 and 10.
1201 Annex to ELDO/CM(July 68)WP/2, Possibilities and Problems of future US-European cooperation in the space
field, Remarks by T.H.E. Nesbitt, Deputy Director, Office of Space and Environmental Science Affairs,
Department of State, at the Meeting of EUROSPACE, Munich, Germany, 21 June 1968.
391
12.7 Unfruitful discussions
The US offer reinforced the necessity, already stressed by various quarters in Europe, to tackle the problem
of the nature and extent of ESRO-ELDO space programmes.
Asked to analyse this problem, an ESC ad hoc group on programmes stressed in 1967 that the choice on
whether or not to build a heavy launcher should be made "bearing in mind the need for Europe to retain its
political, technological and cultural autonomy, not on the basis of purely economical considerations"1202.
Along the same lines, the  Causse Report (December 1967) stated that a sound and imaginative European
programme was a prerequisite to any "fair partnership" in the design, production and management of space
devices. In the words of Causse, "(...)Europe should attempt to achieve independent capabilities of its own
in such areas as application and scientific satellites, placing it in a position to share early benefits of space
exploration, to become eventually a desirable, respected and essential partner of other space powers in order
to share full benefits of space flight activities in the decades ahead". Developing a wide range of space
potentialities was both a prerequisite for a fairer partnership with the major ally, the USA, and a pillar for
European political and cultural autonomy vis-à-vis the Americans. A case in point was, again, represented
by the launchers. The capacity of broadcasting radio and television programs to specific areas being
considered one important expression of political and cultural autonomy, the major space powers could not
be left in a position to exercise control over these opportunities through their monopoly of launching
facilities1203.
This position, though, was not universally shared within ESRO and ELDO. There were those who, in the
words of British Ministry of Technology Anthony Wedgwood Benn, were "very much alarmed at the
thought that because a thing is European, and because a thing is international, this somehow excuses us
from applying economic criteria"1204. European cost estimates at that time made clear that ELDO launchers
were expected to be twice as expensive as their American counterparts1205.
In June 1968, the European Space Conference decided that a mission should be sent to the USA in order to
meet representatives from both the NASA and the Department of State to discuss matters relating to
launchers. The problem was threefold:
1. availability of American launchers
2. possibility of joint development of launchers
3. possible use by the USA of European launchers
The mission would comprise the chairman of the Committee of Alternates, one representative each of UK,
France,. Italy and possibly Switzerland together with a representative of ESRO and ELDO1206.
Some days after this decision was taken, the Department of State representative Trevanion Nesbitt,
reiterated August offers in terms of launch vehicles and affirmed the liberal character of US policy about the
granting of export licenses, in both the satellite and launch vehicles fields. Of a total of approximately
31.000 requests for export licenses received by the Department of State during 1966, only 2%, he stated,
were not approved by the Department of State -which was responsible for controlling the export of
technology and hardware. The cases not approved related to communication satellites, whose relationship
with Intelsat had not been clearly defined1207.
1202 CSE/CM (July 67)6, cit. in footnote 1188; see also Volume II, chapter 10.
1203 CSE/CCP(67)5, December 1967, Report of the Advisory Committee on Programmes,  Causse Report. See also,
this volume, Chapter 11.
1204 Cited in J. Krige, "Britain and European Space Policy in the 1960s and early 1970s", in Science and Technology
Policy, vol.5, no.2, 1992, p.15.
1205 CSE/CM (November 1968) 15, Add.1, Cost Estimates of the experimental satellite CETS-C, 11 December 1968.
1206 CSE/CS(68) 39, Note by the Secretariat, Twelfth session of the Committee of Alternates held in Neuilly on 10
and, 11 June 1968, 13 June 1998.
1207 Ibid.
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Ten days later, in order to focus on the questions to be asked to the American counterpart, ELDO formalised
a list of coordinated requests to the USA in the field of systems management and launcher systems, mainly
guidance and boosters1208. The meeting was duly organised in mid-July 1968. Problems related to the
availability of US launchers for foreign commercial satellites were at the core of the discussions. The
necessity for all cross-frontier telecommunication satellites to be submitted to a judgement of compatibility
by Intelsat was clearly stated. However, "the possibility of establishing domestic or regional traditional
telecommunications systems outside the framework of Intelsat was not ruled out, but they would have to be
technically compatible with Intelsat satellites, and, in case of regional systems, not detract from the revenue
of the global system".
As a secondary element, to European enquiries about the practicability of the suggestion advanced in 1966
to ELDO on a joint US/European development of a liquid upper stage, NASA replied that the expected
number of American missions which would use this stage were too few to justify its development. At the
same time, the "joint development of space capabilities" was dismissed on the basis of the problems related
to reliability, costs of development process and cost/effectiveness of the overall launcher operation. As an
interesting, if marginal, aspect of the negotiations, the US representatives defined a broad category of
satellites that, by their nature (the communication part not being the essential factor) would not to be
submitted to any compatibility judgement by Intelsat. Among them were meteorological, navigation and air-
traffic control satellites. The opportunity for a joint air-traffic satellite project (the future fateful Aerosat)
was discussed for the first time and considered to have "excellent possibilities"1209.
American willingness to launch European telecommunication satellites was put to test three months later,
when the directors of the Franco-German programme to construct an experimental telecommunication
satellite asked NASA if they could provide launch vehicles and service for two Symphonie satellites then
under development. After consulting with the Department of State, NASA replied that it would launch the
two satellites only if their experimental (as opposed to operational) character could be demonstrated1210.
Here was a case where the Causse Report's prophecies seemed to be verified: American willingness to
collaborate with foreign countries was clearly in conflict with the rising commercial interests in the field of
communications. In April 1969, ministers of ELDO Member States decided in favour of the development of
a new launcher system. After stressing the importance gained by application satellites in space policy,
Australian, Belgian, French, German, Italian and Dutch representatives decided to support the study of the
execution of a programme for Europa III launchers, corresponding, in principle, to the launching of
geostationary satellites with a mass of 400 to 700 kg, the reputed size of the new generation of
communication satellites1211.
At the same time, in view of the approaching European decision on the opportunity to approve the then so
called CETS television relay satellite (Eurafrica or Eurovision), due to be approved at the European Space
Conference of November 1969, the Committee of Senior Officials of the ESC decided that Secretary
General of the Space Conference, Hermann Bondi, should make inquires on the prospects of the American
launcher availability for this satellite. To this end, a meeting was held in Washington between NASA and
1208 ELDO/CM(July 68) WP/2, Cooperation with the United States, July 10, 1968.
1209 CSE/CS(68) 2 September 1968, Meeting between US representatives and members of the Committee of
Alternates, held in Washington on 19 July 1968; see also CSE/CS(68)45 rev. 17 September 1968, Meeting
between US representatives and members of the Committee of Alternates, held in Washington on
19 July 1968; 17 September 1968. On this point, see L. Sebesta US-European relations and the decision to build
Ariane, the European launch vehicle, in Andrew Butrica (ed), Beyond the Ionosphere. Fifty years of Satellite
Communication, Washington DC: NASA, 1997.
1210 Library of Congress, Manuscript Division (LCMD), Washington, Thomas Paine Papers, box 26, Paine to Clinton
Anderson, September 9, 1970. See Volume II, chapter 10.
1211 ELDO/CM (April 1969) 8 Final, 15 April 191969, Resolution.3, Studies on Future Programme.
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State representatives on the one hand and Bondi on the other. American's basic attitude was in favour of the
supply of launchers for any peaceful satellite, provided that it was not in contravention of their international
obligations. Due to the fact that the treaty then ruling the use of telecommunications satellites was then in
the process of being revised, the USA could hardly be anything other than non-committal as far as these
obligations were concerned. At a very general level, while for domestic systems only technical compatibility
was requested (in terms of frequency etc.) for regional international systems, some test of economic
compatibility would be required, in order to verify that they posed no economic harm to the existing
organisation's members. As for as the nations that would join the regional system (the European regional
system, in European eyes, extended to Africa and the Middle East), no nation could have joined it until after
it had joined the Intelsat network1212.
In the course of another meeting during the same visit, Bondi was briefed by Frutkin about the future US
programme and showed much enthusiasm for the prospective new post-Apollo programme, mainly
consisting at the time of a space station and a shuttle. It seemed to be a shared assumption for both Bondi
and his counterpart, the Administrator of NASA Thomas Paine, that European willingness to build its own
launcher arose from a fear that the USA could block any expansion of future European telecommunication
satellites by simply not providing the launching facilities. If Europe could abandon its "trouble-plagued and
obsolescent vehicle program", Paine suggested, and reorient itself toward the purchasing of US launchers,
"European funds would be freed for more constructive cooperative purposes", i.e. the post-Apollo
programme 1213.
Discussions that took place during the second part of the 1960s, even if unfruitful, set the stage for a
broadened perspective for US-European cooperation. The so-called post-Apollo negotiations showed how
painful and controversial this process was. The following chapter is devoted to an analysis of the various
interlocking elements that influenced the outcome of these negotiations.
1212 CSE/HF(69)32, Report on the Secretary General’s activities resulting from instructions given to him by Senior
Officials on 28/29 July 1969, 10 September 1969.
1213 LCMD, T. Paine Papers, box 23, Letter Paine to the President, August 22, 1969 and Interview with
A. Frutkin, Washington DC, 8 November 1993 (interviewers: J. Logsdon & L. Sebesta).
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Chapter 13: 
US-European Space Cooperation in the Post-Apollo Programme:
Setting the Stage
L. Sebesta
13.1 The American offer
NASA's offer of collaboration in the post-Apollo programme was put forward to the Committee of Alternates
of the European Space Conference by Thomas Paine, in October 1969 1214. Though rather general in tone, it
made constant reference to a much more detailed document, the Space Task Group Report, which was
conveyed to European partners and served as a basis for a closed discussion session that took place after
Paine's public presentation1215. The document mainly dealt with the "Post-Apollo programme" scenarios in
the USA and suggested some main technological developments, the most outstanding of which were a space
station module (which could be coupled with other similar modules and eventually take the form of a space
base), a reusable space transportation system (the Shuttle), a tug (intended for transfer of payloads from the
Shuttle orbit into geosynchronous orbit) and a nuclear propulsion stage (NERVA prototype engine) to be
used for interplanetary transportation.
Although it was ranked as the last goal of the post-Apollo program, "international participation and
cooperation" was nevertheless given an articulate definition. Two prerequisites for its full development were
suggested:
1. "a substantial raising of sights, interest and investment in space activity by the other nations"
and
2. the "creation of attractive international arrangements to take full advantage of new technologies and new
applications for peoples in developing as well as advanced countries". Despite the inclusion of foreign
astronauts in national missions as "the most dramatic form of foreign participation" in American
programmes, the document recognised as legitimate the desire shown by advanced countries to receive
"technical assistance to develop their own capabilities". In this context, the USA should move toward a
liberalisation of their policies affecting cooperation in space activities and should "stand ready to provide
launch services and share technology wherever possible, and should make arrangements to involve
foreign experts in the detailed definition of future United States space programs and in conceptual and
design studies required to achieve them".
To achieve this, three major steps were suggested:
1. "The establishment of an international arrangement through which countries [might] be assured of launch
services without being solely and directly dependent upon the United States.
1214 The European Space Conference was a coordinating body for ESRO, ELDO and CETS, set up at the end of
1969: this volume chapter 11.
1215 The Space Task Group (consisting of Spiro Agnew, Vice President of the USA, Robert Seamans, Secretary
of the Air Force, and Thomas Paine, Administrator NASA) had been charged by the newly elected President
Nixon in February 1969 with setting up the future goals of America’s post-Apollo space policy. The report,
adopted by the group in September 1969, failed to support the financial concerns shared by the White House
and the Congress and was never adopted as the "blueprint" for the future. See The Post-Apollo Space
Program: Direction for the Future, Space Task Group Report to the President, September 1969. The
document is reprinted, with an introductory note, in John Logsdon (ed), Exploring the Unknown. Selected
Documents in the History of the US Civil Space Program, vol I, (Washington DC: NASA, 1995), pp 522-
543; H. Newell, Beyond the Atmosphere. Early Years of Space Science (Washington: NASA, 1980) p.288.
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2. A division of labour between the USA and other advanced countries or regional space organisations
permitting assumption of primary or joint responsibility for certain scientific or application tasks in
space.
3. International sponsorship and support for planetary exploration such as that which was associated with
the International Geophysical Year"1216.
Paine was extremely elusive in answering the questions put to him by European representatives after his
speech: the real nature of the international agreement he alluded to in point 1 was not clarified1217. To the
observation advanced by Robert Aubinière, then chairman of the ELDO Council, on the "very considerable
impact" that his proposals could have on the European launcher programme, Paine answered that "It is
precisely for this reason that we have brought before you our planning, so that indeed it will be possible for
you to review your plans in the light of what it is that we now propose to do"1218. This comment spurred
French concern about the possibility that post-Apollo would "crowd out" their project for achieving an
independent European launch capability: cooperation would obviously tie a significant part of the scarce
European space resources to a programme led by the USA, reducing the chances of a serious challenge to US
supremacy1219. Nor was it the first time that the USA were conscious of these European fears. In a letter
written to the newly elected President Nixon in February 1969, Paine, then NASA Acting Administrator, had
stressed how Europeans considered that NASA was "attempting to divert European activities toward
scientific pursuits and away from 'high pay-off' projects in space communications" and thought that offers to
provide launch facilities were "calculated to undermine support for ELDO's development of a European
booster"1220.
Notwithstanding these caveats, the striking difference between this proposal and the previous American
cooperative offers in space cannot be overlooked. Whereas the USA had been very careful, until then, to
avoid any commitment in cooperative technological development with commercial or military interest, this is
what they seemed willing to offer now, even if under certain conditions.
1216 The Post-Apollo Space Program: Directions for the Future, Space Task Group Report to the President,
September 1969.
1217 Neither did he clarify this point in front of the Senate Committee which discussed NASA authorisation for
FY 1971 some months later. Paine would just offer a short answer "off the record" to those US Senators, who
asked the same question and would repeatedly characterise the wording as "somewhat awkward". Later in the
hearings, he would make clear that "this suggestion was prompted by the realisation that arbitrary US
restrictions upon the availability of its launch services could stimulate independent activities in Europe on
political rather than simply technical or economic grounds". Hearings before the Committee on Aeronautical
and Space Sciences, US Senate, 91 Congress, 2nd session on S 3374, March 11 1970, part 3, International
Space Cooperation (Washington DC: US GPO, 1970), p. 1047 and p.1062.
1218 CSE/HF(69)39, Annex 2, Text of exchange of views between the members of the Committee and the NASA
representatives, 24 November 1969. See also P. Creola, “European-US space cooperation at the crossroads”,
Space Policy, May 1990, p. 100. As Paine would later explain to the President, his primary goal in offering
Europeans collaboration in the post-Apollo ventures was "to stimulate Europeans to rethink their present
limited space objectives, to help them avoid wasting of resources on obsolescent developments, and
eventually to establish more considerable prospects for future international collaboration on major space
projects". Library of Congress, Manuscript Division (LCMD), Washington DC, Thomas Paine papers, box
24, Letter Paine to the President, 7 November 1969.
1219 The Space Station cooperative experience seemed, later, to generate among European partners the same kind
of apprehension; G. Van Reeth and K. Madders, "Reflections on the quest for international cooperation",
Space Policy, August 1992, p. 228.
1220 NASA History Office reference collection, International Cooperation File, Nixon Administration Collection,
Letter Paine to the President, 12 February 1969, cited in R. Launius, "NASA, the Space Shuttle, and the
Quest for Primacy in Space in an Era of Increasing International Competition", in Emmanuel Chadeau (ed),
L'ambition technologique: naissance d'Ariane, (Paris: Editions Rive Droite, 1995), pp. 39-40.
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In the first "official" call in favour of international cooperation in space (March 1970), President Nixon
seemed to confirm this impression, declaring that "both the adventures and the applications of space missions
should be shared by all people". He then went on to make a brief reference to his willingness to extend the
availability of American launching facilities to "larger applications satellites and astronaut crews"1221. As
would later become unmistakably clear, the President's interest rested mainly in this second option. The
hypothesis of having foreign astronauts on board American space vehicles was the one that better fitted his
vision of cooperation as a way to reinforce US political leadership by means of a highly visible option
involving human beings. Thus, not by chance, he favoured the presence of astronauts from the Federal
Republic of Germany and Japan, the ex-enemies defeated by superior American democracy and
technology.1222
Testifying during the NASA authorisation hearings for fiscal year 1971 held some days after the Presidential
declaration, Paine restated the original characteristics of his proposal by declaring that opportunities for
foreign participation in the post-Apollo programme would be "most meaningful and satisfactory to all
concerned if they (were) taken up as part of a substantive developmental, operational, or experimental
involvement in the program itself"1223.
13.2 Initial European reactions
The Committee of Alternates instructed ELDO and ESRO to study the proposal. A joint ESRO/ELDO
working group to analyse the technical implications of European participation in the American programme
was set up. Visits to NASA headquarters, centres and industrial establishments by European representatives
were organised; they were invited to attend management reviews and to receive updated briefings regarding
the space station and the shuttle. By April 1970, the working group was able to give a first assessment of the
problem it had been charged to study 1224. The document, signed by the two co-chairmen of the working
group, J.P. Causse and J.A Dinkespiler, first made reference to the innovative nature of the American project.
The post-Apollo space programme was not geared, as had been the case in the decade, to the attainment of a
specific goal—the landing of human beings on the moon, for example; it was aimed instead at changing the
nature of activities in space by:
1. the use of the space environment for scientific and technical research by non-professional astronauts who
would be living in orbit;
2. the use of space for particular new applications purposes;
3. the exploration of the solar system by means of manned missions.
The system envisaged provided  the necessary elements for the execution of missions in low Earth orbit:
1. a space station, to be followed later by a space base;
2. served by a recoverable launcher, or space shuttle.
1221 Statement by President Nixon on the Space Program, 7 March 1970, reproduced in Appendix J, H. Newell,
op. cit., p.443.
1222 LCMD, Thomas Paine Papers, box 24, Paine's Memorandum for the Record, Meeting with the President,
January 22, 1970; Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Folsom Library (RPIFL), Troy, George Low Papers, box
69, Fletcher to Low, Summary of meeting with the President on June 15, 1972.
1223 Hearings before the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, cit., p.1065.
1224 WG/COOP-US/6, 16 April 1970.
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Complementary launchers should make possible the passage from this stage to a further one:
1. from low orbit to geostationary orbit (space tug);
2. from low orbit to lunar orbit (space tug);
3. from lunar orbit to the lunar surface (space tug);
4. from low orbit to interplanetary trajectories (nuclear shuttle, NERVA, which could serve, in certain
cases, even for Option 2.).
Studies on the station were the most advanced, reported as being in the competitive definition phase (Phase
B0, with two firms taking part, under the direction of two NASA centres, themselves in competition). The
activity of the station would be oriented towards scientific and technical research. The scientific field was to
cover biology, astronomy, geophysics and solid state physics. Fields that had been purely terrestrial would
find new prospects when the space tool would be available. The station was conceived as work in progress,
and was to be capable of adaptation and extension. This is why its design concept was modular, with modules
capable of becoming elements of the base as well as planetary modules.
The station would require an economic means of transport for putting men and equipment into orbit and
bringing them back to the ground. This means was the space shuttle. While the feasibility of the space station
seemed guaranteed, the feasibility of the shuttle in its original configuration appeared to be dependent on
technological progress that had yet to be achieved.
The space tug was the least known element of the system (a call for tenders had been launched by NASA for
a preliminary study prior to Phase A). It was considered to be a sort of shuttle third stage, because it was
thought to be used to propel spacecraft beyond the orbits reached by the shuttle itself. The tug was bound to
be a manned vehicle, chemically propelled and capable of being placed in orbit not only by a Shuttle but also
if necessary by a Saturn launcher; it would not return to Earth.
A nuclear motor called project NERVA had been studied for several years by the Atomic Energy
Commission. This project was little known in Europe because much of it was classified. The motor would
only be switched on once the vehicle was in orbit, thereby reducing the dangers of radioactive contamination
in the event of malfunctioning of the launch vehicle.
While no timetable had been officially approved by NASA, the document gave a tentative one which called
for the first operational flight of the shuttle in 1977, the assembly of the station after 1977 and its entry into
service around 1978-79. The entry into service of the base was considered to be realistically possible around
1983-84 and the first operational flight for the tug around 1980-82.
The strategy for enabling the objectives to be attained was based on three main principles: reusability,
commonality (in order to produce a lowering of costs) and "widening the objectives of space flight", so that
"it is no longer reserved to the small community of professional astronauts, but takes in categories of research
workers for whom space is not simply an end in itself but a particular means of advancing science and
technology".
"A total metamorphosis of space activity" (emphasis in the original text) by some 15 to 20 years was forecast
in the document. By 1990, the new system would, it was claimed, have completely replaced the present
launching facilities.
What problems would these metamorphoses pose to Europe? The nature of the problem was twofold:
1) on the one hand, questions would arise about Europe's possible participation in the new NASA
programme;.
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2) on the other, it would be necessary to analyse the effects of this American programme on the programme
decisions to be taken by Europeans in the following months.
a) Ideally, participation should be "additional to the activities already embarked on" by Europe. An
alternative could be to achieve all or some of the aims currently pursued in association with the USA,
thus saving on new developments for Europe for which American solutions already existed. For
example, "a guarantee that launchers would be supplied for peaceful missions corresponding to the
European objectives would be negotiated in exchange for European participation in development of
the new system. Such participation should carry with it, from the outset, an 'entitlement' to
launchings". The kind of cooperation envisaged involved:
i) the development of certain elements important for the system as a whole and sufficiently
individualised for the corresponding management to be fully assumed by Europe, within the
overall system management;
ii) a large number of sub-contracts for a valid range of elements, in order to have access to the
largest possible amount of technological information.
b) As far as the impact of the American programme on European programme decisions, three fields
were taken into consideration:
i) space science. The station was considered to be a very rigid instrument because  it would not be
operational for some time (forecast for the end of the 1970s), because it would lack many
specialised modules and because it would have a very special orbit. The only missions affected
would be those deriving such a benefit from it that it would be absurd to try to gain a few years
by using an automatic vehicle at the price of enormous sacrifices in terms of quality and quantity
of results. Optical, infrared and ultraviolet astronomy were identified as priority customers of the
station. Most of the other fields did not appear to be affected in the short term.
ii) space application. Missions in geostationary orbit (mainly telecommunications, scientific
satellites and certain meteorological satellites) would not be technically possible until the base
and the tug were operational, i.e. around 1983-84. The new American programme did not
therefore in any way affect the decisions the Europeans might take at the present time in respect
of application satellites.
iii) launchers. According to the plan for using the shuttle in 1985 only two journeys would be
devoted to the transport of automatic spacecraft, the other sixty being divided between lunar or
planetary missions and serving the base. "Routine use of the shuttle" to place in orbit automatic
spacecraft (such as the satellites of the European application programme) would not happen until
the end of the 1980s at the earliest. Thus, "a launcher such as Europa III, available in 1978,
would have the prospect of a career of at least eight to ten years".
From the organisational point of view, it was suggested that ESRO should remain primarily responsible for
matters relating to the space station and a task group of experts from the national administrations be formed
under the chairmanship of J.Collet. ELDO would be entrusted with the questions related to the means of
transport, such as the shuttle, the tug and the nuclear transporter; a task group had been already set up under
the leadership of H. Hoffmann.
A briefing activity soon got under way. The presentation by American representatives of the space station
took place in Paris, in June 1970, with the presence of some 300 Europeans scientists and space program
authorities1225. A month later, a NASA team briefed European industrial and space representatives gathered
under the aegis of ELDO in Bonn on the Space Shuttle and Space Tug1226.
1225 D.Lord, op. cit., pp. 12-13.
1226 D.Lord, op. cit., p. 13.
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The Ministerial meeting of the European Space Conference of July 1970 entrusted the President of the ESC,
Theo Lefèvre, the Belgian Minister for Scientific Policy and Programming, supported by representatives of
France and the UK, the task of exploring, on behalf of the ESC, with the government of the USA the
political, financial and other conditions for possible European participation in the post-Apollo programme
and requested him to report on these before the end of the year. It also stated that "in the light of the outcome
of the negotiations, the participating states [should] together reconsider the conditions for the carrying-out of
the European programmes, in particular where launchers [were] concerned". No votes against were
registered; only three countries, Australia, Norway and Sweden, abstained 1227. Only Belgium, the Federal
Republic of Germany and France were willing to commit themselves to finance long term studies for Europa
III until an agreement had been reached with the USA. The other countries were not prepared to go along
with their partners1228. Against the UK suggestion in favour of a menu-à-la carte which should leave
members free to choose between launchers and satellites, Belgium, the FRG and France considered it
necessary to agree on the launcher and satellite program as a whole.
The divergence between those who wanted to concentrate on the building of satellites and those who wished
to consider both satellites and the facilities to launch them was one of the most important unsettled problems
against the background of the European position on post-Apollo negotiations1229.
The same meeting provided financial support for the period to June 1971 up to a maximum of 2.5 MAU
(Million Accounting Units); this permitted the extension of the system studies in respect of both the space
transport system and the space station and enabled technological studies to be undertaken, mainly in
connection with the space shuttle1230. In addition, firms in several Member States, financed in most cases by
1227 CSE/CM(July 70)9 (Final), Res. 3 "Cooperation in the Post-Apollo Programme" 24 July 1970. See also
ESRO/ELDO Bulletin, no.11, September 1970.
1228 Interest in the studies for Europa III had been expressed (without any financial committment) before the
American post-Apollo offer, by Australia, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy and the
Netherlands at the ELDO Ministerial conference of April 1969; see ESRO/ELDO Bulletin, no.5, May 1969,
res.3 concerning the studies on future programmes. American unwillingness to launch the Franco-German
Symphonie satellite, if operational, had probably played a relevant role in persuading some European
countries to support studies for Europa III. See this volume, chapter 12.
1229 The need for proceeding with both programmes was stated in the Puppi report (from the name of the head of
the Committee of Senior officials set up by the European Space Conference in 1968), in CSE/CM
(July 70)PV/1 rev., Annex 2, Presentation of the Report of the senior officials by Professor Puppi,
30 July 1970.
1230 In this period, one Accounting Unit (AU) was equivalent to the value of the US dollar.
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their governments, entered into partnership with various NASA contractors responsible for studies on the
station and the shuttle1231.
System studies (in preparation of future projects) on the lines of those set up by NASA were organised by
European in two areas: on the space tug whose propulsion techniques were considered to be sufficiently close
to those being studied in connection with Europa-III (by ELDO) and scientific modules, intended as a
peripheral element of the space station (by ESRO). Much less was done in the field of technological and
predevelopment studies (intended to make possible an eventual execution of the project by furthering the
progress of certain essential new technologies to the maximum extent)1232.
13.3 The first political contacts
On 16 and 17 September 1970, Minister Lefèvre, accompanied by Lord Bessborough, representing the UK,
and Denissse, representing France, had several meetings with their American counterparts on the political and
financial aspects of European participation in the post-Apollo programme 1233. The talks were highly
exploratory in nature because the programme’s future shape and fate was still unresolved on the national
level. Thus, no mention was made of the specific content of the cooperation.
The discussions had two focuses: the relationship between the present negotiations and the availability of
American launchers and the nature of future cooperation in terms of decision making and management.
1231 CSE/CS (72) WP/5 Report by the Secretary General of the ESC on the discussions between Europe and the
United States on participation in the post-Apollo programme, 6 July 1972.
In 1971 a broad spectrum of exploratory studies, though of short duration and low-cost, was contracted to
European industry as follows:
MATRA
(France)
Comparative study of a scientific satellite to be launched by a Shuttle as opposed to
the Thor Delta and study of a telecommunication satellite to be placed in synchronous
MBB
(West Germany)
Cost study of a biological research module to be attached to a Space Station
HSD(UK) Cost evaluation of a free-flying astronomy module
BAC (UK) Parametric cost analysis of research and applications modules
HSD (UK) Study of advanced telecommunication station
GETS (France) European technological capability survey
BERTIN
(France)
Study on use of space facilities for research and advanced technology
Thomson-CSF
(France)
Cost Evaluation of a cosmic ray facility
In D.Lord, op. cit., p.49.
1232 ESRO/ELDO working group, July 1970, (WG/COOP-US/9), July 1970. By October 1970 "ESRO had
already conducted some 15 applications studies related to experiments modules and shuttle payloads. ELDO
had sponsored 14 technology activities in areas related to the Shuttle development and its use and had also
conducted preliminary studies related to a Space Tug". D.Lord, op. cit., p. 16.
1233 The European delegation was assisted by members of the ESC Secretariat, led by the Secretary General,
Renzo Carrobio di Carrobio.On the American side, the participants were: Alexis Johnson, Under Secretary
for Political Affairs, Department of State; George Low, Acting Administrator, NASA; Edward David Jr.,
Science Adviser to the President; William Anders, Executive Secretary, NASA; John Morse, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defence for European and NATO Affairs. The talks were held at the State Department,
Washington DC. Because of their explorative character no minutes were taken; viewpoints expressed were
later reported in CSE/CS (70) 23, Statement by Mr. van Eesbeek relating to the Washington Talks (16-17
September 1970) between the ESC delegation and the American authorities,
8 October 1970.
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The main interest of European negotiators was the relationship between European participation in the post-
Apollo programme and the development of an autonomous European launching capacity. "Owing to its
limited means" European representatives declared "Europe would be unable to finance at one and the same
time the development of launchers for these programmes (defined early on as being essential European
programmes, particularly in practical applications) and a significant participation in post-Apollo programme
developments". In order to be consistent with the missions that Europe had assigned itself, European
cooperation in the Post-Apollo programme had to be supplemented, Lefèvre stated, in the interim period
"from 1970 to 1980 or 1985", with American launching facilities granted "on a commercial basis and without
political conditions".
The Americans replied that, "(...) on the assumption of substantial European participation in the post-Apollo
programme" [emphasis in original] they were prepared to provide Europe, on a reimbursable basis and before
the commissioning of the new Space Transportation System, "with launch service for any peaceful purpose
consistent with existing international agreements"1234.
As to the meaning of "substantial", it was made clear that the Europeans would be required to contribute to at
least 10% of the overall development costs of the Space Transportation System. These costs were forecast as
amounting to $10 billion over ten years; for Europe, this would mean $1 billion spread over the same period.
Broadly speaking, Lefèvre said, this would correspond to the effort Europe was supposed to make in order to
continue the development of the European launcher (some disagreement seemed to exist on this point,
because in Ortoli's view, the cost of European participation in the post-Apollo programme would be double
that of the development of the European launcher)1235.
In reply to a request made by European representatives, the American delegates specified that "any peaceful
purpose" would "include commercial purposes which could, as such, compete with American interests" (this
possibility was made quite clear by the European Delegation before the American stated their position).
These launches would take place at reimbursable costs - reimbursement for actual costs plus a certain margin
for management expenses, but excluding amortisation of development costs. The American commitment was
general in nature, that is, the USA would undertake to provide launch services requested by Europe "without
the right of refusal or of unilateral acquiescence on a case-by-case basis"1236.
It is to be remembered that this exchange of opinions took place within the context of a major debate related
to the new Intelsat agreement which was in the process to replace the interim agreement of 1964 as the ruling
charter for the international communication satellites policy. Within this broader context, the Europeans were
striving to obtain more permissive rules in the establishment of regional satellites, for example Symphonie, as
opposed to the global communications satellites which were to remain under the monopoly of Intelsat.
Whereas the USA initially argued against the right to construct a regional system, the final approved draft
(which would eventually become part of the definite agreement of 1971) seemed to open the way for the
establishment of separate space segment facilities to meet international public telecommunications services
requirements of the various members. In each case, the members would ensure the technical compatibility
with the Intelsat space segment and avoid significant economic harm to the global system. However Intelsat
was not permitted, as requested by the USA, to enforce sanctions against violators, nor were its
recommendations considered binding; moreover, Comsat, the American signatory, was deprived of what
amounted to a veto power according to the Interim agreement 1237.
1234 CSE/CS(70) 23, Statement by Mr van Eesbeek, cit.
1235 CSE/CM (November 70) PV/1, Annex 1, Declaration by Theodore Lefèvre, 4 November 1970.
1236 CSE/CS (70)23, Statement by Mr van Eesbeek, cit.
1237 S.A. Levy, "Intelsat: Technology, politics and the transformation of a regime", International Organization,
vol. 29, n.2, Summer 1975, pp.669-671
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The relationship between Intelsat and American willingness to launch European satellites was specified in a
letter written by Johnson to Lefèvre on 2 October 1970; the document stated that the USA were prepared to
launch European satellites "in those cases where no negative finding is made by the appropriate Intelsat
organ, regardless of the position taken by the US in the vote"1238. "To put it simply" Theodore Lefèvre
declared in relation to the US launcher availability at the ESC meeting of November 1970 " (...) the American
assurances, as formulated, do not specify whether or not we can count on launchers for public service
conventional operational communication satellites, even if their operation is limited to the European zone".
This problem thus remained as "the first substantial point" to be dealt with in any further post-Apollo
negotiations1239.
As far as the decision making was concerned, two possibilities were discussed in the September talks:
1. to work on a separate element in the programme
2. to join in the production of components for major systems
The first solution would fall better with the concern to bring about an interdependent partnership, a principle
"put forward by the European delegation and not rejected by the US representatives"; at the same time it
would help Europe to be entrusted with real "prime-contractor responsibility". What was necessary to verify
was whether this could be achieved with the relatively small financial European effort and whether the
Europeans had adequate technical capacities to succeed in this kind of collaboration. On the other hand, the
second solution would afford greater financial and technical flexibility, challenging, at the same time, the
principle of interdependence and of European "prime-contractorship". In view of the many interface
problems that would eventually rise, there was a risk that it might prove financially harmful and nullify the
effect of the limited European contribution.
In the written exchange that followed the meeting, this aspect was further elaborated. The question was split
in two:
1. decision making and management
2. access to information and facilities
What the Europeans wanted was participation in decision making at all levels of management and detailed
access to technology used in the post-Apollo Programme. These were the two questions on which
disagreement would be especially pronounced.
The Americans considered that Europe’s role in decision-making and management should "relate to, and
be commensurate with, the measure and character of European participation". Participation expected was,
again, defined as "substantial". In this case, "arrangements for collaboration should assure consultation in
the development of the Space Transportation System and Space Station wherever of significant, mutual
concern to both parties”. An extensive role was forecast for Europe only in the management of those
aspects of the systems in which European contractors would be involved, either directly under European
governments or working as subcontractors to American prime contractors. Europe, in other words, would
be a "partner in reaching any decisions which have a measurable impact upon European costs
or  upon  European  tasks in  discharging their  commitments to the  program".  Overall  responsibility for
1238 CSE/Comité ad hoc (71) 9, Letter from Johnson to Lefèvre, October 2, 1970.
1239 CSE/CM (November 70) PV/1, Annex 1, Declaration by Theodore Lefèvre, 4 November 1970.
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management, however, "would necessarily rest with the US". "Wherever there is a basis for European use
of the Space Transportation System or Space Station" the Americans expected "Europe to take part in
mission planning and experimental programs in generous proportion to their use".
As far as access to information and facilities is concerned, the American position was that "each
participating party must have detailed access to technical data and facilities which they would need to
accomplish their specific tasks under the agreed collaboration, but should also have general access to all
technology and facilities in the overall development of the program". Design, development and
production data at the level of commercial know-how meant detailed access. General access included
only access thorough visits and published or publishable documentation. Data which might be "sensitive
in terms of national security" would be exchanged, "but handled within agreed security safeguards". As
for cost estimates, development costs, not including cost estimates for production, facilities and
operations were estimated as being $13.7 billion from 1972 to 1981 for the Shuttle, Space Tug and Space
Station. To avoid the simultaneous peaking of Shuttle and Space Station expenses, the administration
expected to concentrate first on the Shuttle and later on the Space Station 1240.
Lefèvre gave an account of his visit during the Space Conference of 4 November 1970. He called for the
beginning of a negotiation phase proper, and stressed that the talks had enabled the Europeans "to
consider as a priority the hypothesis that Europe will have a large availability of American launching
devices within the framework of post-Apollo cooperation". In consideration of the nebulous US
guarantees on launchers, however, he suggested to follow a two track procedure, whereby the European
programme would be based "mainly and by priority on the development of the Post-Apollo
Transportation System, but with the alternative solution of building a second generation European
launcher". Europeans "should decide to build [their] own launchers, should these negotiations be a
failure" 1241.
13.4 National positions
The European Space Conference of November 1970 was described by journalists as dramatic and recorded
later as the most troublesome of the ESC history1242. Post-Apollo was but a minor topic of discussions, which
centred on complex topics such as the unification of European space institutions and future applications,
launchers and scientific programmes1243.
Delegations were called to vote on three linked concepts:
1. programmes (subdivided in applications, launchers and scientific programmes);
2. unification of the institutions;
3. continuation of negotiations with the USA on the post-Apollo programme.
The positions varied widely, going from the most favourable West German one (the Federal Republic
delegate was in favour of application, launchers, scientific programme, plus continuation of post-Apollo
negotiations and abstained only on the unification, while it had abstained on the space programme voted
during the July session) to the less manageable British one (the UK delegate voted against the launcher
1240 CSE/Comité ad hoc(71)9, 22 April 1971, Letter from Johnson to Lefèvre, October 2, 1970. pp.8-9 (decision
making) and pp 10-12 (Access to information and facilities)
1241 HAEUI, CSE/CM (November 40) PV/1, Annex 1, Declaration by Theodore Lefèvre, 4 November 1970.
1242 Dominique Verguèse, "European space research totters", New Scientist, 12 November 1970. R.Fraysse,
"Retour sur le passé: la décision de l'Europe de participer au programme post-Apollo", ESA Bulletin,
November 1984, n.40, p.61. See also, Arturo Russo, section 11.7 of this book.
1243 Krige and Russo (1994).
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programme, abstained from the applications programme, the unification of the institutions and the
continuation of discussions on the post-Apollo project, which he favoured in the July Conference, and
was in favour of the scientific programme). In the middle was Italy, which vetoed the development of an
autonomous European launch capability (preferring to rely on the American one) and was in favour of
collaborating with the Americans on the post-Apollo project provided that, restricted as Europe’s
participation would be in financial terms, "the right of total access to the technology of the whole
programme and not only that part of it identifiable as financed by Europe" could be obtained as “an
absolute preconditioning”. The continuation of discussions on the post-Apollo programme was not
vetoed by any delegate, but five abstained: Australia, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the United
Kingdom (Denmark and the UK changing their position from the previous favourable advice given on
preliminary studies in the July conference). Belgium, The Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, the
Netherlands, Spain and Switzerland gave their approval. The whole European launcher programme
including Europa III , on the other hand, was favoured only by Belgium, the Federal Republic of
Germany and France1244.
The British Minister of Aviation Supply, could not see any need or scientific value, in the light of the
progress made by the mission, for the development of independent launching capabilities1245. He also
made it clear that he considered that the question of the supply of launchers should be studied separately
from that of participation in the post-Apollo programme.
To this the President (Lefèvre) retorted that as a result of his American mission the link did in fact exist.
This statement was repeated by Ortoli, the French Minister of Industrial Development and Scientific
Research, who stated "At the conference in July, the idea had been current that a European launcher could
be replaced by participation in the post-Apollo programme, but it is now clear that the cost of the latter
would be at least double that of a European launcher programme". It has to be stated that in July, the
French representative considered the availability of launching facilities to be part of the post Apollo
project1246. The ratio might become even more unfavourable, in consideration of the fact that plans for the
post-Apollo programme had not yet been finalised and its financial scope was not yet sufficiently defined.
After noting the very preliminary stage of consultations with the USA and the vagueness of elements,
Ortoli went on to state that "if Europe does really want to be present in the telecommunication market,
then it should not make satellites which will be subject to outside control - which may or may not be
launched - and should make a firm resolve to provide the means for launching its satellites itself, if it is
true, as I believe it is, that the telecommunications market, the communication of information, will be one
of the major markets of the next fifteen years". The German delegate, Professor Leussink (Federal
Minister for Education and Science) agreed on that and on the fact that "the link between participation in
the post-Apollo programme and the availability of United States launchers must be assumed"; in the sense
that American launchers could not be obtained without participation to the post-Apollo programme. In
general terms, the British delegate was isolated on this point1247.
13.5 The industry; the case of Eurospace
Eurospace had been created in 1961 as a non-profit association, bringing together leading European
companies from seven countries (Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, the
Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom) dealing with aerospace-related fields such as aircraft,
electronics, chemicals, steel and machinery to promote the development of air and space activities in
Europe.
1244 CSE/CM (November 70) PV/2, Minutes of the meeting held on the afternoon of 4 November 1970, 19
November 1970.
1245 CSE/CM (November 70) PV/1, Annex V, Declaration of the British Minister of Aviation Supply,
4 November 1970.
1246 CSE/CM(July 70) PV/1 Rev., Annex IV, 30 July 1970.
1247 CSE/CM(November 70) PV/2, 19 November 1970.
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Contacts had been made by ELDO and ESRO with Eurospace in order to convince some of its members
to carry out certain preliminary studies related to the post-Apollo project free of charge. In June 1970
Eurospace produced a memorandum on US-European cooperation in which it favoured collaboration in
the post-Apollo programme. With the participation of its affiliated American firms, Eurospace organised
a symposium in Venice during the same summer (September 1970)1248.
Yet, in 1971, its position on the post-Apollo programme was shifting toward a much more cautious one.
Through its Secretary General Yves Demerliac, Eurospace publicly expressed its scepticism on
cooperation at the American Astronautical Society’s Ninth Goddard Memorial Symposium held in
Washington DC on 10 and 11 March 1971. Demerliac, who declared to have consulted more than 80% of
the industrial space potential in Europe, set out industrial and political motivations to support his cool
reception of the American offer on post-Apollo. From an industrial point of view, he made clear that the
main aim of European industry was "to manufacture operational equipment in quantity and to be able to
master the management and operation of the application systems" like telecommunications, meteorology,
oceanography, oil detection etc. The rather optimistic target for European industry was set out to be "to
acquire prime contractor ability for all space application systems". Technological excellence per se was,
thus, not a priority aim. The two main concerns, instead, were the technological and managerial
capabilities to produce space applications in mass quantities in order to substitute them for traditional
equipment without losing the share of the markets for the new production. Cables and microwave links
against telecommunication satellites was a perfect case in point. The progressive substitution of the first
by the second would lead to a loss of vital markets for the industry concerned unless its market share in
the new products was comparable to that in the old, conventional ones.
As far as political aims were concerned, Demerliac referred first of all to the unsatisfactory share of
Intelsat contracts in the telecommunication sector. The only means to improve this situation would be
"the development and operation of complete European regional application systems". This went hand in
hand with the development of an autonomous European launcher capability. "Only one British firm"
Demerliac specified "took the view that participation in post-Apollo was more urgent and vital than the
development of Europa III". The size of European participation to post-Apollo should, thus, make
reference to such political priorities.
For this reason, a two-track approach was proposed. In the first phase, up to 1975-76, when the peak
expenditures for Europa III would be over, Europe could not devote more than a few million dollars per
year to post-Apollo. In this context, a tug-type project would not be financially viable nor would it satisfy
industrial requirements as stated above. European firms would thus prefer to negotiate agreements with
American contractors and to be funded, at the same time, by the respective governments.
In the second phase a "more massive and integrated European participation" in post-Apollo could be
envisaged. However, even in this medium term prospective, the tug seemed not to be preferred industry.
The only industrial representatives who seemed to like it were the Germans, who expressed interest in a
tug delayed in time (entering operational service by 1985). French and British firms preferred the
development of one or two major systems of the Shuttle, i.e. the orbiter wing and the avionics system. In
this case, however, it was very difficult to see how this participation could be integrated on time into the
post-Apollo schedule.
1248 WG/COOP/9, Second report by ESRO/ELDO joint working group, 16 April 1970; see also
Y. Demerliac (Secretary General, Eurospace), "European Industrial Views on NASA's plans for
the `70s", International Cooperation in Space Operations and Exploration, AAS Science and Technology
Series, vol. 27, proceedings of the AAS Ninth Goddard Memorial Symposium held at Washington DC, 10-11
March 1971 (Tarzana, Cal.: American Astronautical Society, 1971) pp. 29-35.
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On the other hand, because the ESRO community seemed to be favourable to shift part of its scientific
budget to the space station or its cheaper replacement, the development of a European module seemed to
be an attractive proposition1249.
Even on this last point, however, French industrialists had in previous occasions expressed their doubts. It
is useful to remember that, while it had been one of the original aims of Eurospace to encourage European
countries to finance big and technologically innovative space programmes at a time when commercial
uses and profits were but distant possibilities, the organisation was now operating in a changing context,
where real commercial opportunities (outside the "protection" of the government) were opening up for
firms involved in space.
As an illustration of how this influenced the investment strategies of firms, a letter had been sent to Ortoli
in December 1970 by French electronic and aerospace industry groups, indicating their scepticism about
the prospects of European participation in the post-Apollo programme. The (rather prophetic) rationale
behind the decision was threefold:
1. Applications in space were considered feasible with non-inhabited systems at a much lower cost than
with inhabited ones. The case against financing an inhabited device would always be strong,
especially in cases of economic crisis. Thus, such a system would have risked to have its funds cut off
in the future, before being completed.
2. The marginality of European cooperation, due to its objective weakness in technological and financial
skills, would lead to "an undesirable situation of dependence"; Europeans would be excluded from
the development of the new transportation system.
3. participation in post-Apollo would crowd out funds for the independent European expandable
launcher. Because it would be substantially higher that the forecast cost of Europa III, it could also
compromise some major satellite programmes. In view of the impossibility of obtaining a reliable
guarantee for the availability of American launchers, a programme of European launchers should
receive a priority endorsement1250.
1249 Y. Demerliac, "European Industrial Views on NASA's plans for the '70s", International Cooperation in
Space Operations and Exploration, AAS cit., pp. 29-35.
1250 ELDO Papers, box 464, Letter Syndicat des Industries de Matériel Professionnel Electronique et
Radioélectrique et Union Syndicale des Industries Aéronautiques et Spatiales to Ortoli, Ministre du
Développement Industriel et Scientifique, 10 December 1970.
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13.6 The changing framework for cooperation: the revised post-Apollo programme and
its “decoupling” from the question of launchers
By the end of 1970, the post-Apollo programme had undergone a major change in its nature: instead of
being focused on a space station and a shuttle as a means to reach it and supply it with materials and
human beings (be that aim portrayed in the framework of the ultimate goal of a manned mission to Mars
or not), it became centred on the shuttle itself. The rationale for this choice was found in the wide range
of possible commercial and scientific uses of the shuttle and by its potential use, with the possible
addition of a research and application module (RAM) capable of being orbited by the shuttle, a substitute
for the permanent space station1251. Along with this new modular concept, some RAMs could remain
docked to the shuttle and be brought back to Earth by it; others could be left in orbit and merely visited
and eventually recovered by the shuttle.
On the European side, by the end of the year, feelings began to be aired in the press that the USA was
"trying to lure Europe into curtailing the development of launchers and communications satellites in order
that she will continue to be dependent on the US for these items"1252.
European and American delegations met again at NASA headquarters in Washington on 16, 17 and 18
February  19711253. These talks centred on a presentation of the new, reduced, post-Apollo programme and
a discussion about the technical fields of possible European participation.
NASA's representatives seemed to join the Europeans in considering two kinds of possible European
participation: one concerning a major element of the system (tug or RAM) in which the prime-
contractorship would be European, the other concerning smaller and dispersed elements of the shuttle -
 and in this case European firms would be sub-contractors. Parts of the orbiter and booster (the two main
elements, at this stage, in the configuration of the shuttle), in this second case, could be built in Europe.1254
The American presentation of the Shuttle made reference to the concept of a completely reusable shuttle
made up of two parts, booster and orbiter, both operated by human crews1255. Because funds had not yet
been granted by the American Congress, NASA was in the unfortunate situation of offering cooperation
on a project whose configuration could not be considered as final - and which was substantially reviewed
due to financial restrictions.
At the same time, the existing linkage between European "substantial" participation in the post-Apollo
programme and the availability of American launchers for European telecommunication satellites, along
with the uncertain fate of the new Intelsat agreement (due to be opened for signature in August 1971)
which would govern this availability, contributed to a deadlock of the negotiations.
1251 J. Logsdon, "Choosing Big Technologies. Examples from the US Space Program", in J. Krige (ed.),
Choosing Big Technologies (Chur: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1993), pp. 145-146.
1252 B. Valentine, "Europe and the post-Apollo experience", Research Policy, 1 (1971/1972), p.115; for press
position, the author cites "Space brinkmanship", New Scientist, 12 November 1970, pp. 310-311 and
Münchner Merkur, 8 July 1970.
1253 The Europeans were headed by Causse and Dinkespiler (on the 16th) and thereafter by Ortner (17th and 18th).
On the American side, the delegation was composed solely of NASA representatives together with one
observer from the State Department; it was led by Charles Donlan, Director of the Space Shuttle Program.
1254 This was the only possibility, taking into account that the estimated cost of the orbiter represented 55% and
that of the booster 45% of the overall cost of the shuttle. The prime contractor was to be responsible for at
least 50 or 60% of the work which would be, for the orbiter, about $2 billion. CSE/Comité ad hoc(71)8,
Report of the Mission to Washington, 4 March 1971.
1255 J. Logsdon, "Choosing big technologies. Examples from the US Space Program", in John Krige (ed),
op. cit., p.145.
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By the beginning of 1971, post-Apollo project negotiations between the USA and Western Europe were
not going well. This was officially announced by President Nixon in his report to the Congress on the
future of American foreign policy, in which he said: "I have asked NASA to explore in the most positive
way the possibilities for substantial participation by Western Europe, Japan, Canada, and Australia in our
post-Apollo programs. The result is uncertain, for there are very real difficulties to be solved. We will
continue our efforts to meet these problems, for a successful international program of space exploration
could set a precedent of profound importance"1256.
It was not until September 1971, after the opening for signature of the new Intelsat Treaty, whose main
features related to the availability of US launchers we have already recalled, that the deadlock was solved.
At that time, "some soul-searching took place within the US delegation"1257. In reply to Lefèvre's request
of 3 March 1971, Johnson announced the new American position in a letter of 1 September 197: the
availability of American launchers would not be "conditioned on European participation in the post-
Apollo programme".
Secondly, the letter dealt with three main topics:
1. the general conditions for supply of launchers for European programmes
2. the conditions for supplying launchers in the particular case of a European communications satellites
3. the offer of broadening cooperative relationships with the Europeans, including "an exchange of
views regarding the content of space activities in which Europe might wish to participate in the post-
Apollo era". Johnson proposed that the possibility be discussed in a joint working group (Joint Expert
Group), as previously suggested by the Europeans. The main object of their work would be to define -
before political discussions were resumed - what elements of the post-Apollo programme would be
suitable subjects of participation.
As for the conditions upon which the USA would offer its launching services for satellites intended to
provide international public telecommunication services, including European regional satellites, the USA
adopted a restrictive interpretation of Article XIV of the definitive Intelsat arrangements, whereby the
governing body would have to make "a favourable recommendation" (and not merely, as indicated in
Johnson's letter of October 1970, abstain from voting against it). A failure to reach a favourable
recommendation seemed to be considered binding by the USA, contrary to the general interpretation of
the article (see earlier in this chapter).
As to the operational system of European communication satellites presented by Lefèvre during
February's discussion, Johnson stated that "it would appear to cause measurable, but not significant,
economic harm to Intelsat. Thus, if this specific proposal were submitted for our consideration" he
continued "we would expect to support it in Intelsat"1258.
The document was discussed among the representatives of the Committee of Alternates of the ESC; the
new decoupling between launcher availability and the post-Apollo programme was warmly received.
1256 Cit. in B. Valentine, "Europe and the post-Apollo experience", Research Policy, 1 (1971/72), p.104.;original
source, US Foreign Policy for the 1970s; Building for Peace, a Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon,
President of the United States, 25 February 1971, (Washington: GPO) p. 222.
1257 D.Lord, op. cit., p. 16. On this and other aspects related to the American decision-making process during the
negotiations, see L.Sebesta, "The politics of technological cooperation in space: US-European negotiations
on the post-Apollo programme", History and Technology, 1994, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 317-341.
1258 CSE/Comité ad hoc (71)18, Annex I, text of the letter from Under-Secretary of State Johnson to Minister
Lefèvre, dated 1st September 1971. The letter, which was to be confidential in line with an American request,
was passed to the Belgian press (Le Soir, 30 September 1971) and then given widespread publicity.
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Europeans could now get rid of the conditional form in which the Americans proposed to support the
CEPT project and provide the US with additional information 1259.
13.7 The first technical discussions and some clarification on the availability of American
launchers.
After an updated presentation of the post-Apollo project 1260 by a NASA team, the first meeting of the
Joint Group of Experts on US-European cooperation was held in Washington from 30 November to
2 December 1971. J.P.Causse and J.Dinkespiler acted as spokesmen for the European delegation which
was composed of members of the ESC Secretariat as well as of experts nominated by the Member States,
while Charles Matthews headed the NASA group.
Despite the various potential areas of cooperation singled out, discussions were bogged down by the
uncertainty regarding the final configuration of every element (even the most advanced shuttle).
Moreover, as stated by the report, the USA were waiting for "the identification by the European side of a
more definite list of candidate subjects for possible participation" which could eventually lead to a joint
"detailed examination of financial, management and programmatic implications".
As far as the shuttle was concerned, as the most advanced project among those in which collaboration
was envisaged, a few important characteristics of future cooperation were identified at this time:
1. in the field of utilisation, NASA indicated that participants in the development program "probably
would have an advantage over other users"; no pricing policy, however, could be established at this
time;
2. the kind of cooperation envisaged was limited to a relationship of subcontracting by European firms.
This could be done by individual firms and, for larger elements, by a consortium of European firms.
As for the subcontracts already in place, Europeans lamented the lack of formality shown for
participation by European firms in the preparation of proposals by would-be US prime contractors.
US representatives, on the other hand, stressed the necessity to vest clear management responsibility
in the American prime contractors as far as the orbiter and booster were concerned.
3. the content of the cooperation seemed to favour the limiting of work packages on propulsion and
avionics for technical reasons: criticality of integration, complexity of interrelationship between
various systems and the considerable amount of experience already available to the USA. Twelve
elements of the shuttle could be developed in Europe; among these, the airframe seemed to offer the
best possibilities for European participation.
As far as the tug was concerned, the time did not seem ripe for a definite decision because it was so
early in its development. It nevertheless seemed a logical area for European participation since it was
an easily separable item with a relatively clean set of interfaces; moreover, ELDO, in
close cooperation  with  NASA,  had  elaborated  a  Phase-A work  statement.  In the  orbital systems field
1259 CSE/CS(71)PV, Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Committee of Alternates and the ad hoc Committee of
Officials of 22 September 1971, 27 October 1971.
1260 Charles Mathews, then NASA Deputy Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, designated head of
the American team and Capt. Robert Freitag, visited European companies involved in space studies and
concluded their tour with a presentation to the Committee of Alternates of the ESC on 22 October 1971. D.
Lord, op. cit., p. 16. Charles Mathews' briefing was not printed as part of the conference minutes, but as a
separate leaflet, not to be found in the archives; CSE/CS(71)PV/3, Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the
Committee of Alternates and the ad hoc committee of officials of 22 October 1971, 11 November 1971,.
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(RAMs, sortie cans, sortie pallets) and automated satellites, various levels of involvement were identified
both in the development of the elements of the system and in the scientific experiments to be hosted1261.
On 20 December 1971, the ESRO Council adopted a resolution  on the reform of the organisation, which
called, inter alia, for:
a. the US/European Joint Aeronautical Satellite Program, Aerosat (even if the work on the Aerosat
payload pre-development has started in European industry, the failure of the USA to approve the
Memorandum of Understanding concerning the Aerosat programme had delayed the start of a full-
scale development of the spacecraft);
b. the Meteorological Satellite Programme;
c. the Communication Satellite Programme 1262.
Aerosat was a joint air traffic control satellite for civilian aircraft the first exploratory meeting of which
had taken place in June between the USA, Europeans, Australia, Canada, Japan and the Philippines. The
Europeans had made unequivocally clear that they would not accept a pre-operational programme in
which they would be merely subscribers to services provided by a system unilaterally established by the
USA. They had also guaranteed financial support for a cooperative programme; if such a programme
were not attainable, Europe would be prepared to proceed on its own1263. After negotiations in Washington
and Madrid, the FAA reached agreement on a joint project with ESRO representing the European nations,
whereby Europe would pay half the cost and get about a third of the work (because of the need by Europe
to purchase US assistance in order to satisfy European responsibilities in the programme). The agreement
was limited to a pre-operational system for developing procedures, with the operational follow-on system
to be negotiated in the future1264. Between the end of 1971 and the beginning of 1972, the White House
declined to sign the memorandum arrived at by the FAA and ESRO, giving rise to yet another round of
negotiations, whereby the scope of the cooperation was restricted1265.
The ESRO resolution also contained a statement on the policy to be followed by Europe concerning
launch services (which took into account the new information given by Johnson in his letter). The
resolution reaffirmed that European launchers would be given priority, on condition that their cost would
not exceed 125% of relevant non-European ones; should, however, such American launchers be denied,
the price would be based on the cost of production, or even supplemented by the cost of specific
development, if required.
In consideration of the resolution, Lefèvre asked Johnson for a clearer statement on the availability
of  American  launchers  for  European  telecommunication  satellites1266.  In particular,  an  account of the
1261 CSE/CS(71)18 Neuilly, Report of the meeting of the joint group of experts on US/European cooperation in
Space Programmes in the post-Apollo period, 8 December 1971.
1262 CSE/CM (Dec.72)5, Report by the Secretary General of the European Space Conference on the Status of
European Space Programmes, 7 December 1972. See also: this volume, chapter 9.
1263 Nixon Project, NARA, Washington DC, WHCF, Subject files, vt 1, box 14, Department of State, Summary
of international aviation and foreign policy issues in the aeronautical satellite program, no date.
1264 Nixon Project, NARA, Washington DC, WHCF, Subject files, vt 1, box 14, Memorandum Welsh to General
Haig, National Security Council urgent action, 21 October 1971.
1265 Despite the signature of a new memorandum in 1974, Aerosat as originally conceived, would eventually fail
in 1977; see ESA Annual Report, 1977, pp. 53-54. A special chapter is devoted to Aerosat in vol. II
1266 CSE/CS (72)1, Annex, Letter Lefèvre to Johnson, 23 December 1971. The whole exchange of
correspondence between Lefèvre and Johnson until this date is in CSE/Comité ad hoc (71) 22,
22 December 1971. For the ensuing correspondence on launchers, see P. Creola, “European-US space
cooperation at the crossroads”, cit., pp 98-99. On the European Communication Satellites Programme,
see this volume, chapter 9.
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operational system and mission of the European telecommunication satellite system was transmitted and
Johnson was requested to state, on the base on this document, "whether, considering the concept of the
system as now decided in its final form" he could confirm that his government would be willing to
support the project when it would be officially submitted to Intelsat by the participating countries, as
specified in his letter of September 1971. In his reply, Johnson made reference to three difficulties related
to the proposed European Communication Satellites Programme: the economic impact (in terms of higher
charges to users), the technical incompatibility, which could be overcome by adopting a different orbital
position, and, most important of all, the definition of the European region. Johnson clarified once for all
that the USA would not support the program within Intelsat if an expanded coverage was expected in
respect to the European geographical area. In line with the ITU definition, the Europeans gave the
"European Broadcasting Area" a much larger scope than the purely geographical one. It was bounded "on
the West by the Western boundary of Region 1, on the East by the meridian 40° East of Greenwich and
on the South by the parallel 30° North [thus, including the former French colonies in North Africa], so as
to include the western part of the USSR and the territories bordering the Mediterranean, with the
exception of the parts of Arabia and Saudi Arabia included in this sector. In addition, Iraq (was) included
in the European Broadcasting Area"1267.
Lefèvre also informed Johnson of the decision taken at the ESC on 17 December 1971 to open fresh
credits to a total of 2.25 million dollars for pursuing studies carried out on the European side on
participation to the post-Apollo programme. It was envisaged that by Spring 1972 Europeans and
Americans would "be able to tackle " the "political aspects" of the question1268.
13.8 The new shuttle
On 5 January 1972, President Nixon publicly announced his decision to go ahead with the development of
the space shuttle, though heavily modified in its configuration. The President emphasised the need to take the
"astronomical costs out of astronautics" -a recurrent criticism of public opinion - and to make transportation
in space routine ("the space shuttle will give us routine access to space by sharply reducing costs in dollars
and preparation time").
The new shuttle did not represent a new challenging purpose in American space policy (such as planetary
exploration, a moon landing etc.). Nevertheless, in a time of economic crisis, it was tuned to the public’s
expectations, as being "a potential low-cost replacement" to the costly expendable launch vehicles in use. Its
"multifaceted capability for satellite placement and retrieval"1269 seemed to make it a perfect device to obtain
the same services as before at a lower price 1270.
In this last configuration the shuttle consisted of an aeroplane-like orbiter (about the size of a DC-9, capable
of carrying into orbit and back again to Earth useful payloads up to 18 metres in length and 4.5 metres in
diameter, weighing up to 29.500 kg) and a booster. The orbiter would be designed for reuse more than 100
times. It would be able to operate in space for about a week, after which it would return to Earth and land on
a runway like an aeroplane.
The shuttle would be boosted into space through its solid-propellant booster engines and its orbiter stage
liquid oxygen-liquid hydrogen main engines. The booster rockets would detach at an altitude of about 40 km
1267 The ITU definition is cited in ESRO/PB-TEL(72)5, Availability of launchers for the European
Communication Satellites Programme, 22 September 1972.
1268 CSE/CS(72)1, Annex 1, Letter from Minister Th.Lefèvre to Under Secretary of State A.Johnson,
23 December 1971.
1269 D. Lord, op. cit., p.39.
1270 CSE/CS(72)2, Annex 1, Statement by the President, 5 January 1972 (Taken from NASA News,
release no. 72-4, 6 January 1972). For a general overview, see John Logsdon, "The Decision to Develop the
Space Shuttle", in Space Policy, May 1986, pp 103-119.
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and descend into the ocean to be recovered and reused. Fuels for the orbiter's liquid-hydrogen liquid-oxygen
engines would be carried in an external expendable fuel tank that would be jettisoned in orbit1271.
As pointed out by McCurdy, "What began as a $10 to $13 billion initiative emerged from the White House as
a $5.15 billion program, leaving NASA with a shuttle configuration that many believed was technologically
inferior to the two-stage reusable system and a cost estimate that Agency managers could not meet"1272.
In a public statement, Fletcher indicated that the shuttle in this new configuration would encourage greater
international participation in space flight1273. As stated more clearly by Nixon, the shuttle would broaden
American "opportunities for international cooperation in low-cost, multi-purpose space missions". The
shuttle, apparently, would be a means through which to expand future cooperation, but not an object of
cooperation in itself.
Less than three months after Nixon's approval of the programme, in March 1972, NASA completed the
definition of the configuration for the new device and issued a request for proposals from industry. Replies
were expected by 12 May and NASA planned to select the prime contractor for the new space shuttle by July
1972.
This decision had a threefold impact on the post-Apollo negotiations:
1. first of all, there was a new urgency to define the precise managerial framework, financing problems, and
real contents of the eventual cooperative venture on the shuttle, because of the tight schedule devised by
NASA and required by the Congress.
2. moreover, because the first operational flight of shuttle was now forecast for 1979 and because RAMs
(free-flying and semi-permanent laboratories) would only be placed in orbit starting 1982, the need arose
for a new element to cover the interim period. Orbital systems of (relatively) low cost and requiring a
short period for development and construction, the sortie module or sortie-can (a small laboratory carried
by the shuttle whose studies had been initiated by NASA and Europe in October 1971), acquired greater
importance than the RAMs.
3. lastly, the overall technology of the shuttle in its new configuration had a much lower technological
appeal for the European partners than the original one. Its only real technological novelty lay, in their
view, in two areas (propulsion and the heat shielding system), both of which had been both excluded
from European participation. This being the case "the technological interest of the items proposed to
Europe (was) much smaller than it (might) have appeared at first sight". Consequently, the interest in
manufacturing one or more items proposed would lie chiefly, for the Europeans, "in securing access to
the orbiter and shuttle project and so gleaning general information about it and possibly some items of
particular interest"1274. Thus, if the European principle of free access to the technology developed for the
1271 CSE/CS(72)2, Annex II, Statement by Dr. Fletcher, concerning the development of the new Space
Transportation System January 5 1972 (taken from NASA News, no. 72-4, 6 January 1972). NASA's desire to
have it as an entirely reusable single-stage to orbit, with no expandable parts, was considered unrealistic for
the available technology and budget requirements. "National Security Space Policy", International Security,
Spring 1987, vol.11, no.4, pp.169-170. By mid-1971, NASA's plans for a two-stage reusable shuttle had to
undergo a complete reassessment, in view of the Office of Management and Budget’s wish to keep NASA's
budget constant for at least the duration of the then present administration. This seemed to be incompatible
with a programme that would cost over $2 billion annually at its peak. J.M. Logsdon, "Choosing Big
Technologies. Examples from the US Space Programs", in J.Krige (ed.), Choosing Big Technologies,
cit., p.146
1272 H. McCurdy, The Space Station Decision: Incremental Politics and Technological Choice (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1990), p.231.
1273 CSE/CS(72)2 Annex II, Statement by Dr.Fletcher, 5 January 1972.
1274 WG/COOP/US (72)2, European Space Conference, Report on European Participation in the post-Apollo
programme, March 1972.
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entire system was denied, as seemed highly probable, European interest in this kind of cooperation would
be considerably weakened.
13.9 Toward a definition of the final contents of cooperation
The attention of the second ESC-NASA joint group of experts which met at Neuilly (Paris) from 8 to 11
February 1972 took account of the changing context of US-European cooperation1275. Apart from the
prospects of European participation in the shuttle even in reduced terms, two other areas of cooperation
were envisaged:
1. the tug system, on which ELDO had issued a Phase A report since the first meeting;
2. an orbital system or module and some studies on experiment definition. From the beginning of 1972
the various orbital system concepts crystallised in the form of a "sortie module", i.e. a laboratory
transported by the shuttle that would remain attached to it throughout its stay in orbit.
Criteria for choosing among the package works were spelled out as being:
1. Items should not be scheduled as critical nor involve high technical risk;
2. they should involve relatively few and simple interfaces;
3. they should not be those for which there would be a high probability of frequent design changes.
Compared to those spelt out during the previous meeting, these criteria seemed to be more restrictive and,
in the case of the first item, rather vague (no explanation was given about what "critical" and "high
technical risk" meant).
The nature of the cooperation envisaged was far from being defined. NASA experts declared that they
would approach "the concept of European participation in development of the shuttle within the context
of a broader programme of participation which included multilateral European responsibility for
development of a major element of the post-Apollo programme, such as Sortie RAMs or the re-usable
Space Tug". Certain government level decisions and assurances would be necessary before the European
contractual proposals for the shuttle were submitted to the US prime contractor. These decisions and
assurances would involve government-to-government agreements in principle concerning collaboration in
"the development of the tug or family of RAM vehicles".
NASA felt that "participants in such major development programmes should bear full responsibility for
development cost risks related to the tasks they had undertaken". "No exchange of funds" principles were
reaffirmed, by which a firm working as sub-contractor would receive "technical direction from the prime
contractor, but would receive payment directly from its own government authority after certification of
satisfactory work progress by the prime contractor". This system, it was stated by the Europeans, could
create many problems, especially in the fields of "source selection, the negotiation of out-of-scope
changes, limitations on the control by the prime contractor over the subcontractor and the relations
between the subcontractor and its own government authority". Alternatively, European spokesmen
proposed a different application of the "no exchange of funds" principle, under which "a prime contractor
on either side of the Atlantic would be responsible not only for the technical management and direction of
his subcontractors, wherever they were located, but would also be responsible for their funding". No
conclusion could be reached over these innovative proposals and both sides postponed any decision,
claiming the problem was not covered by their instructions.
1275 CSE/CS(72)6, Neuilly, Report of the meeting of the Joint Group of Experts on US/European cooperation in
space programs in the post-Apollo period, 14 February 1972.
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Neither could an agreement be reached on how to select the European contractors. The ESC indicated that
it should be a European responsibility; the new funding approach suggested, on the other hand, that the
weight of responsibility should shift, even in this sector, to the USA. In any case, the final choice would
have required a joint agreement by ESC, NASA and the prime contractor The creation of a joint
NASA/ESRO user group in scientific, application and technology areas for planning payload and
missions was envisaged.
Three major questions remained open at the end of the meeting:
1. A European decision on whether or not to make a commitment to participate in the post-Apollo
programme, which the Europeans undertook to reach by July 1972, and then, eventually, postponed;
2. the political rules on the management and funding under which such participation would eventually
be carried out;
3. the technical content of cooperation.
The question was of special relevance for the shuttle; in view of the timetable drawn up by NASA after
Nixon's decision, without an early decision on these linked problems, it would be no longer possible for
European industry to be awarded subcontracts.
By this time, two main features of post-Apollo cooperation were clear to the Europeans:
1) the partnership would be asymmetrical, in the sense employed by John Logsdon for the Space
Station1276, in two major respects:
a) the USA would be dominant in its financial contribution;
b) while the USA would be able, if necessary, to continue their project even without a European
contribution, Europeans joining the partnership would become dependent on the USA for an
important aspect of their future activities, because device they would produce could only be
carried by a shuttle.
2) this partnership had weak foundations, as was clearly shown by the financial constraints which had
urged the President to change the overall contents of the post-Apollo programme and caused
significant modifications in the technical configuration of the items still left open for cooperation (the
shuttle, for example)1277.
Moreover, a major question continued to preoccupy the Europeans. As Lefèvre made clear in a letter to
Ministers of member countries "for a certain number of us, the question of participation in the post-
Apollo programme falls within the general framework of Europe's policy on launchers"1278.
In March 1972, the Secretary General of the ESC submitted to the organisation an overall report on the
studies carried out in respect of possible European participation in the post-Apollo programme.
The report favoured the selection of one among three options:
1. participation in the development of the space shuttle to a total sum of about 100 MAU, in the form of
a series of subcontracts financed by the European governments concerned;
1276 J. Logsdon, "International cooperation in the space station program. Assessing the experience to date", Space
Policy, February 1991, p.37.
1277 See J. Logsdon's reflections on cooperation in the space station programme, ibid., p. 44.
1278 CSE/CS(72)7, Letter from the Chairman of ESC to the Ministers of the member countries, 6 March 1972.
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2. a joint development of the tug by Europe, sub-contracting to the USA being offset by European
industry's participation in the shuttle development (costs: about 500 MAU);
3. a joint development of the sortie module by Europe, sub-contracting to the USA being offset by
European industry's participation in the shuttle development (costs for Europe: 200 MAU).
Until now discussions had been focused on studying the possible content of European participation. It
was time, the report stressed, to define the terms under which participation could take place. The
Committee of Alternates and the ad hoc Committee would be charged to examine the legal, financial and
institutional terms on which the European governments envisaged taking part in the programme1279.
The various options regarding participation in post-Apollo within the wider framework of space activity
in Europe - taking into consideration for each series of programmes its essential objectives, technical
implications and long-term and short-term financial implications, as well as the other elements of a
European Space programme - were submitted to the Committee of Alternates1280.
13.10 Political discussions resumed
Informal discussions between Europeans and American representatives of both the Department of State
and NASA took place in April 19721281. Pending Europe's final say on the whole question of post-Apollo
cooperation, two hypotheses emerged from the discussions as being the most suitable to both the USA
and Europe:
1. participation in the shuttle plus tug;
2. participation in the shuttle plus sortie module.
The problem of funding was, not surprisingly, the first to be reported on. Once more, the USA made clear
their unwillingness to accept the European proposal, labelled "reciprocal funding", unless "in return for an
undertaking on their part to finance certain work in Europe, they received a simultaneous undertaking
from the Europeans regarding the nature of the tasks for which the latter would assume responsibility and
part of which would be carried out in the United States". Europeans had to take responsibility for possible
failures and had to reciprocate external funding giving back work to the USA.
Neither were they willing to provide any guarantee in respect to the access to the system or to the
purchase by the USA of a European tug or module. If they decided in favour of the purchase, the USA
required the application of marginal prices by Europeans - excluding any amount for amortisation of
development costs - and the conclusion of licensing agreements by Europeans to give the USA the ability
to manufacture the devices themselves in the event of an European failure to build the device.
As for reciprocal access to technology, in the most "sensitive" cases of classified technology, if the basic
technology could not be transferred, the USA would undertake, if necessary, to sell Europe the hardware
itself. A European decision in favour of merging their two space agencies would help to establish, in
American eyes "a very favourable climate for cooperation" in the programme.
1279 CSE/CS(72)8, att:WG/COOP/US(72)2, Report on European participation in the post-Apollo programme,
30 March 1972.
1280 CSE/CS(72)14, Post Apollo Programme options within European overall space activities 8 May 1972.
CSE/CS(72)14 add., Revision of options for European participation in post-Apollo programme, 5 July 1972.
1281 CSE/CS(72)13, Report by the Secretary General of the ESC on the informal discussions with American officials
regarding participation in the post-Apollo programme, 8 May 1972.
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At an informal meeting of the ESC Ministers held in Paris on 19 May, it was decided to ask the USA a
certain number of questions of a political nature, which had deliberately been left aside since the time of
the Lefèvre/Johnson talks which mainly concerned the terms governing European use of the post-Apollo
system as a whole and American use of the various elements supplied by Europe. A list of questions was
compiled, to be presented at the next US-European political meeting, scheduled for June. They touched
upon the availability of US launching systems (both expandable and reusable), the criteria for establishing
priority among users, the conditions of access and use of the technology necessary for the execution of
work undertaken in Europe within the post-Apollo programme, financing rules, the US commitment to
procure from Europe the hardware developed by the latter, the nature of negotiations between agencies
and the pricing policy for users of the transportation system1282.
This was actually the agenda of the meeting between American and European representatives which took
place in Washington from 14 to 16 June 1972.1283 Behind the rhetorical requirements of diplomacy, both
the opening and the concluding remarks by Herman Pollack (Director, Bureau of International Scientific
and Technological Affairs of the Department of State) revealed the tense atmosphere of the gathering.
Cooperation on the tug and the shuttle was discarded and the responsibility for this choice was attributed
to European behaviour. "In the absence of a clear indication of the measure of European interest in
possible participation", Pollack stated, "we shall do our best to make the US views regarding the
questions you have raised as helpful as we can. Were it possible during the early part of our discussions to
obtain a clearer understanding of the measure of European interest, and possible participation, our views
could possibly be more responsive and useful to you". The limitations officially announced by Pollack
regarding the possible field of cooperation were drastic and, as made clear during the discussions, not
subject to change.
As for the shuttle, of the residual work packages proposed for Europe, the nose cap, the radiator and the
instrumentation were definitely suppressed, the remaining items were the tail assembly, elevons, landing
gear and cargo door. American representatives stressed the potential difficulties "that might ensue from
an inter-governmental effort to produce a relatively small number of components of a massive piece of
highly complex hardware, whose timetable is pressing and in whose success the political and economic
stakes are so high". The conditions to be met in order to satisfy US concerns were so stringent that
Pollack acknowledged that the conditions they were obliged to impose as regards the funding and
management of the shuttle elements were discouraging and would substantially diminish the
attractiveness of participating in the Shuttle items.
While the final veto on participation in the development of the shuttle was the end of a progressive
restriction of possible cooperative work packages which had begun soon after the beginning of
discussions of the Joint Group of Experts on US/European cooperation in space programmes, and had
progressively developed over time, the veto on the tug came as a sudden surprise. This was the part of the
post-Apollo programme in which Europe could have best profited from technology transfer1284. The
reason officially given to justify this decision was mainly technical. This, it was said, was the less
advanced project, in terms of the development phase, of the post-Apollo programme; it was not clear
how, when and indeed if ever it would be built (indeed it never was).
The secondary literature gives additional reasons for the US withdrawal, including:
1282 CSE/CM(May 72)WP/1 rev.1, List of questions to be discussed by the European post-Apollo Mission
(14-16 June 1972), 29 May 1972.
1283 CSE/CS (72)15, Report of the ESC Delegation on discussions held with the US Delegation on European
participation in the post-Apollo program, 22 June 1972.
1284 D.Lord, op. cit., p.59.
418
1. American scepticism, widely shared in Europe, over Europe's technical ability to develop the tug on
its own, especially as far as propulsion was concerned1285;
2. The necessity for the USA not to transfer sensitive and/or economically valuable US technology;
3. NASA's concern over the safety of housing a tug with its planned cryogenic fuel in the shuttle's
payload bay1286;
4. Military willingness to take complete control over the device1287.
Of course removing the tug and the shuttle did not mean that there was nothing left for Europe to do. We
have already seen that, as NASA firmed up its post-Apollo configuration, the RAMs were complemented
by other, simpler orbital systems. They now became the best candidates for potential European
participation.
In American eyes, these orbiting platforms, later called sortie laboratories or modules and, finally, space
laboratories or spacelabs, satisfied all necessary qualifications for a viable cooperation of the
'conservative' type that had characterised US-European collaboration during the 1960s. Here was a project
defined in time and limited in scope, whereby cooperation could take place across "clean interfaces", each
partner providing its own technology and financing its work with NASA retaining overall operational
control1288.
13.11 Interlude
In Summer 1972 the sortie laboratory became the major topic of discussion and concern within the European-
American post-Apollo project cooperation. It was the subject of a detailed presentation by NASA to the
Europeans at ESTEC at the end of June 1972. From June to November 1972, the sortie laboratory was the
subject of three definition studies (Phase A), which ESRO entrusted to the COSMOS, MESH and STAR
consortia1289.
The latest developments were presented to the Committee of Alternates on 6 July 1972. Limiting cooperation
to only the sortie laboratory, and thus limiting the costs of cooperation1290, only partially solved the problems
connected with the post-Apollo programme that Europe had to confront, "since not only (had) interest in
1285 P. Creola, "European-US space cooperation at the crossroads", cit., p. 100.
1286 J. Logsdon, "International involvement in the US space station program", Space Policy, February 1985,
pp. 18-19.
1287 M. Schwarz, "European policies on space science and technology, 1960-1980", Research Policy, vol. 8, 1979, p.
220.
1288 This description draws on Pedersen's definition of the general guidelines shaping NASA's early cooperative
efforts; K.S. Pedersen, "The changing face of international space cooperation. One view of NASA", Space
Policy, May 1986, p. 121. A last Joint Tug Steering Group meeting was held on 5-6 October 1972; European
studies on the tug, that ELDO was instructed to terminate following the Committee of Alternates meeting on 12
June 1972, were presented to NASA as well as the shuttle technology studies which had been brought to a normal
completion.
1289 CSE/CS(72)18, att. annex I, Report on the technical discussions between NASA and ESRO (26-29 June 1972), 4
July 1972; CSE/CSWP/5 rev.1 Report by the Secretary General of the ESC on the discussions between Europe
and the United States on participation in the Post-Apollo programme, September 1972. See also “Europe and
post-Apollo”, ESRO-ELDO Bulletin, no. 22, August 1973, p. 10.
1290 The cost of the Sortie lab was then estimated at $200 million, against an estimated cost for (the abandoned) tug of
about $500 million. This difference has been considered in the literature to be an important element in favouring
the positive resolution of the launcher-versus-post-Apollo dilemma, since it freed relevant European financial
contributions in favour of Ariane. See J. Logsdon, "International involvement in the US space station program",
Space Policy, February 1985, p.24.
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participation (to) be balanced against cost, but participation (had) also (to) be considered in the context of all
the different aspects of a European programme"1291.
The ESC Secretariat and NASA officials met in Washington on 17-18 August 1972 to discuss the form and
content of possible agreements following the new standards set out in June1292. It was agreed that the sortie
module was an essential part of the US space transportation system and that it would not be developed in
parallel in the USA, should the Europeans take responsibility for its production.
NASA reaffirmed its willingness to retain overall responsibility for the total programme and the last word in
such vital areas as shuttle/sortie laboratory interfaces, quality control and safety. In particular, NASA would
wish to be in a position to assess the efficiency of the management plan proposed by the European agency for
the sortie module and stressed the necessity for a "unitary management agency" on the European side. On the
other hand, NASA suggested arrangements by which the European agency could participate in the shuttle
interface control activity, defining user requirements and in the regular review of the shuttle programme.
Moreover, a wide range of NASA assistance would be available free or at marginal cost, including provision
of US designs and technology (except where specific considerations from the security and proprietary rights
point of view prevented this), quality control, acceptance testing, cost control, audit and use of US facilities.
The US would favour a very "slender government agreement" containing the clause about US abstention
from any parallel development. The American team also insisted on the importance of an early identification
of areas in which Europe foresaw the need for access and to what extent. Construction of the sortie laboratory
would not guarantee any preferential treatment in the use of the system. All the same, countries participating
in the development of the Sortie Lab would enjoy priority rights in its use and would be entitled to appoint
crew members for its flights.
A few days later, the Department of State informed the ESC of an amendment to the overall system planning.
In the case of European withdrawal, NASA would not need to embark on the development work for the
Sortie Lab before 15 August 1973 (it was considered that it would take the US one year less than Europe to
build one)1293. It was proposed that European commitment would in principle be made at the September
Conference and that formal agreements would be concluded by end-October. This commitment would lead
Europe to start the thorough definition phase (full-scale project definition effort) immediately. Should the
cost established by this study unacceptably exceed the financial ceiling agreed by the ESC Ministerial
Conference, the Europeans would be allowed to withdraw from their commitment at any time before
15August 1973.
The feasibility of the sortie laboratory programme in Europe was considered from two points of view1294:
1. the technology aspects;
2. the schedule constraints that it would have to satisfy in order to be a meaningful contribution to the Post-
Apollo programme.
Technology in this context could have two different meanings:
a. the conventional one, associated with the state of the art in a certain number of engineering disciplines;
b. a broader one, related to frontier exploration of a wholly new approach to the utilisation of space.
1291 CSE/CS(72)WP/5, rev., cit.
1292 CSE/CS(72)25 and Annex I to VI, Report on discussions between the ESC Secretariat and NASA officials in
Washington on 17-18 August 1972 regarding the form and content of agreements necessary in the event of
European participation in the post-Apollo programme, 28 August 1972.
1293 ESRO/C(72)48, Annex I, US Aide Memoire of 21 August 1972.
1294 CSE/CS(72)WP/5, rev., cit.
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While the challenges to technology presented by the Apollo programme were in terms of launch vehicle
capability, communications at distances of more than 300.000 km, landing and take-off from the Moon’s
surface and impossibility to terminate the mission rapidly, those presented by the Sortie Lab were linked to
the constraints of:




• economy of operation.
The Sortie Lab as conceived by NASA in mid 1972 could be built in Europe without any doubt. However,
some technological areas would have to be advanced, if the programme was to be 100% European. In fact, a
certain number of "off-the-shelf" items (available from stock or to be obtained from a running production line
in the most extreme definition) would be available with little or no development in Europe, while a few of
them consisted of such long term and costly development products in the USA that their development in
Europe would represent a major undertaking not commensurate with the Sortie Laboratory time scale and
cost envelope.




No relevant technology transfer was expected from collaboration in the sortie lab project. The major reasons
for European interest in the collaboration stemmed from hopes to gain "programme management and systems
engineering experience in a programme of this magnitude, rather than in specific technical know-how or
direct commercial benefits"1295. No one doubted that Spacelab, above all, signified European willingness to
enter the field of manned space activities and to pay its entrance fee.
13.12 Europe’s final decisions on Spacelab
By the end of 1972, the European countries involved in ESRO and ELDO were passing through hard times.
Three main interlocking questions had to be solved:
1. the future organisational nature of Europe in space, in the context of two concerns: from the tactical point
of view, the disruptive power of the impending liquidation of ELDO (see below) had to be neutralised;
from the strategic point of view, the new European concerns linked to the application capabilities of
satellites (first of all in telecommunications) could not be coped with by an organisation, ESRO, set up
mainly for scientific purposes;




3. the European participation in the post-Apollo programme in its reduced form1296.
The apparent irreconcilability of the French and British positions over these points came to the fore during
the informal meeting of ESC Ministers and representatives of participating states (8 November 1972) called
to organise the subsequent December CSE meeting1297. Attention was focused on a difficult dilemma: what
should be given priority, the institutional framework or the programme toward which this framework would
orient its work?
Charbonnel, the French representative, subordinated the solution of the European space institutional problems
to the "definition of a programme worthy of Europe", i.e. a common programme of heavy launchers capable
of orbiting the payloads which Europe would develop for its needs in the field of space applications (in the
three main fields of telecommunications, air navigation control and meteorology) and which would even
enable it to export commercially viable complete systems.
Faced with the reluctance of certain states to join in the Europa III programme of ELDO, France was
prepared to carry out, on a different technical and institutional basis, a programme meeting the same
objective though with different technical characteristics (see below), the future Ariane.
Considering the organisational question as one which would have implied a great loss of time and energy,
France was more prone to begin by solving the problem which, it felt, was most urgent for the future, the one
of launchers. Why this choice?
1. because dismissing the programme would be seen by public opinion in Europe as an unacceptable
abdication of political responsibility;
2. because it would be an economic mistake, since the funding needed to complete the programme was
minimal compared with the sums Europe had so far invested. As mentioned by President Lefèvre during
his opening remarks, this would have implied not only a loss of technology, but also a loss of markets;
3. because it would deprive the Symphonie project, whose exemplary value was paramount at a time when
Europe was undertaking important application programmes, of some of its meaning.
As for Britain, taking into primary consideration the financial restraints in which the conservatives (back in
power since 1970) found themselves, their representative, Heseltine, subordinated any decision on the
programme to the prior solution of the institutional framework. In view of what was thought to be poor cost-
effectiveness of Europe’s performance in space during the previous decade (whose results did not measure up
to their financial commitment), the UK singled out the organisational problem as it cause ("we are spending
enough money to achieve results but we are not spending it in the way it ought to be spent").
Moreover, neither France nor the UK seemed enthusiastic about joining the USA in the post-Apollo
programme. France, noting that while the sortie lab. "would enable Europe to take an interest for the first time
in the problems of manned flight”, added “...none of the economic needs of the next decade would be met by
the development in Europe of a sortie lab, which can in no case be considered a substitute for a launcher
programme". It was ready to participate to the programme only if all measures were taken to satisfy Europe's
requirements particularly with regard to launchers. The UK, for its part, stated that, for the time being, the
UK would not participate in the post-Apollo programme and thought it could change this position only if
progress were made in the creation of a single European Agency.
Taking an intermediate position, the German and Italian representatives were against defining a priority
between programmes and the institutional problems. In particular, Von Dohanyi, the German representative,
1296 For these three aspects of the ESRO-ELDO crisis, see J. Krige and A. Russo, Europe in Space 1960-1963, cit.
1297 CSE/CM(Nov. 72)4, 17 November 1972, Meeting of Ministers in Paris on 8 November 1972 under the
Chairmanship of Theo Lefèvre, plus Annexes, 17 November 1972.
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thought the question of whether the programme or the institutions should be settled first "rather like the
question of the chicken and the egg". However, he was not prepared to go along with the Europa III project
(which the FRG had initially supported), arguing that it was financially too demanding. The Federal Republic
of Germany preferred to concentrate on promoting a launcher technology - an objective-oriented one - using
existing European launchers and develop them further. The German delegate also stressed how "the
deterioration of the European position in post-Apollo (was) not the fault of the Americans but the fault of the
Europeans" who had been unable to decide in good time on various steps. The FRG was ready to give the
USA any additional assurances concerning its participation in the post-Apollo programme.
The Italian representative, Romita, referred to three conditions which made cooperation with the USA
difficult:
1. one of the prominent aims of US space policy was to keep the leadership in this sector;
2. the USA was not prepared to freely surrender technical and industrial know-how and competence, as this
would represent an instrument for possible European competition;
3. because of the ratio between the possible European participation in the post-Apollo programme and the
American contribution to this programme, the US would keep the control of the programme, both at the
realisation stage and at the stage of engine utilisation.
Notwithstanding these ongoing divergences, some countries (Belgium, the FRG, Italy and Spain) agreed,
under certain conditions, to finance Phase B studies for the Sortie Lab (finalised to the choice of a single
approach from among the alternative approaches selected through the first phase), the Committee of
Alternates gave it its political blessing and invited the ESRO Council to comply1298. The ESRO Council
accepted this request on 9 November 1972 and authorised its Director General to take the necessary
implementing steps1299.
The European Space Conference Ministerial meeting of December 1972 (two years after the previous one)
was a crucial step in respect of both the reorganisation of Europe in space, the policy of acquiring an
independent launching capability and Europe’s relationship vis-à-vis the USA1300.
Reports on the activities of ESRO, ELDO and the post-Apollo programme were presented at the start of the
conference. Each of the three areas had its specific sets of unsolved problems. Among the more prominent
was Britain’s final notice of denunciation of the ELDO Convention (given on 27 September 1972), which
confirmed the declaration made one year before by the UK delegation to the ELDO Council1301.
In spite of the dilatory position of the UK - whose delegates stressed how the "government did not believe in
the need for a European launcher programme" and how the arguments in favour of the post-Apollo
programme were not considered "overwhelming" - and some uncertainty on the part of the Italians - who
subordinated participation in the launcher programme to a fruitful cooperation in post-Apollo and asked that
the rule of juste retour for the common programmes be respected - the resolution of the Ministerial
Conference registered an important agreement on some points which had been objects of intense debate:
1298 Technical studies on the sortie lab were reviewed at a meeting with NASA on 18-19 September and some
possible module concepts were selected for further detailed study, see also “Europe and post-Apollo”,
ESRO-ELDO Bulletin, cit. in footnote 1290  p. 10.
1299 CSE/CM(Dec.72)5, 7 December 1972.
1300 CSE/CM(Dec.72)8, 20 December 1972; CSE/CM(Dec.72)PV/2, 10 January 1973, plus Annexes.
1301 The UK decision would become effective on 1 January 1973 (date after which the UK delegation would become
an observer). After the failed launch of the ELDO rocket Europa II in November 1971, a reorganisation of the
ELDO Secretariat was undertaken in the first half of 1972; Aubinière replaced Carrobio di Carrobio from 1
January 1972.
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1. the setting up of a new organisation, formed out of ELDO and ESRO, i.e. the future ESA, by January
1974, if possible;
2. the Sortie Lab and the French launcher proposal (L3-S) to be managed within a common European
framework (Europa III being dropped);
3. there should be a rationalisation of the various satellite programmes, including the geostationary
technology satellite (GTS). This programme had been initiated in the UK as a national project; originally
intended for telecommunications purposes, it was subsequently reoriented to meet requirements for
aiding maritime navigation and was later merged with Marots1302.
The first element of the far reaching decisions taken at the meeting was the decision to set up a new unique
European Space Agency (ESA), whose programme would consist of a compulsory "basic" programme -
science, general activities and facilities - with GNP-related contributions and an "optional" programme
(including Spacelab, launcher and application satellites) in which the Member States were free to decide on
their participation and financial contribution 1303.
One decisive element to convince hesitant states like Italy to comply with the second decision was the
suggestion put forward by France and Germany about the financing of the launching programme - a fixed
amount for European countries other than France instead of a fixed percentage. The other one was the French
proposal dealing with a launcher (L3-S) nearly as powerful as Europa III, but not requiring such a large and
sophisticated cryogenic stage; the device would be capable of putting payloads of 1500 kg into transfer orbit,
or of 750 kg into geostationary orbit with the aid of an apogee motor. The French government was willing to
assume 60% of the expenses of the development phase (estimated as 550 MAU by Charbonnel) which was
due to start on 1 January 1974 and to end with qualification of the launcher in 1980. This launcher should be
guaranteed a suitable priority of use in Europe compared with launchers developed outside Europe. The
technical and financial management of L3-S would be entrusted to CNES which would define the industrial
arrangements and place contracts with industry on behalf of the programme participants; there would be a
Programme Board to monitor the distribution of work among the various participants and to act as the
appeals body for a participant with respect to the choice of firms made by CNES. The decision was taken as
far the development programme was concerned, not on the production programme, about which participing
states would have to decide before the end of the development phase1304.
A compromise was arrived at on two projects which had for a long time seemed to be mutually exclusive,
mainly for economic reasons: the European launcher and participation in the post-Apollo programme. This
equilibrium was reached thanks to an agreement between France and the FRG on a reciprocal participation in
the launcher and Spacelab projects, where the two countries would provide the majority of funds for the two
projects respectively. The agreement was reached after bilateral talks, because the UK had moved away from
all discussions on the European launcher. The changed position of Germany, which previously declared itself
to be satisfied with American guarantees on availability of launchers, was "a heavy political decision. It was
taken in the knowledge that a negative response would almost certainly bring to an end the European ideal in
space". The decision to carry on the sortie lab project within a European framework (the management of the
1302 In April 1973, the UK delegation submitted to both the ESRO Council and the Committee of Alternates a
proposal to "Europeanise" the GTS programme, taking into account the state reached by the programme at the
national level. The programme comprised two alternative options, GTS and Marots, whose main distinction
concerned the actual management. In GTS, because of the stage already reached in defining the project, Member
States' financing would be limited to 25% and management would be entrusted to the UK procurement executive.
In Marots, the UK’s contribution would be of the order of 55% and it would be developed as an ESRO
programme, with the management being responsibility of the organisation. CSE/CM(July 73)5, Report of the
Secretary general of the ESC on the Implementation of the decisions of the Ministerial Conference of
20 December 1972, 2 July 1973.
1303 J. Krige and A. Russo, Europe in Space 1960-1973, in footnote 1290, p.10..
1304 CSE/CM (Dec.72)PV/2, minutes of the Afternoon Session of the ESC held in Brussels on 20 December 1972,
Statement by Charbonnel, Ministre du Développement Industriel et Scientifique, France, 10 January 1973.
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programme being entrusted to ESRO) was communicated to the US Secretary of State by the President of the
ESC on 29 December 1972. On 18 January 1973, the ESRO Council authorised its Director General to
negotiate with the USA the terms of an arrangement concerning the implementation of the programme1305.
13.13 The major features of the final agreement on Spacelab
The sortie lab was conceived as a two-element device. Consisting of a pressurised manned laboratory
module and an external non-pressurised instrument platform or pallet, it was suitable for conducting
research and application activities on shuttle sortie missions lasting from seven to thirty days. The sortie
lab would be carried into orbit in the payload bay of the shuttle orbiter and would remain attached to the
shuttle throughout the mission. At the end of each mission, the orbiter would make a runway landing and
the laboratory would be retrieved from its bay. The sortie lab was to have the flexibility to accommodate
both multidisciplinary experiments and complements devoted to a single scientific or applications
discipline. The laboratory module would host experimental devices, data processing and electrical power
equipment, an environmental control system and crew control stations. The staff of up to six scientists
would eat and sleep in the shuttle orbiter, but carry out their experimental activities in the laboratory
module. Pallet experiments would be remotely controlled from the laboratory1306.
On 15 February 1973 the ESRO Council, in accordance with article VIII of the Convention, approved an
Arrangement between certain ESRO Member States and ESRO for the development, as an ESRO special
project, of the Spacelab. It determined the objectives and elements of the programme together with the
conditions for its execution and their monitoring by the Spacelab Programme Board. The arrangement
was open for signature from 1 March to 10 August 1973. The participants, Belgium, the Federal Republic
of Germany, Italy and Spain, with the FRG playing the leading role, decided to establish a financial
envelope of 308 MAU at mid-1973 prices. The arrangements provided for a review of the overall amount
at the end of sub-phase B 2 (end July 1973) of the definition phase. If the financial hypothesis would not
be confirmed, but significantly exceeded, those participants who so wished could withdraw. ESRO
appointed a Head of Programme and formed a team within the ESTEC establishment and at the
headquarters of the organisation1307.
The legal framework for cooperation on Spacelab was set out in two documents:
a. an intergovernmental agreement negotiated between the Member States and the US government,
dealing with the political commitment of the Member States with regard to carrying out the
programme. It situated this endeavour in the general context of cooperation between the USA and
Europe and in relation to the space shuttle system 1308;
b. a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) negotiated between ESRO and NASA to define the tasks
and responsibilities of each organisation in carrying out this cooperative programme1309.
1305 Schwarz, art. cit., p.225 and “Europe and post-Apollo”, cit., p. 10..
1306 Ibid. p. 7 and NASA News Release no. 73-12, 19 January 1973. See also Volume II, chapter 13.
1307 CSE/CM(July 73)5, Report of the Secretary General of the ESC on the implementation of the decisions of the
Ministerial Conference of 20 December 1972, 2 July 1973. In the Spring of 1973 France, the Netherlands and the
UK signified their agreement to participate in the work of sub-phase B2, i.e. until July 1973. They were later
joined by Austria and Switzerland. See “Europe and post-Apollo”, cit. in footnote 1289, p. 10. Ten Member
States participated, in an optional framework, in the project.
1308 ESRO/C(73)46, rev. 1, 26 July 1973.
1309 ESRO/C(73)45, rev.1, 26 July 1973, Draft Memorandum of Understanding between the NASA and the ESRO
for a cooperative programme concerning development, procurement and use of a Space Laboratory in
conjunction with the Space Shuttle System, reprinted integrally in D. Lord, op. cit.
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On 14 August 1973 the Intergovernmental agreement was opened for signature in Paris; to implement this
agreement, the NASA-ESRO Memorandum of Understanding was also signed. Less than one month later,
the ESRO Council approved the draft agreement between certain European governments and ESRO
concerning the execution of L3-S, by then renamed Ariane, first phase (development and
qualification)1310.
According to Article 1 of the MOU, ESRO would undertake to design, develop, manufacture and deliver
the first flight unit of the SL (Space Laboratory), and other materials described in the Memorandum. The
SL would be used as an element to be integrated in the Space Shuttle. NASA would set its specifications,
following technical modifications of the shuttle and its timing. The first operational shuttle flight was
scheduled for late 1979; accordingly, the SL flight unit ought to be delivered to NASA one year before.
Although recognising "the desirability of avoiding changes resulting in a disproportionate impact on the
SL programme, NASA reserved to itself "the right to require changes affecting the interfaces or
operational interactions between the Shuttle and the SL" (art. IX).
Relative costs in SL development contracts would be borne by Europe. NASA retained the overall
responsibility for the total programme and the last word in such vital areas as shuttle/SL interfaces,
quality control and safety, "including the right to make final determination as to its use for peaceful
purposes" (art. XI)
Construction of the SL would not guarantee any preferential treatment in the use of the shuttle system;
NASA, on the other hand, would provide access for the use of SL's for experiments or applications
proposed for reimbursable flights by governments participating in the SL program in preference to those
of third countries. Selection on cooperative (i.e. non-cost) flights would follow normal NASA policy,
with European governments given preference over the proposals of third countries if their proposals were
at least equal to the merit of the third country's proposals (art. XI). Countries participating in the
development of the SL, however, would be entitled to appoint European crew members for its flight -"It
is contemplated that there will be a European member of the flight crew of the first SL flight"(art. XI).
Generally speaking, European firms were considered to have the technology they needed well in hand,
despite their weaknesses in the system engineering and data management fields. The Americans were
ready to sell existing American equipment (black boxes) without the need to share information, thus,
eventually helping in development problems on a case-by-case basis 1311. Article 6 of the
intergovernmental agreement on the Space Laboratory and article X of the NASA-ESRO MOU - both
referring to access to technology and information - complied with the American position as stated above.
NASA agreed to procure from ESRO "whatever additional items [SL] of this type it may require for
programmatic reasons, provided that they are available to the agreed specifications and schedules and at
reasonable prices to be agreed" (art. VIII). NASA committed itself to buy "at least one SL" after the one
given by ESRO, which actually happened (art. VIII). It also agreed to refrain from "separate and
independent development on any SL substantially duplicating the design and capabilities of the first SL
unless ESRO fails to produce such SL" (art. VIII).
The initial configuration and capabilities of the SL would be shaped following the shuttle requirements;
Europeans were completely excluded from operating the device they were going to produce. As Douglas
1310 ESRO-ELDO Bulletin, no.23, November 1973, pp. 18-20.
1311 CSE/CS(72)15, Report of the ESC Delegation on discussions held with the US delegation on European
participation in the post-Apollo programme, 22 June 1972. As already stated in informal discussions in April
1972, in the most "sensitive" cases of classified technology, if the basic technology could not be transferred, the
USA would undertake, if necessary, to sell the hardware itself; CSE/CS(72)13, Report by the Secretary General
of the ESC on the informal discussions with American officials regarding participation in the
post-Apollo programme, 8 May 1972.
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Lord, NASA's director of Spacelab, has so properly commented, "it was as if NASA had hired a
development contractor, only in this case the contractor was in Europe and would use its own money"1312.
13.14 Concluding remarks
The magnitude of the elements involved in the prospective post-Apollo cooperation gave rise to very high
political and technological expectations from some European partners. But the range of elements was
progressively restricted in the course of negotiations; political and technological European expectations were
only partly fulfilled.
The post-Apollo negotiations had the merit of throwing into relief the difficulties of changing the pattern of
international cooperation from a "conservative" approach geared to bilateral (and less frequently multilateral)
scientific agreements to much more complex cooperative ventures in development and technological fields.
In this last case, political willingness to cooperate would have to cope with direct or indirect, but altogether
well rooted, commercial and security considerations 1313.
The negotiations made unmistakably clear that a fruitful cooperation is the one in which every partner gets
something that appeals to him/her (as opposed to the competitive zero-sum game). In order to do this,
everyone has something valuable to offer. In this respect, the negotiations served the useful purpose of giving
a new compelling force to the directives stated in the  Causse Report of 1967, whereby the European effort in
space had to be imaginative and substantial in order to give credibility to Europe on the international scene
and as a viable partner in international cooperation. The process of assessing new (commercial) interests,
harmonising them with the previous scientific nature of ESRO-ELDO, building up a credible organisational
structure to wage this policy and find the financial means for it took place in parallel with the post-Apollo
negotiations and noticeably weakened the bargaining position of Europe.
The difficulties of a normal governmental decision-making process were multiplied by the absence of a
supranational structure and a clear hierarchical chain of power, whereby different European positions could
be reduced to a single one by recognising a single legitimising authority. If the Italian Minister of Scientific
Research asked for a total technological sharing, the European negotiator, Lefèvre, had "to take account" of
this position, without being able to enforce any change in the government's position. Nor was it easy for
European representatives to practice any form of bargaining, through which one actor within the national
range is normally free to be flexible within predetermined borders, in order to exert concessions from the
other negotiator.
On the other hand, the nature of the American offer changed remarkably during the negotiations, defusing the
offer of its original political meaning. Born from an American desire to allay European fears about the
"technological gap" in the space field, it ended up by reinforcing instead of relieving them. Many reasons for
the evolution of the American position are to be found in the internal interplay between NASA, the
Department of State and the White House, marked by an increasing fear about technological transfer1314.
1312 D. Lord, op. cit., p. 31. The first Spacelab was handed over to the US in 1980 and the German astronaut Ulf
Merbold, ESA's payload specialist, took part in the first mission in November 1983. For the scientific aspects
of Spacelab missions, see D. Shapland and M. Rycroft, Spacelab. Research in Earth Orbit (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1984). On Spacelab in general, see Volume II, chapters 13 and 14.
1313 On these problems, see Volume II, chapter 13; see also L. Sebesta, "The Politics of Technological
cooperation in space: US-European negotiations on the post-Apollo programme", History and Technology,
1994, vol.11, No. 3, pp 317-341.
1314 On the development of US behaviour vis-à-vis cooperation with Europe during post-Apollo negotiations,
see L. Sebesta, art. cit.
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The parallel failure to cooperate on Aerosat seems to indicate the absence of a political willingness to sustain
cooperation with Europe and a lack of coordination between the various policy-making sectors on the
American side1315.
Finally, it should be noted that the substantial reduction of the US offer conveyed in June 1972 was preceded
by the US-USSR Moscow meeting of May 1972 where, beside the SALT and other fundamental elements of
détente, an agreement on Apollo-Soyuz docking was signed1316. Nixon's interest seemed to be progressively
shifting towards spectacular USSR-US cooperative achievements, while European importance in the US
foreign policy agenda seemed to be decreasing accordingly.1317
1315 See for example Nixon Project, NARA , Washington DC, WHCF, Subject files, vt1, box 14,
Memorandum Welsh to General Haig, cit. in footnote 1264
1316 J. Krige and A. Russo, Europe in Space, 1960–1973, cit.,
1317 While historical work based on primary sources is not yet available, good accounts based on a carefully balanced
analysis of memories and official documents are beginning to appear. The most outstanding is P. Melandri, Une
incertaine alliance. Les Etats-Unis et l'Europe, 1973-1983 (Paris:Publications de la Sorbonne, 1988), esp.. pp.45-
77. For an insightful account written by a key actor (the American ambassador at the European Communities),
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